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Abstract
Through a historical and comparative examination of economic restructuring, this 
thesis has explored the centrality of state regulation of labour in explaining the patterns of 
accelerated economic internationalisation in New Zealand, Japan and Malaysia. The 
primary aim of this thesis was to explore the place of labour regulation in explaining the 
process of accelerated internationalisation that is associated with the term economic 
globalisation in these three reform-oriented states.
Through a detailed examination of New Zealand, Malaysia and Japan, light was 
thrown on the variety of ways in which states articulated reform agendas, and mediated 
domestic and international pressures during periods of reform. The patterns of economic 
restructuring followed by the three states differed significantly. However, political 
agencies, rather than policy per se, within the reform process were found to be central to 
explaining the trajectories and variabilities in the patterns of internationalisation. The 
study found that labour market strategies featured heavily in the restructuring processes, 
establishing the political context and background to changes in labour market policies 
and strategies in the three settings.
Contrary to the mainstream globalisation debates, this thesis highlights the central 
role of the state and politics in the processes of economic restructuring during periods of 
accelerated internationalisation. These were demonstrated through the variety of ways in 
which state-market relationships were re-configured. At the same time, the country 
studies demonstrated that reform-oriented states were themselves transformed during the 
phase of accelerated internationalisation. The transformations were most vividly 
highlighted in the internationalised economic sectors and within state institutions. These 
were the points where the interface between the global and the local were most strongly 
expressed, helping draw out the nodal nature of reform oriented states.
In spite of the variabilities of the reform, some general observations were noted. 
These included the fragmenting and dislocating impacts upon organised labour, and 
emergence of new forms of labour market segmentation, the rise of multiple regimes of 
labour regulation and a gradual expansion in the area of individual rights. These were 
important to understanding the ways in which labours’ compliance was secured during 
periods of radical reform.
Through a historical overview, the thesis demonstrated that contestation and 
negotiation involving a number of agents re-shaped the trajectories of economic policy. 
But the nature of politics itself appeared to have been transformed as well. What was 
especially noteworthy was the way in which an economic policy regime was introduced, 
legitimated and sustained. Through political reforms, this economic policy regime was 
shielded from distributional pressures and most especially from contestation by labour. 
This, we have argued was fundamental to explaining accelerated economic 
internationalisation in these economies in the modem period.
The thesis thus makes a modest contribution to understanding how states and 
labour regulation underpin the processes through which accelerated economic 
internationalisation, and the associated reconfiguration of state-market relationships are 
secured. By recasting the role of the state, and its approach to labour regulation, a sharper 
picture of the principal levers driving the process of economic globalisation in the 
contemporary era can be thus obtained.
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Chapter One: Introduction and outline of the study
Globalisation is a heavy word. It drips with doom and helplessness. It is used as a sort 
o f chloroform gag to shut up people who think that a good government could give its 
citizens a better standard o f living. "Don 't you realise that we are all globalised now, 
and living in a post-political world” (Neal Acherson, The Independent. 12 January 
1997:12).
1:0 The Problem and Thesis
This thesis problématisés economic globalisation and state/market relations within the 
national experiences of three states variously positioned in the global economy. It introduces 
politics, power relations and roles played by various agents, especially those that affect labour 
regulation, to examine the reconfiguration of state/market relations that occurs during periods 
of accelerated economic internationalisation. It argues that the general process of economic 
globalisation is often associated with a phase of accelerated internationalisation of national 
economies that is achieved through a complex and varied reconfiguration of state and market 
relationships. By understanding how such reconfigurations are obtained and legitimated and how 
state/market relations are transformed in relation to three national experiences, this thesis 
advances our understanding of the process of economic globalisation and the place of state 
regulation of labour within that. The case studies from New Zealand, Malaysia and Japan reflect 
three contrasting experiences from the vibrant Asia/Pacific region.
The thesis argues that a process of accelerated economic internationalisation affects 
state/market relations in varied ways in different sites of accumulation and in different sectors 
within national economies. The term economic globalisation is used in this thesis to refer to a 
process of accelerated economic internationalisation and the reconfiguration of state and market 
relationships through which that is achieved. Accelerated economic internationalisation refers 
to the phenomena of significant increases in the proportion of exports and imports in relation to 
the overall size of a national economy, as well as a more general opening up of national 
economies. This is mainly achieved through a dismantling of barriers to international trade. This 
phenomena is associated with a reconfiguration of state and market relationships. Viewed 
historically, there are periods in which economic internationalisation and associated 
reconfiguration occur quite rapidly. In this study, the term accelerated economic 
internationalisation is used to refer to these distinct periods. While the transformations in state 
and market relations, and the economic indicators of international trade are well documented,
l
our understanding of how such reconfigurations are generated and sustained during these specific 
periods is less clear. This is so because politics has been largely absent in the accounts and 
explanations of economic globalisation and its associated changes in the arena of economic 
policy. By reintroducing politics in studying such transformation, the thesis affirms the 
centrality of state and political processes in determining the extent and forms in which 
internationalisation presents itself. By placing politics at the heart of this transformation, 
economic globalisation is shown to be a contested and uneven process.
The thesis argues that the reconfiguration of state-market relations is both part of and 
determined by the process of economic internationalisation. This process of economic 
internationalisation is aided and promoted by multilateral agencies, capital markets and a range 
of other agents. Fundamental economic policy changes, during such periods, are often presented 
in a manner that appears to be depoliticised. This process helped shield major reforms from 
opposition. But the reconfiguration of state-market relationships involves a complicated 
mediation by the state as well. A central dynamic in this mediation, contestation and actual 
reform is the relationship between state and labour. At times states may appear to be a recipient 
of change, as well as an instigator. This is evident in the ways in which states have been 
reconfigured and recomposed. The important point advanced in this study is that the state 
remains the site or the ‘node’ for relations at a local, national and international level. The task 
is to examine the detail and variation in these relations, thereby addressing the substantive 
concerns associated with economic globalisation and the place of the state and labour in this 
process.
Much of the globalisation literature presents globalisation largely as an economic 
process, seemingly devoid of politics and political contestation and immune to interventions by 
states, labour and other agencies (World Bank, 1995b; World Bank 1996b; OECD, 1995). The 
comparative experiences overviewed in Chapter Two (Gottfried, 1995; Hawes and Liu, 1993), 
for example, stress the international influences over shifts in economic policy. Williamson (ed.), 
1994) and Boyer and Drache (eds. 1996) examine the political economy of economic policy 
shifts. Such studies highlight the growing importance of the field, although in very general terms. 
By locating economic policy shifts in relation to concrete national contexts, this study grounds 
its analyses of a seemingly global phenomenon in the very specific experience of states and 
highlights the specific role of agencies within them.
To demonstrate the primacy of political contestation, the study focussed its attention
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upon labour regulation as it helped throw light on some of the ways in which different 
constellations of power influenced trajectories of economic restructuring and patterns of 
internationalisation. A noteworthy absence in the literature on globalisation has been the place 
of labour and the politics of labour market reforms (Hirst and Thompson, 1996a; Boyer and 
Drache, eds. 1996; Schor and You, eds.1995). This absence was partly due to the fact than many 
of these studies were grounded in narrow disciplinary boundaries. To overcome such restrictions, 
this study draws on a range of traditions (Wallerstein, et.al., 1996; Wallerstein, 1991). Moreover, 
these writers do not see labour as being an important part of the overall mechanisms through 
which economic internationalisation is obtained. This thesis critiques such explanations of 
economic globalisation.
By demonstrating the contested nature of economic globalisation, the thesis challenges 
conventional conceptualisations of economic globalisation that present capital markets, 
multinational enterprises and multilateral finance agencies as the principal drivers of economic 
internationalisation in the modem era. In examining the general phenomenon of economic 
globalisation the modem capitalist state was presented as a paradox. Agencies such as 
multinational enterprises and capital markets appeared to limit the scope of state interventions 
and regulation (Offe, 1996; Wallerstein, 1996; Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985). However, the 
real experiences of nations appeared to demonstrate the continued vitality of states in affecting 
economic and social outcomes. The predominant thrust of economic internationalisation was a 
displacement of political exigencies and a blurring of the role of agencies such as labour 
collectivities in economic governance. By recasting the economic globalisation debate in terms 
of the recomposition of state/market relations and the influences of agencies such as organised 
labour, global finance institutions and bureaucratic elites in this recomposition, a purchase is 
obtained on how the state has been transformed in concrete situations and during specific 
periods.
Specific national experiences help throw an original light on how labour regulation 
features in the mechanisms of market interventions and co-ordination deployed by three different 
states. The totality of mechanisms deployed to obtain specific labour market outcomes during 
the specific periods examined in this study is captured by the term a regime of labour regulation. 
A regime of labour regulation, as used in this study includes microeconomic labour market 
policies, labour law and industrial relations practice for the organised and formal employment. 
It also includes less conspicuous mechanisms that have the effect of regulating labour. These
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mechanisms are especially notable in small and medium scale enterprises and informal sectors 
of an economy. Additionally, this term also captures the emergence of new instruments and 
agencies that do not appear to be directly concerned with labour regulation so directly, but which 
have an indirect effect on the regulation and often the disciplining of fragments of labour.
The analysis that is presented attempts to understand the particular relationships between 
regimes of labour regulation and the processes of accelerated economic internationalisation. It 
throws light on the intrinsic, contingent and co-determinant relationships between these two 
variables in specific contexts. These relationships were affected and influenced by a range of 
agents. The nature of these agents and the ways in which they influence these relationships thus 
needed closer examination. The problem that the thesis dealt with was to draw out the general 
and the particular forms o f these relationships and assess their significance.
To assess this, the thesis examines how the three reform oriented states manoeuvre 
international and domestic factors through their choice o f economic policy and the level of 
intervention (Schor and You, eds., 1995). Both the arena of economic policy and the degree and 
nature of state intervention are political rather than strategic selections (Clarke, 1988: 127-128). 
The choices of one policy over another are outcomes of contests and they signal state responses 
to specific contests. In spite of the many variations that this takes, such manoeuvring depends 
upon the regulation and co-optation of labour. Moreover, compromises represented in policy 
transformations have consequences for labour organisations and politics. Economic policies even 
where they do not appear to relate to labour directly are not neutral to labour market associations. 
By studying how state policies that aid internationalisation impact upon labour market 
associations and are dependent upon particular configuration of labour associations, underlying 
features of economic globalisation can be illuminated. The central underlying feature of the 
broad process of economic globalisation was economic internationalisation. One of the least well 
understood aspects of economic globalisation was its impact upon labour (Tilly, 1996). The 
literature on economic globalisation often treats ‘labour’ in an unproblematic manner. It is 
largely treated as a simple factor of production that is merely impacted upon by the process of 
economic globalisation. It pays little attention to its role as an agency that is capable of 
influencing patterns of internationalisation. By advancing our understanding of economic 
internationalisation from this standpoint, the conventional approaches to the study of the process 
of economic globalisation are shown to be glaringly problematic.
Economic globalisation is expressed unequally across national sites of accumulation and
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has fragmentary impacts within nation states. This is so because states structure the terrain upon 
which capital accumulation occurs in a manner that is both politicised and that generates 
contestation in turn. By interpreting class, union and other configurations through which 
collective interests are articulated and asserted, the politicised nature of state’s structuration, and 
the diverse expressions of contestation can be understood. Because economic globalisation is 
interpreted in terms of the outcomes of political contestation, the role of agencies becomes more 
important. Significantly, such agencies not only include labour, but state agencies as well.
A comparative approach helps establish better the relative importance of one or any set 
of agencies in shaping the contours of economic globalisation in concrete national situations. 
This approach also helps establish the more general trends that relate to agencies during periods 
of accelerated internationalisation.
1:1 The Approach
This study is largely of an exploratory nature. By reconceptualising state/market 
configurations through an emphasis on the politics of such configurations an arena for research 
is staked. Through a combination of historical and comparative methodologies some key features 
of both the particular and the universal are understood. Through a combination of analytical tools 
and drawing on diverse literature, this study aims to tease out the underlying generative 
mechanisms of economic restructuring in a context of accelerated internationalisation in three 
specific sites of accumulation as well as develop some indicators for more universal tendencies 
associated with economic globalisation. In so doing, the study provides pointers along which a 
re-theorisation of the process of economic globalisation as well as the state could proceed.
This methodological approach is developed through an elaboration of historical- 
comparative methods derived from Skocpol, (1979); Skocpol, ed., (1984), Rueschemeyer, D. 
(et.al., 1992) and Tilly, (1984). Comparative approaches are used to contrast cases in which 
phenomenon to be explained and the hypothesised causes ‘are present in the other (negative) 
cases in which the phenomenon and the causes are both absent’, although they are as similar as 
possible to the ‘positive cases in other respects’ (Skocpol, 1994:79). Comparative approaches 
also help researchers formulate “useful and new questions; serve as a rough negative check on 
accepted explanations and lead to new generalisations” (Moore, 1966: xiii). The historical 
comparative approach is further supported by analytical-inductive (Sayer, 1995; Rueschemeyer, 
et.al. 1992; 36) and critical realist insights (Bhaskar, 1989 and 1994). The combination of
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methodological tools deployed helps overcome the limitations noted in the literature on 
economic globalisation; the state-centric point of departure being an important one of them 
(Wallerstein, et.al. 1996). Significantly, the rejection of state-centric approaches, in favour of 
a dynamic approach that combines an emphasis upon a range of state agencies and other 
dynamic agencies both within national economies and in the global arena aids a resolution of the 
theoretical questions raised by this study.
Careful consideration was given to the selection of national experiences from New 
Zealand, Japan and Malaysia. These are countries with distinct histories that were subject to 
varying international pressures and contrasting internal dynamics. These selections provide 
contrasting approaches to internationalisation that reflect the key contemporary tendencies from 
the diverse Asia/Pacific region as well as more broadly. Moreover, all three have been sites of 
sustained restructuring over the past two decades. Their broader comparability is derived from 
the fact that they are all committed to closer integration into the international economy. In all 
three societies, central state institutions have played a prominent and persistent role in reshaping 
economic policies, making comparisons more meaningful. However, these agencies interpreted 
the objectives of economic integration quite differently. Moreover, different interpretations of 
policy approaches also reflected the influence of a range of agencies upon policy formulation, 
and implementation. One crucial feature that emerged from the economic policy framework in 
each of the countries was the strong association between economic developmental policies and 
industrial relations strategies. This association provided a useful lever for opening up questions 
and issues relating to the politics of economic restructuring and transformations.
Moreover, policy choices were influenced by the varying developmental experiences. A 
shift to an almost ideological reliance upon neo-classical economics to deliver social goals 
through market-determined growth from a Keynesian social democratic model was dramatically 
illustrated in the case of New Zealand. The subversion of economic development strategies to 
the attainment of regional, ethnic and other goals as determined by the state was evident in the 
Malaysian case. In contrast to these, Japan illustrated the dilemmas of a phased 
internationalisation based on a mix of protectionist and integrationist policies. The choice of 
economic development strategies in each of the countries were codes for understanding political 
contests between capital markets, international capital, national capital and labour among others. 
Through a critical re-interpretation, some of the generic features of the contrasting approaches 
to labour regulation could be understood. These contrasts ranged from the state-led decentralised
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model in Japan, on the one extreme, to a liberalised market dependent model in New Zealand, 
on the other. In each of the case studies labour regulation and industrial relations has been 
presented as central to the goals of economic globalisation and hence growth. These selections 
were also influenced by the fact that changes in economic development strategies had immediate 
and contrasting impacts on industrial relations and labour policy in each of the countries. The 
case studies are thus chosen because they help illuminate the themes. Moreover, they are all 
located in the broader Asia/Pacific region - the region that has given economic globalisation its 
most dynamic features.
These case studies elaborated three distinct approaches to economic restructuring and 
globalisation. They also illustrated marked contrasts in the role of the state in restructuring 
processes, and wide differences in political contestation to the restructuring agenda. In spite of 
these differences and the seemingly contrasting economic policy frameworks that underwrote 
the restructuring processes, many labour market and macroeconomic outcomes were quite 
similar. This forms a useful starting point for tracing the underlying generative mechanisms of 
changes that are studied. At the same time, an analysis of these outcomes helped link the very 
particular national experiences studied here with the more general outcomes associated with 
economic globalisation.
1:2 Outline and Organisation of the Study
The structure and organisation of the thesis and the key arguments developed in each 
chapter are summarised below. Chapter Two also outlines the research problems and locates 
them within the wider interdisciplinary literature. It also examines how disciplinary boundaries 
have contributed to a fragmentation of our understanding of the process of economic 
globalisation. By recasting the debate on economic globalisation from historical and comparative 
vantage points, the validity of national experiences are affirmed. It argues that market/state 
structures and relations are connected to and determined by factors/agencies associated with 
economic globalisation. However, to understand these relations, the study needed to factor 
politics and power relations, thereby bringing the state under much closer scrutiny. Accelerated 
economic internationalisation had created diverse challenges for states in the global system. 
They have responded to these largely through economic policy re-orientation; although the form 
that such re-orientation took was quite varied. Chapter Two outlines the theoretical parameters 
of the study, defines the economic globalisation problematic, stakes its key propositions and
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examines aspects that relate to the transformation of states (Tilly, 1996; Sassen, 1995), and 
through that, outlines features that relate to the recomposition of state/market relations.
It is argued, in Chapter Three that the study of the close relationship between market- 
state restructuring and internationalisation of economies requires a historical and comparative 
perspective. Such a perspective provides a vantage point from which the changing strategies of 
economic development and changes within state institutions across different countries can be 
assessed. This perspective focused on the state as a unit of analysis, both as an arena of 
contestation and the interface between the global and the national. Moreover, the undervaluation 
of the state so characteristic of the dominant neo-classical developmental discourse is redressed 
through this approach.' At the same time, the selected cases demonstrate that the premium on 
agencies required situational qualification. For example, the mutually contradictory nature of 
state agencies even when there is a perception of a high degree of co-ordination was illustrated 
in the case of Japan. The case studies also illustrated how state institutions themselves were 
transformed during periods of accelerated economic internationalisation. One key transition that 
was observed was a realignment of institutional responsibilities for economic policy 
formulation.2
The next three chapters present the case studies, highlighting the common framework for 
historical comparison and detailing the contemporary events for comparative analysis and 
scrutiny. Chapter Three overviews the case of radical liberalisation in New Zealand. It sketches 
the historical origins and performance of its showcase welfare state and its social democratic 
model of corporatism. It further discusses the acute impacts of changing international 
environment on New Zealand’s economy, triggering two distinct periods of restructuring and 
different sets of challenges for its labour and corporatist institutions. The Keynesian - demand 
management approach by the National Party throughout the 1970s and the monetarist reforms 
initiated by the Labour Government in 1984 are contrasted. This transition in economic policy 
orientation reflected deep transformations in its economic structures and changing form of 
economic management.
In contrast, in Malaysia there was a combination o f state interventions and co-ordinated 
development strategies. This process involved a state driven ethnic structuring of the political 
and civil spheres, overt state sponsorship of a Malay bourgeoisie, and the disciplining of 
autonomous labour movements. Without the restraints o f  democratic corporatism, and armed 
with authoritarian powers, the state intervened in the process of economic restructuring,
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amplifying the limited appeal of the neo-liberal agenda. It illustrated that where states had the 
political capacity, they could plan and co-ordinate their economic growth, distort prices and 
factor markets and yet achieve high levels of growth. The Malaysian case draws attention to the 
limits of international capital markets. By emphasising the importance of domestic agencies in 
the process of economic globalisation, this case powerfully re-asserts the importance of the state.
A more specific focus on the position and responses of labour in Malaysia’s 
contemporary economic development illustrates another form that the depolitisisation of markets 
took. Depoliticisation specifically referred to clinical manner in which fundamentally political 
nature of reforms were presented and legitimated purely with reference to concepts drawn from 
economics. State/market relations were re-constituted in a manner that excluded labour, 
incorporated ethnic corporate pressures, and persistently rewarded compliance in the name of 
achieving national goals, such as international competitiveness.
Japan provides another contrast in the form of a gradual and more persistently contested 
reconfiguration of state/market relations and of labour regulation. While global contingencies 
help explain modes of labour regulation in the post-war period, intra-capital contestation was an 
important aspect of this process. The rapid economic growth has been explained with reference 
to the successes of its policies designed to crush radical labour in the 1950s, the rise of the state 
supported industrial elite, high levels of control and regulation through state agencies, and a 
unique system of enterprise unionism. The marked continuities and indeed expansion of the 
scope for corporatism in the 1990s appeared to contradict some of the basic assumptions of the 
neo-liberal economic policy paradigm. Japan’s rapid internationalisation was dependent upon 
quite unique labour market strategies.
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The three case studies are analysed in the two chapters that follow. These analyses illustrate the 
flawed presentations o f the relationships between economic restructuring and fiscal crisis; a 
central pillar in the conventional globalisation debate. They show that while restructuring reflects 
international obligations, national political variables closely prescribe the implementation and 
possibilities of neo-liberalist types of economic reforms. Moreover, the comparisons highlight 
economic globalisation as a dialectical process subject to contestation. While the sites of 
contestation varied, the state itself is a major node in this process. Because economic 
restructuring was shown to be a political as much as an economic process, both the validity of 
conventional accounts of economic development (World Bank, 1996b and 1996c) and of the 
international political economy and the post-fordist and regulationist schools (Ruigrok and 
Tulder, 1995; Schor and You, 1995) were shown to be problematic. Developmental agencies 
and state institutions had variously shaped an economic policy framework as a depoliticised set 
of proposals. This to some extent relied on the presentation of an economic ideology as 
economic science and the articulation of national goals on the basis of that ideology. The 
principal agent upon whom this policy framework was directed and upon which it impacted 
adversely was labour. Labour market changes appeared to be a key feature of the reform agendas 
when large scale policy shifts occurred. Where organised labour had a more developed political 
project autonomous from the state, its capacity to contest this reform was sharper but this did not 
always translate into gains for labour.
Possibly, economic globalisation had shifted the terrain upon which labour and state 
conflicts were structured. The depoliticisation of economic policy was also shown to be a 
process, that involved not only the varying degrees of success based on the strategies deployed 
by its principal proponents, but also triggered conflicts within state institutions. These conflicts 
had variable impacts upon state/labour relations as well. Finally, the analyses sought to 
understand how state/markets relations were transformed and the extent to which labour 
featured as an agent in this. Labour’s compliance, resistance and contest were sectorally uneven 
in each of the case studies. Moreover, its character as an agency underwent substantial 
transformation in each o f the case studies, although they were uneven.
The globalisation debate assumed that capital reconstituted itself via global financial 
markets, which exerted its influence through exchange rates, inward investment rewards and 
other devices. But these were untenable as the primary reasons for the internationalisation in the 
three economies. Accounts that simplistically emphasise global capital as a homogenous agent
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and market expanding force appeared enormously problematic. Like labour, capital was not an 
undifferentiated agent. This needed to be problematised.
Overall, restructuring was expressed differently and its contradictory consequences and 
impacts were shown to be important. While the state remained an important economic stake 
holder in Malaysia; this was much less so in New Zealand and Japan. Trying to connect these 
outcomes simply to economic policies popularised by multilateral agencies was unhelpful in 
advancing our understanding of economic globalisation. Only in New Zealand was its 
association with the neo-liberal reform agenda clear, even though its place in any systematic 
package of reform was unclear. So how are we to explain the uneven and differentiating 
outcomes of economic globalisation?
The complicated relationships between state and labour that aided our understanding of
diverse patterns of restructuring that the there economies experienced. These experiences
generated a range of impacts and in which the states themselves emerged transformed both as
an agent of change and a site of accumulation in the context of increasingly integrated markets.
(Moreover) it is clear that defining the nation-state and the global economy, as mutually 
exclusive operations is ,... highly problematic. The strategic spaces where many global 
processes take place are often national; the mechanisms through which the new legal 
forms necessary for globalisation are implemented are often part of state institutions; the 
infrastructure that makes possible the hypermobility of capital at the global scale is 
situated in various national territories. The condition of the nation-state cannot be 
reduced to one of declining significance. The shrinking capacity of the state to regulate 
many of its industries cannot be explained simply by the fact that firms now operate in 
a global rather than a national economy. The state itself has been a key agent in the 
implementation of the global processes, and it has emerged quite altered by this 
participation (Sassen, 1995:2).
This study suggests pointers for re-theorising the state in the context of economic globalisation. 
Overall, this study established significant pointers for theorising the labour and economic 
globalisation problematic. Labour policy, regulation and markets were significant contingent 
variables in both democratic, open national economies and in less open and less democratic 
environments. The primary contribution of this thesis would be its situation of micro-economic 
developments in national economies in the their much broader global setting by using labour as 
a key variable. In that manner economic policy and developmental changes can be interpreted 
as situationally specific outcomes of global and national matrixes of power. This approach has 
implications for the growing field of comparative industrial/employment relations (Kochan , 
1996; Hyman and Femer, eds. 1994) and enables more meaningful interpretations of changes 
occurring in specific formations.
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Moreover, the comparative approach developed a line of inquiry that transcended the 
developed/developing country distinction evident in such debates.3 The recomposition of 
market/state relations creates new regulatory processes that compensate for the otherwise 
disorganising impacts of economic globalisation (Offe, 1996). But how is it that markets induce 
the disciplining of labour, for example? How do markets induce labour’s compliance to the 
reform and globalisation agenda? For these standpoints, the marginality of labour in the 
economic globalisation debates was shown to be severely problematic. While the momentum 
of global restructuring, increased capital mobility and the impacts of freer capital markets are 
undeniably the strong features of the current phase o f economic internationalisation, it is also 
true that labour’s political projects remain potent. The thesis concludes by providing some 
pointers for understanding the prospects and constraints confronted by labour as a consequence 
of the new challenges induced by economic globalisation.
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Chapter One: Endnotes
1. In a similar manner the state is also undervalued in the international political economy 
approaches. Mittelman (1996:3) for example, references causality in economic globalisation 
in relation to spatial reorganisation of production, integration of financial markets and 
changing investment strategies of multinational enterprises. The fact that each of these 
factors is clearly affected by policy choices made by individual states is viewed as having 
marginal importance.
2. Two sets of arguments are presented here. First, is the growing autonomy of the 
treasury (or comparable institutions) from the legislature. Second, is the emphasis on 
locating how this seemingly minor transition is attained. Sassen (1995:23) notes with 
respect to Mexico that ‘a shift in responsibility from its State Department to Treasury 
signaled the extent to which the state itself has been transformed by its participation in 
the implementation of globalization and by the pressures of globalization’. Bonefeld, 
Brown and Burnham (1995) develop this argument with respect to Britain. Much of the 
literature on New Zealand, Malaysia and Japan has presented this transition as being of 
secondary importance. This study critiques such a view.
3. For example, Clark and Sinclair (1993) have studied the comparable tendencies such as 
efficiency gains from privatisation experiences in a number of countries including the UK, 
Malaysia, Tanzania and New Zealand. This debate is equally relevant in these diverse 
economic formations.
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Chapter Two: Conceptualising the study of states, economic globalisation and 
labour regulation in cross-national settings
2:0 Introduction
Economic globalisation is a process that generally involves the 
internationalisation of national economies obtained through a reconfiguration of state 
and market relationships. The pace of internationalisation and the scope of 
reconfiguration varies between states and is often differentiated by economic sectors 
within national economies. Over the past few decades, such transformations have 
become more visible because of the accelerated internationalisation of many national 
economies. By examining key transformations during periods of accelerated 
internationalisation, this study outlines the changing character of state institutions, 
drawing out some of the structural as well as more salient features of these changes. 
This examination in turn throws light on some key levers that appear to drive the 
general process of economic globalisation. This study will demonstrate that 
transformations in national economies during periods of accelerated economic 
internationalisation were associated with changes in strategies of labour regulation. In 
specific cases and under certain conditions, these relationships presented themselves 
more sharply. Economic restructuring that was associated with globalisation had a 
variety of implications for regimes labour regulation, but these inevitably depended 
upon political choices of specific strategies. Thus the place of politics in the choice of 
labour market strategies needed to be examined.
Theoretically, the thesis is concerned with understanding the problem of 
differentiation in state regulation of labour across national settings during different 
phases of economic internationalisation. It attempts to develop explanations for the 
diverse impacts of the differential strategies of labour regulation in cross-national 
settings. These problems are studied through a historical and comparative 
examination of differentiation and homogenisation that is associated with economic 
globalisation through detailed case studies of three national experiences.
This chapter is laid out in the following manner. It first sets the background to 
the study of economic globalisation. In the sections that follow, I show why state and 
labour are important for an understanding of the impacts of economic globalisation. 
This is followed by a review of the literature on economic globalisation and an 
assessment of the position of state and labour regulation during this process. This lays 
the conceptual framework for developing the methodology for this study.
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2:1 Background: Restructuring between 1970s and 1990s
The period 1970 to the mid-1990s has been one of profound economic 
restructuring globally. This restructuring was heavily focussed on regimes of labour 
regulation, the functioning of state institutions, the legal environment for trade, and 
on approaches to economic and enterprise management. Such changes are popularly 
associated with the process of economic globalisation and the associated rise of a 
neoliberal economic policy orthodoxy. This study situates the problem of economic 
reform within the broader economic globalisation literature.
During this period, industrial relations researchers have sought to explain 
changes in economic policy environment that affected labour regulation and state 
institutions in terms of interactions between selected sets of national particularities 
(Hyman and Femer ed., 1994; Bagnioni and Crouch, 1991; Frenkel and Harrod, eds. 
1995). Such studies variously emphasise work re-organisation, competitiveness, 
shifts in political environment, changes in employer strategies, and other similar 
variables. But changes in these areas have not always been unidirectional. Between, 
1970 and 1995, we have also witnessed sharp breaks in continuities that marked 
labour/state relations in a number of countries. However, in many instances long 
established industrial relations processes were overhauled as a consequence of shifts 
in economic policy. In many countries, trade unions appeared to decline in 
importance and labour market institutions were generally devalued. These 
transformations gave rise instead to new forms of contestation in increasingly 
globalised national economies. These seemingly contradictory outcomes exposed the 
limits of the conventional industrial relations approaches. Many economies appear to 
be experiencing the increasing marginality of organised labour and a corresponding 
decline in the importance of economic regulation through labour market mechanisms 
(ILO, 1995b; World Bank, 1996b). At the same time, there has been an intensification 
of ethnic, gender, region, age and similar pressures within national labour markets, 
affecting in turn electoral politics and state policies. Such diverse developments have 
gone against the grain of theoretical approaches that stressed the homogenising 
outcomes of restructuring and economic globalisation.
However, the general process of economic globalisation has engendered 
highly differentiated regulatory frameworks. Such differentiation are inadequately 
problematised by the international division of labour (Boyd, Cohen and Gutkind, 
1987) and the world systems schools (Wallerstein, 1992). These changes appear to 
affect the very character of the capitalist state (Kothari, 1995; Bienefeld, 1994; 
Piccioto, 1991; Bonefeld and Holloway, 1991). Both the state and its role in the 
process of economic reform give a purchase on the complexities of economic 
globalisation in the contemporary period.
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But the study of states’ has become increasingly complicated by the variable 
consequences of economic reform. Such consequences derive from privatisation, 
commercialisation, deregulation and liberalisation. A differentiated pattern of 
transformation of state institutions that has resulted makes cross-national studies 
inherently complicated as well. Economic liberalisation appears to reduce the scope 
for direct interventions on part of the state and expand the role of civil society and 
non-state market agents (Kothari, 1995). Moreover, the restructuring process was 
often associated with an intensification of the struggle for control of state institutions, 
resulting in new social and class alliances (Waterman, 1996). These often saw the 
crystallisation of new interest groups that affected state/market relations. Moreover, 
some of these operated across states and economies. The transnationalisation of a 
bureaucratic class responsible for economic policy formation is one such example 
(Sklair, 1995). Such new agents have helped to bring under sharper scrutiny the 
diversity of localised struggles that are associated with accelerated 
internationalisation of national economies. It is clear that the re-organisation of the 
global system of production compels us to develop new theoretical tools to 
understand the complex consequences of economic globalisation, explain its 
disintegrating and differentiating outcomes and explain the influence of new agents at 
the same time.
The uneven consequences of economic globalisation also complicate the 
theoretical challenges raised in this study. In some regions and economies, the 
process of globalisation has been associated with substantial expansion in 
employment; a narrowing of productivity gaps and a harmonisation of product 
markets (Lee, 1996). Invariably, these outcomes have enhanced the power of 
multinational enterprises and international capital more generally. Moreover, growth 
in some sectors of the newly industrialised states have not come simply through the 
mobilisation of low-wage labour intensive industries, but often through developments 
in high-wage, capital intensive sectors. These developments challenge some of the 
key propositions within development theory.1 At the same time globalisation is 
associated with increased marginalisation of many economies and a widening of 
disparities within national economies. In this confusing matrix, state responses are 
articulated in relation to complicated sets of external and domestic exigencies. The 
question of the general and the specific in relation to state responses to economic 
globalisation is thus inherently problematic.
Moreover, the processes through which economic policies were formulated by 
states have also become complicated. Economic policy making has become highly 
dcpoliticised phenomenon in the 1990s - characterised in part by the diverse ways in 
which policy is conditioned by capital markets for example (Jomo eds., 1999). This
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coincides with the appearance of a displacement of the role of governments in 
economic policy formulation (Burnham, 1996, Prasad, 1998). The depoliticisation of 
economic policy is illustrated through transformations in the legal and political 
regimes of labour regulation as well. This depoliticisation is related to the 
increasingly technocratic presentation of economic policy discourses. This is 
associated with the increasing dominance of labour market policy discourses by 
labour economists, a centralisation of the responsibility for economic policy 
formation in a few premier agencies of the state, and the rise of monetarism and the 
growing autonomy of treasuries and reserve banks. From the literature, this 
development was presented as being highly specific to those economies undergoing 
radical neoliberal reforms (Burnham, 1996). We thus needed to establish, firstly the 
variances in the experiences of depoliticisation. Based on this, observations on its 
general and specific forms, and their relationships to the general process of 
econonomic globalisation could be advanced.
These developments have been largely ignored by comparative industrial 
relations researchers. While comparative industrial relations scholars (Baglioni and 
Crouch, 1991) have mainly read-off changes in labour markets with reference to the 
role of actors in national contexts, Hyman has broadened its remit. He noted that 
it is fallacious to exaggerate the autonomy of the processes of 
institutional mediation of the capital-labour antagonism. In an epoch of 
crisis the interconnections between the various levels and elements of 
the social formation (national and international capitals and their 
various fractions; state and civil society; material and ideological 
relations), whose superficial independence once encouraged attempts 
to develop a self-contained theory of the ‘industrial relations system’ 
are now increasingly transparent (Hyman, 1989: 138).
Sholte (1997) and Hobsbawn (1996) have situated industrial relations within the 
broader matrix of the international economy and its impacts upon national labour 
markets. These writers provide useful pointers for grounding the study of state and 
labour regulation with reference to economic globalisation. While their studies are 
helpful, it does need to theoretically connect itself to the broader field of
development theory. To illustrate this argument, one could examine the reforms in the 
UK in the 1980s. “Thatcherism” clearly represented a macroeconomic (and 
ideological) project to restructure British economy in response to a crisis. In this, the 
restructuring of industrial relations emerged as a key feature of a wider 
developmental project, rather than merely labour market policy (Overbeek, 1990). 
Industrial relations restructuring have been generally conceptualised in terms of their 
relations with economic policy (Baglioni and Crouch, 1991). This has narrowly 
focussed the analysis of economic reform in terms of the relations between state
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institutions and their approach to economic policy. As a result, the importance of the 
increasingly internationalised environment in which state institutions operate and 
policies are formulated have been less well understood. This study breaks away from 
such approaches by locating the problem of reform in its broader setting at the outset.
Several writers attribute developments such as labour market deregulation to 
the homogenising effects of globalisation; emphasising the ways in which capital 
deals with crisis and accumulation on the global scale (Holloway, 1994 and 1995), 
while others emphasise the continuities over a larger historical periods (Arrighi, 1994; 
Tilly, 1992). 2 This thesis attempts to connect these historical approaches to the 
changing structure of state/labour relations over a relatively shorter time frame during 
which accelerated economic internationalisation occurs in specific national settings.
Economic restructuring in the present period has been studied from a variety 
of theoretical standpoints. Marxist writers have explained the trajectories of 
contemporary change with reference to class and modes of regulation in specific sites 
of accumulation. Carter (1995) notes how variables such as the changing forms of 
management and the transformation of the labour process have resulted from 
restructuring. Waterman (1996) notes how agencies such as the World Bank, and 
international civil society organisations have affected economic reforms (Waterman, 
I996).3 Neoclassical approaches have emphasised structural constraints within 
national economies (such as labour market rigidities) as the principal levers of 
economic restructuring. Strategies of political domination have been less well studied 
by these writers. Strategies of political domination call attention to the fact that 
categories such as labour, employers, and the state are internally differentiated. 
Inadequate attention has been given to this. This flaw is best illustrated with reference 
to labour economics, which has contributed most to the neo-liberal labour market 
environment popularised by institutions such as the World Bank and the OECD. This 
discipline has treated both labour and capital as homogenous agents.4
In sociology, the international division of labour stream aptly captures the 
features of the theoretical sciences outside of mainstream economics. (Boyd ct. al, 
1987: 23)
question the historic starting points in the theorisation of international 
labour. We cannot any longer be content with a disembodied, 
politically inert notion of industrial relations, or one that erects the 
workplace bargain as the centre of the problem. Not only arc the 
patterns of industrial protest and bargaining empirically more diverse 
than any of the models proposed by industrial relations specialists, 
such an approach simply avoids asking the salient questions. What is 
the shape and character of the working class in different areas? Where 
do its parameters begin and end? ... What is the relationship between 
different segments of the working class? ... Can they begin to regroup 
internationally in response to the pressures of international capitalism?
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While these international division of labour specialists recognise the internationalised 
origins of new challenges for the working class, they still fall short of theorising these 
developments. Clearly labour is affected by a qualitative change in the character of 
global capitalism. But why this is so is not well understood. This study grapples with 
this paradox.
Some explanations for major changes in the area of labour regulation 
emphasise shifts in the parliamentary arena and their impacts upon interest group 
coalitions (Jomo and Todd, 1994; Kelsey, 1995). The rise of global institutions and 
the promotion of a coherent economic agenda through them have transformed our 
understanding of interest group politics. This development exemplifies that some 
changes occurring across nation states do not lend themselves to clear-cut 
explanations in terms of either domestic exigencies or international pressures.
Hyman and Femer have posed similar difficulties with respect to European 
context. They are sensitised to underlying motions such as adaptations in ‘national 
industrial orders’, changing structure of industry ownership, shifts in political power 
to the right, among others -  in their totality constituting a regime of regulation 
(Hyman and Femer ed., 1994). However, they give a marginal emphasis to the 
broader global dynamics that influence convulsions in national economies 
periodically and that lead to restructuring of industrial and economic policy 
frameworks.
But trends associated with economic globalisation such as the accelerated 
economic internationalisation are not always unidirectional. Trends such as the 
demise of corporatism, legislative efforts at decollectivisation, and the shift of 
industrial regulation away from specialised collective interest regulation to civil 
regulation do not apply equally to even among the core members of the European 
Union where there is an increased scope for the harmonisation in the regulatory 
environment. Moreover, such tendencies also affect capital and industry. Economic 
policy regimes committed to sustaining high levels of growth appear to lose their 
momentum over time. Such policy regimes often transform relationships between 
states and collective interest groups including employer groups. In the reformulation 
of collective relations, a host of new agents evolve. Some of these new agents exert 
their influence at the global, rather then national levels. But some of the shifts in 
organised relationships could be merely cyclical, reflecting shifts in political opinion 
for example. Others may be of more transformative nature. In dealing with historical 
transformations in regimes of labour regulation we are cautious to see that cycles are 
not interpreted as real transformations (Runciman, 1994).
The limitations noted above outline some of the theoretical concerns of this 
study. By examining restructuring between 1970 and 1995 and using comparative
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foci, we may be able to get a better picture of the large-scale transformations being 
studied, thus providing a better understanding of the changing nature of the state 
itself. It is through state institutions that labour market strategies are operationalised. 
But often the state is itself transformed as a result o f  changes in economic policy 
frameworks. By re-looking at labour, labour market strategies and labour’s politics, 
this study attempts to resolve some of these paradoxes and redress a glaring flaw in 
the literature on economic globalisation.
2:2 Conceptualising economic globalisation
The globalisation debate transcends disciplinary boundaries such as 
international political economy (IPE) and international relations. This thesis draws
from a number of disciplines -  an approach that is endorsed by Mouzelis who argues 
that only a painstaking process of theoretical labour that aims at 
building bridges between the various specialisations can overcome 
compartmentalisation. Such a strategy does not abolish social science 
boundaries: it simply aims at transforming them from impregnable 
bulwarks to transmission belts facilitating interdisciplinary research ...
The real issue is (thus) between compartmentalisation and open-ended, 
non-compartmentalised, 'dialogical' differentiation (Mouzelis, 
1995:54-55).
Globalisation is a term is used variously in different popular, theoretical and 
policy related discourses. Reflecting the populist origins of the term Chesnais (1993) 
noted
journalists and politicians (and internationalists in the international 
environmental, labour and developmental fields) largely coined a term 
globalisation. It has been thrust in the academic community. Some 
economists have rejected it, characterising it simply as a catchword 
and others have adopted it, but only using it to characterise certain 
types of corporate strategy. Others have attempted to give the term 
scientific meaning by relating it to certain objective processes 
underway in the world economy ... We would argue that globalisation 
and all its consequences are facts (Chesnais, 1993: 12).
Economic globalisation can thus be seen as the form taken today by international 
production in which an increasing fraction of value and wealth is produced and 
distributed worldwide through a system of inter-linking private networks. Giddens 
similarly argues that the origins of globalisation were primarily political rather than 
economic. These included the collapse of Communism which left a single world 
market and technological changes (quoted in The Guardian. 25/9/96: 13). This 
process is associated with an intensification of interconnectedness, and a 
decentralisation of control and regulation. This process was also creating a global 
class system with a divide between a rich and cosmopolitan class, and a widening
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class of excluded (Sklair, 1995). Economic globalisation concerns the loss of 
many of the attributes of economic and political sovereignty suffered by an increasing 
number of countries even within OECD. These mainly concern loss of influence over 
economic policy matters. (Chesnais, 1993: 13). This contrasts with the view of 
Humbert (1993:3) who observes that ‘globalisation is the name given for a lack of a 
theoretical concept matching more closely observed phenomena’. Reflecting the more 
specific theme of internationalisation of capital, Harris (1993: 78) referred to 
‘liberation of capital from the state’ as the material form of globalisation. Likewise, 
the OECD (1992) defines the concept as a reference to the ‘growing presence of 
foreign firms in national economies’, and the ‘integration of economies to an 
unprecedented extent’. Internationalisation of capital and decline of the state are twin 
processes that are commonly associated with the globalisation process (Cox, 1992; 
Bienefeld, 1994; Radice, 1999). Generally, all these writers point towards the fact that 
the primary expressions of this process of change are economic -  thus the term 
‘economic globalisation’. Secondly, they all agree that economic changes associated 
with globalisation also have political implications, expressed through the variety of 
ways in which state-market relationships are reconfigured.
Two points arising from this are developed. The first, relates to the applied 
social sciences and policy orientated approaches that emphasise concrete strategies 
and changes within states and regions. Humbert (1993) notes that globalisation ‘is a 
phenomenon which emerges within the bloc of the leading industrialised countries’. 
He notes that the ‘architecture within the bloc of leading countries and the boundaries 
of this bloc has changed’. He further notes that the route from internationalisation to 
globalisation is marked by shrinking of separateness and that 'a kind of global 
networking appears to be organising industry at the world level' (Humbert, 1993:4-6). 
These views generally also reflect the institutional conceptualisations of the OECD 
(1995) and the World Bank (1996b). This networked system is thus presented as an 
industrial system driven at world level by global competition between firms and 
nations. Both public institutions and private networks have built up industry as a 
global system, and this system is shaping the future of so-called international trade 
and world territorial distribution of industrial production (Humbert, 1993: 9). The 
second approach is associated with writers who stress continuities in the process of 
historical evolution over a much longer period of time (Tilly,1992). To them, 
globalisation was underwritten by the military might of hegemonic blocs and a 
‘deepening’ rather than a qualitative change in the global economic structure (Broad, 
1995:21; Cox 1992). This deepening is reflected through increased trade between 
nations, a freer flow of capital in the international economy, the rise of MNE’s and 
transformations of the state that reflect changes in the global economy (Scholte, 1997;
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Evans, 1997). These processes have especially intensified after the end of second war 
-  leading to the accelerated internationalisation of national economies. The term 
economic globalisation is thus used to capture changes during this phase of 
accelerated internationalisation in the post-war period generally, but after the 1970s 
more specifically.
The broad global changes are important not only at the national and global 
level, but also at the local levels. They affect outcomes at workplaces, in enterprises 
and industries.
(The) word and concept (globalisation) are now common currency, in 
the dire warnings of the captains of industry, in the business press and 
in business schools, and in the works of public policy analysts, .... The 
message is clear: the nation state as a regulator of production relations 
is fast becoming ineffective and obsolete as information, capital, raw 
materials, semifinished goods, and skilled workers become 
increasingly mobile on a global scale. There has been a fundamental 
shift in the structure of capitalism, ... from monopoly capitalism to 
global capitalism. As for the workplace, once the repository of 
diversity and variation both within and across countries, it is now 
subject to inexorable global production imperatives that will uniformly 
lower wages, remove legal and contractual protections for workers, 
eliminate or marginalised trade unions, and assimilate personnel 
management into the human resources variant (Haiven, Edwards and 
Belanger, 1994:277-279).
Another importance of globalisation lies in the fact that increasingly agents 
located outside the nation-states come to dominate policy choices that governments 
make. Such agents include transnationals, the more nebulous capital markets, and 
international agencies that have acquired an uncanny potential for disciplining states 
and governments (The Economist. 1995; 5-44). While there is no
explicit political or authority structure for the global economy, there is 
nevertheless something that remains to be deciphered, something that 
could be described by the word nebulous or the notion of 'governance 
without government’... There is a transnational process of consensus 
formation among the official caretakers of the global economy. This 
process generates consensual guidelines, underpinned by an ideology 
of globalisation.... Part of this consensus formation process takes place 
through unofficial forums... Part of it goes on through official bodies 
like the OECD, the IMF, and the G7. These shape the discourses 
within which policies are defined, the terms and concepts that 
circumscribe what can be thought and done. They also tighten the 
transnational networks that link policy making from one country to 
another (Cox, 1992:30).5
Interconnectedness between agents, groups and classes permeates national 
boundaries. Clearly,
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The actions of powerholders in one region of a network rapidly and visibly 
affect the welfare of at least a significant minority (say a tenth) of the 
population in another region of the network. Such a criterion indubitably 
makes our own world a single system; even in the absence of world-wide 
flows of capital, communications, and manufactured goods, shipments of 
grain and arms from region to region would suffice to establish the minimum 
connections (Tilly, 1984:62).
Sklair (1995:166-168) observes that globalisation researchers have focussed in 
particular on two new phenomenon that have become significant in the last two 
decades: the spread of TNC’s and transformations in the global scope of the mass 
media. Both these are underwritten by two factors; the rise of a neo-liberal economic 
policy agenda globally and the emergence of global capital markets. Such views, are 
however, contested by Hirst and Thompson (1996) who engage several indicators to 
demonstrate the world of trade has not been fundamentally transformed. They 
especially show that the developed economies remain relatively closed by historical 
yardsticks and thus argue that globalisation does not represent a dramatic change in 
the organisation of the international economy.
Economic globalisation is thus a variable, complex and contested 
phenomenon. Most commentators agree that the process is associated with the 
globalisation of production, accelerated economic internationalisation and a 
reconfiguration of state-markets relations. What is clearly lacking from these 
accounts is an explanation of how states and labour act as agencies and feature in this 
transformation. Treating them merely as agents that are impacted upon, by the general 
phenomenon of globalisation and during periods of accelerated internationalisation 
more specifically appears as a flaw across the globalisation discourse. This study 
makes a modest contribution to correcting this.
2:3 Economic globalisation: writing in state and labour
The globalisation literature has underplayed the importance of labour and 
states, and the place of labour regulation in the process of economic globalisation. It 
is clear that they are not merely agents that are acted upon, but agents that influence 
outcomes. Labour market strategies, negotiation and contestation in labour markets, 
and political responses to economic policy (including labour market policy) 
frameworks provide some levers for subjecting economic globalisation to theoretical 
and empirical scrutiny. This section develops some guidelines for understanding how 
such levers may inform out understanding of the general process of economic 
globalisation.
By developing some guidelines, the study hopes to bridge the conceptual gulf 
in our understanding about the increasingly internationalised orientation of production 
on the one hand, and localised and fragmented collective responses, on the other.
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Moreover, because economic globalisation appears to drive conflicts to the outer 
boundaries of market economy, conflicts appear to take highly localised and 
fragmented expressions. This occurs in core economies such as Japan where the 
unequal burden of adjustment is transferred to the outermost and smallest enterprises 
in complex commodity chains (Price, 1997). But it also occurs across national 
boundaries. The example of Japanese industrial giants relocating small and medium 
enterprise supplier networks in South East Asia provides evidence for this 
(Williamson, 1994). Economic globalisation thus remolded conflict by fragmenting 
and disconnecting sites of contestation. It induced a marked differentiation between 
‘the integrated, the precariously linked and the excluded’ in national and cross­
national labour markets (Cox, 1992). Economic globalisation is also associated with 
the acceleration of such differentiation both among nations as well as within nations. 
This differentiation of workers appears to energise the process of trade liberalisation. 
In this process, the state does not sit as a neutral actor. It is an active agent of change, 
intervening to structure the relations of production and being transformed itself as a 
consequence. The contradictory pressures of shaping and being transformed through 
the same process are a defining feature of the state during the general process of 
economic globalisation. This feature is most sharply outlined during periods when 
national economies experience accelerated economic internationalisation. Accelerated 
economic internationalisation occurs when a range of policy measures aimed at trade 
liberalisation are introduced over a relatively short period of time and when a 
significant re-composition of economic activity in favour of increased international 
trade is experienced by these economies subsequently. During this period, both the 
state and regimes of labour regulation lend themselves to clearer scrutiny. This is 
helpful when large scale transformations are being studied across a range of 
economies and in contrasting domestic contexts.
During such periods, a ‘hollowed out’ state, that is, one with a considerably 
reduced scope for economic intervention which is a site at which contradictions 
associated with the general phenomenon of economic globalisation become most 
transparent (Burnham, 1996). It thus becomes possible to link the global, national and 
local at this site. For example, economic globalisation depended upon trade 
liberalisation and deregulation of labour markets. But these are results of complicated 
political negotiation even in authoritarian contexts. Such negotiation involve states, 
international agencies, multinational and national corporate groups and organisations 
of labour. The restructuring of employment relations is thus premised upon state’s 
compliance as well as capacity to manage such complicated negotiations. Its 
compliance and capacity are therefore central to informing our understanding of the
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variable impacts of economic globalisation, and exposing selected contingent and 
dependent variables for closer scrutiny.
Studies on economic globalisation have been mainly focussed on the private 
sector, MNE’s and capital markets as the engines of change -  under-emphasising the 
state sector (Turner, 1991; Evans, 1997). However, it is in the state sector that new 
forms of state/labour contestation express themselves more explicitly. 
Transnationalisation of economic activity appears to have contributed to a general 
weakening of industrial worker organisations and undermined neo-corporatist 
settlements whose foundations were stronger in the public sector. At the same time, 
economic liberalisation was often associated with a renegotiation and reformulation 
o f these structures and settlements; which in turn required political negotiation. 
Moreover, neo-liberal policy measures for the private sector labour markets also 
depended upon the prior renegotiations of these structures. Because, this 
reformulation depended upon the state, its reconceptualisation is thus necessary if we 
are to make sense of the basis of accelerated internationalisation. In so doing, the state 
must not be seen merely in its instrumental role, but as a complex agency subject to 
competing global, national and sub-national pressures, and internally fragmented at 
the same time. The interface nature of the state and the role of agents within the 
interfaces provide a conceptual anchor upon which the key propositions that is 
advanced in this study rest.
But the changing character of the state in comparative settings is a complex 
research problem in itself. This is so because, in some instances, economic 
globalisation appears to limit the scope of the state’s role in economic management 
(Cox, 1992). Yet in others, states have been able to powerfully assert their control 
over policy and economic management (Radice, 1999). Changes in the degree of 
influence that states exercise over the formulation of economic policy are distinct, 
but uneven across states. Such changes draws our attention to the structure and 
operations of different state institutions across states. The problématisation of a 
transformed state in relation to factors associated with economic globalisation, as well 
as in relation to agents that affect change is inherently complicated therefore. We 
need to understand factors that drive transformations in the role of the state and those 
that shape its responses to changes in the global political economy. The state is 
central to explaining continuities in regimes of economic and political governance as 
well as sharp breaks or u-tums in them.
It is necessary to explain the changing contours of state and industry relations 
in concrete historical conjunctures (Bonefeld and Holloway, 1991). Changes in labour 
regulation accompany shifts in industrial strategy and economic policy. A powerful 
centralised state bureaucracy can, at least theoretically, regulate and influence key
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agencies including those that act on behalf of multinational capital. A small state 
bureaucracy may, on the other hand, broaden the influence of corporate elites on the 
public policy making process. Globalisation has not had homogenous impacts upon 
states. Different societies are thus subject to widely differing sets o f domestic 
pressures (Kielv, 1994: 154-156). Sweeping generalisations that suggest the 
emergence of states that merely respond to interests o f multinational capital and that 
are hollowed-out as a consequence of restructuring needs to be backed by concrete 
empirical evidence.
But there are other reasons why state and labour markets need to be factored 
into the study of economic globalisation. If the post Cold-War 1990s represent a new 
phase of global capitalism, amplified by the exponential expansion of international 
finance markets6, it may be possible that modes of labour regulation, especially in the 
internationalised sectors of economic activity have become increasingly 
homogenised. This may occur, for example, through the emergence of international 
regulatory standards associated with regional trading blocs, in ways that were not so 
possible in the pre-WTO era.7 Thus economic globalisation can also be associated 
with greater, rather than lesser degree of international (or regional in case of trading 
blocks such as the European Union and APEC) labour regulation (Picciotto, 1991: 43- 
46; Bienefeld, 1994).8 Explanations for differing labour standards across the sample 
of states that are examined throw light on the unevenness in the harmonisation of 
modes of labour regulation.
Yet another factor that encourages us to place the state at the starting point of 
our analysis arises from a critique of the ‘internationalisation of the state’ thesis . This 
school observes that the loss of effective sovereignty by states in economic policy is 
matched by the development of transnational mechanisms for the development of 
economic policy (Cox, 1992; Radice, 1999). These transnational mechanisms need to 
be expounded. But variabilities still appear striking even in those public policy areas 
where we have noted some convergence. Privatisation, which is commonly associated 
with this broader public policy framework, is still premised upon different modes of 
labour regulation. Moreover, in several states, the state itself has been a major 
bulwark against privatisation, resisting the opening up of some state sectors, as well 
as managing highly corporatist labour relations regime. Such responses obviously 
contradict the broader deregulatory thrust of economic policy that is associated with 
the ‘internationalisation of the state’ school. The preservation of sources of state 
power, and corporatist institutions upon which they rested went hand in hand with the 
otherwise internationalising thrusts of public policy in many states.9
Moreover, the centrality of the state is further affirmed by the fact that states 
shape the global policy environment and endorse national commitment to policies
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developed at the global level. The overbearing influence of the Post-Bretton Woods 
institutions is not directly based on the might of transnational capital, but consensus 
between competing states. Thus the structural adjustment "fad" of the 1980s and the 
shrinking of the overdeveloped state, i.e. an excessively interventionist state, were 
developed largely consensually by competing industrialised states. Public policy 
choices that sought to constrain the interventionist and regulatory capacities of states 
were also backed by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the OECD .
Besides the pressures of globalising markets and institutions, capitalist states 
responses also reflect the interests of capital nationally (or at least of dominant 
fractions within it). These often underwrite policy options. Crisis of accumulation 
periodically led to a re-negotiation of such social relationships. Moreover, re­
negotiations may often involve overwriting the interests of national-capital in the 
short term. Neo-Marxist analyses such as those of Clarke are helpful in thinking about 
state strategies and options during such periods. He notes that
attempts to resolve the crisis through either inflationary or deflationary 
means carry enormous risks, either course threatening to destabilise 
the international financial system... For this reason it is likely that 
capital will continue to make every effort to ... reconcile the expansion 
of debt with the stability of the financial system through international 
co-operation ... Such co-operation presupposes the willingness of 
Governments to sacrifice immediate national interests in order to 
sustain accumulation on a global scale, so is constantly threatened by 
domestic political pressures which make such sacrifices politically 
unacceptable (Clarke, 1988: 131).
From this standpoint, the reformulation of modes of labour regulation and a 
reconstruction of the institutional form of the state itself are examples of state 
responses to crises of accumulation. Once again, by commencing our analysis from 
the standpoint of the state, we are able to get a purchase on an underlying generative 
mechanism affecting the process of economic globalisation and the patterns of 
economic internationalisation.
Economic globalisation constantly appears as a process that involves 
negotiation between national and international interests. This does not, however, 
presuppose that there is a homogenous national interest or international interest. 
Clearly, the nation state is the loci of multiple contradictions and conflicts not only 
between classes in the market sector, but also between all classes in the formal sector 
and "excluded groups"10, and classes located in the non-market modes. Moreover, 
such contradictions conflate into variable collective forms. Feminist, environmental 
and other new social movements complicate the responses to globalisation 
(Waterman, 1996). Their reconstitution at the international level also gives a view of
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the complicated dimensions to political negotiation and the role of states in such 
negotiation.
National governments try to reconcile competing interests and promote 
politically acceptable compromises while taking into account the exigencies o f the 
global system." This appears as an endlessly complicated task, blurring traditional 
forms of politics and transforming the arena of politics in ways that transform the 
state as well. Burnham (1994) observed that
it is evident that the conceptualisation o f public services alongside 
deregulation and privatisation has transformed the character of the 
state. For example, Australian Department of Social Security is 
actively competing in global markets, while French water authorities 
expand into Britain following privatisation. This process has been 
described as the "hollowing out" of the nation state. While some state 
capacities are being transferred to pan-regional or international bodies, 
others are devolved to local levels within the nation state, and yet 
emerging horizontal networks that bypass central states and connect 
localities and regions in several nations usurp others. Globalisation has 
not signaled the end of the state but rather a tendency for a three-way 
hollowing out of its national institutional form. A refined 
organisational view of the state is one of the conceptual tools that will 
enable political science to understand the changes in the global 
political economy (Burnham, 1994: 6).
Skocpol's argument that ‘state is a potentially autonomous organisation 
located at the interface of class structures and international situations’ (Skocpol, 
1979: 33) provides a leverage for theorising the transformed state. The vitality o f the 
modem state is the fact that ‘modem states enjoy a potential autonomy that is far 
greater than most varieties of Marxist conceptions allow’ (Rueschemeyer, et.al. 1992: 
64).IJ Intensifying contradictions within global capitalism and varying national 
expressions of these only work to enhance the importance of the state at that crucial 
axis where the interfaces occur. In this situational matrix, the state becomes an 
agency, which reconciles and adjusts national economic policies to the perceived
exigencies of the global economy. Consequently,
the state becomes a transmission belt from the global to the national 
economy, where heretofore it has acted as the bulwark defending 
domestic welfare from external disturbances. Power within the state 
becomes concentrated in those agencies in closest touch with the 
global economy - the offices of presidents and prime ministers, 
treasuries, central banks. The agencies that are more closely identified 
with domestic clients - ministries of industries, labour ministries, etc.- 
become subordinated (Cox, 1992: 31-32).
Inevitably, there develops a tension between the ‘hyper-liberal globalising capitalism, 
and a capitalism rooted in social policy and territorially balanced development’ (Cox,
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1992: 31). This thesis engages this contradiction head on in conceptualising the role 
of the state. This ‘transmission belt’ or ‘nodal’ nature of the state noted enables us to 
connect policy transformations and state restructuring to their underlying generative 
mechanisms, a principal aim of this thesis.
To understand these underlying generative mechanisms, it vital that we do not 
invest too much in the ‘state’ to yield explanatory accounts. Recent turbulences in 
capital markets throughout Asia (The Economist. December, 1997; Jomo, eds., 1999), 
for example, demonstrate the culpability of even interventionist and developmental 
states. And yet when states respond to pressures that increasingly open capital 
markets impose, they do so in ways that can be best described as ‘political’. State 
responses are political as they reflect some consensus about the national interest and 
compromises. These reflect social relationships rooted in both the domestic as well as 
in the wider global environment. These compromises and interests are products of 
negotiation and reflect underlying contradictions. These negotiations are expressed 
institutionally, through for example, a re-organisation of power within state 
institutions, or through unions, parties, or tensions between governments and capital 
markets and other agencies. In this manner politics become central to explaining and 
understanding the nature of, and variability in, state responses, policy shifts and 
subsequent economic restructuring. In this thesis, I have demonstrated that the 
political becomes more visible at the interfaces between the global and the national. 
Accelerated economic internationalisation intensifies conflicts and competition at 
these points and thus activates a range of institutional mediation of political agencies. 
The use of the term ‘political’ captures the enhancement of the role of the state as the 
primary institutional mediator at the interfaces.
Claims by governments about the protection of ‘national interests’ through 
policy interventions elaborates the contested nature of the any notion of the ‘national 
interest’. State mediations often depend upon some ideological references. They may 
include references to goals of competitiveness, developmentalism and other similar 
themes brought out in the country chapters. Recent state responses show that states do 
not merely respond to global pressures such as the calls for liberalisation in the 
financial sector. Their responses take into account and reflect domestic 
considerations. In this manner, state policy responses inevitably take on political 
dimensions, although they may appear to be merely technical in nature.
It is not inconceivable that labour market and economic policy responses 
adopted in the present climate of neo-liberalism and reform may be subject to 
political renegotiation. Again, it is argued that we are currently witnessing a process 
that is still evolving, through creative forms of intervention and co-ordination (Wade, 
1996). If modes of labour regulation were to be renegotiated, where does that leave
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the globalising states? States that are examined here have thus far have managed the 
contradictory requirements of the international markets and domestic pressures, with 
some damage to democracy and open government in the process. Their differential 
approaches to such management are reflected in labour market variabilities for 
example. So what do internal transformations within nation states represent? While 
states depend on accumulation and hence expansion of capitalism - they also remain 
sites of accumulation. As such they are competitors in the accumulation process as 
well. New sets of agents appear to influence their participation and competition in a 
variety of ways. They also provide indictors for state behavior in managing and 
structuring markets. States do not negotiate, people representing interests do. Yet 
some states appear to compete as a block in the international system, while others 
leave that to market agents. These contradictory claims sketch out a strong area for 
further research. This study advances some theoretical pointers for formulating and 
studying these research questions.
2:4 Conclusion
This chapter has advanced the argument that economic globalisation impacts 
upon states in a variety of ways and that states drive that process through policies that 
are products of political negotiation. As a result, it concluded that the state was a 
central lever to help us understand the process of economic globalisation. The 
adoption of historical and comparative approaches that are grounded in the 
experiences of three reform oriented states differentially positioned in the global 
economic system provide pointers for understanding the underlying generative 
mechanisms affecting, or co-determining different state responses. Such an approach 
encourages us to critically examine state regulation of labour and labour markets 
especially during periods of economic restructuring and accelerated 
internationalisation. But the development of such a study depends upon a robust 
articulation of the comparative and historical methodological framework.
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Chapter Two: Endnotes
1. Kiely (1994) similarly contests the conventional approaches within 
development theories that seek to read-off developments in the 'periphery' in 
relation to events in metropolitan countries. His emphasis on indigenous 
classes and state structures locates some key indicators of development in 
relation to the NIC's.
2. It can also be argued that industrial relations outcomes are going to 
oscillate; rather than be homogenous. If differentiated industrial relations 
outcomes result from a neo-liberal ideology driven restructuring process, how 
central then are industrial relations itself to the process to reform? I return to 
this question in Chapter 7.
3. Rueschemeyer et. al. 1992 critique the Marxist state theories which 
conceptualise restructuring in terms of modes of domination, relative 
autonomy, and economic determination as being too narrow. Holloway (1994) 
critiques theorisations of the state in purely national terms as being similarly 
too narrow.
4. Peter Nolan ("Understanding the employment relation", public lecture, 
University of Warwick, 16/1/95) alludes to the poverty of theory in industrial 
relations as one of the reasons for the growing popularity of labour economics. 
Based on a study of the British coal industry, Nolan challenged some of the 
basic premises of labour economics, particularly its treatment of unions and 
the firm in an undifferentiated manner.
5. This contrasts with the view that ‘global’ simply refers to the growing 
interdependence of the international economy, organised along a number of 
connected dimensions of economic activity (see, for example, Michie and 
Smith, 1995).
6. Cox (1992: 31) notes that ‘global finance has achieved a virtually 
unregulated and electronically connected 24-hour-a-day network. The 
collective decision making of global finance is centered in world cities rather 
than states’. Developments in the global capital markets have given much 
broader impetus to the "space"-centered conceptualizations (Harvey, 1989).
7. Schor and You, (1995) assess the implications of GATT and the WTO on 
international trade in specific sectors. They conclude that international trade 
agreements can reduce the scope for state intervention in labour markets -  
thus further disabling them.
8. In 1995, transnational employers can be subject to the two codes of 
practice: firstly the International Labour Organisation's (ILO) Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles of Multinationals and Social Policy and the 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation's Guideline on Employment and 
Industrial Relations. International workers groups have proposed linking 
international free trade with social clauses within the framework of WTO. 
Unions have been pursuing similar types of agreement within regional trading
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blocs such as the European Union, and APEC. While such movements express 
the internationalisation of class struggles, they also reflect deep and growing 
tensions within the international worker movements (Williamson, 1994).
9. For a discussion of the national and international axes of labour and state 
strategies, see Picciotto (1991). Kamo (1994) demonstrates the overbearing 
national orientation of public policy interventions by the Japanese state in 
pursuing economic internationalisation.
10. The term "social exclusion" has gained currency in the publications of the 
OECD, the ILO and other international institutions. (Rodgers et. al., 1995) 
makes a modest effort at theorising social exclusion as a permanent feature of 
both advanced and peripheral capitalism. This conceptualisation applies to the 
non-formal employment sectors in the case studies here quite well.
11. At the same time, there are periods when change is imposed via state 
structures through distinctly authoritarian means. The excesses of 
"Thatcherism" have been widely noted, as has been the assault on trade union 
freedoms by the National Party in New Zealand.
12. To deal with contradictions between different types of states, Holloway 
suggests that because capitalist social relations are global, ‘each national state 
is a moment of global society, a territorial fragmentation of society which 
extends throughout the world. No national state, 'rich' or 'poor' can be 
understood in abstraction from its existence as a moment of the global capital 
relation. The distinction so often made between 'dependent' and 'non 
dependent' states falls. All nation states are defined, historically and 
repeatedly through their relation to the totality of capitalist social relations’ 
(Holloway, 1994: 32).
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Chapter Three: The Historical and Comparative Framework for Cross-National Studies
3:0 Introduction
This chapter develops the methodological framework for the thesis. To develop this 
analysis, three states are examined. These are differently positioned within the Asia/Pacific 
regional economy. A historical-comparative method for understanding the complex relationships 
between state strategies, labour regulation and economic globalisation is developed with 
reference to these case studies.
The relationships between state, labour regulation and economic globalisation is viewed 
through the process of economic reform, drawing out the distinct impacts of shifts in economic 
policy. Although the ‘state’ is the node through which economic reform is operationalised, the 
analysis covers a range of agents that influence state policy. The three states were carefully 
selected to lay the groundwork for rigorous and systematic comparison. This comparison throws 
light on the process of economic globalisation and the place of different approaches to the 
regulation of labour in that process.
The first section of this chapter presents the methodological framework of the study, 
outlining the importance of a historical-comparative approach. Some of the problems of 
comparison in cross-national settings are outlined in this section together with a discussion of 
the autobiographical origins o f  the study. A discussion of the limitations and the strengths of 
comparative methods and techniques deployed for data collection is presented as well. This is 
followed by an outline of the key propositions that are studied and a discussion about the 
selection of the case studies. The chapter then outlines some of the background features of each 
state covered by the research.
3:1 Methodology for the study
3:1:1 The historical -comparative approach
The methodology deployed in this study is primarily a historical-comparative one. This 
methodological approach is viewed as being most useful in studying large-scale transformations 
across states. The historical sociological tradition developed by Skocpol (1979; 1994), Tilly 
(1984) and McMichael (1995) provide the building blocks for this methodological framework. 
In developing this approach, some of the inherent weaknesses in comparative approaches to 
sociological research had to be redressed. These include, the undervaluation of history in the 
comparative industrial relations school (Crouch and Traxler, eds. 1995; Hyman and Femer,
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eds.1994), and the overbearing eurocentricity of the broader regulationist and globalisation
schools (Ruigrok and Tulder, 1995; Sklair, 1995).'
To examine our principal hypothesis, the study needed to be able to deal with large scale
processes whose impacts are felt not only within states, but across states as well. These processes
occurred over several decades. Skocpol (1979) and Rueschemeyer et.al.(1992) have
demonstrated the vitality of historical comparative methods in their analysis of macro-processes
across national settings and over long time frames. However, in using comparative historical
approach and data, it has not been our focus to
collapse all comparative history into multivariate analysis ... (it) is recognised 
that comparative history could be used not only for hypothesis testing, but also 
to contrast different societies or cultures and to highlight their respective 
individual features (Sckopol, 1994:92).
Such data helps highlight the differentiating and homogenising aspects of transhistorical global 
tendencies. This study adopted the strategy o f ‘analytic induction’. Analytic induction begins 
‘with a thoroughly reflected analytic concern’ and moves from understanding of a few cases to 
the articulation of potentially generalisable theoretical insights capable of explaining the 
problematic features of each case. These theoretical generalisations are then re-tested in the other 
studies. Committed to theoretical explanation and generalisation, analytic induction builds its 
arguments from the understanding of individual histories. A key feature of analytically inductive 
research is the initial theoretical reflection. This takes the form of an explicitly developed 
‘theoretical framework of concepts, questions, guiding ideas and hypotheses’ (Rueschemyer et. 
al„ 1992: 36-7).
A comparative historical approach has special strengths in dealing with two phenomena. 
They are:
multiple causal paths leading to the same outcome and different results arising 
from the same factor, or factor combination, depending on the context in which 
the latter operates (Rueschemeyer et. al, 1992:34).
Comparative historical research has a powerful advantage in assessing multiple and 
‘conjunctural’ causation as the reason for the peculiar complexity of social phenomenon and 
especially of large-scale phenomena (Rueschemeyer et.al., 1992).
This study begins from the premise that structural changes associated with economic 
internationalisation transform both the social and institutional dimensions of the capitalist state. 
Such transformations involve a range of political and economic actors. They transform the arena 
of political contestation as well.2 Social relations are displaced and axes of contestation redrawn
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at these junctures. In such large transformations, the axes at which the national and global 
intersect get blurred. These transformations displace some agents, empower others and transform 
most agents. In this manner, the process of economic internationalisation has eroded many 
conventional conceptual categories. Cross-national comparisons thus have to pay particular 
attention to defining the categories and concepts that are the subject of analyses quite sharply.3 
A longer time scale also allowed me to observe largescale transformations in the policy 
environment in contrasting national settings. But the problem of separating the general from the 
specific remained. Without being able to do this, the relationships between the key variables 
would be difficult to establish or sustain. Critical realism provided a way of overcoming this 
problem. A critical realist ontology is open to the view that explanatory variables for social 
phenomena and relations are not only internal but also external or contingent in any situation 
(Bhaskar 1994; 1995). It assumes that ‘social phenomena vary in their degree of historical and 
geographical specificity, some being highly context-dependent, others less so. Critical realism 
offers support for a position where some objects have trans-historical essences, some are specific 
to periods of varying duration and some are transitory’ (Sayer, 1995:27-8). Using insights gained 
from critical realism, the study was able to both separate the historical and geographic specificity 
of several variables associated with the phenomena of accelerated economic internationalisation 
and draw out the internal and contingent variables that affected that process.
Large scale transformations o f the type studied here, reflect more than a “deepening” of 
the global economic structures (Broad, 1995:21). They are also more than a transition from 
Keynesian demand management to neo-liberal monetarism; blurring the conventional political 
conceptualisations of economic policy.4 They often occur in response to some real or perceived 
economic crisis. By exploring the interconnectedness between national, industrial or workplace 
changes and the global context over a longer time frame, these transformations can be 
conceptualised. By recasting the state’s role in facilitating the complicated interlinkages, both 
the interconnectedness between variables and agents can be better understood. This approach 
takes its cue from Bonefeld, Brown and Burnham (1995) and Holloway (1995) who rescue the 
state’s role as an agent with reference to Britain. As a result, they are able to bring the politics 
of economic restructuring back to the centre stage of their analysis.
To help the comparison, some abstraction was also necessary. This abstraction was 
informed by two factors. Firstly, by locating restructuring in specific national contexts, a better 
purchase on political contestation could be obtained. Secondly, the examination of economic 
reform programmes assisted the construction of a framework for cross-national comparisons.
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While most member states of the OECD and the IMF are undergoing some form or the other of 
economic restructuring, not all lend themselves to cross-national comparison given either the 
very moderate pace of restructuring (as in Sweden and Denmark) or because restructuring is 
periodically reversed as a result of political pressures (India and Nigeria). Thus a good selection 
of states where there is a visible continuity in the restructuring agenda that can survive regime 
changes is more suited to an exploratory theoretical study. A comparative and historical 
approach was also important to understand the overall and long term direction of structural 
transformations.
Structural changes in the international economy reinforce the importance of grappling 
with economic interconnectedness. We have witnessed the evolution of the international 
economy into more global economy, one less bound by nations and by the control of 
states. This is more than a difference in semantics. Politically, states still exist, with 
governments that can enter into agreements on their behalf, but the influence of those 
governments over their own economies has become more limited and uncertain. A gap 
has arisen between an international economy and national trade and monetary policy. 
Economic developments move faster than an individual government’s ability to react, 
and market forces quickly outrun their policy decisions. Even the terminology of 
international trade is misleading. States do not trade, companies do, and now those 
companies often “trade” within themselves, subsidiary to subsidiary, their national 
allegiance one of convenience, blurring notions of export and import (Nitzc and McCall, 
1996: 216).
A comparative and historical focus helps emphasise the interconnectedness within an 
international system. Such interconnectedness may be established by observing patterns of trade, 
the role and operations of multilateral financial institutions and the role o f ‘techopols’. This 
helps us overcome the conceptual problems created by the appearance of disconnectedness 
between different agents and between economies. Some aspects of this interconnectedness can 
be illustrated with reference to labour market policies. In this regard, the presentation of labour 
market reform policies as highly technical and scientific programmes had the effect of 
depolitisising the policy formation process. Policies thus appeared to become divorced from the 
political sphere. Through comparison and contrast, we can see how ’depolitisisation’ is achieved 
and sustained, and outline the different national experiences of depolitisisation. This helped 
throw light on some key aspects of the broader transformations associated with economic 
globalisation. A comparative approach also demonstrates the capacity for capital and industry 
to (re) organise itself across historical and situational contexts through economic policy regime 
shifts, and help us understand the variety of ways in which dépolitisation features in this re­
organisation (Boyer and Drachc, cds. 1996).
There are twin processes at work in economic globalisation. On the one hand, changing
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production relations require different forms of intervention by the state. In certain periods, these 
forms may appear in relatively homogenous ways across states. On the other hand, economic 
internationalisation that results from restructuring has highly fragmented outcomes across and 
within states. Such diverse outcomes generate diverse responses. Arguably, the British economy 
is no more internationalised now than it was between 1870 and 1914 (Hirst and Thompson, 
1996a and 1996b) while the opposite is true for countries such as Malaysia and Japan who 
maintained protective domestic markets during their post-war industrialisation. Some 
developments that are associated with economic globalisation are clearly rooted quite 
specifically in national contexts, while others are of a more general nature.
Studies of globalisation that place states and their relation to labour as the starting point 
for analysis are best approached from a comparative and historical perspective for two reasons. 
First, an essential feature of the globalisation is that national economies are re-articulated in an 
international economic system. This involves a number of agents and occurs through the 
compliance of states, which draws attention to the problem of negotiation within states. 
Negotiation in the present period results in a variety of programmes of economic (re)regulation 
of which labour regulation is a key element. In the negotiation and presentation of strategies for 
the (re)regulation of labour, policies are often framed in a ‘depoliticised’ manner.
Depoliticisation, in this respect, refers to the process whereby economic policy decisions 
are removed from the sphere of public debate and scrutiny (Bonefeld, Brown and Burnham, 
1995).5 It also refers to the ways in which economic policy decisions, once adopted, are shielded 
from democratic scrutiny. Because politics appears to be removed from negotiation, labour’s 
compliance and regulation cannot be well understood. A comparative inquiry helps us 
understand how contestation and negotiation is affected by the different experiences of 
‘depoliticisation’. Moreover, it also helps draw attention to the centrality of the process of 
‘dépolitisation’ itself to the reform project. A historical and comparative focus was central to my 
efforts to define this process, and draw some generalizable conclusions about it.
Second, such an approach also helps us overcome the shortcomings of national studies, 
and regional studies (Wade, 1992). This study places a high premium on the multiple agents in 
the global system. Given that states retain vital influence over the policy making through their 
organisational configuration, by defining distinctive locations and support for economic activity, 
by providing differential access to groups and as an arena for contestation itself (Campbell, 
Lindberg and Campbell, 1991: 358), reform agents need to be identified and scrutinised.6 This 
approach also helps us overcome the state and market dichotomy. A historical and comparative
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framework helps us recast them not in competitive terms but in dialectical ways that emphasise 
their contingent relationships. The transformations of the state, the variable responses and 
approaches to labour regulation during periods of regime change and accelerated economic 
growth throws light on this contingent relationship. However, more general conclusions derived 
from analytic induction could only be valid if the tools for making the comparisons held up to 
scrutiny. It was important to therefore pay attention to the comparative method.
3:1:2 The comparative method
A particular problem that I have had to deal with in this study was assessing and 
evaluating data drawn not only from a number of countries but from a range of sources as well. 
The success of a comparative inquiry depends upon the careful selection of data that lends itself 
to cross-national comparisons. But in selecting the data that is used in this study, I became aware 
that data that is generated in different disciplinary settings inevitably complicates analysis and 
induction. This is so because of the different methodological techniques deployed by different 
disciplines. To make meaningful comparisons, it is vital that methodologies that are drawn from 
across disciplines were properly contextualised and their key assumptions critically assessed.7
Comparative projects in industrial relations have provided a useful starting point in 
formulating a comparative methodological framework for this inquiry (Hyman and Femer eds. 
1995; Cook and Kirkpatrick ed., 1995). However, this study proceeds from the base that 
economic internationalisation has been associated with the internationalisation of policy making 
and economic regulation (Picciotto, 1991; Cox, 1992; Harvey, 1989). This process is associated 
with changing technologies of production, regimes of accumulation and productive capacities. 
Changes in both labour regulation and the organisation of the state itself reflect the particular 
responses on the part of the state as competitive actors within that global system. But all states 
are not pressed by similar exigencies. They respond differentially even when external exigencies 
were of a similar nature. Thus, the variabilities in responses and outcomes to economic reform 
need to be problematised at the outset. To understand variability, it is important to have a 
selection of states that are variously positioned in the global economic system and that presented 
for comparison a range of domestic ‘change agents’. This range included organised labour, 
political parties, bureaucratic elite and think tanks.
If globalisation is both a homogenising and differentiating process at the same time, then 
clearly we can best view that process comparatively. The starting point may be to situate this 
contradictory development as a backdrop to the comparisons. This helps draw out the ways in38
which ‘globalisation’ does or does not induce change at the national level. This approach is thus 
sensitive to the dialectical and contradictory relations that underpin states. The challenge is to 
locate these processes and understand how they arise in the first place.
In developing the comparative approach, it is appropriate to also take note of Holloway's 
warning that:
comparative analysis which focus on the occurrence of similar socio-economic 
changes in different countries as in the regulationist analysis of Fordism, takes 
us deeper, but the analogies, although suggestive, tend to be sketchy and 
superficial: the unity on which analogies are inevitably based remains 
untheorised. To reach a satisfactory understanding of the changes taking place 
at the moment we need to go beyond the category of the 'state', or rather we need 
to go hevond the assumption of separateness of the different states to find a way 
of discussing their unity (emphasis added - Holloway, 1994: 25).
It is largely via the state that we connect the particular and the global. The 
interconnections in the global system are made possible through international, national and sub­
national agents. But in each instance, conflict is grounded at the interface of the global and the 
local. The state provides this interface.
But the comparative approach is laden with other complications as well. A central 
problem concerns the need to ensure comparability of concepts across cultural and historical 
settings (Runciman, 1994; Sanders, 1994). Archival materials as well as institutional assessments 
need to be studied with reference to their cultural, social and historical milieu. By identifying 
the particular form that variables take, the distortionary influences of cultural, and social and 
historical specificities can be minimised. While, the strengths of this study lies in its comparative 
focus, their validity rests on how well the conceptual issues are dealt with. These issues involve 
concerns with equivalence and the question of what constitutes data. The problem of interpreting 
data from a range of sources is also noted, along with the problem of connecting the specific with 
the general. In dealing with institutional data, the study used Roots (1993) notion of critical 
social sciences to draw out their ‘idealised’ underpinnings.8 In formulating the methodological 
framework, these concerns have been carefully considered.
This study uses the comparative data to distinguish between the ‘general’ and the 
‘particular’. It does not merely seek to collect cross-national data and draw out the general 
lessons. That would be little more than description of national trends and analysis (Hyman and 
Femer eds. 1994; Windmuller, 1987). Even institutionalist approaches such as that of the ILO 
(1995b) demonstrate widely divergent meanings associated with key conceptual terms and 
processes across different social formations. Skocpol (1979); Rueschemeyer et. al. (1992) and
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Tilly (1984) have discussed these problems in their analysis of macro-processes. By refining that 
approach, we have been able to both build on existing studies and make sense of a large volume 
of cross-national data at the same time.
But the comparative approach also depends upon how vigorously and critically variables
were pre-selected. This thesis draws upon the approaches to preselection highlighted by Skocpol
(1994; 1979) and Wallerstein (1997). Both these approaches sharply contrast the largely
ahistorical comparative approaches popularised by industrial relations researchers. By conflating
the two approaches, more empirically tenable comparative methods were developed for this
study. These helped us analyse data from multiple sources and countries. This study thus
proceeds by acknowledging the differences (such as varying political institutions) and
similarities (such as economic policy responses) and contextualising these with references to
specific national factors. This also helped to highlight the historical and the specific and
understand their interconnectedness. By using changing state strategies as its leverage,
empirically sustainable interconnections are developed. Because the state is the nodal point at
which these outcomes are expressed, and because it is through state strategies that outcomes are
mediated, comparisons become theoretically explainable as a consequence. In this respect,
(the) comparative method can be used as a way of generating and/or validating theories, 
models ’that are either of potentially universal application or at least readily transferable 
to a number of situations other than those being directly examined. The purpose of using 
the comparative method may therefore lie either in demonstrating the validity of a theory 
by illustrating its analytical comprehensiveness by reference to comparable instances or 
in advancing a set of explanatory hypotheses which is then tested by applying it to a 
number of comparable (test) cases. But there is a third way in which the comparative 
method can be utilised: as a way of identifying what has to be explained. (In this respect) 
the comparative method can be used as a way o f grasping the peculiarities of each 
analysed ‘case’ and establishing what is particular about each specific historical 
experience. Rather than look out for uniformities on the basis of a comparative analysis, 
this strategy of comparison aims to identify peculiarities, i.e. differences, between ‘cases’ 
by contrasting instances. In short, through a contrasting comparison, the particular 
features of each individual ‘case’ are highlighted (Axtmann, 1993: 69).
The thesis thus endorses the view that ‘comparative research consists not of comparing but of 
explaining’.9 The general purpose of ‘cross-national research is to understand’ (Dogan and 
Kazancigil, 1994:15).
By sharpening the comparative methods to advance explanations of the phenomena being 
observed, I was able to adequately synthesise a range and a large volume of data. This data was 
both of a qualitative and a quantitative nature. Moreover it was both of a primary as well as of 
a secondary nature. The section that follows spells this out.
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3:1:3 Data collection
This study is based on both qualitative and quantitative data. Given its comparative 
focus, this mixture of methodological approaches was necessary if the study was to capture 
the operations of a range of change agents over a long period of time. Moreover, it was also 
necessary to demonstrate one of its principal theoretical concerns, that is, of demonstrating 
the different experiences o f ‘depoliticisation’ during reform periods.
The qualitative data was derived from key informant interviews in Japan, Malaysia and 
New Zealand. The study has relied extensively upon key informant interviews. Given the 
exploratory nature of the study, this technique allowed for repeat interviews. It also enabled 
me to deal with the major shortcomings that are identified in the secondary materials used in 
this thesis. Key informant interviews also allowed me to explore economic policy debates and 
discourses that were occurring during the writing-up phase. In each country, key informants 
were chosen from academic, industry, government, union and employer organisations. This 
ensured that the main perspectives on the major reforms that are studied were captured. 
Because both primary and secondary materials were also identified through key informants, 
this method also ensured that primary materials from a range of sources were examined. This 
method proved vital in validating primary data, and capturing the degree of contestation over 
economic and labour market policy shifts between ‘change agents’ and interest groups. Both, 
the validation of data and the capture of degrees of contestation proved essential for examining 
the hypotheses being tested in this study.
Key informant interviews were useful in another way. Several respondents that were 
chosen were closely involved with the reform and restructuring programmes in their countries, 
or across all the countries. Key informant interviews provided an opportunity to capture some 
of the autobiographical experiences of these players. They also helped me to understand some 
of the ways in which the compliance of organised labour and other interest groups were 
achieved. Moreover, key informant interviews were useful in establishing the influence and 
impact of ‘technopols’ over policy discourses. These impacts and influences were often of an 
informal nature and they also cut across national boundaries. Again, the special role of 
‘technopols’ was useful in testing the main hypotheses of this study.
Key informant discussions in Malaysia were held with the following: Dr Peter Wad (of 
Copenhagen Business School), Dr Dunston Ayadurai (Department of Economics, University
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of Malaya), Rajasekran (General Secretary, MTUC), Siva Subramaniam (Secretary General, 
CUEPACs and NUTP), Dr Chandra Subramaniam (Research Director, Ministry of Human 
Resources and Development), Bruno (Research and Education Officer, MTUC), Arokia Dass 
(union activist) and Muthusamy (Vice President, Kesatan Pekerja Tenaga).
In Japan, the following persons were consulted: Prof. Jim Benson (Hiroshima City 
University), Dr Michael Ehrke (Director, Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, Tokyo), Mitsuo Tanaka 
(International Affairs Bureau, RENGO), Dr Shigemi Yahata (Senior Researcher, JIL), Naoyuki 
Kameyama (Research Director, Japan Institute of Labour), Dr Shiro Kawai (Japan Institute of 
Kabour) and Prof. Takashi Inoguchi (The United Nations University).
The following person were consulted and interviewed in New Zealand: Colin Hicks 
(State Services Commission), Professor Kevin Hince and Jonathan Boston (of Victoria 
University of Wellington), David Thorp (General Secretary of the PSA), John McCaskey (New 
Zealand Employers Federation Inc.) and Peter Harris (NZCTU).
In these countries, I also consulted officers in planning, human resource and policy 
units of government. These respondents choose to remain anonymous. Moreover, the 
qualitative data was also drawn through discussions with officers employed by the International 
Labour Organisation, the Asian Development Bank and the APEC secretariat. These 
discussions were mostly informal. They proved useful in identifying sources of official data. 
They also proved useful in assessing the ways in which regional and international agencies 
acted as conduits through which aspects of economic policy discourses were harmonised and 
national policy guidelines established.
The study has also used a range of quantitative data derived from primary and 
secondary materials. The main source of data and information on economic policies and reform 
programmes has been official documents, especially those from finance departments, economic 
policy institutions and treasuries. These were backed by official reports from international 
institutions including the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, International Labour 
Organisation, The International Monetary Fund and the OECD. These regional and 
international agencies provided comprehensive economic and labour market data. These data 
were derived from annual reports of these agencies, periodic country surveys and official 
memorandums that were made available. In addition these agencies also provided substantial 
‘on-line’ country and regional economic and labour market data.
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While the official data used was important to understand economic trends and especially 
to understand the sectoral content of economic internationalisation, it was useful in other ways 
as well. The reports of the OECD, the IMF and the World Bank covering the period 1975 to 
1995, almost always were prefaced by remarks about the validity of neo-liberal economic 
policies. They often selectively used macroeconomic data to demonstrate national commitment 
to economic internationalisation. Macroeconomic data was also used selectively to comment 
on the ‘institutional constraints’ to economic internationalisation as they were perceived by 
these multilateral agencies. In this manner, the construction and presentation of what appeared 
as technocratic data became a subject of analysis. Besides validating the concerns about the 
influence of international agencies upon policy, this exercise also cast light on how the ‘science 
of economics’ was deployed to obtain politically selected developmental outcomes.
In addition, the study drew upon primary materials from a range of sources. In New 
Zealand, primary materials were obtained from libraries at the Public Service Association 
Library, the NZCTU library and the New Zealand Business Roundtable resource centre. In 
Malaysia, primary materials were gathered from the MTUC and CUEPACS, and the Ministry 
of Human Resource and Planning. In Japan, primary materials were gathered from the libraries 
of RENGO, MITI and the Japan Institute of Labour. The primary materials collected from 
these sources included official policy documents such as development plans and white papers, 
annual reports, press statements, official memos, policy position papers or publications. Such 
documents were extremely useful from a number of standpoints. Firstly, they amplified the 
different positions taken on key economic policy questions by different social and institutional 
actors. In this respect, they were helpful in tracing the contestation and public debates over 
economic policy questions. They were also immensely useful in explaining the nature of 
responses by different social actors .
Secondary research was carried out at the following university libraries, Victoria 
University of Wellington, United Nations University (Tokyo), Meiji Gakuin University 
(Tokyo), University of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur), the University of the South Pacific (Suva) and 
the University of Warwick. World Bank documents were obtained through its office in 
London.
Both primary and secondary materials were also obtained from the International Labour 
Organisation libraries in Geneva and Bangkok. ILO technical experts in Geneva also provided
43
useful background information about the research. Through the ILO, I was also able to access 
policy papers that were not made available during field research in the three countries. These 
papers helped throw particular light on the often-haphazard manner in which national policy 
agencies approached economic restructuring and labour market reforms more specifically. 
They also helped throw light on policy debates between national and international agencies and 
on the relationships between national policy units and international agencies such as the ILO 
and the World Bank.
I was also able to hold discussions with researchers working on these three countries 
through my participation in the International Industrial Relations Association conference (Asian 
Region) in Taipei (August, 1996) and the Industrial Relations Association of Japan conference 
in Tokyo (December, 1996). These seminars also provided opportunities to revise my research 
data and hold repeat discussions with several key respondents.
Some of the theoretical questions that are dealt with in this study were presented to the 
University of Warwick Centre of Comparative Labour Studies and the International Centre for 
Labour Studies at Manchester University seminars on “State and Labour Regulation” . These 
seminars proved helpful in dealing with the flaws of the commodity chains approach in 
explaining patterns of economic internationalisation in Asia and in developing the substantive 
theme of depoliticisation and reform. Comments by Peter Burnham, Peter Gutkind and Simon 
Clarke (all of University of Warwick) and David Coates (of Manchester University) at these 
seminars were helpful in reformulating some of the theoretical and conceptual questions 
associated with the theme of depoliticisation.
My participation in the International Labour Organisation Network of Asian Labour 
Institutes between 1994 and 1997 provided useful opportunities to develop this research project 
through periodic discussions with other researchers working in the region more generally. They 
included Noyoki Kameyama (of Japan Institute of Labour), Rashid Amjad (of ILO regional 
office in Manila, Duncan Campbell (of International Institute for Labour Studies) and Mr 
Nakamura (former director of the Regional Asia Pacific Office of the International Labour 
Organisation).
My involvement in these research networks gave me a purchase on how institutional 
conceptualisations of the processes of economic globalisation were framed. It also gave me a 
critical insight into how a convergence in some of these policy frameworks promoted by the 
ILO, the IMF and World Bank and bodies such as the OECD has occurred, especially during the
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past decade. This helped bring to light both the agency and the policy nature of these institutions. 
In particular, I acquired a critical insight into how these agencies operationalised and helped 
embed the transfer of aspects of the neoliberal economic policy onto national institutions.
In both Malaysia and Japan, major new economic policy reforms were introduced during 
the final writing-up phase. Many of these were not assessed in policy documents or in secondary 
literature. For these debates, the study has relied upon newspapers (The Guardian. Japan Times. 
The Financial Times and the Nikkei Weekly) and magazines (The Economist. Japan Echo, and 
the Far Eastern Economic Review). These sources provided adequate coverage of some o f the 
main aspects of economic reforms and financial sector crisis that triggered these reforms. They 
were given sufficient media coverage given the intensity of the economic downturns faced by 
these economies and their serious implications not only for the regional economy, but for the 
international economic environment as well.
The study was supported by a British Overseas Developmental Assistance training grant 
awarded by the University of the South Pacific (USP), a research grant from the Research 
Committee of the University of the South Pacific, research support from the Japal Institute for 
Labour and the International Labour Organisation for research involved with the Asian Labour 
Studies Institute network, visiting fellowships by the Industrial Relations Centre at the Victoria 
University and Meiji Gakuin University in Tokyo. Research at the ILO was made possible 
through an ILO sponsored study attachment to the Institute of International Labour Studies in 
Geneva. In spite of this, I was unable to spend the time I would have liked to for field work 
purposes in any of the three countries. This constrained my ability to carry out repeat interviews 
with several informants, and revisit primary data libraries during the preliminary analysis stages. 
I also lost a lot of time making initial contacts in these countries. This also limited the success 
of the field work. Where possible, limitations in field work has been overcome through the use 
of the internet and electronic databases and through links and insights that were derived from 
my autobiographical experiences.
3:1:4 Autobiographical contributions to the study
The conceptualisation of the research problems has strong autobiographical origins. My 
autobiographical experiences have proved central to the design and actual research for this study. 
These have included my experience as a teacher of comparative industrial relations for seven 
years. During this period, a neo-liberal economic policy agenda has vigorously propelled labour 
market changes across different social formations. Such changes appeared to have been
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associated with the ascendance to political power of conservative governments. This raised the 
problem of explaining similar transformations in states that did not experience similar regime 
changes. As a consequence, the research question began to move away from its primary foci on 
political factors and lock upon the ‘underlying generative mechanisms’ (Bhaskar, 1995). This 
approach meant that It adopted a broader sweep, looking at pressures within the global 
economic system that drove the remarkable transformations studied.
The study has a parallel origin in a network of labour institutes in the Asia/Pacific region 
(of which 1 have been a member through the University of the South Pacific). This network has 
been exploring the impacts of globalisation on labour regulation and labour market institutions 
(ILO, 1995a). The country studies carried out in this network broadly stress the homogeneity in 
the experiences of countries, and emphasise the generally favourable impacts of economic 
globalisation across this diverse region until the end of 1995. This study challenges both the 
theoretical and methodological framework adopted by that network.
At another level, this project flows from my MA thesis: titled "Re-Theorising the Post 
Colonial State: A Case Study of Industrial Relations, Ethnicity and Political Change in Fiji". 
This study was completed in Fiji in 1987. In analysing policy changes in the aftermath of 
military coups during the year, my natural inclination was to associate changes in the industrial 
relations arena with authoritarianism and the need on part of a highly conservative regime to 
control a politically assertive trade union movement. Immediately following the coups, the 
regime imposed compulsory state supervised ballots for all industrial action, restrictions on 
secondary union action, curtailed public sector unionism and introduced a range of anti-trade 
unions changes in labour law. Using political sociological methods; I interpreted these changes 
in terms of the political strategies of an illegitimate regime aimed at retaining its tenuous hold 
on power.
However, during the same period, Britain and New Zealand were legislating even more 
dramatic anti-union type of reforms. Both New Zealand and Britain went even further than the 
military regime in Fiji in restructuring their industrial relations frameworks. This led me to ask 
the question whether, what was happening in Fiji was part of something more global in nature 
than I had understood it to be.
In developing the research, 1 was struck by other questions. Could it be possible that Fiji, 
like other countries was responding to an acute economic and political crisis through labour 
market strategies? If that were true, it would require a comparative study of a number of 
countries that did not necessarily face such acute problems. So I looked to the Asian ‘miracle’
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region. In this region, the newly industrialising economies and Japan had recorded high levels 
of growth almost persistently for most of the 1970s. One could safely conclude that there was 
no compelling labour market based reasons for similar reforms in these countries. This is where 
the picture became complicated. Countries such as Japan coming from entirely different 
industrial relations traditions were also undergoing restructuring that appeared similar in several 
respects. Thus the research question grew in its scope to include the high growth regions so the 
paradoxes noted above could be re-cast in relation to a broader range of factors. Overall, these 
autobiographical influences have gone far in shaping this project, its methodological approach, 
as well as in determining the choice of countries that are studied. In many ways, by expanding 
the scope of my study to include countries in the broader Asian region, I was able to understand 
better not only what was happening in Fiji during a period of dramatic economic reform, but in 
countries outside the Asian region as well. The structure and the organisation of the study that 
thus emerged is outlined in the sections that follow.
3:2 Key propositions that frame the historical-comparative inquiry.
The methodological framework developed in the previous sections is used to address the 
following questions with respect to Japan, Malaysia and New Zealand:
1. How have regimes of labour regulation been transformed? Moreover, how do regime 
changes connect to the processes of accelerated economic internationalisation that is a 
specific phenomenon associated with the more general process of economic 
globalisation?
2. How have state institutions (and associated ‘agencies') and international institutions 
featured in this transformation? Is a rcconccptualisation of the state necessary to reflect 
these transformations?
3. Does restructuring inside the state relate to the process of economic globalisation? Can 
we distinguish the particular and the global by studying labour regulation transitions 
inside the state?
4. To what extent does changes in labour regulation present general or particular 
phenomena and how can variabilities in outcomes and approaches be explained?
5. Do particular forms of responses by organised labour to the economic reform 
programmes affect the patterns and pace of economic internationalisation? How can the 
variabilities in the responses by organised labour be explained?
These questions guide the inquiry into the changing role of the state regulation of labour in the
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contemporary era. They shape the main propositions around which the subsequent chapters are 
organised.
In the country chapters, it is not my concern to present separate historical accounts of the 
role of the state in restructuring via labour regulation and public sector reforms in individual 
states in the tradition of the cross-national studies. This study tries to draw out the new forms 
of state/labour contestation and assess how they are affected by pressures and agencies that are 
associated with the process of economic globalisation. As a result, a reconceptualisation of the 
role of the state, and of specific state agencies in particular becomes possible. Such a 
reconceputualisation presents the state not in its instrumentalist form, but as a process that is 
moulded by global, national and sub-national agencies. As a result, the ‘interface’ or ‘nodal’ 
nature of the state is brought out. This approach thus provides a theoretical grip on the principal 
propositions advanced in this thesis.
3:3 The selection of New Zealand, Japan and Malaysia
Much thought has been given to the selection of New Zealand, Malaysia and Japan for 
this comparative inquiry. The influence of autobiography on the selection of case studies has 
already been noted. However, in selecting the states, I wanted to examine different experiences 
of economic internationalisation. Based on an evaluation of the secondary literature, I found that 
the three countries provided that. Moreover, the selection of the three states has also been 
influenced by factors such as the level of internationalisation of economies, sustained 
commitment to liberalisation and the presence of a sharp economic crisis between 1975 and 
1995.
All states selected have made a comprehensive, though often ‘ambiguous’ policy 
commitment to trade liberalisation. They are all members of WTO and of international 
institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and more importantly of APEC. The thesis thus 
selected states that are variously positioned within the Asia/Pacific trading region. Japan is a core 
industrial nation that wields considerable influence, not only in the region but globally as well 
and could shield its national policies from international pressures. Moreover, both as a member 
of G7 and through its strategic alliances with the United States, Japan has played a central role 
in the structuring of markets in the Asia/Pacific region. New Zealand by contrast was a highly 
protected welfarist economy until recently, although it adopted one of the most radical 
programmes of reform. It presents an interesting case study and serves as a useful comparator 
in that it points to a different trajectory of change. Clearly, the ability of these two economies
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to respond to global exigencies was widely different. Malaysia provides an appropriate case of 
a ‘developmental state’ confronting the exigencies of economic globalisation from a different 
base. It is characterised by a high degree of political stability reflected in its stable economic 
policy regime. It also draws attention to the specificity of internal political and social 
arrangements more sharply.
The study deliberately excludes countries from outside the Asia/Pacific region. This is 
so because over the past two decades economic development, economic policy and 
internationalisation debates have been concentrated in this region. As a result, all states in these 
regions have been subject to intense policy debates, and observable shifts in developmental 
gears. They have been subject to extensive scrutiny by policy institutions (World Bank, 1996a; 
ILO, 1995b).
The selection of the case studies was also influenced by the following considerations;
a. To consider states that were differentially positioned in the international economic system.
b. To examine countries that were actively committed to economic reform.
c. To draw upon contrasting national approaches to economic development.
d. To examine different approaches to labour regulation.
c. To assess examples of significant policy transformations over the past two decades.
New Zealand, Malaysia and Japan met these requirements.
While the number of states is small, a selection of a varied states differently positioned 
in the global economic system and committed to economic restructuring over a comparable time 
frame provides a basis for conceptual coherence. Given that one of the outcomes of this process 
across the case states is the increasing permeability of national markets, the focus on the state 
helps open up questions for further research on causality in the global system in interesting ways 
as well.
3:4 Selected features of the case studies
The three states provide a set of comparisons through very clear programmes of 
restructuring. Moreover, they each experienced very distinct economic crisis that forced attention 
to issues of politics and reform dramatically. They were also committed to accelerating their 
economic internationalisation in response to a range of national and global exigencies. A 
consideration of a number of political, economic and social features helps ground the 
comparisons.
The three countries have at different times been faced with acute economic problems that
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triggered the concern of bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (Malaysia in 1981 and 
1996, New Zealand in 1984, and Japan in 1995 and 1997). Such an environment was perceived 
to be crucial to the commencement of radical reform agendas by policy makers. It is argued that 
such environments enabled policy makers within state institutions to promote economic reforms 
with a greater degree of autonomy than may have been possible previously. This helped develop 
the theme of contestation and depolitisisation.
The development of a framework for a comparative enquiry has been made easier by the 
fact that these countries have attracted substantial research scrutiny. There already exists a vast- 
body of literature on labour regulation, economic reform and economic policy. This literature 
demonstrated the strong but shifting commitments towards restructuring, contestation and re­
negotiation between state and other agencies. A comparative inquiry based on such differentially 
positioned economies that were products of sharply differing histories provided a theoretical 
anchor to counter deterministic and neo-liberal accounts of the development and repositioning 
of the three economies.
The institutional setting through which states have sought to recast social and 
employment relationships could be gleaned from the public sector in these countries. Firstly, the 
public sector in all the countries have been major sites of contestation between organised labour 
and the state, resulting in a variable pattern of re-radicalisation, acquiescence and re-regulation. 
In all the cases, public sector restructuring has proceeded haphazardly, characterised often by 
inconsistency in the policy environment and policy reversals periodically. Contests and 
negotiations that arose from the political framework provided strong foundations from which the 
state regulation of labour discourse could be levered open.
Secondly, the changing contours of national corporatisms (Bagnioni and Crouch, 1991; 
Boyer, 1995), that were shaped by specific historical political exigencies also provided levers 
for opening up questions about labour regulation regime transformations. Social settlements 
were exposed to fundamental re-negotiation in each of the case studies, raising questions about 
the historical specificity of such settlements, and their relationships with economic policy 
frameworks associated with economic globalisation. Moreover, transformations within the state 
also helped throw light on the specificity and generality of national settlements as basis for 
labour regulation. The ascendancy of neo-liberalism coincided with the opening up of social 
settlements to re-negotiation.
Neo-liberalism (was) at once directed towards disarticulating the old formation which 
was in crisis, that is towards deconstructing corporatism and the Keynesian welfare state, 
and towards the formation of a new configuration (Overbeek, 1990:180).
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A changed legislative framework, labour market deregulation, the changing nature of work, the 
growth of the service sector, are some factors that may help inform the role of agents in this re­
negotiation.
In comparative industrial relations, the institutions of collective bargaining illustrate the 
ways in which states have subordinated labour, and shaped accommodation at workplaces. 
Moreover, these institutions impose limits upon labour and capital concurrently. By contrasting 
such core industrial relations processes, the thesis was able to draw out the emerging 
incongruencies that resulted from the mismatch between ‘nationally bounded labour markets’ 
and highly ‘globalised capital markets’. Because of the incongruence, both labour and capital’s 
organised relationships were undergoing metamorphosis even when the industrial relations 
framework itself propelled them in that direction. By focussing on this, another avenue was 
opened for viewing changes in state strategies and labour’s responses. States connived to expand 
the sphere of reproduction while narrowing the sites for contestation. Economic globalisation 
appeared to promote these contradictory tendencies, resulting in ‘disorganising the working 
classes’ overall (Offe, 1996). Disorganisation has taken historically specific forms, ranging from 
ethnic segmentation in Malaysia, to legislative decollectivisation in New Zealand and 
compartmentalisation of production itself both nationally as well as internationally in the case 
of Japan. The purpose is to draw out the ‘underlying generative mechanisms’ for transformation 
of regimes of labour regulation, rather than discuss the comparative industrial relations trends 
per se.
Frenkel (ed. 1993) examines political structures and developmental strategies for 
comparison of unionism in the Asia-Pacific region. This is helpful in developing a comparative 
framework. Systems of political representation, and centralisation and decentralisation of power 
affected state strategies and responses. Moreover, developmental strategies were also shaped by 
the systems of representations and considerations that had to do with how power was exercised. 
These are broadly summarised in Table 1.
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Table 1: Political institutions and developmental approaches in mid 1990s
Country Power:
Centralisation/
Concentration
System of 
representation
Political
Stability
Development
Strategy
Malaysia Medium
dispersed
Federal, multi­
party, single 
party
predominant, 
evidence of the 
emergence of 
popular 
opposition by 
the end of 1997
High, some 
regional 
governments 
pose challenge 
to central 
authority
Strengthen 
economic 
position of 
Malays; export 
manufactured 
goods, state-led 
wealth
redistribution
goals
New Zealand Medium
dispersed
Unitary, mainly 
two party
High, but 
relatively weak 
coalition 
governments 
since 1992
Rapidly 
changing from 
protected, 
regulated 
welfare state to 
a radically 
deregulated 
market 
economy
Japan High,
concentrated
Multi-party,
predominant
coalition
High, but weak 
coalition 
government 
since 1992
Changing from 
protected, 
heavily 
domestic 
oriented 
economy to an 
internationalise 
d one
Table 1 notes the medium to dispersed levels of centralisation of power in New Zealand 
and Malaysia, compared with a much higher level of concentration in the case of Japan. In spite 
of these, each enjoyed high levels of political stability over the past two decades. This was also 
true during the most recent economic crisis in Malaysia and Japan. However, in all three 
countries governments increasingly came to be formed through broad multi-party coalitions.
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This was especially true in the 1990s. In contrast, thel980s were a period in which government’s 
were dominated by single parties in all the countries. All the countries were dealing with policy 
reforms connected with economic internationalisation in a variety of ways. Kuruvilla and 
Venkatraman (1996: 12-13) examine the relations between industrial relations regimes and 
industrialisation policy in Asia; demonstrating a link between industrialisation strategies and 
chosen modes of integration into the global economic system. The relationships between 
political structures and developmental strategies are discussed in detail in individual chapters. 
Their utility lies in the fact that they facilitate explanations of why different states approach 
economic restructuring with varying levels of commitment. The questions raised above 
demonstrate the renewed importance for understanding how economic policies are formulated 
in the first place. Arguably, comparisons of the different states have shown that economic 
restructuring has generally continued in spite of regime changes. It is therefore proposed that the 
context of economic policy formulation deserves wider attention as some of the explanations for 
the centrality of regulation of labour to the overall process of restructuring are clearly located 
in this sphere. If there is a convergence of economic policy criteria during a period of 
accelerated economic internationalisation, how are the variabilities in modes of labour regulation 
and outcomes in labour markets to be explained? This is a central problem for this research.
3:5 Periodising the country observations
Given the fact that a range of domestic and international exigencies have affected the 
patterns of economic internationalisation in these countries, it was important to pay attention to 
specific periods for which observations and data were presented. By paying particular attention 
to périodisation, two concerns were redressed. Firstly, by periodising the country observations, 
I was able to mark out periods in which significant associations between specific domestic and 
international factors could be observed. This allowed me to identify some general approaches 
to economic reform more systematically. A clear périodisation was also necessary in order to 
assess the causal weighting ascribed to different factors. Furthermore, by clearly periodising the 
observations, 1 was able to contextualise the historical observations by references to the broader 
international factors. Each of the country chapters therefore commences by looking at the broad 
features and approaches to economic development in the post-war decades, leading up to the 
early 1970s. During this period, the predominant developmental approaches were shaped by 
quite different national specificities (such as post-war reconstruction in Japan, and post-colonial 
industrialisation in Malaysia and New Zealand). But the developmental approaches were also53
influenced by an international context characterised by the term ‘new international division of 
labour’ which provided impetus and incentives for transnationalisation of industry and the 
implementation of international trade friendly developmental policies. The second part of the 
observations are focussed upon the 1970s. During this decade, these three countries were 
exposed to a common set of international economic pressures that were at least in part related 
to the oil crises. The third part of the observations are focussed more specifically upon the 1980s. 
During this period, the countries experienced a significant shift in the economic policy 
orientation. The final part of the observations are focussed on developments between 1990 and 
the end of 1996. Preliminary remarks and comments are made about some significant 
developments in 1997 and 1998. While a clinical périodisation has been difficult, the time 
periods for which observations are presented help us better understand some of the specific and 
the general economic policy shifts and changes. However, the framework for periodising the 
observations is prefaced with a cautionary note. There were changes and shifts occurring in all 
the countries across overlapping time frames and which may have not been affected by similar 
exigencies or factors. These are brought out in the in the country discussions.
3:6 Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the historical-comparative approach is most helpful in 
exploring the complex and contingent relationships between state, modes of labour regulation 
and economic globalisation. With adequate safeguards to ensure comparability, validity and 
desired levels of generality, the countries selected can throw light on the interconnectedness 
between these variables. At the same, time, the study of economic globalisation is a far broader 
project that attempted here. What is required is a more ambitious project where the framework 
elaborated here could be applied more broadly if the theoretically desirable levels of generality 
are to be attained. Given the variability of the three states, interesting and historically specific 
accounts of restructuring can be studied in an exploratory manner. The next three chapters 
outline the country experiences. The chapters that follow try to assess and separate the particular 
from the general.
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Endnotes: Chapter Three
1. The ‘regulation approach’ is commonly attributed to the work on Aglietta (1979) 
who observes regime changes in a predominantly US context. This approach has 
since been applied to the European context in the works of a number of ‘regulation 
school’ authors.
2. Boyer and Drache argue that a political transformation that the process of 
economic globalisation creates is the ‘displacement of the sites and objects of 
political struggle for oppositional movements’. The uncertainties and contested 
‘political spaces thus created suggest that neo-liberal imperatives can be contested 
both in the social and economic terrain. The forms such contestation will take in 
specific formations is unclear in this period of profound adjustment’ (Boyer and 
Drache, eds. 1996:395).
3. Cross-national studies have already been burdened with the problem of 
operationalising complex ideas and concepts. Sanders, for example, notes that a basic 
concept such as the political strength of trade unions is ‘a more elusive notion than 
simple membership since it entails the extraordinarily difficult task of ascertaining the 
precise extent of unions’ formal and informal links with political parties and the 
extent to which trade union leaders enjoy access to senior party officials (Sanders, 
1994: 517). This already complex concept is made even more elusive as a result of 
transformations in electoral systems in countries such as New Zealand and Japan, 
growth of trade union internationalism including trade union access to policy making 
at the international level. These coupled with major transitions within the trade union 
movement, including creative and new forms of alliances with disorganised labour 
underscores the fluidity of this concept.
4. It was also clear that in the present period, the demarcations between left and right 
became less clear and more muddied. See Panitch and Leys eds., 1999.
5. Bonefeld, Brown and Burnham (1995:51) argue that the policy of state austerity in 
Britain was achieved ‘not only through trade union co-option but also, and 
importantly, by the claim that government’s hand was forced by international 
bankers, and in particular, the IMF’. In practise, however, capital markets do wield 
pressure upon the political system, not through institutional mechanisms, but mainly 
through the effect of uncertainties in capital markets upon exchange rate stability. 
However, real pressure is exerted in cases where multilateral institutional bailouts 
through the IMF’s structural adjustment facilities take place. There is no reason to 
assume why any of the OECD states can be forever immune from this. Secondly, 
voluntary agreements between states such as the convergence criteria for a single 
currency in the EU can also translate into austerity programmes.
6. An example of a new reform agent is the ‘transnational technocratic class’. Sklair 
(1995: 1996) argues that bureaucrats who belong to this class oscillate between 
national treasuries, multilateral institutions and national and global think tanks.
7. The problem of disciplinary boundaries is examined by Wallerstein (et.al., 1996).
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They outline the state-centric foundations of classical social science and its legacy in 
the present period. They advance a compelling argument for removing disciplinary 
barriers. The problems identified in using data drawn from different disciplines in this 
study would re-affirm some of the thesis advanced in that report.
8. Roots (1993) critically assesses the claims for value-free social sciences and 
exposed the liberal 19th Century ideal as the value-laden choice of a set of ‘good’ as 
the foundational principle of much of social sciences. In the real world, where we 
assess competing claims for the ‘national interest’, arising as a result of the nation­
states accommodating both a national and global context at the same time, the social 
sciences are more likely to lend support to one or another claim for the national good.
9. There are a number of implications for theory construction based on this approach. 
Drawing on the work of Reinhard Bendix, Axtmann concludes ‘this is also an 
argument against a research strategy which is built around ceteris paribus 
assumptions; rather than downgrade historical variations, Bendix favours an approach 
which allows for variability and diversity in context. (Theory) thus operates on the 
assumption of uniqueness and has therefore, of necessity, to downgrade the 
importance of identifying, for explanatory purposes, cases comparable because of 
their (shared) structural characteristics’ (Axtmann, 1993:70).
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Chapter Four: Radical restructuring, accelerated internationalisation and labour market- 
deregulation in New Zealand
4:0 Introduction
New Zealand has been projected as the ‘world model’ for structural adjustment (Kelsey, 
1995). It is also being marketed by institutions such as the World Bank as the ‘best practice’ 
model for other reforming economies. There are three sets of issues that New Zealand story of 
reform raises. They are, firstly, that a quite unique combination of domestic and global 
exigencies induced significant pressures upon capital accumulation during the 1980s, which 
formed the backdrop to the sweeping economic reforms of the 1980s. Secondly, the key effects 
of these reforms were felt through a reconstitution o f state/market relations via a deregulation 
and a market based re-regulation of labour. Finally, these reforms aided the accelerated 
internationalisation of its economy. The key problem that this Chapter addresses is how do we 
interpret the role of organised labour in such a major transition, understand its apparent lack of 
response during the transition period and its relationship to the external environment.
This chapter is laid out in the following manner. It first examines the socio-historical 
setting of the radical reform programme of the 1980s and 1990s; emphasising the development 
of a highly corporatist model of labour regulation during the post-war decades and a re­
negotiation of its terms of economic internationalisation in the 1970s. The sections that follow 
examine the economic and political crises of the 1980s and outline state strategies and policies 
in relation to these crises. The third section examines how labour market policies featured in 
these responses and examines the place of labour in these policy transformations. The chapter 
concludes by drawing attention to the transformations within state institutions and in labour 
markets that and their association with the accelerated internationalisation of the New Zealand 
economy.
4:1 Background to New Zealand’s reform
New Zealand presents the starkest example of the intemationalisation/globalisation 
among these case studies. In this respect, it serves as the comparator. This is a consequence of 
the sustained economic restructuring since 1984. This reform agenda emerged from a historic 
combination of domestic and global exigencies. The objective of this agenda has been to 
‘transform the very architecture of the state on the foundation of economic rationalism’ (Kelly, 
1995:334; Easton, ed. 1989; Roper and Rudd, eds.1993; Kelsey, 1995).
New Zealand’s colonial and post-colonial economy was horizontally integrated with the
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UK and to a lesser extent Australia. It suffered serious challenges when Britain joined the 
European common market in 1975. Its joining resulted in the ending of preferential access 
arrangements into the UK market for many of New Zealand’s primary exports. This, combined 
with the impacts of the 1973 oil crises, aggravated its economic problems. The economic crisis 
that followed had severe consequences for labour. During the 1970s, declining commodity 
prices for New Zealand’s primary products on world markets further stressed the Keynesian 
“think-big” interventions introduced by the conservative National government in the 1960s and 
1970s. But the overall approach of massive state investment remained on course during the long 
reign by the Nationals throughout the 1970s.
An incoming Labour Government in 1984 began a programme of financial liberalisation 
and sweeping economic reforms. While ostensibly, this programme was ‘engineered’ and led 
by parts of the state bureaucracy, it found support in a small but powerful fragment of the Labour 
Party cabinet. Given the party’s exceptionally close relation with organised labour, it attempted 
restructuring through a mode of corporatism as exemplified in the Labour Relations Act (LRA) 
of 1987. The defeat of Labour Government in 1988 provided an opportunity for the National 
Party-led government to complete the restructuring process, achieved by severing the links 
between state agencies and organised labour and operationalised through the Employment 
Contracts Act (ECA) in 1991. This Act completed the deregulation of the labour market and 
removed the last vestiges of state intervention in these markets.
Organised labour had initially sought accommodation with a reform oriented Labour 
government. This accommodation was endorsed through the Labour Relations Act in 1987. 
However, collective bargaining and union membership had already entered into a rapid slide. In 
a little less than a decade, one of the best organised workforces in the world had been reduced 
to a fringe pressure group, with little political clout in a deeply fragmented Labour Party that was 
to be condemned to the opposition benches for another decade. There was little comfort in 
judicial redress to the employer onslaught. However, electoral reforms that introduced a 
proportional representation system gave smaller parties some leverage in parliament, raising the 
possibility that the special concerns of organised labour could be represented and possibly 
defended. In spite of this organised labour was to remain devoid of direct political leverage. 
Organised labour has come to accept the dilemmas of trade liberalisation and reform, belatedly 
accepting that peak tripartite social settlements are a thing of the past. It has also come to accept 
the value of local, workplace and shopfloor based responses, an approach that had been
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substantially devalued during the corporatist era.
The New Zealand economy was internationalised quite rapidly as a result of the post- 
1984 reforms. Most of former state enterprises have been privatised, with transfers from one 
group of owners to others becoming common. Its financial sector has become one of the most 
open in the world. Inflation has been contained and unemployment significantly reduced with 
gains in jobs and incomes occurring in the newly competitive sectors (OECD, 1995). At the 
other end, with the collapse of the welfare state, ‘social exclusion’, ethnic fragmentation of the 
labour markets and open poverty have induced new political challenges. Organised labour has 
been isolated, and is largely incapable of influencing the social policy agenda.
Although based on the lines of the two party Westminster system, the party political 
landscape has become much more varied over the past decade. Since the end of the Second 
World War, Labour and National parties have dominated New Zealand's political landscape. 
However, by late 1996, this had already changed. The electoral disillusionment with Labour's 
sponsorship of sweeping economic reforms precipitated the rise of new political groupings. The 
adoption of a multi-member proportional representation system of voting under which elections 
were held in 1997 broadened the parliamentary representation of new political groupings. It may 
have also brought to an end the single party governments that emerge from the dominant two 
party system. In a decade of persistent setbacks, organised labour's one significant victory was 
the adoption of the new electoral system (CTU, 1995:3). However, this development is unlikely 
to lead to radical policy shifts, which would indicate a return to an organised labour-led agenda 
in the near future. While new forms of political contestation have developed, these have not 
involved trade unions and related labour organisations.
It is noteworthy that in New Zealand, it was the Labour Party which launched the process 
of radical economic re-structuring in the mid-1980s, leading to its gradual distantiation from, and 
a weakening of organised labour and the eventual demise of corporatism (Holland and Boston, 
eds. 1990; Jesson, 1989).' The context in which it launched this programme is also important. 
Re-structuring on the scale supported by the Fourth Labour Government was not part of its 
election manifesto in early 1980's. To that extent it demonstrated a lack of electoral support for 
the project. However, by the time of its 1984 electoral victory, disillusionment with the quality 
and delivery of public services had become widespread. However, the reform agenda had been 
amply elaborated in a publication by then Labour backbencher, Roger Douglas in 1980. The 
Finance Minister’s views complemented neatly those of the policy-making team within the
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Treasury that he inherited, which was overtly committed to the reform process.2 As the finance 
Minister, Douglas strongly pushed the restructuring agenda onto the centre stage within the 
Labour Cabinet in a relatively short period, moving the party as a whole further right in the 
process (Douglas, 1980).3 Finally, the economy that Labour inherited at the time was in its 
severest crisis since the great depression (Kelsey, 1993; 1995).
Labour's restructuring agenda followed in the wake of almost a decade of National's 
‘think-big’ state-led development strategies. It was clear that by the time of Labour's electoral 
victory public attitudes and more importantly perceptions within the government bureaucracy 
about the organisation of state and the economy had shifted dramatically. Signalling Labour's 
intention to proceed with restructuring, Douglas declared ‘we cannot protect everyone from the 
adverse short-run impact of what has to be done’ (IMF, Summary of Proceedings, 1984: 216-19). 
The Labour-led restructuring signalled the end at an era of corporatist politics and the demise 
of a Keynesian consensus in New Zealand. It was replaced by a developmental ideology that was 
informed in the main by managerialism, public choice and agency theories. When public opinion 
shifted to favour the reforms, it became much more difficult for pressure groups including 
organised labour to influence policy reversals. Further, the question of policy reversals in New 
Zealand did not arise, as the National government that followed Labour was even more 
determined to complete the restructuring process. The new National Government of 1990 pushed 
forward the restructuring agenda with a degree of urgency rarely seen in Western social 
democracies.4 Political changes fed the restructuring process, transforming New Zealand in a 
relatively short time span of some 15 years into one of the most open economies in the region. 
In this process almost no sector of the state, or its economy and the relations between the two 
were left unchanged. But to read-off the restructuring process in New Zealand in terms of the 
shifting contours of electoral politics denies the role of non-party political agencies.
Radical reform in New Zealand coincided with a clear ideological shift in the 
parliamentary system to the right. A blurring of the differences between the two dominant parties 
has expressed itself clearly in the 1990s - making the party political struggle to dominate the 
economic policy formulation apparatus less electorally controversial. As a result, restructuring 
and economic globalisation in New Zealand brings to the fore issues about the hegemony of 
developmental ideologies. This raises the question, how do successive governments implement 
and sustain policy options that visibly disadvantage labour? The massive defeat of Labour in 
1990 and an unworkable majority for the National Party in the 1997 general elections exemplify
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the popular discontent with New Zealand's party political system. Legitimation via the traditional 
parliamentary instruments appears to have run out of steam. We thus have to look elsewhere to 
understand how such a sweeping anti -labour reforms have been sustained within the framework 
of a parliamentary democracy.
The legitimisation puzzle is further complicated when the profound dislocations in New 
Zealand’s public sector are analysed. There was extensive downsizing of the public/state sector. 
The introduction of contract work, part and flexi-work, dismantling of superannuation rights and 
dislodging of employment security has created a highly vulnerable and insecure public sector 
workforce. Arguably such dislocations could lead to a radicalisation of employees in public 
sector and a consequent weakening of the state. When the battle lines between the state and its 
own employees are drawn so sharply, the problem of legitimation is compounded. Similarly, the 
dismantling of the welfare state could have led to the re-emergence of strong radical working 
class politics. However, such prospects seem unlikely. I return to this paradox later in this 
chapter.
New Zealand readily reacted to changes in the global economic system since the 1970's 
and met its obligations as part of the Caims Group and a member of the GATT framework. But 
the restructuring that resulted from commitments under these was political. Both its heavy 
protection and corporatist settlements with organised labour had acted as disincentives to 
investment. Structural weaknesses in its economy that resulted from the heavy dependence of 
its premier export industries upon state support had ensured that its markets were politically 
regulated. Thus the restructuring of state/market relations in New Zealand was a deeply political 
programme. To understand these, we need to examine the historical-economic setting in which 
the New Zealand ‘experiment’ occurred.
Through this, I draw out the policy continuities over a longer time frame. The thesis 
argues that the contradictory demands of ensuring domestic political and economic stability, and 
generating conditions favourable to capital accumulation have brought to the forefront a systemic 
tendency of depoliticisation of macroeconomic policy and economic management by different 
governments. The depoliticisation of economic policy has made it easier for successive 
governments to implement reform programmes without being derailed by class and interest 
group pressures. The concern of policy makers has been not so much with ensuring continuities, 
but creatively anchoring reform policies in ways that shield them from future changes in 
Government. The prevention of policy oscillation thus appears to have become one of the
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primary features of economic reform since 1984.
4:2 Socioeconomic transformations in the post-war period
As a British colonial economy, ‘New Zealand developed as a colonial farm, partially 
funded through British investors in order to supply the UK consumer with relatively low cost, 
high quality foodstuffs and fibres’ (Britton, 1991:5). Its early economic activities were, like 
those of other colonies, tied to the needs of the colonial economic system which came with a 
privileged market access (Roper and Rudd eds., 1993:7-11). It was incorporated into this system 
on the basis of both its ‘environmental advantages as well as its political ties’ (Britton, 1991:4). 
During the post-war decades, agricultural and industrial development that was premised upon 
favourable terms of trade with the United Kingdom mainly supported the strengthening of a 
corporatist regulatory framework. This framework came to be challenged in the early 1970s, 
when the favourable trade links were exposed to serious pressures. Between the end of the war, 
and at least until the mid 1970s, the New Zealand economy had remained a relatively closed one 
(OECD, 1993).
Over the past fifty years the New Zealand economy has been transformed from one that 
gave it the highest standard of living in the world post-second world war years to one that has 
ranked between 20 and 25 in the Human Development Index over the past decade. This has 
coincided with a significant ‘retreat’ of the welfare state (Kelsey, 1993) and a transformation 
from a high wage to a low wage economy by OECD standards (OECD, 1993). Epitomising its 
changing position in the global economy has been the transition from a primary product exporter 
to a base for a range of manufactured products and services and the development of substantially 
diversified trade relations with the Asia/Pacific region.
Since the depression of the 1930s successive governments have sought to stabilise 
income from the export sector and diversify the economy through an import substitution strategy. 
This was based on an extensive programme of state intervention and the encouragement of 
strategically important foreign investment in mercantile services, food processing, transportation 
and manufacturing branch plants. A last major extension of state intervention occurred in the late 
1970s and early 80s under the National government. New Zealand had historically relied 
'heavily on relatively unprocessed primary based commodities and a single export destination, 
the UK’ (Britton, 1991:5). The entry of the UK into the European Community ended New 
Zealand's privileged access to the UK market. This subsequently provided the impetus for export
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diversification and processing based on extensive state intervention and overseas borrowing in 
the 1970s.
Protected export markets, for principal export commodities such as dairy products, wool,
meat and fruits had meant that productivity increases generally lagged behind that of other
OECD countries (OECD, 1993: 50-55). In the crucial decade before the commencement of the
restructuring process, the New Zealand economy grew by a paltry 0.2 percent compared with 1.8
percent OECD average (OECD, 1993 and 1994). In the same period, its GDP per capita rose by
a similar 0.2 percent. By the 1970s, New Zealand was one of the most regulated economies in
the OECD (Kelly, 1995; Britton, 1991; OECD, 1993). Noting this, Britton observed that
by the 1970s the country was one of the most protected and state directed in the 
OECD. Even after a decade of slow reductions in state regulation, there were still 
over 400 acts of Parliament and 1000 associated regulations which had economic 
effects in 1984, along with $NZ 2 billion of producer subsidies - representing 6 
percent of GDP (Britton, 1991:4).
The coming to power of the Labour Government in 1984 marked the beginning of a new phase 
of reform which was to be characterised by the rapid removal of state intervention from the 
economic sphere, and restructured micro-economic environment so that enterprises and 
industries became more open to international competition. The sequence of the reforms took 
account of political considerations. These reforms began by the deregulation of the capital 
markets. Complete labour market deregulation was not to follow until some six years later.
The New Zealand pattern of reform is also complicated by renewed pressures by 
indigenous Maori communities for control over natural resources, recognition of indigenous 
rights and attempts to achieve a settlement of the problems associated with the colonial period. 
Tensions between the indigenous Maori communities and the predominant white community 
have intensified in the 1990s and re-politicised economic policy formulation with reference to 
the mediation of ethnic interests (Awatere, 1993).5
An immigration policy closely linked with labour market considerations has seen the 
inflow of skilled, professional and business investors mainly from the Asian region over the past 
decade. This has complemented the traditional Pacific Islander migration flows that have given 
New Zealand a very ethnically diversified population. Ethnically segmented labour markets, and 
in particular a much higher proportion of unemployment among the Maori and Pacific Islander 
communities periodically unsettles New Zealand's social stability through worsening race 
relations: a trend that is likely to be exercebated as a result of further internationalisation of its 
economy. Immigration has stabilised the loss of skills to mainly Australia and the US - a process63
that was greatly speeded up as a result of the lay-offs, income declines and employment 
insecurity that came to be associated with the restructuring process of the 1980s. Moreover, 
restructuring has unmasked ethnic and racial privileges and inequalities that in an era of full 
employment and welfarism had remained less visible (Kelsey, 1993). Both the structural and 
social features of this transformation are relevant to our analysis of the changing modes of labour 
regulation in New Zealand.
4:3 The socio-economic context of restructuring in the 1980s
It is important to situate New Zealand's restructuring in its historical and political setting.
The Labour Party formed its first government in the 1980s in the midst of a severe recession
(Bollard and Buckle, 1987; Holland and Boston, eds. 1990) and when the economy displayed
‘one of the most lacklustre performances among countries in the developed world’ (The
Treasury, 1984:103). ‘The considerable increase in unemployment from 20,000 in 1978 to over
80,000 by the end of 1983’ turned public opinion away from government (The Treasury,
1987:271). However, economic reforms did not have immediate impacts upon the levels of open
unemployment, as by 1993 this had reached 211,000 (Statistics New Zealand, 1995:34).
A growing open unemployment rate placed three sets of pressures upon the state in the
mid-1980s. Firstly, it burdened an already over-stretched welfare state amidst its deepest
recession in the post-war era. Further, it brought into the open the ethnically segmented nature
of labour markets and the concentration of unemployment in Maori and Pacific Islander
communities. Unemployment among the Maori communities, for example, was as high as 25
percent by 1990. Thirdly, it gave the state a powerful popular rationale to support its
restructuring agenda, and placate the unemployed at the same time.
The mid 1980s data of economic performance:
showed that over the ten years to 1983, real GDP grew by less than half the 
average for all OECD countries. For the same period, prices increased by nearly 
one and half times the OECD average, while the registered unemployment rate 
increased markedly compared with other OECD countries. This relatively poor 
employment and growth performance occurred despite a dramatic increase in 
external borrowing (The Treasury, 1984: 104).
A deterioration of New Zealand's credit rating epitomised the extent of the debt problem. This 
was to become another selling point for the reforms. While New Zealand suffered a deterioration 
in its credit ranking in mid-1980s, it was far from the Third World type of debt case that it was
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made out to be (NZ Business Roundtable, 1990). However, this is not to argue that it did not face 
a critical debt problem. Its external debts had grown from $863 million (8.5 percent of GDP) in 
1974/5 to $12 billion (31 percent of GDP) by 1984/5. Interests payments alone on its total debt 
accounted for 6.7 percent of GDP in the same year (OECD, 1994; 1995). The expansion in debt 
servicing costs from 10.8 percent of net government expenditure in 1983/4 to 14.4 percent in 
1984/5 demonstrated the growing pressures on government revenues in a context of growing 
open unemployment.
Highlighting its impact on government, Clark and Williams (1995: 36) noted that:
By 1983 it had become obvious that the Prime Minister had begun to lose the 
support of some of his key colleagues. His unilateral decision to call a snap 
election proved to be a disaster for the Government. The election found Labour 
on the treasury benches for the first time since 1972. Despite warnings from the 
Reserve Bank and the Treasury, Sir Robert Muldoon had consistently refused to 
act, and $US110 moved offshore the day after the election. By 31 July 1984, the 
Auckland Star reported that half a billion dollars had left the country and that in 
the absence of a massive devaluation, the world might see the sight of a 
(developed) country going bankrupt.
A stabilisation programme thus moved high on the new Labour Government's agenda
immediately following its electoral victory. It began with a twenty- percent devaluation. These
new economic circumstances rather than any well thought out electoral manifesto drove
structural reforms. These brought home the extent of insularity in New Zealand's economy, even
though it had historically been a trading nation and had begun to make adjustments at the time
of the entry of the UK into the European single market. It also exposed the weak foundations of
its social democratic and corporatist consensus.
The 1984 crisis also marked a fundamental shift in the system of Government in New
Zealand. Following the post-election fiscal crisis of the state, the Treasury and the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand were able to dominate economic policy with relative ease. One important
consequence of the post-election devaluation as part of a stabilisation measure was the effect it
had on the new Labour government itself.
These decisions were made before the cabinet had been selected or the 
government sworn in; they occurred within the power vacuum. They were not 
Labour Party policy; they were Reserve Bank and Treasury policy. Control had 
passed not to the elected members of the Labour Government but to their 
advisers in the Reserve Bank and the Treasury. The pattern continued in the 
months that followed, as the government rapidly passed a series o f radical 
measures: the abolition of exchange controls, the deregulation of finance, 
abolition of subsidies and incentives, the floating of the dollar .... A coup had
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occurred, with power passing to a small group of cabinet ministers and top-level 
bureaucrats (Jesson, 1989:4).
In this respect, it is argued that structural reforms that characterise states in the contemporary era 
also mark a significant change in governance and in public policy formulation; highlighting the 
ascendance of power of ‘elite technocrats’ (Kelly, 1995) both in governments and policy making 
units within political parties.
While 1984 marks the watershed year, there were threads of continuity with reforms 
instigated in the last years of the National government. Under both political regimes, 
fundamental policy changes were initiated in response to a deepening economic crisis originating 
from contradictions that arose as a result of the global recession, decades of protectionism, and 
shifts in the nature of international competition and organisation of production (Britton, 1991:5; 
Duncan, Lattimore and Bollard, 1992). The forms in which such economic crisis present 
themselves are often political and thus state responses have not only been via economic policy 
instruments, but also through a range of social and public policy measures.
There is a common thread of argument that exceptionally high unemployment, balance 
of payment problems and an unsustainable external debt were the cause of structural reforms. 
This line of argument (Kelsey, 1993: Roper and Rudd eds. 1992) needs qualification. These 
factors may have been the symptoms that triggered Governments to act, although restructuring 
had slowly been coming to the centre stage in New Zealand from the late 1960s onwards. The 
National government’s 'think-big' strategy in the 1970s was a last ditch effort by New Zealand 
to prolong the corporatist compromise. But the Labour Government came to realise that as a 
trading nation, the promotion of a state supported national capitalism would create collisions 
with international capital. The promotion of a national capitalist class propped up by extensive 
state support and the exclusion of such support to capital generally had begun to adversely affect 
employment creation and economic growth. However, in the internationalised markets, capital 
can severely discipline insulated economies as indeed the Labour Government learned in its first 
few days of office in 1984 (The Economist. 1995:5-8).
The OECD lists the following problems that the incoming Labour Government inherited 
in 1984. They were: a fiscal deficit of 9 percent of GDP, a growing debt problem, a persistent 
current external deficit, which was complicating overseas debt management and putting pressure 
on the exchange rate; an overvalued exchange rate and a run on the New Zealand dollar that 
looked likely to exhaust the foreign exchange reserves; a lax monetary policy which, because66
of the unwillingness to accept higher interest rates, had led to excessive monetary growth. It 
further noted that a heavy reliance on interventionist policies had inhibited the flow of labour and 
capital to their most productive uses (OECD, 1985:11). These form the backdrop to the 
stabilisation regime that the incoming Labour Government put in place, to be followed by a 
comprehensive restructuring programme.
There was a significant political backdrop to the embrace of deregulation policies by the 
Labour Government of 1984. The electoral defeat of the Bill Rowling Labour government in 
1975 had already raised the electoral stakes of the ‘neo-realists’ within the Labour Party in the 
early 1980's. The compact with organised labour and commitment to the welfare state were no 
longer at the forefront of the Labour Party policies. This was also aided by the general 
disillusionment with 'Keynesian policies' within the Treasury (Denemark, 1990:282).
Labour regulation was the pivot in which the restructuring policies turned. Walsh (1989: 
165-69) argued that industrial relations reform under the fourth Labour Government, and the 
setting back of radical reform under the Labour Relations Act represented a ‘family fight’. 
However, by 1987, the labour market reform programme was only beginning to take effect. The 
programme was comprehensive and would eventually lead to the near complete demise of 
corporatist politics. This was clearly much more than a ‘family fight’.
This study of restructuring with its focus on labour regulation and the public sector 
departs from the main body of industrial relations literature on New Zealand in several ways. It 
places the reforms and restructuring in their broader political and economic setting. This setting 
is both determined by sets of New Zealand centred factors but also conditioned by global 
pressures. Factors from both these environments inform this analysis of New Zealand’s radical 
restructuring in the 1980s and the 1990s.
4:4 The restructuring agenda of the 1980s
The extent and pace of:
Systemic economic change in New Zealand during the reform years were 
breathtaking. With only some exaggeration, many observers compare the 
thorough-going program of market liberalisation, deregulation, corporatisation 
and privatisation to the dismantling of communism in Eastern Europe (Nagel,
1994:5).
The 'transformational' nature of the reforms implied that linear or incremental strategies had to 
be abandoned.
In a blitzkrieg of change, financial and foreign exchange markets were
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liberalised, factor and product markets were largely deregulated, incentives and 
supports were removed,...Supply side thinking replaced demand emphasis. 
Monetarist techniques supplanted fiscal weapons. Elegant theoretical constructs 
relating to public choice, managerialism and agency theory crowded out 
administrative wisdom... New Zealand embarked on the most radical programme 
of monetarist market-oriented structural adjustment o f any developed country 
(Kelly, 1995:335).
OECD (1995) lists the key policy transformations in detail. Restructuring relied upon extensive 
legislative overhaul that affected employment in all sectors of the economy. Complex re­
organisation of work in enterprises located in protected and public sectors followed on the back 
of legal reform. The goals and criteria for attaining competitiveness induced substantial changes 
in management practices and in the strategies of employee organisations including trade unions. 
Structural reforms sought to secure the primacy of market forces; of capital directly regulating 
the factors and social relations of production. This transition was a fundamental pre-requisite for 
the further integration of the New Zealand economy into the global system. However, structural 
reforms can also retard such integration. New Zealand’s early reforms disadvantaged large 
segments of its population. They gave rise to sporadic, but disorganised confrontations with the 
state and facilitated electoral challenges to the party in government. The fourth Labour 
Government was to pay a price for initiating such reforms in a highly regulated environment. It 
was to be denied control of government for at least another decade.
The crucial explanation about the form and direction of reforms was that they were 
presented as a technical solution to economic and thus political problems. This de-politicisation 
of economic policy making in New Zealand played an important role in focussing and protecting 
the reforms from pressure group politics. De-politicisation was to take various forms. But 
primarily it involved the subcontracting of fundamental economic policy formation to selected, 
and well-shielded state agencies such as the Treasury and the Reserve Bank. In this manner 
fundamental political choices could be presented as technical economic choices.
A feeble attempt by Labour at re-kindling corporatism was abandoned early. This 
attempt had close parallels with the UK experience where the:
politics of incorporation meant that austerity had to be endorsed by the trade 
unions. The incorporation of the trade unions (amounts) to an attempt at 
depoliticising the state from the social consequences o f austerity. However, the 
legitimation of austerity through incorporation of trade unions (is) precarious 
(Bonefeld et. al. 1995: 49-50).
A restructuring of organised labour and state relations followed quite naturally in the wake of 
the new policy environment. The process was associated with the reification of what was at best
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an economic ideology into technical questions. This has been essential in ensuring the 
implementation and sustainability of structural reforms.
4:5 Economic reforms and accelerated internationalisation in the 1980s
While it is difficult to conclusively relate structural reforms to the level of 
internationalisation in any economy, some selective yardsticks help illustrate the trend of 
internationalisation. In the first instance, the liberalisation of foreign exchange markets led to 
increased export of New Zealand capital offshore. Secondly, some import substitution industries 
‘badly affected by the combination of reduced protection and high interest rates relocated their 
production to offshore sites offering cheaper material inputs and labour’. As a consequence, 
financial sector reforms help explain the steady rise ‘in overseas interests in the New Zealand 
economy’. In this regard, between 1974-1978, the Overseas Investments Commission had 
approved 936 'overseas companies' commencing business in New Zealand. The period 1984- 
1988 saw a significant increase in this figure to 3,588 (Britton, 1991:6-9). Ninety percent of New 
Zealand's banking industry were owned by foreign banks in 1995 (Council of Trade Unions, 
1995: 9), which according to The Economist (1995: 30-45) was the most internationalised of 
sectors.
The impact of restructuring on trading patterns product differentiation and shifting export 
priorities was also clearly visible.
New Zealand products are found in some 40 countries, with six out of ten top 
markets located in the Asian region and accounting for almost 35 % of exports.
By contrast, the United Kingdom in 1992 took 6.5% of our exports; in 1963 that 
market accounted for 53%. Similarly, Australia, which took 4% in 1960, 
absorbed 19.3% of exports in 1992 (Clark and Williams, 1995: 23).6 
These trends have meant that ownership of industries diversified with considerably less
New Zealand ownership. The differentiated ownership on the backs of the deregulated
environment resulted in more aggressive lobbying strategies of corporate interest groups,
particularly the Business Roundtable. The Business Roundtable is a closed, by-invitation only
club dominated by the principal executives of the some of the largest corporations in New
Zealand. Its ascendance as a pressure group was particularly noteworthy. This coincided with
a parallel decline in the role and influence o f the New Zealand Employer’s Federation, which
had developed during the corporatist era.
Internationalisation had two other key impacts. It resulted in an increase in the number 
of overseas trained or based corporate managers moving to New Zealand. This was a relatively
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new development which came to be widespread. Secondly, rapid internationalisation was also 
achieved through equity take-overs by foreign capital. This had the result of diluting the presence 
and influence of New Zealander corporate managers over labour market policies. These were 
significant transformations although the most fundamental change was not in Financial sector 
regulations; it was in the area of labour market policy and practice.
4:6 Reform of the labour regulation regime: 1984-1992
New Zealand, for the best part of the past Century was characterised by a degree of
continuity in its regulatory framework in the industrial relations arena. The source of this
stability was the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1894 (ICA Act), which
established a complex system of compulsory arbitration and conciliation, establishing the basis
thereby, for a highly regulationist state. Interestingly, the ICA Act followed the great Maritime
Strike of 1‘890 in which workers and a number of newly set-up unions were delivered a crushing
blow by the state. The wastefulness and disruptive nature o f strikes deeply impressed upon the
newly appointed Minister of Labour, William Pember Reeves to re-look at state, labour and
employer relations afresh, resulting in the ICA Act (Roper and Rudd eds. 1983). Incremental
changes to the ICA Act occurred regularly, for example, in 1921 when the arbitration courts
were given powers to fix wages related to cost of living. These often led to general wage orders
and wage/price and employment trade-offs were often made within the corporatist framework
of industrial relations that was derived from this act. In 1931, provisions for compulsory
unionism were removed but were reintroduced in 1936. The 1936 changes to the ICA Act also
supported the development of national unions more generally. A preference clause for unionists
in Arbitration Court awards made union exclusion less attractive for employees in organised
sectors of employment, giving New Zealand exceptionally high levels of union density until
1991 (Brooks, 1995; Hinceand Harbridge, 1994).
Boxall and Decks (1993: 299) label the ICA Act as an attempt:
to create a system that would deliver statutory recognition and guaranteed dispute 
settlement to the trade unions and industrial relations stability to employers. For 
the government, the system was designed to facilitate national economic 
development without socially disruptive strike activity. In retrospect, the statute 
can be regarded as one of the earliest attempts in the world to enshrine a pluralist 
ideology in labour law, and encourage the resolution of industrial disputes 
through rational debate rather than demonstration o f bargaining power.
Consequently, New Zealand's labour regulation provisions were corporatist in intent and
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practice. In the post-war era of full employment, these arrangements served the key interest 
groups well, and provided a tier of consultation and policy making that aided the development 
of the welfare state (Boston 1995: 275-7).
Nowhere was the stabilising influence of the industrial relations system felt more heavily 
than in the area of wage fixing. The ICA Act nurtured a corporatist state which was Janus like 
in its operation. Although its wage-fixing jurisdiction was restrictive; the Act was a potent 
instrument of social policy especially with reference to relativities and comparative wage justice 
(Kelly, 1995:338). This system granted unions a monopoly bargaining position and provided for 
compulsory conciliation and arbitration of unresolved disputes.
Legislative changes in the 1980s and the EC A in 1990 were to abruptly bring to an end 
the long corporatist tradition of industrial relations. Significant changes occurred with the 
passing of the Industrial Relations Act of 1973 passed by a National Government which 
recognised that unions and employers had continued to negotiate alongside or above awards in 
the inflationary post war era. The Act specifically designated disputes of rights from disputes of 
interests, which in an indirect manner circumscribed the limits of state intervention and 
regulation (Boxall and Decks, 1993:300-301).
The next major reform was brought into place by the Labour Government in 1987, 
through the Labour Relations Act (LRA), providing for the establishment of larger unions with 
a minimum membership of 1,000 and greater membership accountability within unions. It 
principally sought to ensure the viability of unions, and transparency in their operations as well 
as their democratic functioning.7 It also required that a single set of negotiations cover 
employment conditions for a group of workers and gave unions the choice between award and 
agreement coverages. The LRA further empowered parties to bargain across the whole range of 
issues without any restrictions, granting greater responsibility for settlements and flexibility and 
removing the responsibilities of the state in this respect (Harbridge, ed. 1989). The general 
objectives of the LRA were complemented by the passing of the State Sector Act in 1988.
The LRA was a part of a much larger armoury with which the Labour government sought 
to restructure the New Zealand economy in the 1980s. Since the experiments of 1890s that 
resulted in progressive labour laws for the era," the 1987 changes marked the next substantial re­
look at labour laws and industrial relations processes. The explicit intention of facilitating 
enterprise bargaining and removing the protective cover of compulsory unionism was not lost 
of the two national union federations. They were acutely aware that their influences over the
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state policy machinery were already under considerable pressure as a result of changes within 
the state.’
The 1CA Act and other legislative developments influenced the organisation of unions 
and employers. A bargaining system that had historically given occupational floor-setting awards 
engendered the organisation of unions and employers along industry, regional and national lines. 
Long periods of compulsory unionism ensured that industry unions such as Engineers Union, NZ 
Distribution Union, Meat Workers Union among others enjoyed high membership. It appeared 
that these trends were being consolidated in 1987 with the amalgamation of private and public 
sector federations, (The Federation of Labour and Combined States Unions), resulting in the NZ 
Council of Trade Unions (NZCTU) with a total membership in excess o f 500,000 (Hince and 
Harbridge, 1994).
Given that the ICA Act required employer registration, the development of employer 
organisations was along similar lines. A number of regional employers’ federations had evolved 
by the early 1900s and the New Zealand Employers Federation (NZEF) was set up in 1902. By 
the early 1990s, the NZEF had come to enjoy an employer membership in excess o f 10,000 
(NZEF, annual reports). The New Zealand Business Roundtable had by that time begun to take 
over much of the role of employer advocacy in the political system. The Business Roundtable 
had persistently applied pressure since the early 1980s for a major reform o f industrial relations 
in New Zealand. Significantly, the Business Roundtable, dominated by senior executives of New 
Zealand's largest corporations, took over the role of actively pushing the agenda of radical labour 
market and public sector reforms. Given their overbearing influence, such a position was slowly 
adopted by the Federation itself, though not without resistance from the large numbers of small- 
scale employers who saw stability under the existing system of centralised bargaining and 
industrial relations. In fact the NZEF had to employ a major education campaign to win over its 
small employer membership base to support the reforms.10
The LRA had clearly heralded a new industrial relations paradigm deriving its strengths 
from rational choice and supply-side thinking in economic policy. It also heralded an era in 
which industrial relations policy was to be increasingly subsumed within economic policy 
framework. The Act hence triggered a gradual demise of the role of specialised government 
agencies such as the department of labour in policy formulation, and began to hollow out the 
corporatist arrangements. These clearly signalled that the underlying class politics was 
undergoing a reformulation. This was to come to a head with the new National government.
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Following the electoral defeat of the Labour Government in 1990, the National 
Government repealed the LRA in 1991, replacing it with the Employment Contracts Act (ECA). 
The ECA's key features were,
a. the scrapping of award system; employment relations would be determined by individual or 
collective contracts; decentralisation of bargaining to enterprise (or lower) was implied,
b. membership of workforce organisations would be entirely voluntary and devices such as union 
preference was prohibited,
c. the privileged position of unions was abolished; an employee might be represented by any 
bargaining agent or none at all,
d. bargaining agents would be recognised by employers of production of authorisation in respect 
of each employee represented,
e. the Minister and Department of Labour were excluded from any role in industrial relations 
processes,
f. provision of voluntary mediation and adjudication was retained by way of an Employment 
Tribunal and an Employment Court (Kelly, 1995:341).
The ECA was to fundamentally overhaul the entire system of industrial relations. While the ECA 
marked a decisive break in New Zealand's system of industrial relations, the underling project 
of restructuring displayed a high degree of continuity between the Labour government's agenda 
of the 1980s and that of the Nationals in the early 1990s. The ECA was preceded by 
complementary legislation. This included revoking Equal Opportunities Act of 1990, thus 
removing an important restriction in the increasingly deregulated labour market. The government 
also revoked the Trade Union Education Authority, a union education body based on the Unions 
Representatives Leave Act of 1986, further reducing the base of union organisation (Hince and 
Harbridge, 1994).
The ECA provided for the determination and primacy of individual contract of employment, or 
individually mandated collective contracts. Individual contracts of employment readily 
facilitated enterprise unionism and the decentralisation of collective bargaining. Compulsory 
unionism and union privileges were ended, replacing unions with bargaining agents who needed 
the sole authorisation of individual employees. The ECA excluded the Department of Labour 
from any role in the industrial relations processes, although it retained provisions for mediation 
via the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Court, which provided some relief to unions 
(Hince and Harbridge, 1994). The ECA made no reference to trade unions and its use of the term
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bargaining agents was unprecedented. Moreover, the one reference to unions (Section 185:1) was 
to ensure the re-registration of unions under the Incorporated Societies Act of 1908.
Quite clearly, the overriding mission of the ECA was to create an ‘efficient, disciplined 
and internationally competitive labour market’ which required that interventionist labour laws 
be rescinded. These changes were crucial for the completion of the structural reform agenda. 
Capital markets had already been deregulated as early as 1984. By 1991, there had been marginal 
improvements in the levels of employment. Policy makers felt that any halfway measure in 
labour market deregulation could threaten the entire reform process. Significantly, the ECA was 
not subject to negotiation in either the parliamentary process or the industrial relations machinery 
and was pushed through parliament with little advance warning (Grills, 1994:87). In this manner, 
economic restructuring came to be associated with anti-democratic sentiments.
By design, the ECA sought to ‘disorganise organised labour’ resulting in differentiating 
and segmenting labour markets into competitive and non-competitive sectors. It had no 
complementary social policy through which fallouts could be cushioned. By extrapolation, it 
sought to dismember the political influence of organised labour. The ECA had far-reaching 
consequences not only for the labour market but also more broadly. Rigidities in the labour 
markets began to explode readily. Union coverage collapsed from by roughly 200,000 within the 
first two years of the Act (Hince and Harbridge, 1994:7). Collective bargaining similarly 
collapsed (Harbridge and Kiely, 1995; Harbridge et.al. 1996). But the acquiescence and 
marginalisation of organised labour was not derived solely by the radical changes in the 
regulatory environment. Employment security was devalued so that labour experienced 
increased vulnerability at the individual as well as at a collective level. For this, a discussion of 
the sweeping reforms of New Zealand’s public sector is relevant.
4:7 Public sector reforms and the enhanced vulnerability of labour after 1988
By the mid-1990s, New Zealand had again become the International Monetary Fund's 
and the World Bank's model for reforming states (The Economist, 1995). World Bank financed 
technical and ministerial missions from Latin American, Caribbean, South Pacific and 
Scandinavian Europe have visited the country recently seeking to draw lessons for reform." One 
element behind this popularity was the radical overhaul of the public sector.
Public sector restructuring preceded other structural reforms including labour market 
deregulation. The State Services Act of 1988 was introduced in the mid-term of the Fourth
Labour government. But this did not mean that union opposition was non-existent.12 What 
happened instead was that the traditional levers of union access to government policy were 
transformed. Public Sector restructuring was brought to the centre stage through the Treasury's 
1984 ‘Economic Management’ report, prepared as a brief for ihe incoming Labour Government 
(The Treasury, 1984). The period of the Fourth Labour government saw the final ascendancy of 
the Treasury over other government departments as the principal source of major economic 
policy advice. This was to eventually change also the nature of parliamentary democracy in New 
Zealand; as a government with a simple parliamentary majority could fundamentally alter the 
structure of economy and society.
The ‘Economic Management’ report proposed broad policy reforms across a range of 
issues. Jesson (1989:43) observed that:
"Economic Management" was a hard-line Chicago School document that must 
have been written with the expectation of a labour victory.... It is significant that 
Treasury assumed that it would be acceptable to Labour, because it was 
fundamentally in conflict with the welfare state politics of the Labour Party. 
Treasury must have written it in the knowledge that there were people in the 
Labour Party who would find it congenial.13
The adoption of the framework for economic management for public sector management 
contradicted Labour's electoral pledges. Labour had fought the 1984 elections on platforms of 
full employment, social justice, price stability, democratic economic management and greater 
control of the economy by New Zealanders. Each of these aspirations was to be adversely 
affected by the sweeping reforms in the public sector.
The Treasury's ‘Government Management’ combined strategic choice, new 
managerialism and monetarism within a broader neo-liberal economic framework. However, 
after some four years of Labour government-led reforms, the ‘core’ public service remained 
unchanged (The Treasury, 1987: 59). Its proposals for public sector reforms took their cue from 
managerial objectives aimed at clarifying objectives for public sector managers, giving them 
greater freedom to manage, together with adequate accountability considerations, and argued for 
effective assessment of performance. A new managerial ethos was at the heart of further public 
sector reforms. This required major changes to terms and conditions of employment of public 
sector managers and a re-definition of their accountability procedures.
The first reform as a result of Government Management report in 1988 made New 
Zealand:
the first country in the world to prepare proper public sector accounts with a full
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balance sheet and an accrual-based operating system of income and expenditure.
(The Fiscal Responsibility Act also) sets out general principles for prudent fiscal 
policy which the government itself must translate into numerical targets for the 
balance budget, debt and public sector net worth... (The Act) requires much fuller 
disclosure of information to allow scrutiny by parliament, the public, not least, 
the financial markets ÍThe Economist. 1995:42-3).
Hailing these changes, The Economist (1995:43) noted that New Zealand had probably the best 
fiscal and monetary policy framework anywhere in the world. But it further observed that by 
itself, that did not guarantee good policy; but by making policy more transparent, it will improve 
the capital market's ability to impose discipline. Managerialism, corporatisation, and a range of 
other measures introduced since 1988 have exposed the state sector to capital markets and open 
competition.
In the first instance, the State Sector Act developed the twin goals of the Labour
Relations Act, that is, of promoting enterprise level bargaining and importing private sector
managerialism into the public sector. In this respect it had:
radical implications for public sector industrial relations. It meant the elimination 
of the distinctively public sector system that had developed since 1948, and its 
replacement by the private sector system embodied in the then Labour Relations 
Act. Thus the State Sector Act abolished general pay increases for state 
employees, statutory pay-fixing criteria, occupational class pays claims and 
compulsory arbitration. There was now no obligation upon the government to 
provide employment conditions fairly comparable with those in the private 
sector. The elimination of compulsory arbitration and the persistence of high 
unemployment made it harder for unions to maintain relativity with the private 
sector (Walsh, 1993: 127).
The public sector was initially compartmentalised into 40 autonomous departments 
headed by chief executives with powers similar to those of private sector, apart from wage 
bargaining functions, which were still the responsibility of the State Services Commission. While 
chief executives were able to negotiate conditions of employment either with the Public Service 
Association or units of workers in individual departments, the retention of centralised wage 
bargaining was an important armoury with which to ensure fiscal restraint.
‘Government Management’ according to Jesson:
signified a shift in Treasury's attention from the overall economy, which it 
thought was largely restructured by this time, to the processes and structures of 
the state itself.... The state still interfered in a fundamental way in the affairs of 
the private economy. It protected the unions, and provided them with coverage 
of the wage-earning workforce. If the reforms of the private economy were to be 
effective, the momentum would have to be carried into the public economy.
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Jesson further noted that:
in terms of its constitutional role as adviser of the government, Treasury should 
have ignored the question of the goals of society and the underlying values of the 
welfare state. These are political matters for the government to work out, and not 
within the Treasury's competence. Treasury's role should have been limited to 
discussing how most effectively to achieve these goals.... It accepted no limits of 
this sort....it was animated by ideology: its economic methodology was combined 
with political goals and a political point of view, the same combination as an 
extended Chicago school. The methodology and the goals were mutually 
reinforcing and the combination allowed no possibility of doubt or of alternative 
point of view (Jesson, 1989:113-114).
The State Sector Act raised issues concerned with the future constitutional role of the public 
service, and issues connected with the nature of public employment. Martin observed that most 
commentators on the public sector reforms had concentrated on the new managerial systems 
designed to improve performance. Less attention had been paid to values relevant to governance 
other than economic policy (Martin, 1990:186). When we examine such issues, the almost 
revolutionary nature of the broader project comes into view, because clearly what the fourth 
Labour Government had begun was a fundamental overhaul of the state itself - as a logical initial 
step aiding the internationalisation of New Zealand's economy, and subordinating labour more 
fully to the primacy of capital accumulation.
When the National Government took over government in 1990, it hastened the pace of 
the reforms. In the 1993 electoral challenge, the narrowly defeated Labour Party had conceded, 
this time with the support of the CTU that there would be no return to the corporatist, regulatory 
regime of the 1970s. Short of ensuring a legislative environment conducive to collective 
bargaining, the labour programme made no further concessions to organised labour - a theme 
that was equally dramatically affirmed during the 1997 elections.
Public sector reforms made public sector employees as vulnerable as their private sector 
counterparts had become. It aggravated the vulnerability of public sector organisations of 
workers as well. Both these measures combined to ensure that the public sector did not become 
the hot bed for revolt against the reform agenda. This, it is argued was the political project 
behind the dramatic public sector reforms that New Zealand experienced over the past 15 or so 
years. It was also one that favoured multinational capital which was best placed to take over the 
management and operations of most of the previously state sector enterprises.
Crucial to the restructuring project has been the reform of the public sector, which has 
included sweeping privatisation, introduction across the board of new managerialism in the
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remaining state sectors, and clear commitment to further privatisations. State sector reforms have 
apparently been propelled by the twin needs of reducing the public debt and to reduce the costs 
of business in New Zealand. Thus what appeared as a project to discipline and fragment labour 
and to wipe out the spaces from which collective contest could be spearheaded was sold to the 
electorate by references to reducing the cost of government.
The State Services Commission's review of public sector reforms led to the development 
of a fragmented public sector. Moreover, by introducing incentive-based management and pay 
systems under which both its managers and employees operate, the public sector organisations 
began to compete with each other. This undermined worker solidarity and diminished the public 
profile of public sector institutions. The debate whether privatisation ought to be viewed as a 
response to economic crisis or an acknowledgement of the failed state interventions also worked 
to deflect criticisms of the anti-union thrust of privatisations and public sector reforms.
But other measures that were part of the state sector reforms also helped the electoral and 
public saleability of this project. Tax reductions had been made possible by a dramatic reduction 
in public sector spending as a result of the massive privatisations in New Zealand. For a while, 
therefore, privatisation did look attractive to middle New Zealand taxpayers burdened with high 
rates of income taxes. Moreover, by the early 1980s there was widespread disillusionment with 
state service delivery.
However, there is a more global dimension to such sweeping public sector reforms. New 
Zealand’s economic downturn of the 1980s fitted into a more global pattern. Similar agendas 
were being developed in the principal OECD economies such as the US and the UK at the time. 
During this period, the economic policy agendas of the OECD and G7 reflected the need for co­
ordination at the global level to deal with the crisis of accumulation. Protectionism in advanced 
economies was viewed as a matter of growing concern and tension. It was during this period that 
moves towards multilateral liberalisation within the GATT framework took off in earnest - 
although the first round of agreements was not to take place until 1995. The problem of 
accumulation in the global capitalist system could only be dealt with by sustained measures in 
national economies - which require state acquiescence and support. New Zealand provides an 
excellent example of how a transnational agenda for reform was applied in a very specific 
situation.
Wallerstein (1996), Silver (1995a) and others have examined the responses of capitalism 
to crisis over the long term. It is clear that capitalism has periodically confronted crisis by waves
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of expansion. In the post-cold war era, physical expansion of markets are no longer so relevant. 
So how can capitalism’s expansive thrust be sustained in the present period? State sector 
reforms provide a helpful way of dealing with this paradox. Viewed sectorally, the 1960's to the 
present are marked by the enormous strides made by international capital in penetrating the state 
sectors. In New Zealand, this has taken the particular form of deregulating the 
telecommunication, airline, banking and utilities sectors.
Such developments were made possible by a host of deregulatory measures, that had the 
effect of fragmenting and marginalising organised labour. The corporatisation and 
commercialisation that made it possible to sell off state enterprises in the first place achieved this 
initial goal quite effectively. This approach provides a useful way of looking at how class- 
politics underwrote a process of economic reform and how it reflected a recomposition and 
intensification of class politics within the global, rather than merely the national environment 
at the same time.
4:8 Two decades of battering
No where has adjustment and restructuring impacted more than upon organised labour. 
New Zealand, until the mid-1970s had boasted of one of the best-organised trade union 
movement in the world (Council of Trade Unions-CTU, 1995). The impacts of reform and 
restructuring upon union membership, their effectiveness and influence was felt evenly across 
the private and public sectors. Moreover, new employment created after the reforms of the 
1980's was largely in sectors outside the union umbrella. These were partly counterbalanced by 
union efforts across the private and public sectors to mediate the fall-outs by developing 
increasingly co-ordinated responses; a process made easier by the emergence of the CTU as the 
main national union centre.
The Labour Relations Act promoted the amalgamation of public and private sector 
federations into the Council of Trade Unions which at its launch in 1987 enjoyed over 530,000 
members. By the 1994-1995, this had fallen to 258,276. Between 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 a 
further 15.5 percent decline had occurred (CTU, 1996). There is no evidence that decline in 
union membership has levelled out. This reflects the continuing unfolding of the full impact of 
the ECA and restructuring generally.
Bray and Neilson (1996:79) conclude that:
a labour government committed to a market direction of economic reform and a union
movement relatively disorganised and distanced from the Labour Party presented a
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mutually reinforcing set of contingent causes that help explain the steady direction of 
Labour reforms towards labour market flexibility. The Government could move quickly 
to determine the basic direction of economic reform. The NZCTU did not have sufficient 
power and legitimacy to ensure compliance with its decisions by the union movement 
as a whole. In turn, the Labour government could remain sceptical about a ‘negotiated 
economy’ while this lack of central legitimacy remained apparent. The further the 
government moved down its chosen track, the more the inability of the union movement 
to confront its direction of reform became apparent, as its bargaining power diminished.
The national union federation presently enjoys an almost token consultative status. Its 
influence upon public policy has been almost irreversibly narrowed; replaced by the 
assertiveness of the New Zealand Business Roundtable. The appointment of a number of 
members of the New Zealand Business Roundtable to senior executive positions in the reformed 
public services and corporate bodies have also given an added impetus to the implementation 
of public sector reforms.14
Both the scope and coverage of collective bargaining has shrunk severely as a result of 
the ECA (Harbridge ed. 1993). Arguably, the fear that the prohibitive costs of administering 
large numbers of individual contracts may give some impetus for a return to collective 
bargaining has been found wanting. Moreover, unions have been unable to roll back the rise of 
independent bargaining agents, mainly legal firms. With lower overhead costs, and often better 
and more focussed advocacy, many of these have been able to secure better contracts for 
individual or groups of employees than have unions. Thus a competition between ‘unions and 
other bargaining agents has become apparent’ (Colin Hicks, interview, 18 August 1995).
Because the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (CTU) in 1987 enjoyed a 
membership of 63 percent o f full time workforce, many trade unionists had felt that a neo-liberal 
labour market based assault long the Thatcherite lines could not take root in New Zealand 
(Harris, 1995). But by the time the ECA was introduced, the CTU had already been worn down 
by the problems created by ‘high levels of unemployment, the decline of industries in which the 
traditionally more militant unions were based, a rise in business political activism, the emergence 
of industrial militancy amongst employers and the implementation of a New Right policy agenda 
by Labour’ (Roper, 1996:257).
Efforts by the CTU to co-ordinate national responses to the neoliberal agenda introduced 
by the Labour Government had borne limited success. The CTU hung on to the corporatist 
settlements while negotiating the neoliberal reform agenda, an inherently contradictory approach. 
The Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 1987 was generally seen as a favourable outcome. It
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confirmed that given the odds against organised labour during a deep recession, the LRA gave
it some protection. Its inability however to counter the ECA even from a relatively strong base
that the LRA gave is explained in a number of different ways.
Firstly, applying the theory of contingent bureaucratic conservatism, Roper (1996)
concludes that a cadre of full time CTU officials failed to harness rank and file anger and CTU
affiliates pressure for action towards a general strike.
From the introduction of the Employment Contracts Bill to its enactment, the 
CTU vacillated and finally did nothing. The CTU failed to provide a cohesive 
public, visible leadership in opposition to the Employment Contracts Bill and, 
instead, left others to take the lead or to flounder because of its lack of direction 
(Roper, 1996:269).
While a theory of bureaucratic conservatism is useful, it fails to account for other factors that 
shape unions choice of strategies. While there is some evidence that public support for the new 
National government had waned in the first six months of its term, its impact on the prevailing 
anti-union orientation of large segments of the community was clear. The National Party- 
government capitalised on the financial insecurities of a middle-class and largely white New 
Zealander population. Reforms visibly rewarded this class of the population (Kelsey, 1995:182- 
4). Scott locates the limited support for CTU opposition to reforms in a broad context, arguing 
that that when the Employment Contracts Bill (ECB) was introduced, the union movement 
confronted a range of obstacles. They included a restructured economy, a traditionally anti-union 
political party was in power, a traditional parliamentary ally was in disarray and a dominant 
ideology had exploited general disillusion with big government. Thus the presence, however, 
temporary, of a particular configuration of political and ideological forces influenced the 
restructuring of industrial relations (Scott, 1996:293).
Within this changed configuration, the National Government was able to deploy 
resources aimed at media coverage through which to contest the growing union and public 
opposition to the Employment Contracts Bill. Firstly, the release of the Bill as part of the 
Government’s ‘Economic and Social Initiative just days before Christmas ensured diminished 
press coverage. Secondly, where the media did report the Bill, the government was the primary 
news source. When given coverage, reports on the Bill competed with Gulf War stories. Thirdly, 
because the CTU had gone along with the neoliberal agenda of the Labour Government, its 
opposition to the Bill was seen as less than principled by the reform agents within government. 
The New Labour Party, which had opposed Labour’s restructuring agenda was not accorded81
media attention as a credible political party. Moreover, when media reporting focussed on the 
Bill as a result of growing opposition, this coverage was negative highlighting protest action as 
illegitimate, drawing attention away from the substance of the policy. Indeed the point 
communicated by the media was the inevitable passage of the legislation. And the dominant 
news frame represented the introduction of the bill as an event without a responsible agent; it 
was a neutral piece of legislation and this served to depoliticise the issue’ (Scott, 1996: 289). 
This further dented the CTU’s resolve.
Conscious of the media’s predilection for anti-union story frames and the 
government’s capacity to exploit these frames for populist purposes, the CTU 
became fixated with the public relations battle (Scott, 1996:294).
These factors could arguably have reinforced the contingent bureaucratic conservatism of the 
CTU leadership, but ultimately they exposed the hollowness of a narrow union-based response 
to a broad anti-working class agenda imposed by a right wing, hyper-liberal government.
Following this spectacular defeat, the CTU shifted attention, in the knowledge that any 
ideological opposition to the ECA was largely lost and the prospect o f reversals through a future 
Labour Party victory was also slim. Embeddeness of the radical labour market reforms thus 
depended upon the particular configuration of ideological and political factors. Given the 
overwhelming odds, the CTU and organised labour’s attention shifted elsewhere.
One the main successes claimed by the CTU in recent times is the reformed electoral 
system through which it hopes that ‘nobody will get the government that they vote for’ (CTU, 
1995:3), reflecting a recognition that Labour Party and CTU relations had weakened. It also 
demonstrated a commitment to expanding its direct stake in the political process through support 
of electoral reforms. The CTU also noted that labour market deregulation led to differentiated 
outcomes, leading to diverse union responses. An ‘organising model’ of trade union has won 
some support among CTU affiliates, as have medium term strategics of developing industrial 
unions via strategic amalgamations. Both these responses look very dated and provide little 
source of comfort to workers in the short term.
Interestingly, several union officials stated that they had been reduced to merely 
responding to day to day challenges presented by such a large reform agenda (Hicks, 
interview, 1995; Harris, interview, 1995). Unions were not affected solely by the ECA, but by 
social policy reforms, privatisation, liberalisation of working hours, and a range of other reforms. 
For the CTU, this meant that vastly increased localised pressures dispersed their capacities. Few
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leaders were able to grasp the interconnectedness between the different part of the reform project 
(Harris, 1995).
The indivisibility of reforms arose because they were presented in technical, often 
dressed by seemingly complex economic equations and endorsed by agencies such as the World 
Bank. For the larger industrial unions, such as the Public Service Association, localised 
bargaining and co-ordinating between increasingly fragmented bargaining units presented new 
day to day challenges to the leadership, deflecting attention away from longer-term strategies 
and implications of these reforms.
A logical outcome of the ECA was the proliferation of individual employment contracts. 
Because unions were pressured to keep pace with the increased range of contract negotiations 
their broader strategies suffered. Differentiated contracts also gave rise to diverse sets of 
interpretation disputes, leading to a phase of judicial activism on the part of unions. Some gains 
have been reported through favourable decisions in Employment Courts.
Internationally, the CTU waged a successful campaign through the International Labour 
Organisation, with New Zealand becoming one of the few OECD countries to be unfavourably 
commented upon in the Freedom of Association and other ILO committees. However, the limits 
of ILO advocacy were demonstrated in its feeble response to the CTU's complaints. The final 
recommendations following an inquiry were: ‘that the Government inform it of the results of the 
proceedings before the Court of Appeal of the New Zealand Medical Laboratory Workers Union 
case, and Capital Coast Health Ltd., and other relevant judicial proceedings; that the ILO hoped 
that the New Zealand Government would ensure that the established principles of collective 
bargaining would be incorporated into the Employment Contracts Act; that workers and their 
organisations should be able to strike in support of multi-employer bargaining, which is 
expressly illegal; and that the ILO's services are at the disposal of the New Zealand Government’ 
(Harbridge et.al. 1996:18-21). These failed to have much impact upon Government policy or on 
public opinion. Drawing its strength from the field of individual rights, the Government has 
largely dismissed these recommendations.
Unions have drawn some relief from two developments. Firstly, the introduction of the 
multimember proportional representation system of voting has increased the scope for direct 
political influence. The fragmentation of the Labour Party of the 1980s and the rise of new 
smaller national parties might have, however, negated possible gains during the 1997 elections. 
Secondly, the very progressive bill of rights has resulted in a number of challenges to employer
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privileges and actions under its human, civil and other individual rights provisions. At another 
level, the Employment Court and the Court of Appeal have given further hope to unions on a 
number of employment related issues. Unions have regained some ground on issues, such as 
redundancy and personal grievances, dismissal, entry to workplace, and similar issues. Judicial 
activism has increased. Thus, it is possible, at some point in future, that these developments may 
provide an impetus for a return to some form of tripartism, even if its scope were to be restricted 
to agreements about narrow workplace issues.
New Zealand's union movement developed on the back o f a strong corporatist tradition 
and set of relations. The recent assaults on these practices have meant that many unions have 
begun to return to their roots through organising campaigns and related activity. Within the space 
of a decade or so between initial reforms and the current period, economic developments were 
used to justify the neo-liberal agenda. In the case of New Zealand developments on a number 
of economic fronts have been used to soften public hostility and reactions against the state.
4:9 The rise of the neoliberal model of state/market configuration
The radical changes in labour regulation, public sector organisation, and a 
comprehensively liberalised capital market fundamentally transformed the architecture of the 
New Zealand state. The many reforms introduced between 1984 and 1995 were part of a 
comprehensive and unified strategy to overhaul a protected economy. It is thus important to 
understand the overall picture of this transformation. The traditional arguments about the retreat 
of the state are far from satisfactory in capturing the comprehensive nature of changes. What 
clearly resulted from New Zealand’s restructuring was a transformation of its market economy, 
providing the basis for its accelerated integration into the global capitalist system.
The state made a decisive retreat and ‘retired almost completely from any form of active 
economic management’ (Lange, 1996:26). With the entry of the UK into the European Union, 
New Zealand's advantaged trading position in Europe was slowly eroded. Closer Economic 
Relations with a similarly aggrieved Australia came with new uncertainties. The aggressive 
export oriented ASEAN economies of the 1980s and 1990s that had long been overlooked by 
New Zealand exporters forced the New Zealand state to confront the impact of declining 
competitiveness across a range of industries. This was complemented by a preferential trading 
arrangement with the island states of the South Pacific resulting in trade balances that 
significantly favoured New Zealand capital. These externalities combined to create unique
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challenges for capital and opportunities for its state.
It is necessary to move beyond narrowly-based understanding of the dramatic 
restructuring in New Zealand, primarily in terms of a response to a deeply embedded economic 
crises, and focus on the broader generative mechanisms. Firstly, the crisis facing New Zealand 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s undoubtedly had its origins in the global environment. 
Secondly, the New Zealand state’s response to that crisis reflected fundamental political choices. 
These choices enabled it to mediate both global pressures and a sharp domestic economic 
downturn in the same breath. A crisis of capital accumulation in a social democratic corporatist 
setting created the political condition in which labour could be re-regulated. By drawing labour 
into this equation, it is possible to understand the generative factors for a deep hollowing of the 
state, and for the near complete liberalisation of New Zealand’s capital markets. This equation 
was given a favourable gloss by economic policy institutions; and the new settlement was kept 
in place by technocratic institutions rather than political elites. The main transformations and 
selected consequences of economic restructuring are outlined in the Table below.
Table 2:0 Features of economic restructuring in New Zealand: 1970-1995
T r a n s f o r m a t i o n s 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 5
I m p e t u s  f o r  c h a n g e O i l  c r i s i s  o n  1 9 7 3
E n d i n g  o f  p r e f e r e n t i a l  m a r k e t  a c c e s s  in  
t h e  U K  in  1 9 7 5 .
E c o n o m i c  d o w n t u r n  in  m id  1 9 8 0 s ,  
d e f e a t  o f  t h e  r e f o r m  o r i e n t e d  l a b o u r  
g o v e r n m e n t  i n  1 9 8 7 ,  f o l l o w e d  b y  
f i n a n c i a l  s e c t o r  c r i s i s .
E c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  c h a n g e s T r a d e  l i b e r a l i s a t i o n ,  e f f o r t s  to  
c o n s o l i d a t e  t h e  c o r p o r a t i s t  r e g u l a t o r y  
f r a m e w o r k
C o m p r e h e n s i v e  l i b e r a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  s e c to r ,  d e r e g u l a t i o n  o f  l a b o u r  
m a r k e t  a n d  i n d u s t r y
R e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  s t a t e  
i n s t i t u t i o n s
I n c r e a s e d  K e y n e s i a n  t y p e  o f  s t a t e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n s  i n  i n d u s t r y ,  e x p a n s io n  o f  
t h e  s t a t e  s e c t o r  in  s e r v ic e s
R a d i c a l  c o m m e r c i a l i s a t i o n  a n d  
p r i v a t i s a t i o n ,  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  
e m p l o y m e n t  r e l a t i o n s  in  t h e  s t a t e  
s e c t o r ,  e n h a n c e d  r o l e  o f  t h e  F i n a n c e -  
t r e a s u r y  c o m p l e x  in  e c o n o m ic  p o l i c y
O u t c o m e s I . S o m e  t r a d e  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  a n d  
w i d e n i n g  o f  e x p o r t  b a s e
2 . t r a d e  u n io n s  c o n s o l i d a t e d  t h e i r  
i n f l u e n c e
3 .  D e c l i n e  i n  F D I
4 .  L o w  e c o n o m ic  g r o w t h  a n d  
g r o w i n g  u n e m p l o y m e n t
1 .S u b s t a n t i a l  i n c r e a s e  i n  F D I  in  
s e r v i c e s  a n d  m a n u f a c t u r i n g ,
2 . r e c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  e m p l o y m e n t  a c r o s s  t h e  
e c o n o m y  ( d e c l i n e  in  
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  e m p l o y m e n t ,  
i n c r e a s e d  I f p r  f o r  w o m e n )
3 .  w e a k e n e d  t r a d e  u n i o n s  a n d  
c o l l a p s e  o f  b a r g a i n i n g  c o v e r a g e  
in  s e v e r a l  s e c to r s .
4 . i n c r e a s e d  i n f l u e n c e  o f  B u s in e s s  
R o u n d t a b l e  a n d  E m p l o y e r  
g r o u p s  o v e r  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  
e c o n o m ic  p o l i c y
5 . E x p o r t s  a n d  i m p o r t s  a s  a  r a t i o  
o f  G D P  i n c r e a s e  b y  m o r e  t h a n  
1 0  p e r c e n t .
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4:10 Conclusion: Writing labour into the depoliticised reform equation
What resulted from these dramatic changes in New Zealand is a reconstituted state, 
characterised by the demise o f a welfare state, and a reassertion of the primacy of the market. 
At the same time, the capitalist New Zealand state has reconfigured itself. However, there 
remains a potential for state intervention and economic management. The Waitangi claims, for 
example, continue to highlight the pivotal role played by the state in mediating conflict and in 
economic management. Restructuring was a deliberate policy choice that enabled capital to 
reassert its primacy through a forced separation of the public and economic spheres.
Corporatist labour politics may have been delivered a body blow by the economics of 
liberalisation; it also exposed the weak foundations for labour’s resistance to the most 
comprehensive anti-worker assault that labour has faced in New Zealand over the past fifty 
years. However, organised labour's accommodation with the Labour Party and its continuing 
experiments in creative responses open future possibilities for labour in New Zealand. While the 
reforms have contributed to further internationalisation of New Zealand’s economy, 
internationalisation has not been simply about efficiency gains, competitiveness or economic 
growth; it has served to enhance the mobility of capital on the one hand and the deepen the 
control of labour on the other. This required a reorientation of New Zealand’s politics, through 
which capital/labour contests were managed. In this respect, economic internationalisation had 
both homogenising and differentiating impacts. It was homogenising to the degree that the 
conditions for capital accumulation in an increasingly internationalised market were 
reconstituted. It had highly differentiating impacts upon workers in terms of worsening income 
differentials and ethnic inequities, and increased workplace vulnerability.
The 1980s and early 90s clearly present a resounding defeat for organised labour by a 
reform process induced by changes in the global political economy and implemented by a 
dependent capitalist state. The globalised world of the 1990s, however, is still a world of nation­
states with recognisable national interests, which include discrepancies in standards of living and 
welfare. At the same time, internationalisation has been propelled and sustained by nation states, 
involving political choices on the part of states. Clearly, state/labour and capital contests will 
continue to define the parameters of the political sphere, even though they may be expressed in 
different forms. New forms of fragmentation, including the ascendancy of new corporate 
pressure groups and the rise of ethno-political pressures express the forms in which capital itself 
came to be re-organised.
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A global free trading environment brought about through the lowering of tariff and 
protective barriers has levelled the stakes for competitors in that system, translating into 
increased pressures upon wages and cost of business. These costs were affected by state 
regulation and organisations of labour. The economic reforms thus sought to cripple organised 
labour and fragment labour politics. However, these outcomes arc not permanent and will remain 
contested
A permeable but centralised state has succeeded in making class-politics less visible. 
The technicalisation of economic policy formation, the shielding of that policy framework from 
class-political pressures has been central to the attaining the reform goals. This has critical 
implications for democratic politics as well as for political options for traditional forms of labour 
organisation.
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Chapter Four: Endnotes
1. A last ditch effort by Prime Minister Mike Moore some months prior to Labour's 
electoral defeat in form of a negotiated wage restraint illustrated very clearly that the 
time for corporatism had passed. Capital markets had a new found ability to discipline 
states. Similarly, re-structuring had led to a large scale differentiation within working 
classes making elite national trade union type of leadership a less effective tool for the 
disciplining of labour. An increasing proportion of new employees now found itself in 
the unorganised (or 'unorganisable') categories.
2. Denemark (1990:280) also argued that the failure of Keynesian policies in the 1970s 
and early 1980s (under both Labour and National) resulted in the creation of a ‘highly 
ideological treasury hardened not only in a free market direction but in a Chicago 
school direction’.
3. Douglas (in Douglas, 1980) outlined his personal vision about the reforms that were 
necessary prior to the 1984 general election. The Treasury's brief to the incoming 
Government titled F.conomic Management of 1984 exemplifies a remarkable degree of 
agreement with Douglas's broad prescriptions outlined in his book.
4. The term social democracy was widely used to refer to New Zealand society prior to 
the mid-1980s. Denemark discusses the crisis of social democracy in New Zealand in a 
comparative framework. Generally, the point is strongly made that a free-market 
ideology driven policy process severely fractured the compromises between labour and 
state that led to the dismantling of tripartism. There was no re-negotiation of the 
historical compromises (Denemark, 1990: 285). Such changes have altered the nature 
of New Zealand politics quite considerably. Social dislocations that emerged 
consequently led to a period of restructuring within the constituent agents (for example 
the trade union movement). Re-organisation of established bargaining agents thus 
correspond to both the demands of a restructured economic environment and its 
demonstrable undermining of (neo)-corporatist mechanisms that were at the heart of 
the New Zealand social democracy.
5. Andrew Higgins, ( ‘Land And Freedom’, The Guardian. 17 October, 1995: 2-3) 
provides glimpses of the growing nationalist sentiments among segments of the Maori 
community and the rejection by the leaders of that community of packages for 
accomodationist settlement of Maori grievances by the National Government. See also 
Kelsey (1993).
6. For exports by region, see Clark and Williams (1995: 26). Also see Tradenz, 1993/4. 
Regional Market Profiles for more detailed breakdown of import and export trends. A 
greater differentiation in the origin and destination of exports and imports also resulted 
from the structural reforms to the New Zealand economy (OECD, 1993 and 1994).
7. Harbridge (ed.). 1989 also discusses the possible impact o f the Act on union 
structures in New Zealand. The LRA, however, had too short a life span to seriously 
affect the labour market and trade unions structures.
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8. Much of the reforms of the 1890s were attributed to William Pember Reeves, a 
fabian socialist who became the Minister for Labour in 1892. His book State 
Experiments in Australia and New Zealand give the first example of the "social 
laboratory" nature of New Zealand. See also Brookes (1995).
9. Walsh (1989: 21) argued that in the making of the LRA ‘there was a fight between 
the advocates of radical deregulation and (slightly less radical) re-regulation. The 
policy battle was fought out between the Treasury, a passionate advocate of de­
regulation, and the Department of Labour, who opposed de-regulation on the scale 
wanted by the Treasury and the Business RoundTable which did not favour re- 
regulation either. ... The Department of Labour won’. This was the last big policy 
battle won by the Labour Department.
10. Personal discussions. Professor Kevin Hince, Director, Industrial Relations Centre, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 19 September, 1995. The small enterprise 
employers, according to Hince, also feared that they were being streamrolled into 
accepting drastic changes by employers from large corporations.
11. From discussions with Peter Harris (New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, 
17/9/95). The CTU is routinely added to the itinerary of such visits.
12. Following public outcry against the reforms, and the waning of the support of the 
unions for the Labour Government, Douglas was replaced from his position. However, 
his successor was unable to reverse the tide of opinion that had shifted away from the 
Labour Party and by 1989 many unions had actively campaigned on an anti-Labour 
Party platform.
13. Marks (1996:18) states that the ‘radical Chicago-school free market economics of 
Roger Douglas was shared by senior Treasury officials who had secretly worked with 
him in the dying days of the free-spending National administration’.
14. This point is owed to Colin Hicks of the New Zealand State Services Commission.
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Chapter Five: Japan - Neo-corporatism, accelerated internationalisation and dis-organised 
labour
5:0 Introduction
Japan presents an interesting study of labour regulation and economic transformations 
in an interventionist and a comparatively ‘closed’ economic setting, in what otherwise appears 
as a highly internationalised industrial economy. This contradiction underlines the very specific 
form of the Japanese capitalist state (Wade, 1996; Tabb, 1995; Tsusu, 1993). As a case study, 
it demonstrated unique legislative, political and non-institutional mechanisms to regulate labour 
in the post-war period. This chapter assesses labour’s often-contradictory responses to economic 
policy regime changes both historically and especially in the present environment of reform and 
adjustment. Periodic economic policy shifts that redefined the role o f the Japanese state also 
reoriented labour institutions to the challenges posed by the rapid internationalisation of the 
Japanese economy. Such reorientation also reflected a process of continuous reconciliation of 
competing domestic and global pressures. This study demonstrates that a general account that 
places an excessive premium on global factors as the key determinant of economic 
developmental trajectories can be faulty. Alternatively, an account that re-positions the state as 
an internally differentiated and at times self-contradictory agency better helps us understand the 
complex generative mechanisms of change during periods of accelerated internationalisation.
The Japanese state responded to global economic challenges at a pace largely dictated 
by domestic considerations. Its spectacular industrial growth between 1950s and early 1970s 
created options that few other OECD states enjoyed at the time. During this period, it refined a 
unique approach to labour regulation. Paradoxically, the re-regulation o f labour by the state was 
achieved during the decade of its most accelerated economic development. Moreover, during 
this period, the Japanese political economy did not experience sharp swings in economic policy. 
However, major shifts are now more likely as Japan re-adjusts to a changed regional and global 
economic environment. This is likely to have major implications for its approach to labour 
regulation.
This chapter first highlights the historical trends in the internationalisation of the 
Japanese economy and the development of its approach to labour regulation. It assesses Japan’s 
state-led and co-ordinated approach to industrial growth that emerged prior to the second world 
war. It then examines the industrial relations regime upon which its industrial development
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policies were rooted. An examination of the patterns of developments in labour policy and 
industrial development follows, drawing out the contradictory development of neo-corporatism 
on the one hand, and the decentralising and fragmenting thrusts of labour market policies on the 
other. This discussion is presented in two time frames. First, is the period of economic 
reconstruction between the end of second world war and 1960. Second, is the crucial decade of 
1960s, when the Japanese state speeded up the integration of its economy with the world 
economy. By re-examining these relationships during these periods, it is possible to explain how 
the post-war Japanese state managed the contradictory global and national pressures during a 
period of state-led economic internationalisation. The chapter then examines how the regimes 
of labour regulation were remoulded as a response to new pressures arising from both the global 
economy and the domestic economy in the early 1970s and between 1990 and the end of 1995. 
The chapter concludes by examining labours changing strategies, the mechanisms through which 
compliance was achieved historically and the ways in which new regulatory regimes were 
legitimated.
5:1 The emergence of a ‘unique’ labour regulation framework
Labour regulation in post-war Japan is contextualised within the framework of a 
‘developmental state’ (Tabb, 1995). This term broadly characterises the configuration of 
economic and political power that emerged in the post war decades. Its post-war policies were 
strongly orientated towards selectively developing world competitive industries through 
productivity gains derived from a complicated labour regulation framework that emphasised 
efficiency, flexibility as well as the ‘national interest’ (McNamara, 1996; Kiyoshi, 1992; 
Inagami, 1992). The term ‘developmental state’, captures the political process through which 
policy frameworks were shaped with reference to some sense of a ‘national interest’. 1 This 
discourse about the ‘national interest’ was shaped by political and bureaucratic elites (Fukui, 
1992). This is significant to understanding the re-orientation of its mode of labour regulation in 
the 1960s and more recently in the 1990s.
A protectionist and nationalistic economic development strategy nurtured the 
development of a strong national industrial and manufacturing entrepreneurial class (ziabatsus) 
and the keiretsu groups (Wilkinson, 1994: 32). However, industrial development policies such 
as anti-monopoly laws constrained competition among them especially in areas such as the 
financial sector (The Nikkei Weekly. 18/11/96:18). Secondly, Japan’s economic
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internationalisation is quite distinct given its extreme dependence upon state regulation of 
industrial development. Domestic economic and political factors thus weighed heavily upon the 
chosen modes of development throughout the postwar period. These historical features 
influenced the emergence and legitimation of a centralised and de- regulated regime of labour 
regulation. This regime emerged from a reorganisation in the immediate post-war decades and 
through labour market instruments and neo-corporatist practises more recently (Price, 1997; 
Taira, 1993; Takanashi, 1996).
Accounts that stress the causal connection between the internationalisation of the 
Japanese economy and developmental o f ‘in-house’ enterprise-based industrial relations regime 
since 1960 are problematic. Enterprise unions cover less than 20 percent of Japan’s workforce, 
and the economy is among the most closed in the OECD. Several interpretations stress the role 
of a powerful and interventionist state, and the elite bureaucrats. Such interpretations undervalue 
the role of politics and political competition during the process of economic internationalisation 
in the post war period. Political factors are shown to have been even more important during the 
period of accelerated economic internationalisation between 1975 and early 1990s. A relatively 
closed economy provided an environment where political agencies could readily affect 
labour/capital relations. By re-focusing attention upon political agencies, this study hopes to 
transcend the simplistic associations between specific development strategies and an enterprise 
based mode of labour regulation that is found in much of the literature on Japan.
Japan’s post-war development and the central role played by its state in its 
developmental processes have been fairly extensively studied (Hoston, 1996; McNamara, 1996; 
Tsuru, 1993;Odagiri and Goto, 1996). These accounts under-emphasise the complicated 
relationships between developments within Japan and the broader global political economy. As 
a result, the links between domestic policy choices and global pressures has been less well 
understood. Such linkages are important as they help explain the variety of ways in which the 
Japanese state balanced the aims o f reconstruction and its international policy commitments. 
This was even more significant during the immediate post-war period when the state autonomy 
was severely diminished. However, to understand the why and how o f economic policy re­
orientation, it is necessary to return to the global post war environment characterised by the 
emerging hegemony of the Bretton Woods institutions, the emerging international orientation 
of US corporate interests in Japan and Asia, and an assessment of their implications for the 
Japanese state, its economy and for its mode of labour regulation.
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A pluralist industrial relations regime was honed during the post-war period of US 
occupation. This regime severely constrained class and political challenges by organised labour 
between the end of the second world war and the 1955 (Price, 1997; Makoto, 1996). This 
pluralist regime was premised on the support for an enterprise-based labour relations practice. 
To achieve this, Japanese cultural values were skilfully manipulated by the Government in the 
early 1950s to regain workplace-based regulation. This new mode of regulation was used to 
crush the ‘mass unions’ that had mushroomed in a more liberal post-war political climate. 
Clearly, it was the political mediation of well articulated corporate and class interests, rather than 
economic policy perse that helps explain contestation and regulation during this crucial period 
of reorganisation of production (Tsuru, 1996: 45-52). Political strategies that resulted from these 
mediations were central to providing an understanding of the patterns and pace of ensuing 
economic reconstruction.
To understand the remarkable recovery of Japan, it is important to focus upon the
changing influence of agencies such as state bureaucracy, corporate managers, and unions in
shaping discourse of development. By stressing the role of these actors, a less-deterministic
account of Japanese capitalist development can be developed. These policies were:
made in the light of, never wholly determined by, either world economic 
developments or local cultural affinities; and these choices (were) the outcomes 
of indeterminate and complex political processes (Wilkinson, 1994: 200).
Moreover, this new phase of global political economy was associated with a sustained effort to 
re-discipline labour through pluralist industrial relations mechanisms. By re-situating 
developments in Japanese capitalism within this broader context, a better view of the state as 
‘transmission belt’ or the ‘interface’ is obtained. This form of the state was anchored to specific 
labour policies, labour market strategies and legitimation mechanisms that reflected the 
compromises that state agencies negotiated in competitions between labour and capital.
The fact that Japan remains one of the least open of the OECD economies is also 
significant in developing this account of its mode of labour regulation. Moreover, such an 
economy also provided a more controlled setting for studying the interconnectedness between 
the global and the national. Far from having a lame union culture as implied in many Western 
accounts, enterprise unions have been able to secure employment security, wage gains and 
improved working conditions within in otherwise restrictive regulatory framework (Pempel and 
Tsunekawa, 1995). Thus the question can be posed: has organised labour improved its lot as a 
result of the rapid economic internationalisation, or has rapid economic internationalisation been
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achieved at the expense of disorganised labour in the non-intemationalised sectors? An answer 
to this question required unravelling the relationship between selective internationalisation 
especially during the 1970s and 1990s and strategies for labour regulation (Odagiri and Goto, 
1996).
Japan’s approach to economic restructuring is unique in several ways. In terms of the 
overall economic policy orientation, McNamara (1996) noted that ‘(while) Reagan and Thatcher 
sought to reduce government’s role in areas such as deficits, regulations, state ownership and 
taxes, Japan has remained largely outside this debate’. However, this is likely to change as a 
consequence of major ‘adjustments’ announced since 1995.2 Moreover, these extensive 
interventions have been aimed not so much at expanding the government’s economic role, as at 
directing trade policies. Such an approach gave successive governments sweeping powers in 
shaping the ways in which its economy internationalised. It is thus noteworthy, that the Japanese 
state ‘is a pervasive market player without a commercial market presence’, and the near absence 
of state ownership distinguishes it from most industrialised nations. In this regard, ‘Japan is a 
singular case of public policy without public ownership’ (Ravenhill, ed. 1995: 2). Such an 
interventionist state raises questions about the centrality of modes and regimes of labour 
regulation in the development process. This chapter develops this argument.
Since the early 1970s Japan has been exposed to an externally induced economic crisis. 
While the 1973 recession was largely overcome through employment adjustment and industrial 
restructuring, the more recent recession appears more enduring. This has triggered intense 
debates and pressures for financial sector deregulation, administrative reform and employment 
adjustment (Japan Kcho. 23(2); Nikkei Weekly. 11/11/96; 1 and 3; 2/12/96: 3, The Economist. 
November, 1997).3 However, even if neo-liberal reforms were to gain currency in Japan, it is 
inconceivable that dramatic labour market reforms could occur, as the Japanese system does not 
lend itself to sharp policy breaks, because its labour market is already characterised by the pre­
eminence of an enterprise-based industrial relations system and a deregulated wage market -  the 
two pillars o f the neo-liberal labour reform package elsewhere.
During the post-war decades, there was a remarkable degree of continuity in the 
economic policy framework. These continuities were largely sustained by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). However, by the 
early 1990s, the gravity had shifted greater corporate autonomy (Callon, 1995). The policy 
environment as a result was exposed to new forms of pressures that have immediate implications
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for modes of labour regulation.
How then, does the state and industrial development process connect with the discourse 
on labour regulation? This discourse has been largely presented in a ‘disconnected’ manner. As 
a result, the interlinkage between state strategies and labour has been poorly understood. This 
chapter re-examines the extent to which unions and an enterprise based neo-corporatist regime 
affected the unique pattern of Japan’s industrial development. In examining this, it will be shown 
that the objectives of industrial development were determined by state agencies through political 
bargaining. These goals were then internalised as the primary objectives of the labour relations 
regime, enabling the expansion of neo-corporatism in an era of rampant neo-liberal restructuring 
in a rapidly internationalising economy.
5:2 The rise of a growth orientated state in the postwar period
US corporate investments aided Japan’s post-war economic growth. Moreover, the 
outbreak of the Korean War stimulated the development of its manufacturing industries. Both 
these factors contributed to its rapid economic reconstruction. The succeeding post-war 
economic growth also transformed state institutions. During these transformations, there was a 
tendency towards concentration of powers in a select few executive arms of government. This 
was to significantly affect the emerging modes of labour regulation during the reconstruction 
decades (Tsuru, 1993).
Japan’s economic reconstruction and internal transitions has its roots in a broader
historical context, however. The Meiji Reformation of the 1890s was a period when the modem
Japanese state acquired its primary characteristics. The Meiji state emerged as a:
distinctively nationalist/patemalistic state. This was a state that would, by its very nature, 
promote domestic harmony, consensus, and unity, and suppress conflict. It tried to ensure 
national unity, on the one hand, by the manipulation of the emperor cult - that is, the 
myth that the emperor was divine and imperial rule eternal and inviolable and, on the 
other, by ruthless suppression of ideas and ideologies that challenged orthodoxy. Even 
more offensive and dangerous were actual industrial actions by workers and revolts by 
farmers inspired by such theory. The appearance of the first Japanese labour union in 
1897 was met by the enactment of the Peace and Security Police Law in 1900, while a 
temporary resurgence of the labour movement in the wake of the Russo-Japanese war 
(1904-5) was stalled by the brutal repression that followed the apprehension and 
prosecution in 1910-11 of two dozen leaders of its radical wing.... The anti-class and 
anti-labour thrust of the Peace and Security Police Law was substantially sharpened in 
the Peace and Security Maintenance Law that replaced it in 1924 (Fukui, 1992:201).
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Overall, the Meiji era marked the evolution of unified nation-state that emphasised economic 
internationalism, premised upon a consolidation of consensus and unity domestically.4 Clearly, 
labour regulation was central to this project. In many respects, this underlying orientation 
towards state-directed internationalisation and consensus domestically remained largely 
unchanged.
Thus, a restrictive political environment created during the Meiji era lay at the heart of
the project of the modem Japanese State. The continuities with the modem era are stressed to
illustrate the importance of this specific historical context. An expansionist post-Meiji state
embarked on military aggressions in China, Mongolia, Taiwan, and seized the German
controlled territories in Asia during the First World War. By the early 1930s the military took
control away from politicians and plunged Japan into a full-scale war in China in 1937 and in
the Pacific four years later. Following its surrender, Japan was subject to a comprehensive
political restructuring under the direction of the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the USA,
demonstrating the relationship between economic crisis and restructuring. The fact that the
directions of restructuring were influenced and indeed at times imposed by the USA reflected
the role of US capital in promoting a new global agenda. This agenda favoured the supply-side
prescriptions that promoted preferential development of selected industries such as coal and
steel. In 1949, the USA moved to assert its commercial interests. These were reflected in the
macroeconomic guidelines outlined in the ‘Dodge Line’. These drastically reduced the level of
subsidies, balanced the government budget and fixed the exchange rate at 360 Yen to the US
Dollar - all being principally aimed at the control of inflation, and the attainment of wage
stability (Price, 1997; Tsuru, 1993).5 Ostensibly, the Dodge Line presented an early effort to
restrict political intervention in the liberalising economy.
The net impact of these reforms, and the post-war economic stabilisation plans more
generally arc aptly summarised by Tsuru. He concluded that:
such was the monetary background, which, in the generally depressed conditions of the 
economy, had the effect o f favouring those Japanese business firms with former zaibatsu 
connections and penalising small and medium-sized independents. It may be said that 
while the general public was being subject to the consequential forced savings, gradual 
redistribution of wealth ensued through capital accumulation favouring big businesses 
and a solid link came to be institutionalised between the erstwhile zaibatsu banks and 
industrial enterprises. In effect (Dodge)... constituted ‘the first post-war channel between 
conservative Japanese big business elements and their bureaucratic and political allies 
in Japan and the top level officials in the US Government’ (Tsuru, 1996: 56).
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As a consequence the aim of deconcentrating the power of the zaibatsus, who had been 
‘responsible for Japan’s militarism’ was compromised (quoted in Tsuru, 1996: 18).6 During the 
Japanese recovery, the zaibatsu holdings (industry/bank coalitions) were stronger than during 
the austere pre-war decades. This was not only to have implications for the form that industrial 
development took in Japan, but also for power relations within Japanese society.
Illustrating the degree of concentration of capital that emerged between the end of the 
war and the end of the 1960s, Halliday (1975: 95) observed that by 1970, ‘the six Zaibatsus 
controlled six of the top seven commercial banks, the top eleven general trading houses and four 
of the top five transport firms. Together with the seven Konzerns (mainly non-financial 
operations characterised by integrated operations within a single industry or related industries), 
they controlled 91 percent of all mining and manufacturing companies and 83 percent of all 
companies with an annual sales in excess of SUS200 million per annum’. Such a concentration 
of capital provided fertile conditions for state co-ordination in the corporate sectors and enabled 
capital to regulate labour markets even under conditions of acute labour shortages.
While the Dodge Line dampened economic growth, it was the outbreak of the Korean 
War that provided vital economic relief. As the US procured war supplies in Japan, the 
subsequent industrial deepening, growth in manufacturing output and employment, together with 
dollar receipts for exports created conditions for accelerated growth. Following the signing of 
security treaty in 1952 US occupation came to an end. This treaty prescribed an anti-communist, 
free trading orientation and non-aggression commitments on part of the Japanese state. By the 
mid-1960s, the reconstructed state began to turn its attention to longer-term developmental 
objectives. This reorientation was strongly influenced by the fact that radical labour movements 
had been effectively marginalised, particularly during the more austere reconstruction decades.
Between the period 1956 to 1970, sustained expansion enabled a relaxation of import 
restrictions, increased exports and freer exchange. Moreover, the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI)
assisted designated industries and firms with information services, import 
licenses, credit and support to reduce excessive competition. Inflation was 
restrained by tense combinations of fiscal expansion and monetary deflation 
(Sheridan, 1993: 193-194).
Such assistance led to a unique form of corporatism, focussed on selected state agencies and 
business directly, a corporatism that excluded labour until the mid-1970s.
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As a result, the Japanese economy:
developed a dual structure - at one level - the high productivity and targeted 
industries that competed in the global marketplace and at the other - the low- 
productivity non-targeted sectors protected by regulations that provided little 
incentives to become competitive (Takenaka, 1996: 7).
This dualism was to characterise the domestic industrial scene as well; marked by a complex 
web of crosscutting, interlinked small and medium scale enterprises and the very large 
corporations. However this simplistic dualism was not without its problems.7 These links were 
mediated through complex supplier networks that were loosely regulated by government 
agencies. Such networks also acted as integrated labour markets. With the increasing re-location 
of Japanese enterprise abroad, such inter-linkages began to transcend national boundaries. Such 
a recomposition of producer networks thwarted the vertical integration o f enterprise unionism 
and thus further complicated the organising campaigns of the national union centres such as 
RENGO (the Japan Trade Union Congress) (Wilkinson, 1994: 60-62). This structural 
characteristic of Japanese industry ensured that high growth and full employment did not 
encourage increased union assertiveness.
Japan was hit by the oil crisis in 1973 barely a year after the attainment of the income 
doubling goal set by the Government in 1960 (Halliday, 1975; Tsuru, 1996). This crisis stressed 
the long-term trajectories of industrial development so carefully mapped by MITI and the 
Committee for Economic Development. It also exposed the shortcomings of the coercive modes 
of state co-ordination of the past two decades (Sheridan, 1993: 194; Landsberg and Burkett, 
1996). The crisis induced a shift from indicative planning to strategic co-ordination of selected 
factor markets, resulting in significant industrial transformation. After the pause in growth 
following the oil shock, there was some reduction in working hours per annum, an increase in 
labours’ share of national income, and a reduction in salary and other differential working 
conditions between different sized enterprises (Sheridan, 1993: 221). Arguably therefore, the 
1973 crisis expanded, rather than constrained possibilities for capital especially in the newly 
internationalising sectors, and organised labour appeared at least to have held onto the gains it 
had secured over the previous decade. This ability to regulate both labour and capital markets 
even during economic downturns was a notable feature of the Japanese state, achieved through 
a complicated network of formal and informal relations between labour and capital interest 
groups, various state agencies and the political system.
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By the 1980s the national plans were replaced by ‘vision documents’ such as the 
‘Outlook and Guidelines for Economy and Society’ (Ministry for International Trade and 
Industry- MITI, 1984). In these documents, the focus had shifted to environmental 
considerations, needs of an ageing population, search for safer energy supplies, promotion of 
responsible international policies and improvements in the quality of life for Japanese people 
among other goals (Sheridan, 1993; Tsuru, 1993). This encouraged a form of neo-corporatism 
that further dented labour’s efforts at organising at national and industry levels (Pempel and 
Tsunekawa, 1995). Vision documents went further than the depoliticising of economic policy; 
they depoliticiscd social policy as well.
This process shielded state institutions even more securely from political pressures.8 The 
national vision papers also enjoyed substantial authority as the teams charged with preparing 
them reflected a cross-section of society. Union and employer nominees featured prominently, 
along with representatives from the main political groupings. Thus when vision documents 
staked the case for adjustment and restructuring, they had usually also been well considered by 
labour focussed interest groups. A new form of interest representation had already come into 
being long before the first public signs of serious economic downturn of the 1990s emerged. 
Overall, Japan’s response to the 1973 economic crisis had triggered modest structural changes. 
As a result, an international economic crisis was managed through increased state co-ordination. 
By withstanding pressures for rampant liberalisation, state autonomy was re-asserted. More 
importantly, the need for subservience of labour to the goals of productivity in the 
internationalised sectors, and attainment of global competitiveness by selected sectors had 
already been endorsed by labour and labour-supported political groupings as part of the social 
settlement of the 1960s.
After the 1973 oil-crisis, the Japanese economy avoided another downturn until the mid-
1980s. This economic crisis had more diverse implications for Japan. Also it demonstrated
major institutional dilemmas for the historically interventionist state. The Reserve Bank of Japan
(BOJ) was still regulated by the state, and as a result it remained open to the political pressures
exerted through the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Its policies often reflected political compacts:
The 1942 law, under which the Bank of Japan is presently constituted, gives politicians 
considerable power over the bank. The governor and his executives can be dismissed for 
disagreement with government policy, and their board always contains senior bureaucrats 
from the MOF and Economic Planning Agency /The Independent. 13/11/96: 9).
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Japan’s ‘big-bang - an ambitious programme of financial deregulation announced by the new 
LDP government in November, 1996 included recommendations to weaken the links between 
the BOJ from the finance ministry.9 This recommendation is also endorsed by the International 
Monetary Fund. Moreover, the ‘big-bang’ also aims to encourage competition by removing 
intermarket barriers, allowing new financial products and services to be introduced, revising 
investment guidelines and setting legal, tax and accounting systems in line with global practice 
(Nikkei Weekly. 18/11/96: 1; The Economist. November, 1997). Such reforms are epochal 
because Japanese financial institutions have been prohibited from holding more than 5 percent 
of other companies shares since the end of the second world war. A second key reform was a 
move to rescind of Act 9 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, which bans holding companies. This ban 
was enacted at the impetus of American occupation forces to prevent a clique of industrial 
groups, zaibatsus, from regaining control of the nation’s economy. In these ways, a set of 
reforms triggered by an economic crisis enhanced the power of capital domestically, and 
promoted its integration with global capital markets at the same time. These were not 
insignificant for the analyses of changes in regimes of labour regulation.
Moreover, capital market reforms are an acknowledgement of the fact that foreign capital 
flows into Japan had been sensitive to excessive state co-ordination. Widespread corruption, 
bank failures and limitations on disclosures have dented confidence as well (Nikkei Weekly. 
25/12/96: 12). Moreover, the post-war restrictions led to a proliferation of relatively small banks 
- numbering over 5000 in 1992. This further constrained the internationalisation of the finance­
banking sector.
Between 1952 and 1973, Japan’s economic growth averaged 9.0 percent per annum. For 
the period 1973 to 1990, this has averaged 3.9 percent. It was clear that economic growth during 
this period were propelled by expansion in the domestic, rather than export sectors of the 
economy . These domestic origins o f growth also account for the fact that the Japanese state has 
been able to withstand the pressures for liberalisation until the end of 1997. Moreover, its 
economic structure is such that domestic economic pressures have required high degrees of 
political co-ordination. Thus even the 1996 package of reforms were subject to severe political 
contest domestically. Because of its unique structural economic features, the direction, pattern 
and degree of economic restructuring in Japan is an unusual case. Moreover, because the 
Japanese state is fairly open to domestic political pressures, it finds it more difficult to abdicate 
to international markets the responsibility for economic management and labour market
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regulation. Subsequently, the Japanese state did not have the same ability to project economic
policies in the same depoliticised manner that was possible in New Zealand.
Overall, the growth oriented Japanese state that emerged after the war was characterised
by an interlocking network of centralised agencies, including MITI, Economic Planning Agency
(EPA), Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the BOJ. Officials of these premier agencies moved
between these institutions, and often ended up in their retirement with jobs in the main industrial
associations.10 Moreover, the select kancho economist group members are largely drawn from
these agencies as well." Thus the impacts of these state agencies upon the developmental
trajectories and policies are both direct and indirect.
The ability of the Japanese state to co-ordinate economic policy rested on a network of
alliances between powerful actors, labour market associations, political and state agencies. Such
alliances ensured that the state acted and intervened in a market-conforming manner, and in so
doing, fortified “the position of existing firms” (Ravenhill ed., 1995: 411). When this came under
strain, new alliances began to compose themselves. Led by weak associations in capital markets
these emerging alliances may yet play the determinate role in driving the reform programme as
Japan accelerates towards fuller liberalisation. The main national labour centre, Rengo (Japan
Trade Union Congress - JTUC) has been slowly drawn into these emerging alliances.
From the end of the post-war period to the mid-1990s, the Japanese state has undergone
visible architectural changes. The ‘co-odinationist’ state has given way to what can be better
described as a ‘competition state’ which suggests that the notion of Japan Inc. is all but obsolete.
Rather than attempt to take certain economic activities out of the market, to 
decommodify them as the welfare state was organised to do, (such a state) pursues 
increased marketisation to make economic activities located within the national territory 
... more competitive in international and transnational terms .... (Moreover), such states 
are less and less able to act as strategic or developmental states, and are more and more 
splintered states, with state actors and different agencies increasingly intertwined with 
‘transgovemmental networks’ - systematic linkages between state actors and agencies 
... and including a heterogeneous collection of private actors and groups in interlocking 
policy communities (Cemy, 1996:48).
The focus on state and labour relations and the reorganisation of labour in the post-war decades 
throws further light on some of the systemic features of the transformed (ing) post-war Japanese 
state and helps draw out key implications for modes of labour regulation.
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5:3 Changing organised labour and state relationships: 1950s to the 1990s
Japan’s post-1955 trade union structures affected its economic development trajectories. 
Union structures were in turn influenced by the selection of industrial development policies. 
They were consequences of state actions that helped crush larger units of labour organisation in 
the early 1950s and early 1960s (Kume, 1998). However, there remains considerable 
heterogeneity between unions and even within enterprise-based structures (Benson, 1996). 
Moreover, even the smaller enterprise units continued to provided sites for contestation 
(Benson, 1995). Significantly, because of the continuity in political orientation, labour policies 
have not undergone the sharp swings as a result of changes in government in the 1990s. Labour 
policy shifts have been much more gradual, providing enterprise unions with opportunities to 
develop responses to these developments.
During the phase of militarisation, labour unions had been either decimated or forced to 
dissolve. A totalitarian labour-management system was set up by the military authority and 
secret police in 1938 - referred to as “Sanpo” organisations (Makoto, 1996). In effect, labour 
unions were considerably weakened in the inter-war period. Indeed, ‘no autonomous unions 
existed in Japan for the seven years from 1938 to 1945’ (Okuchi, Marsh and Levine, 1973:496). 
This was to have enduring effects during the reorganisation phase in the post-war period. Union 
structures were also shaped by the defeats faced by radical fragments of organised labour in the 
1950s (Price, 1997). The fragmentation and political isolation led largely, though not 
exclusively, in the direction of enterprise level organisation. Rapid progress in parliamentary 
politics also meant that union energies were dissipated in electoral contests and labours political 
loyalties were spread broadly.
As a result of defeats and the dispersion of political influence, labour looked to the legal
arena through which to advance and protect its interests. In this regard:
The foreign perception of Japanese unions ... as docile and submissive is largely 
misplaced, since it ignores the basic strength in the union structure derived by the post­
war legal reforms carried out by the American authorities. Under various legislated 
reforms, such as the Labour Conciliation Law, the Labour Standards Law, and the 
Labour Relations Adjustment Law - reforms so profound even by US labour norms they 
amounted to what Dore has called a ‘social democratic revolution’ - unions gained for 
their members not only the basic pay and work conditions similar to management but the 
legal right to direct involvement in all management committees making decisions 
relating to labour conditions (McNamara, 1996: 381).
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Such a protective environment facilitated the rapid expansion of trade unionism in the 1950s. 
Because of such protection, unions have identified closely with the developmental goals set by 
the state. In some respects, these liberal conditions for trade unionism helped contain the 
expansion of the radical fragments of labour, although the contest and tensions between different 
fractions continued. Legal protections favoured enterprise unions at the workplaces and 
enhanced their workplace autonomy. The dominant feature of trade unions in the postwar 
decades was their uncompromising commitment to socialist politics and their belief that a 
revolution that would bring about workers control of industry (Makoto, 1996).
The Japan Communist Party linked Sanbetsu Federation (Japan Congress of Industrial 
Unions) and the American supported Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) agitated 
for improved wages, job security, and a voice in the enterprise by demanding decision making 
powers in management councils.
In the 1950s, this strategy, labelled ‘shopfloor’ struggle (shokuba toso), enjoyed a fair 
measure of success in a number of industries, including coal mining, automobiles, steel, 
paper pulp, shipbuilding, and railroads. But in every one of these cases, the Sohyo-linked 
unions were ultimately defeated in a major confrontation with mangers who decided the 
costs of a long strike would be less than that of continuing to tolerate these organisations. 
Critical confrontations came at Nissan in 1953, at the Oil Paper Company in 1958, in 
almost all the major steel mills in 1957 and 1959, in the Miike mines in 1960, and at the 
Mitsubishi’s Nagakaski shipyard in 1964-65 (Gordon, 1996: 134).
Thus, the context in which enterprise unions flourished in the internationalised sectors was a 
consequence of protective policies in domestic markets, marginalisation of radical trade 
unionism and promotion of new coalitions on workplace productivity. Strong productivity 
growth and employee associations within individual enterprises were rewarded generously for 
productivity improvements. Such associations were stronger in the larger export orientated 
enterprises, the showcase sectors. Overall, however, the framework within which strong 
enterprise unionism flourished was a political one. It was political to the extent that such 
corporations relied heavily upon protection secured through their political alliances. But most 
importantly, given this form of support, an exclusionary labour policy would have been a source 
of excessive discontent. Because internationalisation of key sectors was directly subsidised by 
domestic consumers, both employers and the state were able to provide a liberal industrial 
relations environment in these sectors (Wade, 1996). An exclusionary labour policy under such 
circumstances could have been a source of much broader conflict in society. Thus the 
labour/state and capital social contract forged in the 1960s was firmly rooted within workplace.
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Why then did this system gravitate towards national corporatism in the 1990s? I argue that the 
generative mechanisms for this transition lie in the realm of the global political economy.
Economic restructuring in the post-‘big-bang’ era has generated new challenges for the 
established regime uf labour regulation. Economic policy orientation during this period took a 
neo-liberal turn, which coincided with significant advances in corporatism, which from the end 
of the war to the 1980s was closely associated with the protected nature of the Japanese 
economy. This economy was managed by:
the dominant coalition ... that was composed of the state bureaucracy, big business and 
agriculture. Small and medium-sized industries joined as minor partners. Yet the political 
strategy of this coalition with regard to labour remained exactly as it had been in the pre­
war period: exclusion from the national level and incorporation at the plant level (Pempel 
and Tsunekawa, 1995: 268).
The internationalisation of Japan’s economy was to alter this matrix and create conditions that 
facilitated neo-corporatist institutions, with complex consequences for the economy and state. 
Pempel and Tsunekawa (1995: 269) had observed that the ‘isolated position occupied by 
Japanese labour under the varied corporatist institutions would have come under strain as a 
consequence of restructuring in the 1980s. However, the proliferation o f neo-corporatist 
institutions that occurred deserves further scrutiny.
Neo-corporatist devices, that include labour, are a recent phenomenon in Japan. This 
development had been held back by the unresolved disputes between the radical fragments of 
organised labour, Sohyo and Japan Socialist Party (JSP) alliance, on the one hand, and the 
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and Domei alliances, on the other. In spite of their strong 
political alliances, the two fragments of organised labour were unable to stop the legislative 
reforms proposed by the bureaucracy under the successive LDP governments since the mid- 
1980s (Inagami, 1992: 63). However, neo-corporatism was also held back by the LDP 
government, which rightly felt that such institutional co-operation would further entrench the 
influence of the bureaucracy, in this respect the labour ministry (Rengo, 1996).
Because the three main federations, Sohyo, Domei and Rengo were so fragmented, along 
ideological and industrial lines, they remained committed to expanding their direct political 
influence in the diet through their selective support of political parties and candidates, rather than 
support for corporatist procedures (Michio, 1994).12 The national unification o f the trade union 
movement through the new Rengo in 1989 and the setting up of the Trade Union Council for 
Policy Promotion (TUCPP) provided favourable conditions for expanding the scope of
corporatism. Moreover, Rengo’s support for this was also premised on its belated recognition 
that firstly, the balance of influence over labour policy matters really lay with various 
government bureaucracies, rather than the legislative arm of government. Secondly, increasingly 
labour policy became part of the economic policy framework. Thus support for neo-corporatist 
machineries on part of unions reflected a new pragmatism. It is noteworthy, however, that 
Zenroren - the communist fragment of Sohyo which opted out of the Sohyo/Rengo unification 
in 1989-has persistently opposed the corporatist line taken by Rengo. It, on the other hand, has 
favoured direct political influence through its sponsorship of the New Frontier Party. For the 
bureaucracy, the expansion of neo-corporatist institutions also served a useful purpose. Its 
excessive powers over the political system in policy formulation had begun to attract severe 
criticism both domestically and internationally. More inclusive policy formulation processes thus 
helped deflect some of these criticisms.
However, corporatist developments in the field of labour policy have not restricted the
enormous powers enjoyed by the administrative system overall. All political parties during the
1996 general elections campaigns promised varying degrees of administrative reform - aimed
at restricting the influence of state bureaucracy. The 1980s thus marked the confluence, on the
one hand, of state bureaucracies readiness to give a large, though selective part of organised
labour, access to policy process, and on the other hand, labours’ aim to increase its participation
in the public policy process. This increased participation of labour in formal, and informal
processes of public policy making and policy implementation has dented the nexus between the
large corporations and state bureaucracies, characteristic of the previous two decades (Harari,
1996: 122-6). As a result, labour was better placed to moderate the adjustment programmes of
the 1980s and 1990s, at least in the present period.
Trade unions are now part of consultative processes at many levels. For example, they
have been involved in the Industrial Structure Council, the powerful body responsible for
developing and deliberating on industrial structure, and the Trade Union Council for Policy
Promotion (Inagami, 1992: 74-5).13 Inagami concludes that
Rengo and its remarkable idea of policy participation, which brought about the 
emergence and development of neo-corporatism in Japan, had its origins in the difficult 
economic situation after the first oil crisis. ... Its efforts might bring about not only the 
end of the de-politicisation of modem politics, but also fundamental changes in the post­
war production-oriented Japanese society.14
Given the deep misgivings about the power of the bureaucracy, organised labour has also been
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pressured to support some of the proposals for administrative reform. With the implied 
complicity of the bureaucracy in the banking sector, Rengo would have gone against popular 
feelings had it opposed economic (administrative) reform.15 Paradoxically, organised labour 
may be forced into a comer where it agrees to nullify the scope for corporatist settlements. In 
this regard, a new committee chaired by the Prime Minister Hashimoto (the Conference on 
Administrative Reform Panel) has attempted to ‘lessen the power of government through 
decentraiisation and deregulation’. The inclusion of the chairman of Rengo - Jinnosuke Ashida 
on this (Hashimoto, 1996: 5) is important in this respect. Labour’s representation on a number 
of other high profile reform oriented agencies was particularly notable after the 1996 general 
elections.
It is against this backdrop that the expansion of neo-corporatism should be examined. 
Two factors stand out in this regard. Firstly, within the union movement, Rengo with its more 
moderate political policy orientation had gained a hegemonic position amongst organised labour. 
It thus reflects the completion of a cycle of political contest between moderate and radical 
fragments of labour. More important, following the 1973-oil crisis, the policy orientation shifted 
decidedly in favour of anti-inflationary policies and the reduction of wage differentials between 
different categories of workers. It reduced the divergence over Japan’s economic policy 
orientations between the bureaucracy and organised labour. Consequently, labour’s support 
could be harnessed for the process of economic restructuring, compensated by high levels of 
policy participation. This displayed, quite uniquely, the way neo-corporatism facilitated a social 
consensus between labour and state bureaucracy over important elements of economic policy. 
The question then is whether this consensus can hold during the more aggressive phase of 
restructuring that looms on the state’s current agenda. Between 1992 and the end of 1995, it was 
apparent that such a macro-corporatism was not antithetical to neo-liberal economic orthodoxy.
Three additional factors should be noted. Firstly, neo-corporatism based on an expanded 
role for labour has gone hand in hand with the accelerated economic internationalisation that was 
experienced in the post-1973 period. Secondly, neo-corporatism represents a political effort by 
parts of state bureaucracy to maintain their organising capabilities, which were threatened by 
administrative reforms during the phase of accelerated internationalisation. Thirdly, neo­
corporatism represents a pragmatic response on the part of Rengo to preserve organised labour’s 
privileged position in the regulated industries. Clearly, some of Japan’s most internationalised 
corporations arc also among the most protected domestically. Because protection is anchored to
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tough political choices, and because organised labour has made the most gains in such 
enterprises, neo-corporatism represents a strategic policy investment in maintaining this status 
quo and protecting it from the vagaries of internationalisation. This point is central to 
understanding the associations between the mode of labour regulation and economic 
internationalisation more generally.
Neo-corporatism connects to the process of economic internationalisation in a variety of
ways. Firstly, declining international competitiveness in the ‘sun-set sectors’ such as coal,
shipbuilding, textiles resulted in a negotiated set of incentives for both labour and capital. This
was possible because the declining sectors were selected politically, that is, through negotiations
and compromise with employers, unions and industry federations. These negotiations were led
by the developmentalist state. Through limited inclusion in policy determination:
Japanese labour has won benefits comparable to its western counterparts during the 
retrenchment at textile mills without the unrest that often impedes the survival of 
vulnerable firms when domestic industry adjusts to rapid changes in international 
markets. The benefit of Japanese tripartite strategies for adjustment must be balanced 
against constraints on labour’s initiatives beyond issues of profit distribution and job 
security. ... One key to effective state co-ordination in Japanese corporatist strategies is 
the ability to extend special interests into priorities encompassing both the 
commonwealth and individual interests. Interests negotiation in the adjustment of the 
(declining) textile industry shows how capital and labour make their interests 
complementary to weather change (McNamara, 1996: 395-6).
Secondly, neo-corporatist strategies at industry levels in internationalised sectors are also shaped
by global exigencies. Through corporatist strategies, both labour and capital could periodically
realign state co-ordination to reduce the vagaries of economic globalisation. Overall, it is thus
clear that neo-corporatism has been engendered by the global environment and has found willing
hosts in political and bureaucratic configurations that have characterised the Japanese political
economy over the past decade.
5:4 The restructuring of the labour relations regime: 1973 to 1996.
Japan’s industrial relations system has attracted widespread attention. In fact many 
OECD economies have looked to it for lessons for industrial rejuvenation. Developing countries 
have looked to it as a model of regulation that helped reduce industrial conflict, and promote 
productivity. Accounts of Japan’s industrial relations have varied from those that emphasise its 
universalistic characteristics (Tabb, 1996), to those that emphasise its specificities (Dore, 1983; 
Koike, 1988). In the 1970s and 80s Western business and industrial relations schools glorified 
aspects of Japanese industrial organisation, and saw in it a framework through which the powers
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of labour market associations could be reduced, and re-aligned to improve product quality, and 
competitiveness(Price, 1992).16 Interest in it, however, waned rapidly since neo-liberal labour 
market reforms gained prominence internationally in the 1980s.17 It is important to therefore 
understand the contrasts in the labour relations regimes after the oil crisis of 1973 and in the 
post-bubble era. A historical elaboration is necessary to contextualise these contrasts.
Price (1992) divides three phases o f its post-war industrial relations development. First, 
the 1945 to 1947 phase was dominated by labour, which had won real concessions through its 
socialist industrial unions at workplaces. Such gains included veto rights over matters such as 
employee layoffs in an era when mass layoffs had become fairly common. Second, the 1950s 
were a decade of profound instability as this highly politicised system began to give way to new 
institutions. Third, between 1960 and 1973, a new workplace based industrial relations regime 
developed its four pillars: tacit but limited job tenure, performance based wage system that was 
mainly controlled by the employers, unions that had a highly inward and enterprise specific 
orientation and joint consultation. Kim (1994) looks at Japan’s industrial relations system over 
a longer time frame (1897 - 1985). Kim’s examination of the 1916 to 1934 period, in particular 
shows a period of profound structural change. Changing strengths of the state vis-à-vis labour 
were reflected in the move from authoritarian controls to paternalistic approaches in the pre-war 
era. But even in this period, the state articulated national goals by reference to international 
imperatives, that is, the expansion of Japanese influence through an expansion of industry 
required the discipline and subordination of labour.
Many writers have attributed the spectacular post-war growth to Japan’s industrial 
relations system (Lee, 1993). However, such accounts ignore the importance of historically 
specific factors, such as favourable post-war terms of trade with the US, the impact of the 
Korean war, and a covertly authoritarian anti-socialist political system. These specificities 
underpinned Japan’s approach to labour regulation. Most of the approaches noted under­
emphasise the position of non-union segments of labour, and internal labour market organisation 
within the industrial relations system as a whole. Moreover, they also under-emphasise factors 
associated with the global political economy. The expansion of neo-corporatism was affected 
by both Japan’s external obligations and the unique institutional factors outside the sphere of 
industrial relations. Moreover, Japan illustrates a very high degree of differentiation within the 
three interest groups (state, unions and employers) and the conventional ‘three pillars’ apply to 
them in a very differentiated manner. Some of these differentiations are also based on
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competition and conflict (such as that between Sohyo and Rengo previously, or between state 
agencies and the political system currently) within any one of the agencies. Such factors have 
ensured that the labour relations regime has remained dynamic, constantly reflecting changing 
domestic configurations and international pressures. Moreover, the wide variances in industrial 
relations practice between sectors, enterprises, and regions has meant that simplistic 
generalisations are difficult to sustain.
In order to explain Japan’s impressive economic growth between 1975 and 1989, it is 
important to re-examine how economic integration was managed through labour market 
strategies. As the largest exporter of private capital during this period (Statistics Bureau, 1995, 
June: 7, OECD, 1994a), Japanese industry has been able to transfer its labour market strategies 
abroad as well. Japanese developmental aid agencies acted as transmitters through which 
national practices have been diffused into the global environment (Williamson, 1994). But they 
also acted as transmission belts in a reverse manner, that is, helping embed international 
practices into the domestic environment. Both these characteristics have ensured that its 
industrial relations system has remained dynamic and constantly adaptive.
Japanese scholars have studied the internal, industrial and regionally segmented nature 
of labour relations (Shirai, eds. 1983; Kume, 1998). Such segmentations make generalisations 
quite problematic (Benson, 1996). These differentiations need to be understood historically, 
mainly in terms of changing state strategies (such as the developmental goals of the Meiji state, 
the pre-war militarist state), as well as situationally (in terms of labour’s chosen strategies). 
Where industrial organisation served labour’s interests well, as in the railways prior to its 
privatisation, unions bargained at the industry level. Overall, however, the emphasis was on the 
enterprise. In contrast, Halliday (1975) provides evidence of how labour market mechanisms are 
deployed to repress unions. These writers variably show how unionists faced persistent 
discrimination through the secretive nature of salary assessment under the satei system In 
addition, women faced acute disadvantages and discrimination in Japanese labour markets 
overall, and within unions. Not only did they face structured disadvantages through lower pay 
assessments under the satei system, but they also were denied equal opportunities to lifetime 
employment (Takanashi, 1996) as well as employment opportunities in the large enterprise 
sectors. These situational accounts help explain the co-existence of different modes of labour 
regulation. But labour’s chosen modes of organisation were also moulded by global factors. 
Global market considerations influenced the decline of the coal, shipbuilding and textile sectors.
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In response, labour organised at the industry level in these sectors, and promoted corporatist 
solutions very strongly (Makoto, 1996; Price, 1997). Overall, therefore the picture that emerges 
is one of variability in the organisation of labour and its responses to competitive pressures.
Labour’s responses were also shaped by the legislative environment. Fairly liberal labour 
laws introduced after the war reflected the liberal democratic orientation of the occupying power. 
At the same time, this orientation was counterbalanced by the broader consideration of 
promoting rapid capitalist growth. The reliance of organised labour upon labour law was 
extensive, though often more implicit than in most Western states. State regulation of this 
environment was necessary, to achieve some measure of balance, otherwise workers would have 
been overwhelmed by the high levels of concentration of capital (Shin Yamada, 1995 - 
interview). Moreover, organised labour actively sought a more liberal legislative framework to 
overcome the disabilities that had been inflicted upon it by the military regime during the war 
years.
But such unique factors are still did not make Japan immune from international
pressures. Because the developmental Japanese state co-ordinated the international orientation
of larger corporations since 1954, it has been able to withstand some of the international
pressures to restructure its labour relations regime (Wade, 1996). But the accelerated
liberalisation that it now faces seriously reduces this capacity. Moreover, because senior
bureaucrats move between the premier state agencies and top corporations, the diffusion of state
policy and conventional industrial relations conventions through them into the global arena has
become more constrained. As a consequence, differences in industrial relations practises in
Japanese MNE’s located in Japan and abroad have become more varied (Smith, 1994a and b).
Economic globalisation has thus induced variabilities in modes of labour regulation within
Japanese MNE’s globally. In this manner, economic internationalisation since 1973 especially
has increased the competitive pressures on workers in all Japanese enterprises.
Japan offers an example of this process, as even core workers are now under increasing 
pressure to lower their real wages and accept ever longer and more intensive work times 
in order to protect a lifetime employment which itself is increasingly insecure ... The 
reason Japanese firms give for not raising wages will sound familiar: A recent Japanese 
Federation of Employers Association report said a wage hike ‘would invite a loss of 
international competitive force and deindustrialisation (quoted in Burkett and Landsberg, 
1996:77).18
However, the impact of global forces upon approaches to labour regulation ought not to 
be overestimated. In spite of substantial international pressures, the state has continued to
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underwrite reforms (Wade, 1996). The three pillars of the new economic package unveiled in 
1995 are: boosting public works spending to spur domestic demand, promoting structural 
economic reforms and resolving pressing issues hindering growth such as a fall in property 
value» (Japan Times. 21/9/95; 1 and 3). While these reforms have been eclipsed by the unveiling 
of the big-bang package of reforms announced by the new LDP government in 1996, the level 
of state subsidisation has not decreased substantially (Nikkei Weekly. 4/11/96: 1-3; and 25/11/96 
1 and 5; Japan Times. 6/11/96: 1). These observations have consequences for Japan’s industrial 
relations system. Because of a continuing high profile role of state agencies in co-ordinating the 
international interests of large corporations, and because the level of protection remains high, 
large corporations have found it politically difficult to liberalise internal labour markets and thus 
reduce the influence of collective labour institutions. So while the state has not directly intervene 
in employer and organised labour relations, it continues to underwrite those relations by 
maintaining protective regimes. In this manner, both Japanese corporations and organised labour 
have managed to maintain their support for an enterprise based system even under the increasing 
strains of a global competition imperatives (Iganuchi, 1996, interview).19
Trade liberalisation, is premised upon increased labour market flexibility which 
inevitably required reduced direct regulation of labour markets (World Bank, 1995b). Over­
regulation was a primary feature of Japan’s enterprise based system until the early 1990s. Unique 
to the Japanese mode of labour regulation was the way internal labour markets were organised 
through the complex supplier networks. By transferring the burden of flexibility away from core 
units of production, a high level of regulation could be sustained -  even during the phase of 
accelerated internationalisation . This gave Japanese corporations distinct advantages over non- 
Japanese competitors. Deregulation is thus also aimed at de-linking the complicated web o f ‘anti- 
global’ state/corporations and labour networks that have evolved over the past two decades. A 
combined response against the dercgulatory thrust through the neo-corporatist institutions both 
after the 1973 crisis and during the post-bubble adjustments marks a political response to global 
exigencies in this respect.
In spite o f these considerations, the new LDP Government has signalled major reforms 
in the area of labour regulation. This has pressured union federations to seek pre-emptive 
alliances in the Diet (parliament). Reforms have also opened new lines of contestation within 
state institutions. While the Ministry for Labour favours a high level of regulation, the Ministry 
of Trade and Commerce and the Finance Ministry favour greater deregulation in the labour
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markets. Thus economic globalisation has transformed the internal architecture of the Japanese 
state, with the differentiation noted above exemplifying the thrust of this transformation. This 
also demonstrates that state and labour strategies can be quite contradictory; as exemplified by 
MlTI’s support for further deregulation and the promotion of neo-corporatism conjunctly.
These transformations have directly affected trade unions. Declining union membership, 
shift of Japanese FDI abroad and relocation of even the smaller and medium scale enterprises 
to low cost economies illustrate the diverse nature of these impacts. This is not to argue that 
economic globalisation and declining union densities are directly related. 1 have argued that 
declining densities can be attributed to a range of factors, not the least of which was the high 
degree of concentration of capital.
In response to such declines, union strategies have become more diversified. Large 
unions in large enterprises such as Nissan, have been able to maintain effectively compulsory 
unionism not only within the core enterprises, but in many of their supplier networks as well. 
Such showcase enterprise unions often had an earlier history of failed radicalism in the 1950's. 
However, their radical traits have not been fully erased, even though current unions in Nissan 
were set up as:
a company controlled union with the assistance of white-collar workers and blue-
collar supervisors,... and it became an integral part of the personnel department
(Wad, 1996:29).
It is also clear that many enterprise unions have been regaining their autonomy (Benson,
1995). From this standpoint, exigencies of economic internationalisation have both aided 
and constrained this process.
Most new unions which emerged from the 1950 phase of anti-unionism became closely 
aligned with their enterprises. The crushing of independent unionism in the 1950s dovetailed 
with a wider strategy on part of the US to hive off workplaces as potential sites of class-conflict. 
At the same time, this broader strategy aimed to secure an industrial relations system that 
promoted productivity gains while keeping in check the re-emergence of the mighty zaibatsus. 
In this way Japan’s tradition of independent and militant shopfloor unionism, thus faced a second 
blow within a space of two decades; the earlier one being the crushing and co-opting of the 
independent unions by the military regime prior to the second world war.
By externalising anti-autonomous union agenda, large enterprises were able to act 
without explicit reference to organised labour during the reconstruction period (Makoto, 1996).
A sustained effort to weaken independent unions was blamed, firstly, on the demands of the
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occupying power, and, secondly, the need to attain economic goals (export growth, international 
competitiveness) that were required of Japan. As a result of these attacks on independent 
unionism, smaller and more independent unions have persistently had to depend upon the higher 
courts for their survival (Katayanagi, 1996: 244-248).
The declining union density has also attracted substantial interest. The explanations for 
decline in union membership are quite varied. Given that enterprise unions fail to reach non-core 
(and hence the flexible employees) within their own enterprises, the chances that they will reach 
out to employees in other enterprises are substantially lower. Thus as an organisational form, 
these unions face acute difficulties in organising the expanding non-core sectors. Such union 
structures are a deliberate, rather than a chance feature. They are the consequence of deliberate 
state strategies in the 1950s and they underwrite the organisation of Japan’s political economy. 
Moreover, the decline in union membership is in part attributed to major privatisation 
programmes between 1975 and 1995 in the state sector, as well as the structural transformations 
in the Japanese economy. This has included the increased labour force participation rates for 
women, the relocation of Japanese plants abroad, and the sustained efforts to weaken the 
remaining industrial unions. Unions experienced an overall decline of 7 percent between 1975 
and 1990 and a further estimated decline of 13 percent between 1992 and the end of 1995 (JIL, 
1995). This decline has meant that organised labour has had to change its tactics and bargaining 
strategies especially during its response to the most recent economic crisis.
5:5 Organised labour's contest for influence in a decentralised setting
During the post-war period, Japan’s labour movement passed through three distinct but 
overlapping phases, revolutionary unionism (1946-1950), industrial unionism (1950 to 1965) 
(Gordon, 1996) and enterprise unionism (1965 to the early 1990s) (Kihoshi, 1992). In the 1990s 
unions are evolving in ways that appear to be both ambiguous and often contradictory. A 
decentralising tendency has been observable since the 1960s. This tendency was accelerated 
somewhat after the employment adjustment reforms between 1973 and 1975. However, unions 
have persistently contested this decentralising tendency. But this decentralisation contrasts with 
the centralising tendencies associated with corporatism already discussed.
By the early 1990s, Japan clearly possessed one of the most decentralised industrial 
relations systems. This level of decentralisation was a product o f the mode of labour regulation 
that evolved during its occupation. Its embeddedness, thereafter, rested upon a comprehensive
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campaign to wipe out the militant fringes of organised labour. This ensured that corporatist and
social democratic forms of labour/state institutional relations could develop speedily once the
radical phase of unionism had been contained (Makoto, 1996).
Given a highly restrictive environment for organised labour and its failure to secure
improvements via political support from Domei and Sohyo-sponsored politicians for most o f the
1970s, union strategies shifted in the 1990s. First, there was the growing support within unions
for the expansion of neo-corporatist arrangements. Second, there was an acceleration of
pressures towards centralisation of labour organisation at the national as well as sectoral levels.
Loose inter-union co-ordination for ‘shunto’ purposes gave way to more stable industry and
sectoral labour alliances in the late 1980s (Nakamura and Nitta, 1995). Both these responses
also illustrate how unions have chosen to respond to pressures of economic internationalisation.
The formation of Rengo (Japan Trade Union Congress) in 1989 as a more unified labour
association opened new possibilities. Before the unification:
Sohyo (the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan), Japan’s largest national centre 
of labour unions and Domei (Japan Confederation of Labour), the second largest had 
strong ties to the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), 
respectively. It is no exaggeration to say that both parties depended almost entirely on 
individual national centres (Nitta, 1993: 137).
During this period, inter-party competition had intensified and recreated inter-union rivalries. 
This lesson was not lost upon Rengo when it was convened as the new national centre. A 
distancing between political parties and organised labour was seen as necessary to maintain 
organised labour’s new found unity. As a result, the emergence of a new national centre and the 
subsequent loss of direct political leverage within the Diet created an interest representation 
lacunae which was filled by the neo-corporatist institutions. The second effect of labour’s 
centralisation was the homogenisation of labour-policies of the main political parties (LDP and 
JSP). Labour policies became a less important mechanism for electoral mobilisation. This made 
it possible for state institutions to begin to directly deal with organised labour. To an extent, the 
centralising tendency was aided by the perception that the numerical expansion of the more 
moderate private sector unions had peaked. By the late 1980s, employment expansion in the core 
manufacturing sectors had also subsided. These sectors had provided the backbone of the private 
sector unionism.
However, this centralising tendency continued to be challenged by ‘communist and other 
left wing unions that did not to affiliate with Rengo’ at its formation (Williamson, 1994: 59). A
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radical segment of Sohyo established itself as Zenroren (National Confederation of Trade
Unions) on the same day as the new Rengo was set up. By 1993, it had approximately 1 million
employees (as opposed to 8 million for Rengo), mainly drawn from the public sector unions
(teachers, medical workers’ unions, local government unions). It maintained its close
connections with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and remained ‘militantly anti-capitalist
and strongly critical o f Rengo for collaborating with big business and government’ (Williamson,
1994: 86-88). Public sector restructuring has both fuelled labour militancy in this sector and
contributed to its declining membership base. In contrast to the radical Zenrokyo, more moderate
public sector unions set up the Sohyo (National Trade Union Council of Japan) in 1989.
Overall, the strengthened national organisation of labour has affected trade union
configuration by promoting stronger industry federations and de-linking organised labour from
party political processes. However, the different forms of enterprise unionism have remained the
mainstay. As a result, labour’s responses to changing state strategies for labour regulation
remained more effective at the enterprise level and its political strategies remain diffused.
Although enterprise unions are not unique to Japan, their prevalence clearly is unusual.
Over 80 percent of all union members belong to more than 70,000 enterprise unions. Dismissing
the common perception of enterprise unions as homogeneous, Benson (1996: 374) outlines a
typology that divided enterprise unions into ‘company unions, enterprise unions, oligarchic
unions and independent unions’, with company unions being most prevalent.20 Many western
scholars and unionists have condemned enterprise unions as tame, employer-led and unable to
pursue political projects on behalf of labour. This is shown to be problematic:
Japanese enterprise unions evolved to protect and enhance the interests of a particular 
group of workers, the regular employees of large corporations. These unions have 
fulfilled this function very well. A web of personal and institutional relationships 
harmonises the economic interests of workers and employers, focuses on mutual 
survival, and reflects the acceptance of a shared destiny... The relationships could be 
characterised (either) as co-management through consensus making or as manipulation 
and domination by corporate management. ... Among regular employees, trust in this 
system is being tested during the recession of the 1990s. To date, the pain associated with 
downsizing has been felt mostly by those employees not represented by enterprise 
unions. Additionally, cost cutting pressures have been transmitted down through the 
layers of affiliated, non-union subcontractors (Miller and Amno, 1995: 47).
While the majority o f enterprises have one union only, Japan’s industrial structure has retarded 
the prospects for a considerable expansion of enterprise unionism in spite of the security of the 
‘closed shop’ (Benson, 1995: 88). This is so because ‘Japan is a nation of small scale firms; more
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than 80 percent of the labour force are employed at companies with 300 or fewer employees’. 
The small and medium sized enterprises simply cannot provide the critical mass of membership 
required for financial autonomy. An increasing number of these are located in the expanding 
service sector where union penetration is less than 15 percent and falling (Miller and Amano, 
1995:45-47).21
Small and independent unions were often victims of harsh, aggressive tactics on the part
of larger unions. The use of underground gangs against them was common in the 1960s, though
this practice has subsided in recent years. Labour militancy was not, thus contained merely
through neo-corporatism and workplace co-optation, but was also a product of direct union
coercion. In spite of this, militant and radical fragments of trade unionism have remained strong
and this has translated into direct union influences in the legislature. Moreover, the proportional
representation system introduced for the first time in the 1996 general elections has broadened
the direct influence of union electoral colleges, although this is fairly dispersed. These have two
implications. Firstly, the enterprise-based unions continue to be exposed to harsh and aggressive
anti-union strategies and their shop-floor level of organisation make them vulnerable even under
the best of circumstances. When the enterprises are small, these vulnerabilities are exacerbated.
Secondly, labour’s political and national strategies have worked to minimise such vulnerabilities.
In this regard, a largely enterprise-based system also offers prospects for labour to mediate the
harsh impacts of economic globalisation. However, organised labour cannot endlessly transfer
the costs and burden of reform to workers outside the organisational umbrella:
The willingness of unions to enter into various forms of co-operative arrangements with 
management may represent a series of strategic decisions and trade-offs by unions. ... 
“Japanese unions have shifted their attention from the distributive or egalitarian interests 
of individual workers to administering personnel policies on behalf of management in 
the name of higher incomes and a larger pie for all workers”. In addition, Japanese 
unions more frequently exist in larger enterprises and usually recruit only full-time 
regular employees. The remaining workers, often temporary, part-time or women are 
denied the protection of unions. The existence o f such a peripheral work force provides 
flexibility for larger enterprises and may well be the reason why unions have been able 
to bargain more successfully (Benson, 1995: 89).22
It is thus relevant to look both at labour’s strategies and its organisational forms. The enterprise- 
based system has generally worked well as far as membership are concerned. This approach also 
allowed large well-organised enterprises to shift union-distortions onto the supplier networks and 
the hierarchy of peripheral labour. Subsequently, the dominant form of trade unionism in Japan 
also appears to be further driving, rather than helping reduce labour market segmentation.
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Because, foundational principles such as employment security for unionised labour was not only 
secured through bargaining but also protected by law, it was difficult for employers to lay off 
organised sector workers. So long as the state maintained this arrangement, an enterprise union 
and employer coalition could be sustained, to the disadvantage of non-core employees in the 
supplier networks and the medium and small-scale enterprises who comprise the majority of 
wage/salaried workers. Enterprise unions were able to secure real wage increases even during 
the present recession, at a time when real wages were declining in Japan’s competitor economies. 
Again, while wage policies are co-ordinated by both employers and unions, they reflected also 
the exclusionary strategies adopted by unions at the enterprise levels. This was backed by a 
strong legal framework that accorded employment security, privileged collective bargaining and 
entrenched freedom of association. It allowed enterprise unions to retain their privileged position 
at the zenith of a complex labour market hierarchy.
As a result, independent enterprise unionism was and is relatively well established in the 
internationalised sectors of the economy, although far weaker and less autonomous in the 
medium enterprise sectors. The glossy picture o f a co-operative enterprise based-system hides 
the reality of severe repression and curtailment of independent unionism in these sectors. It also 
overlooks the diversity of labour relations practice, which has served the interests of a small 
segment of well-organised core workers, and of the internationalised enterprises and state 
agencies. Most importantly, an enterprise-based system has enabled capital and the state to 
proceed with restructuring at a gradual pace, thereby minimising dislocations in the organised 
sector. An enterprise-based system of labour regulation was well suited to this type of economic 
restructuring. These unique strengths of enterprise unions and the mutuality of interests between 
them and employers, was a precondition for private sector-led economic growth.
5:6 Labour regulation in peripheral and informal sectors
A critical element in the economic restructuring in Japan was the persistence of a
flexible, vulnerable workforce at the periphery. This non-core labour not only refers to workers
in the small and medium enterprise sectors, but also to those within firms who were not part of
the regular workforce and thus excluded from the enterprise unions.
Growth and structural transformation of the Japanese economy were characterised by the 
persistence and increased complexity o f structural dualism ... Structural dualism has, 
however, not been confined to inter-organisational relations based on firm size. Within 
larger-scale organisations themselves, different systems of labour relations have been 
developed that have also had the effect of making the best of Japan’s large and
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intermediate-sized corporations supremely adaptive to the exigencies of global 
competition (Camey and O’Kelly, 1990:123).
This flexible non-core workforce has been a defining feature of its labour relations since the end 
of the 1950s (Nakayama, 1965). Non-core employment or the peripheral labour market is 
important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it shows that Japanese unions had followed the 
patterns of their western counterparts, of creating and organising an elite segment of the 
workforce whose interests were placed ahead of those of the working classes more generally. 
Moreover, they also explain how adjustments had been relatively easy to implement in Japan 
during periods such as the 1973 oil and the post-bubble crisis. The costs and burden of 
adjustment after both these crises were readily transferred to the flexible non-core and 
disorganised employment sector. By keeping this sector disorganised, capital has been able to 
respond to global exigencies readily. Japan’s industrial relations system anchored to the 
predominant enterprise mode of labour organisation was crucial in sustaining this arrangement.
This segmentation has influenced the selective patterns noted in Japan’s post-war 
economic development. Chalmers (1989) provides the following presentation of labour market 
segmentation in Japan.
Figure 1:0 Core-Peripheral Segmentation Structure: Japan
Regular Workers Non-regular Workers
Large-enterprise 
sector workers core workers temporary and day labour 
And contract labour
Small and medium 
enterprise sector 
workers core workers in dependent 
or sub-contracting firms
temporary, day labour, 
family workers, female 
workers, contract labour 
and self employed
(Source: Chalmers, 1989: 19)
This framework needs further clarification, as Chalmers ignores other forms of segmentation that 
were also prevalent in Japan’s labour markets. For example, the increasing numbers of migrant 
labour were concentrated in a few, and mainly informal sectors. Labour practices in overseas 
enterprises (based in Japan) and Japanese enterprises were also quite different. Japanese 
enterprises were able to exciude company-wide trade unions organisation through their supplier
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networks, whereas overseas enterprises did not have this option. This gave Japanese enterprises
a competitive edge in the home market. The differentiation between protected and more open
employment sectors was also significant basis for segmentation.
Finally, the gendered nature of Japanese labour markets deserves particular attention. For
example, while part-time employment as a proportion of total wage/salaried employment
increased from 6.3 percent in 1960 to 12 percent in 1989, the composition of women within that
increased from 43 percent to 75 percent over the same period (JIL, 1993:127-128). Camey and
O’Kelly (1990: 123 andl27) further observe:
it is in the complex relationships among core and peripheral systems of labour both 
between firms o f  different sizes and within firms, particularly larger ones, that the 
intersection of economic organisation and gender has determined the structure of 
women’s work and parameters of women’s place in the post-war Japanese economic 
miracle. ... (Women’s) place in the rapidly changing economy of post-war Japan; 
women’s increasing importance as a structurally circumscribed group of non-lifetime 
workers and flexible labour reserve, (was) strategically necessary to the maintenance of 
the restricted lifetime employment system and the facilitation o f structural transition in 
a rapidly changing economy.
A largely enterprise-based system transfers some of the costs of unionisation onto the peripheral 
workforce comprised o f  increasing numbers of women who are also temporary employees. 
Chalmers (1989: 242-3) concludes
that the implications of enterprise based labour organisation are far reaching, and the 
effects extend well beyond the organised sector ... By default, the protection, privilege, 
and advantage associated with organised labour are denied to workers in Japan’s largely 
non-unionised and non-regulated sector.... The operation of enterprise unionism militates 
against politicisation and the initiation of the broader union movement strategies that 
may cover issues of concern to non-unionised workers. Such disenfranchised workers,
... have little capacity themselves to express their interests in these issues or have them 
placed on agendas of major industrial unions and union federations.
Peripheral labour markets thus underline several features relevant to the broader focus 
of this study. Firstly, given their low levels of unionisation, competitive pressures through lower 
wage costs are normally borne by this sector. This creates tensions between unionised and non- 
unionised sectors within enterprises. Secondly, during periods of downturns, and restructuring 
more generally, the non-core segment had provided the flexibility for “employment adjustment”. 
In this manner, the regulated and non-regulated sectors form part of a single continuum, an 
internal labour market that is segmented along occupational lines and where segmentation is 
reaffirmed through labour’s organisational structures. Thirdly, international pressures are also
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better absorbed via the flexibility of the peripheral sectors. International competitiveness is 
secured through labour policy changes mainly in deregulated non-core labour markets. Thus the 
Japanese state was able to facilitate the movement of even the smaller and medium scale 
enterprises into Asia to deal with the politically sensitive trade deficits without drawing 
opposition from organised labour.
The kinds of flexibilities that the peripheral sectors provided support a more conventional 
neo-liberal type of policy orientation in terms of their consequences. Because it is historically 
rooted, the pressures for labour policy reforms have been less acute in the current economic 
crisis.23 Clearly, differentiated labour market strategies on part of capital and labour have 
assisted the accelerated internationalisation of Japan’s economy. It is evident that such 
segmentation within labour markets rests upon a precariously balanced power configuration 
between state agencies, trade unions and capital. If economic internationalisation engenders 
increased vulnerability of the core sectors, this balance of power may shift, leading to a re­
radical isation of organised labour. This configuration of power was central to holding together 
a differentiated regime of regulation. It would appear, however, that the differentiating outcomes 
that result from the process of economic internationalisation have been slowly eating away at 
the foundations of this configuration.
Overall, therefore, this chapter rejected the notion that the enterprise-based system in 
Japan is a normative caricature of the predominant mode of labour regulation in Japan in the 
1990s. It also rejected the notion that enterprise unions have been management controlled. 
Enterprise unions have clearly secured significant gains. The wages of workers in the organised 
sectors are among the highest in the world, and real wage increases have been maintained even 
in the present depressed environment. Unions have developed industrial federations and 
coalitions through which industrial and economic policy at a number of levels are directly 
influenced. Moreover, unions have also shifted their attention to questions of quality of working 
life (Rengo, 1995). This suggests that enterprise unions are gradually framing national labour 
policies largely through the new corporatist institutions. At the same time, union autonomy at 
many workplaces has been expanding.
However, recent efforts at rekindling national centres appears to have constrained the 
scope of enterprise unionism in Japan, especially as workplace issues become subject to industry 
or national negotiations. When transposed upon a wider regional context of union decline 
(Frenkel and Harrod, eds. 1995), it becomes evident that enterprise unionism will face acute
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difficulties in organising new firms. Firms not rooted in Japan’s social milieu and without 
extensive state support can do little to hold together the compacts unon which its enterprise- 
based system rests.
As the internationalisation of the Japanese economy proceeds, there is likely to be an 
increase in the number of non-Japanese enteiprises operating in Japan. This is likely to impact 
upon existing union configurations, as these enterprises are likely to be concentrated in non­
union areas, resulting in a further deterioration in union membership rates (Tsuru and Rebitzer, 
1995: 482). International corporations compete more directly without complementary support 
in domestic markets. As a result, there is less pressure upon them to sustain the existing mode 
of labour regulation. Trade liberalisation inevitably exposes corporations and hence labour to 
global markets more directly, thus the externalised interest of promoting international 
competitiveness begins to apply more closely at the workplace level. Consequently, Japan’s 
regulationist enterprise-based system of labour relations is likely to be exposed to the vagaries 
of economic globalisation. What is different about Japan, however, is that this process of 
economic change is slow and continues to be highly co-ordinated. The apparently contradictory 
rise of neo-corporatism in the 1990s exemplifies this tendency and its attendant contradictions. 
To assess the prospects for labour as a result of accelerated internationalisation, we need to 
understand how state and market relationships have been transformed. Moreover, we need to 
understand how the political influences of labour were co-opted to support the transformation 
process itself.
Nowhere are the consequences of economic internationalisation and the limits of
enterprise unionism more apparent than with regard to wage setting. Japan’s showcase nenko
system of co-ordination at the industry level of wage bargaining by numerous enterprise unions
delivered real improvements in wage and working conditions almost persistently over the past
two decades. Central co-ordination was further boosted through the emergence of a unified
RENGO in 1989. In spite o f both these developments, this mode of regulation masked the
differences between internationally trading and domestic orientated sectors. Accelerated
internationalisation of its economy has helped to expose these differences. For example, in 1996,
the annual shunto had failed to produce a more homogenous wage outcome as the
highest pay awards clearly went to internationally competitive industries such as 
cars, steel and electronics and lower awards to domestically orientated or high 
cost sectors such as heavy engineering and power supply / Financial Times.
1/4/97: 4).
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The emergence of such differentiation has lead to a partial breakdown of the industry-wide 
awards, a strategy through which otherwise weak enterprise unions had maximised their 
bargaining powers. Indeed for an increasingly large sector of the economy, the shunto has 
become irrelevant (Financial Times. 1/4/97:5). Prospectively, the unique way in which an 
enterprise-based and dominated mode of worker organisation had mitigated their disadvantages 
maybe in rapid decline. By promoting the internationalisation of industry, the state is 
undermining its own commitment to the unique form of corporatism that it engendered. 
Paradoxically organised labour is a party to these transformations, and most affected by it at the 
same time.
5:7 Labour’s Responses: reorganisation and militancy in the state sector
Japan’s state sector offers an interesting site where the associations between the process 
of economic internationalisation and labour regulation can be viewed. The state sector is small 
by relative international standards. The government’s fiscal expenditures were below 20 percent 
of GNP, and ownership of key industries has been relatively small (OECD, 1995a). In areas such 
as fiscal expenditure, state ownership and taxation, the Japanese government might be described 
as minimalist, rather than dirigiste’ (Ravenhill, ed. 1995: 351-353). In many ways, Japan led the 
world in privatisation when the Meiji state sold off a significant number of public corporations 
to promote indigenous industrialisation in the 1890s (Yanamoto, 1993: 338). The second wave 
of privatisation occurred in the post-war period. By re-examining the state sector and labour’s 
response to changes within it, post-war continuities in state regulation of labour can be better 
understood.
In the post-war period, the US feared the rising labour militancy in the public sector. The
involvement of the public sector unions in the 1947 strike was seen as a political constraint to
Japan’s economic reconstruction. In July 1948, MacArthur advised the Japanese government to
split off the government railways and monopoly enterprises as separate public 
corporations and let their employees bargain collectively, although not strike. Instead, 
mediation and arbitration procedures were to be set up ... The remaining three-quarters 
of government employees, including 700,000 communications workers and teachers, 
could now no longer bargain collectively, depriving them of a right they had de facto for 
three years and de jure for two (Tsuru, 1996: 31).
For the occupying power, it was clear from the outset that the political potential of public sector 
workers had to be constrained. These stiff reforms, according the then US Secretary for State,
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Saltzman were to lead to a polarisation of politics in Japan, taking the form of radicalisation of
state sector labour associations, and a strengthening of their association with left-wing political
parties. The public sector unions’ direct challenges to the state to set it apart from private sector
unions. The SOHYO and RENGO divisions emerged from the differential political orientation
of the public and private sector workers. Because of their radical orientation, both the occupying
power, and the single party LDP government that ruled Japan almost continuously from the
1950s until the mid -1980s deployed a series of labour market, legislative and associated
measures aimed at constraining the political strength and organisation of public sector workers.
This approach is further illustrated during the decade of administrative reform (1981 to
1987) when the third wave of privatisations occurred. This wave occurred during a period of
boom - rather than economic crisis, although key public sector corporations such as the Japan
Railways (JR) were in severe financial difficulties. By 1975, JR had run up a deficit of SUS9.1
billion. When the Public Corporation and Government Workers Unions began an 8-day strike
to restore the right to strike at this time, public opinion turned against it. A decision was
eventually taken in 1986 to privatise the railways, by which time the JR had run up a massive
debt to the tune of $215 billion (Rengo, n.d. mimeo). Kume (1998; 16) observed that:
through privatisation, the national railway eliminated room for political and union- 
brokered intervention and established autonomy for corporate management. If the 
railways were to remain as an organisation of about 280,000 employees, the dependency 
of that organisation (and its union) on political favours would also remain.
Significantly, since its break up almost a decade ago, reorganised railway workers unions have 
not staged a single strike. This showcase privatisation illustrates the dilemmas and contradictions 
of a state co-ordinated approach to economic development. JR and other privatisations have 
‘hardly brought about deregulation’ and the internal labour market remains heavily regulated.24 
This was because privatisation was a ‘product of compromise between the government, the LDP, 
the business world (Keidanren), and the Japan Socialist Party’ (Yamamoto, 1993: 350) and its 
transition to a full market-driven sector remained contested.25 However, the impact of 
privatisation on labour fragmentation is very clear.
As a result of the considerable benefits obtained from labour’s fragmentation, two other 
interest associations appear to have made considerable gains from the lucrative privatisation 
introduced as part of the 1980s administrative reform project. They were the premier state 
agencies and Japanese and US industry.
In determining the profile o f privatisation in the 1980s, the role of foreign pressure
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should not be underestimated. The US in particular felt that privatisation could open new 
opportunities by increasing competition and accelerating market growth. Japan had to 
concede to America’s pressure in order to alleviate escalating trade friction.... (More), 
in the mid-1980s Japanese capital markets developed rapidly and sales and public assets 
promised to be highly profitable to the state, as well as to the financial intermediaries 
involved in underwriting them (Yamamoto, 1993: 339).
These twin pressures of internationalisation and a boom in capital markets created the unique 
circumstances in which Japan’s most recent privatisation programmes commenced. The fact that 
the impact o f these pressures was felt most acutely by organised labour suggests linkages 
between economic globalisation (in this case represented by pressures to liberalise domestic 
markets), capital markets and labour regulation. Such linkages will need to be studied in far 
greater depth and on a case by case basis. My task here was to show that the inter-linkages were 
operationalised by and through state agencies. It is not simply the case that privatisations have 
been spurred by economic crisis as the case of JR may suggest. However, because privatisation 
did not lead to a completely deregulated labour market, organised labour had managed to 
preserve some of its bases. A distinctive labour market segmentation also ensured that public 
sector labour militancy did not envelop the organised labour movement as a whole. Moreover, 
the predominantly moderate fragment of organised labour stood ambivalently by as the 
restructuring commenced, because as private sector unions they stood to gain from that process 
through increased membership.
The key trends in economic reform and approaches to labour regulations since the early 
1990s are summarised in Table 3:0 on the next page.
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Table 3:0 Economic Restructuring and labour regulation in Japan: 1973-1995
K e y  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s  a n d  
o u t c o m e s
1 9 7 3 - 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5
Im p e tu s  fo r  c h a n g e O il c r i s i s  b e tw ee n  1973 a n d  1975 ‘b ig -b u b b le ’ c r is is ,  c o l la p s e  o f
In c r e a s e d  U S a n d  e x te rn a l  p re s s u re p ro p e r ty  p r ic e s ,  la rg e -s c a le
fo r o p e n in g -u p  s e c to r s  o f  th e b a n k ru p tc ie s , fin a n c ia l s e c to r  ba ilou t
d o m e s t ic  e c o n o m y a n d  in te n s if ie d  e x te rn a l p re s su re s  fo r
lib e ra l is a t io n
E co n o m ic  p o lic y  c h a n g e a. ‘E m p lo y m e n t a d ju s tm e n t a. ‘ B ig  b a n g ’ r e fo rm s  a im e d  at
p ro g r a m m e s ’ in tro d u c e d . ra p id  l ib e ra l is a t io n  in  the
b. N e w  p h a se  o f  s tra te g ic f in a n c e  s e c to r  a n d  ra p id
p r iv a t is a t io n s  c o m m e n c e  a n d w ith d ra w a l  o f  b a r r ie r s  to  trad e
s t a t e  s u p p o rt f o r  s u n se t b. L a rg e  s c a le  p r iv a t is a t io n s  a n d
in d u s tr ie s . a d ju s tm e n ts  p ro g ra m m e s
c. M o d e s t  l ib e ra l is a t io n  in th e in tro d u c e d  in th e  k e y  eco n o m ic
f in a n c e  sec to r s e c to rs
c . R e fo rm  o f  e m p lo y m e n t  in the
s ta te  s e c to r  c o m m e n c e s .
R e str u c tu r in g  o f  s ta te - th e  c o n s o lid a tio n  o f  M IT I a n d - th e  o rg a n is in g  a n d  p o lic y
in s titu tio n s E c o n o m ic  P la n n in g  A g e n c y  a s m o n o p o ly  o f  a g e n c ie s  su ch  as
th e  p re m ie r  p o l ic y  in s t i tu t io n s M IT I a n d  E P A  fu r th e r
- s t a t e  c o n tro l o f  s tra te g ic c o n s o lid a te d .
in d u s tr ie s  in th e  ra il, te le c o m  e tc . - L im ite d  a u to n o m y  g ra n te d  to
r e d u c e d th e  tr e a s u ry ,  a n d  m e a s u re s  to
- e m e rg e n c e  o f  a  h ig h ly  c e n tra lise d p ro te c t  it f ro m  p o litic a l
g o v e rn m e n t  sy s te m p re s s u re s  in tro d u c e d .
- th e  c o n so lid a tio n  o f  th e - T h e  c e n tra l is e d  n a tu r e  o f
‘d e v e lo p m e n ta l  s ta t e ’ g o v e rn m e n t  re p la c e d  b y  w eak
a n d  f lu id  g o v e rn in g  c o a l it io n s .
O u tco m es a. J a p a n e s e  e c o n o m y a. G ro w th  s lo w s  d o w n  to  2
e x p e r ie n c e s  a n  a v e r a g e  o f  7 p e rc e n t  a n d  th e  e c o n o m y  e n te rs
p e rc e n t  re a l e x p a n s io n  in s e r io u s  re c e s s io n  a t  th e  e n d  o f
G D P 1995.
b. L a rg e  sca le  in c r e a s e  in th e b . T h e  e x p o r t  o f  p r iv a te  J a p a n e se
e x p o r t  o f  J a p a n e s e  c a p i ta l c a p i ta l  in c re a s e s ,  b u t  th e
a n d  re lo c a tio n  o f  J a p a n e s e re lo c a t io n  o f  in d u s t ry  s lo w s
in d u s try  (m a in ly  S M E ’s) to d o w n .
A sia . c . M o re  g e n e ra l p r iv a t is a t io n
c. S tra te g ic  p r iv a t is a t io n s p ro g r a m m e s  in tro d u c e d .
c o n s id e ra b ly  w e a k e n  th e d . L a b o u r  m a rk e t d e re g u la t io n
re m a in in g  le f t- o r ie n te d m e a s u re s  in tro d u c e d  e sp e c ia lly
in d u s tr ia l  u n io n s in  th e  c r is is  s e c to rs
d. P a r tie s  a lig n e d  to  o rg a n is e d e. T h e  c o rp o ra t is t  s e t t le m e n ts
la b o u r  s u f fe r  s u c c e s s iv e h o llo w e d  o u t  b y  n e w  m e a su re s .
e le c to ra l s e tb a c k s . U n io n s  a d o p t  a  r a n g e  o f
e. A n  e x p a n s io n  o f  n e o - s tra te g ic  r e s p o n se s .
c o rp o ra t is t  a r ra n g e m e n ts .
The significant changes between the two periods have unsettled the mechanisms through which 
the Japanese state has managed state and capital contests honed during the high growth years. 
This suggests that Japan has entered a new phase of re-composition of state and labour 
relationships. The ways in which this occurs may have some bearing on the pace and strategic
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directions for further internationalisation.
§:8 Social democracy and the problem of legitimation
Japan’s labour regulation framework rested upon a distinct institutional framework. The
Japanese post-war state had skilfully masked a fairly closed political system until the mid-1970s.
It was the mounting pressures against its rising trade surpluses that led to more careful scrutiny
of its political institutions. Large corporations had a direct stake in the political system through
sponsorship of political parties and candidates. Borthwick observed that:
big business is not a special interest group in Japan; it is the prime beneficiary 
and virtual raison d’être of the Japanese system, as the theory of capitalist 
development state stipulates. For that reason it is meaningless to speak of the role 
of big business in Japanese politics; the two are indistinguishable (quoted in 
Tabb, 1995).
To some extent, its membership of the OECD and the IMF opened Japanese industry, industrial 
policy and the state to greater international scrutiny, focussing on restricted accumulation 
policies created by the post-war developmentalist state. This was largely so because Japanese 
industry sought to expand trade in a manner that did not dilute the highly centralised interests 
of a few large corporations. Moreover, OECD membership came with new obligations with 
respect to trade and exchange rate policies most specifically (Tsuru, 1996).
In understanding the post 1960s internationalisation of the Japanese economy, several 
factors were important. The US had wanted stability in the immediate post-war period. This 
depended upon the continuing dominance of the pre-war industrial and political elite. Thus, both 
the emperor and pre-war industrial houses, such as Mitsukoshi, emerged as crucial stabilising 
influences. At the same time, the US wanted to promote a democratic regime. A very specific 
form of inter-linkage between the power structures of the pre-war period and a new one 
dominated by political parties evolved subsequently. Within and inside the political system, 
parties came to be held to ransom by strong factions with clearly identifiable support and interest 
group bases. External sponsorship of factions came to be dominated by industry (both in the 
internationalised manufacturing, industrial and service sectors as well as the protected rural and 
small to medium enterprise sectors). A defining character of Japan’s political institutions since 
its rapid internationalisation in the 1960s has been the persistent effort to reconcile the 
contradictory pressures of the protected (agricultural, rural and small and medium enterprise 
sectors) and the industrial/manufacturing and service sector enterprises who trade both
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domestically, but increasingly globally. This was a highly political process, shaping the contours 
of parliamentary politics and defining its weak democratic credentials.
The post-war Japanese state was quite successful in managing these contradictory 
pressures. Labour was not excluded from the political system either. Indeed it retained strong 
organisational links both through its association with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), and more 
indirectly through union sponsorship o f  individual Diet members. Because the JSP remained in 
opposition for almost the entire period under review, Japanese labour did not enjoy the luxury 
of Labour-influenced governments. After the crushing blows to militant labour in the 1950's, 
indirect access to power via expanding corporatist agencies won the support of both the Sohyo 
and the Domei. Despite these, unions played politics on a highly lopsided playing field except 
briefly during the time of the short-lived socialist government in the 1950s. The LDP maintained 
control over the Diet until the mid-1990s when Japan’s institutions come under aggravated 
international scrutiny. While the LDP’s near complete control in the Diet has waned, political 
shifts have not occurred on a scale where the gains made by international and national capital 
during the period of administrative and economic reform could be directly reversed.
Organised labour’s political fortunes have improved through its increased access to 
decision making. This is counter balanced by the fact the trade liberalisation has freed capital 
from high degrees of state regulation at the same time. Overall, the implicit social settlement 
upon which labour regulation has rested from the early 1960s has been thrown into question as 
a consequence of the accelerated internationalisation of Japan’s economy. A rapid 
reconfiguration of state/market relations is underway. The challenge for labour is whether it will 
be able to withstand and moderate the influences of the neo-liberal policy framework of the 
contemporary state. These are closely tied to the debate about legitimation of state strategies and 
its changing modes of regulation of labour. A more open market ethos has transformed Japan’s 
social democratic processes through which state/market relations are reconfigured. 
Reconfiguration does not necessarily aid the legitimation of new modes of labour regulation 
(Price, 1997). It often complicated that mode of regulation. This presents itself as a paradox for 
both state and capital in contemporary Japan. In the mid-1990s, the Japanese state confronted 
two distinct challenges. Firstly, the society witnessed an expansion of individual rights and 
freedoms through constitutional and legal developments. On the other hand, it confronted the 
problem of limiting in the growing autonomy of enterprise based organisations of labour so as 
to enable Japanese enterprises to meet serious economic challenges. These developments have
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the potential of tearing apart the narrow corporatist mechanisms upon which its regime of labour 
regulation is rooted.
5:9 Conclusion
Economic globalisation in japan has occurred within the context of a high degree of state 
co-ordination. This co-ordination involved selected agencies of the state that often held 
competing interests. The internal fragmentation and contestation was aggravated during the 
decades of accelerated economic internationalisation, beginning in the early 1970s. During this 
period, the transmission belt nature of the state was re-defined. State agencies succeeded in 
transmitting an agenda in which Japan’s internationalisation could be achieved in a regulated 
manner, thereby maintaining its compacts between national capital and large segments of 
organised labour. This compact and consensus stands fundamentally exposed by the economic 
challenges that have developed in the post-bubble era. By further fracturing the labour markets 
and hence further disadvantaging peripheral segments of labour, the costs of reform have been 
transferred onto those outside the organised structures within a dominant enterprise based regime 
of regulation. Their exclusion generates new and differentiated forms of tensions on the political 
system as a whole.
Japan’s post-war internationalisation was managed through a complex system of labour 
regulation characterised by strong internal labour markets within large corporations and allied 
small and medium enterprises. Segmented patterns of labour regulation evolved subsequently 
leading to the hegemony of moderate modes of labour organisation. An enterprise-based system 
of labour relations aided this and also accorded a very high level of flexibility to elite segments 
of labour and helped large corporations deal with the vagaries of economic globalisation.
Labour in Japan strongly featured in the process of its economic internationalisation by 
internalising the challenge and constraints imposed by the international system. Thus 
international competitiveness, the pursuance of an anti-inflationary climate among others came 
to represent the political goals of labour as well. But by the mid-1990's, major reforms were 
clearly underway. The growing autonomy of capital markets and Japanese corporations had 
hollowed out the possibility of a return to neo-corporatist forms of regulation. This was further 
exacerbated by the trend of greater autonomy for even the small and medium scale enterprises. 
As Japanese capital moved off shore, for both political and economic reasons, a nationally 
managed approach to economic development, the incentives for neo-corporatism and capacity
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for state co-ordination have been reduced.
This chapter has shown that economic policy framework at the heart of which lay a 
segmented labour market arrangement aided the reconstruction and massive expansion of the 
post-war Japanese economy. Moreover, its accelerated economic growth has to be attributed to 
the ways in which domestic factors were harnessed as the 1950 to 1973 boom ‘was not export 
led, though exports helped’. Under such a controlled system, labour could negotiate real 
advances. This was to change in the 1990s when the system overall came under severe global 
pressures. State/market relations were to be subsequently altered in ways that were often 
contradictory and ambiguous. This exemplifies the complicated nature of the process of 
economic globalisation and its uneven impacts and consequences.
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Chapter 5: Endnotes
1. The term ‘developmental state’ is used quite distinctly from its more common late- 
developer orientation in Tabb (1995) and Appelbaum and Hendersen (1992). It 
indicates at best the tendency of planning, market coordination and high levels of 
sectoral regulation through state agencies.
2. A MITI policy panel for example announced 133 refomi proposals as part of a 
restructuring package (See Ishizawa, “MITI Panel calls for strong medicine”, in 
Nikkei Weekly. 2/12/96: 3). Further reforms were announced in late 1997 (see Japan 
Echo, various issues).
3. Employment adjustment has a fairly specific connotation in Japan. It refers to the 
capacity for enterprises to manipulate the internal labour markets to minimise the 
impacts of recession. This most commonly takes the form of shukko - i.e. transfer and 
movement of employees in a network of firms (Sugeno, 1994). Administrative reform 
refers to restructuring of state agencies, and the reform of their policy-decision 
making procedures.
4. Several years prior to the Meiji restoration, ‘European countries and the USA had 
threatened Japan with their overwhelming military power in order to open its ports 
and allow trade. Japan had to accept unequal treaties ... which allowed the USA, the 
UK, The Netherlands, France, and Russia extraterritorial privileges and deprived 
Japan of the right to set its tariffs’ (Odagiri and Goto, 1996: 17). In the post-war 
period, policy makers were again conscious of the fact that the US had forced Japan 
into a similar comer. This has bred an orientation best described as that of economic 
nationalism.
5. Joseph Dodge, a Detroit Banker represented President Truman in promoting a set 
of adjustment policies to the Japanese Government, after the direct influence of 
General MacArthur (Head of the GHQ) over economic policy had been 
circumscribed. Because the Japanese Cabinet had rejected an earlier set of 
stabilisation measures, the dispatch of Dodge represented the re-assertion of US 
economic interests over the Japanese political system. Dodge’s nine point plan aimed 
to achieve a balanced budget, strengthen the program of tax collection, restrict credit 
expansion, achieve wage stability, strengthen the price control programs, improve the 
operation of foreign trade control, and promote food production and raw material 
production domestically while diluting the regulations on trade more generally 
(Tsuru, 1996: 47). Its overall effect was to hollow Japan’s capacity to pursue neo­
mercantilist policies inspired by a sense of economic nationalism.
6. Schonberger noted that ‘even without the intervention of American business 
interests in the zaibatsu dispute the opposition of Japanese capitalist class to 
déconcentration would have influenced American state managers to scuttle the 
program’ (quoted in Tsuru, 1996: 42).
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7. Okuchi et.al. (1973) makes the argument that many non-targeted and small and 
medium scale sectors such as precision equipment and consumer electronics also 
attained high levels of international competitiveness. He concluded that ‘the success 
of non-targeted industries and the problems in certain targeted sectors suggest that the 
reasons for Japan’s spectacular track record goes well beyond the realm of industrial 
policy, into broad areas of the political economy as a whole’ (p.69).
8. Both unions and employer groups also responded with their own vision documents 
each time a major one was announced by a government agency that affected their 
interests. NIKKEIREN (The Japanese Federation of Employers’ Associations), for 
example, released its influential ‘Report of Research Committee on Labour Problems’ 
in 1988. This report noted that wage levels were the highest in the world and hence 
international competitiveness required some reconsideration of pay negotiations, the 
need to reduce consumer prices, and to promote market liberalisation Nikkeiren, 
1988).
9. The 1942 Bank of Japan (BOJ) Law has given rise to a ‘strongly control-orientated 
bank whose independence compares poorly with that of its US and German 
counterparts’ (Nikkei Weekly. 18/11/96: 12). Subsequently the BOJ board is often 
referred to as the ‘sleeping board’. The ‘big-bang’ proposal of reforms have sought to 
grant the BOJ greater autonomy (Japan Echo. December, 1997).
10. Amakudari - is a long established practice whereby retiring senior 
finance/economic planning bureaucrats were appointed to cushy management 
positions in the industry associations. Through this, industry associations were able to 
maintain direct influence in state agencies.
11. The kancho economist group is responsible for articulating strategic policy papers 
that are referred to as the ‘vision” papers. Interestingly, ‘academic economists, who 
construct and exhibit the imaginary worlds of neoclassical, post-Keynesian and 
Marxian economic theories have not found many positions of influence in the 
planning of the economy’ (Sheridan, 1993: 207).
12. Moreover, even at the peak of its influence in the mid 1950s, organised labour 
was spilt down the centre, between a fragment that was hostile to any conciliation 
with business and one that was more aligned with that development. Such divisions 
were so bitter, that they effectively undermined the ‘socialist government’ in the 
1950s (Pernple and Tsunekawa, 1995).
13. Other agencies on which Rengo has gained representation include the Council on 
External Co-operation - jointly convened by the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of 
Finance and M1TI; several specialised M1TI councils and Ministry of Labour 
councils. Since 1990, Rengo has been making direct representation to government on 
international issues (Wilkinson, 1994: 82-83). See also Dore, R. (1990), “Japan: A 
Nation Made for Corporatism”, in Crouch, C and Dore, R. (Eds.). Corporatism and 
Accountability. Oxford: Clarendon.
14. Depoliticisation here refers to the domination of the Japanese diet by two main
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groups of political parties that were broadly ‘pro-business, pro-American and lacking 
distinctive ideas’ (The Economist. 1996: 72).
15. This notion of administrative reform has a very particular usage in Japan whose 
origin lies in the development of ‘administrative guidance’ during the reconstruction 
phases. Administrative guidance was a ‘method widely used by Government to 
support and reinforce many sorts of policies, both microeconomic and 
macroeconomic. It involved the use of influence, advice and persuasion to cause 
firms or individuals to behave in particular ways that the government believed was 
desirable (Tsuru, 1996: 96-97). Administrative reforms are usually interpreted as the 
winding down of such methods.
16. Shirai ed. (1983: xxii) noted that ‘some Western labour specialists have 
formulated and promulgated notions about the distinctive characteristics of Japanese 
industrial relations that have become established as stereotypes and have tended to 
circumscribe the further development of research as well as to constrain a balanced 
understanding of the system’.
17. To an extent, this was replaced by the increased scholarly focus on the diffusion 
of Japanese industrial relations and management strategies through Japanese TNC’s 
(discussions, Nitta, M. Tokyo, April, 1996). Smith (1994 a and b), for example, has 
studied employment practices of Japanese MNE’s and enterprises in Malaysia.
18. The deindustrialisation issue is now a subject of extensive research within Japan 
(see JIL 1996 newsletters, for example). In various tripartite machineries, labour has 
been pressed to consider the lower wage/and employment preservation trade-off 
(interview Kamenaya, JIL, April, 1996).
19. This argument does not apply to, firstly, those industries for whom the level of 
state support and scope for administrative guidance has been reduced considerably. It 
also does not apply to the small-scale sectors and the informal sectors. The point is 
owed to Prof. Igonuchi (United Nations University, Tokyo).
20. Because enterprise unions identified more closely with their employers, they often 
also supported the political orientation of their employers. This was so because in a 
highly protected and closed economy, enterprises depended upon political favours, 
these inevitably affected labour (Miller and Amano, 1995). With trade liberalisation, 
such political associations are likely to become less useful for employers.
21. Miller and Amano (1995: 48) conclude that ‘in the expanding service sector, a 
different union model is evolving. ZENSENDOMEI (a former enterprise union) has 
abandoned its company-specific orientation in order to establish a membership among 
numerous retail and wholesale employers. This evolving industrial-type union could 
represent the future of a renewed Japanese labour movement’.
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22. Ironically, the re-centralising tendencies within organised labour are overtly 
problematic. Because of the elitist nature of enterprise unionism, externalities such as 
unemployment, wage cuts outside the core employment and other adjustments were 
o f marginal importance to many enterprise unions. However, the unemployment issue 
has become one of the main agendas for Rengo presently. Neo-corporatist tendencies 
can pressure Rengo into national wage policies in return for wage-moderation in the 
core unionised sectors (see for example opening speech by Jinnosuke Ashida - 
President of Rengo to its 4th Bennial Convention - quoted in RENGO. No. 35, 1995; 
December).
23. Segmented labour markets also have implications for worker discipline.
Wilkinson (1994: 35) observes that ‘worker discipline and obedience ... might be best 
explained by the strong labour market segmentation in the Japanese economy which 
makes widespread unionisation difficult and might give unionised workers a feeling 
o f being privileged; by the rigorous procedures of selection and indoctrination; by the 
extensive and direct communication between management and the workforce; by the 
use of peer pressure via ‘team work’; and a detailed surveillance of industrial 
activities of key employees... Industrial harmony is not a natural state of affairs in 
Japan. Harmony has been actively created by employers, sometimes with the crucial 
support of the state, and is re-created on a daily basis through propaganda, peer 
controls and work place surveillance’.
24. See Tsuru (1996: 205-211) for further discussion of the main privatisations during 
the administrative reform period that is not examined in this thesis.
25. For example, the very lucrative NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone) remains 
in government hands almost a decade after its privatisation was first mooted (see Lee, 
P. “Japan: The Telecom Dilemma”, F.uromonev. February 1996: 10-12).
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Chapter Six: Malaysia -  Political regulation of labour and accelerated 
internationalisation
6:0 Introduction
This chapter expands the principal thesis in relation to Malaysia; a complex 
developing Asian state that embarked upon a programme of rapid industrialisation in the 
1980s. This programme was associated with a noticeable transformation of the role of state 
during the period of accelerated internationalisation that followed. This chapter examines 
the ways in which this internationalisation was influenced by economic policy instruments 
and patterns of state intervention in labour markets. It further examines how labour has 
featured in the process of economic restructuring that was underwritten by a unique mix of 
political and labour market instruments.
The theoretical arguments advanced have demonstrated two contradictory themes. 
They involved the centrality of the state regulation of labour in neo-liberal reforms and the 
exclusion of the state regulation of labour in the economic globalisation debates. I 
demonstrate the centrality of labour market strategies to the reorientation of the Malaysian 
economy. To do so, it was necessary to re-examine the patterns of flow of capital. FDI flows 
over the past two decades have been concentrated in a few developing states, Malaysia being 
one of them. The policies and strategies that were deployed be the Malaysian state to achieve 
this helps inform the theoretical issues raised in this thesis.
This chapter first outlines the historical background to the economic reforms of the 
1980s. This includes a discussion of the state-led programme of selective industrialisation 
and import substitution until 1969, and an outline of export oriented growth following the 
political upheavals of the late 1960s. The chapter highlights the rise of an ethno-nationalist 
state committed to a market economy and the redistribution of the rewards of growth by a 
politically defined ethnic criteria during the 1970s. It then examines how labour regulation 
was approached by a developmental state in the 1970s and following the economic crisis of 
the mid -1980s. In the sections that follow, I assess the re-orientation of state’s regulation 
of labour achieved through a combination of labour market and political strategies during 
a period of an extraordinary high level of economic growth. The chapter concludes by 
making some observations about the end of the high growth period in the mid-1990s.
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6:1 Background: Transition from import substitution to export orientation in the 1960s
Malaysia adds a distinct national variant to this comparative study. It is an example 
of a state led effort to develop a vibrant open-market economy while continuing to mediate 
complex domestic pressures during the process of restructuring. Tensions created as a result 
of accelerated growth created new challenges for both labour and the state. Starting from a 
disorganised base in early 1970s, both the sphere of contestation and scope for labour to 
maximise gains during a period of accelerated economic growth were restrictive 1. Through 
its dedicated pursuance of accelerated integration, the state moved economic policy out of 
the arena of political and economic contestation. An armoury of anti-labour strategies 
backed this. However, in promoting accelerated internationalisation, the state came to rely 
less on policy instruments in the industrial relations arena, and more on its increasingly 
deregulated labour markets. The concentrated impacts of economic globalisation generated 
adverse outcomes in Malaysian labour markets for capital. By regulating and controlling the 
import of temporary labour, the state re-imposed a combination of discipline and flexibility 
in an expanding labour market. Moreover, the pursuance of anti-inflationary policies, even 
in a context of high growth ensured that the costs of economic adjustment were passed onto 
the labour. Through this the government ‘gave priority to growth with price stability’ and 
‘minimised the effects of inflation on resource allocation’ (Ministry of Finance, 1992: 3). 
Through this discussion, 1 question the validity of the neo-liberal labour market strategies 
(World Bank, 1996a), commodity chains approach to industrial development (Hendersen and 
Appelbaum, 1992) and the late developer thesis (Wilkinson, 1994) that are most commonly 
used to explain Malaysia's rapid economic growth in the 1980s and early 1990s2.
Malaysia's industrial development strategies and the context of ethnically segmented 
labour-market structures has been the subject of many studies (Rasiah, R. 1995b; 1996; ILO, 
1995a; Ayadurai, 1996; Bowie, 1991). By distancing changes and developments in the 
labour relations regime from both the global (regional and international trade liberalisation 
agreements) as well as national factors (role of ethnic pressure groups, regional pressures), 
explanatory flaws have been observed in these studies. I argue that the interconnectedness 
between the global and the national is mediated through a range of agencies that have not 
been analysed adequately. These agencies help explain Malaysia’s accelerated
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internationalisation and its mode of insertion into the global economic system following 
economic and political crisis in the late 1960s and late 1980s specifically.
This study also notes that while ethnic politics exerted real influences by creating 
tensions that required repeated state interventions, their influence in explaining the 
trajectories of Malaysia's internationalisation should not be overstressed. Ethnic tensions 
emerged from the situation of ethnic groups in its economy. Thus, the demand for economic 
parity by Malays was backed by the fact that they had largely remained locked in low- 
income sectors during the import substitution industrialisation era (IS1) by the end of 1960s. 
By the late 1960s such exclusion had become the basis for serious political discontent and 
challenge to the United Malaysian National Organisation’s (UMNO) national leadership 
(Bowie, 1991). Following opposition electoral gains in 1969, these resentments boiled over 
into racial riots, which led to the declaration of an emergency. This heralded an overtly 
authoritarian phase of the state and the commencement of a programme aimed at equalising 
the economic stakes held by different ethnic groups in the economy.3 Thus, 1969 marks one 
turning point in Malaysia and represents a unique effort to reposition a national economy 
with a view towards securing economic advantages for Malays. Such a political equation 
required even firmer control by the Malay group over the state apparatus. Secondly, such a 
repositioning took the form of projecting Malaysia as a producer of finished manufactured 
goods, rather than primary products. This was operationalised through the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) that emphasised export oriented industrial development.
The NEP came into being after the 1969 emergency. It sought to rapidly 
internationalise the Malaysian economy. It anticipated that high levels of growth would 
create economic opportunities that could be targeted for the advancement of Malays. In this 
respect, the NEP was a state sponsored effort to create a dependent Malay bourgeoisie 
outside the state sector. The related economic strategies thus defined the form that the state 
took as well. Ethno-political interventions by a Malay orientated state, however, were also 
prescribed by global economic exigencies. The analysis of economic internationalisation and 
state regulation of labour in Malaysia is this were anchored to the political and economic 
transformations set in motion by the implementation of the NEP. A primary feature o f the 
NEP was its shift from ISI to EOI. This shift was also associated with significant changes 
in the approach to labour regulation
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6:2 State and capitalist development after independence
Pre-colonial Malaysia had experienced a long period of Indian and Arab influence, 
followed by the Portuguese who arrived in Malacca in 1511, then by the Dutch in 1641. 
British interests are commonly traced to the lease of Penang by the British East India 
Company. During this period, Chinese and Indian workers were imported into the emerging 
commercial agriculture, mining, rubber plantations and trading activities. The system of 
indentured labourers for the import of Chinese and Indian workers came to an end in 1911 
and 1914 respectively. By this time, a multi-ethnic colonial economy had been firmly 
established. Britain's political control was established across Peninsular Malaysia and 
Singapore by 1909, which lasted until Japan's invasion during the Second World War. The 
reassertion of British political hegemony after the war resulted in intensified anti-colonial 
struggles.4 The UMNO was formed in 1946 to advance the cause of independence and 
integration of a unified Malay state. In contrast, the Malaysian Communist Party commenced 
armed struggle against colonial rule.
An UMNO and Malaysian Chinese Association Alliance secured victory in the 1955 
general elections, and power was transferred to this anti-colonial and anti-communist 
Alliance in 1957.5 This alliance pursued a vigorous campaign of import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) and the expansion of Malaysia's traditional primary resource 
industries. This developmental equation favoured foreign capital in the primary resource 
industries and domestic Chinese capital in primary and protected manufacturing sectors. The 
equation remained largely unchanged until the crisis of 1969. In response to Malay pressures 
for economic parity, the NEP was promulgated in 1970 on the back of an increasingly 
authoritarian state machinery (Crouch, 1996). Its ultimate aim was to achieve national unity 
through poverty eradication and inter-ethnic economic parity via a comprehensive economic 
restmeturing within a largely 'laissez-faire' economic framework. While wealth restructuring 
was the main emphasis of the NEP; the government hoped to achieve the goal of a thirty- 
percent 'Bumiputera' (Malay) ownership of the corporate sector by 1990 (Gomez, 1994: 3; 
Jesudason, 1990; Jomo, 1995a).
This approach generated new developmental paradoxes. Malay commercial 
advancement at the expense of Chinese capital could hurt the goals of the NEP. To overcome
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this, the NEP
(also) involved an assault on the dominant position of foreign, particularly 
British, capital... The goal of raising Bumiputera ownership of the corporate 
sector to 30 percent would be achieved not by reducing the non-Malay share, 
but by restricting the foreign share (Crouch, 1996: 26).
Malaysia's spectacular economic growth in spite of such an impediment to foreign capital 
amplifies the powerful position of the state in directing the trajectories of capitalist growth. 
Socio-economic engineering ingrained in the NEP coincided with Malaysia's efforts to 
promote rapid industrialisation. Such goals depended upon the success of export orientated 
industrialisation (EOI). The contradictions that these brought to the fore underlines the 
analysis developed in this chapter.
Malaysia's transition from ISI to the EOI resulted in a complicated reorganisation of 
capitalist production. This reorganisation has been largely explained by references to the 
ascendance of a Malay elite committed to favouring Bumiputera. This elite sought to pursue 
policies that enhanced social stability. It accepted that import substitution industrialisation 
based on a relatively pluralist deal between main political and economic groupings had 
failed to promote social stability (Kuruvilla and Arudsothy, 1995; Jesudason, 1990; Crouch, 
1996). Such accounts have largely ignored the role of non-political and global agencies 
during this transition.
The global environment during this period was characterised by full employment and 
the pre-eminence of Keynesian economic policy framework that favoured state intervention. 
But by the late 1960s welfare deals were under pressure and the role of the state came under 
scrutiny. Clearly, a paradigm shift in economic policy was under way by the mid-1960s. 
Moreover, economic pressures also meant that state interventions had to be constrained. By 
the late 1960s, Malaysia had evolved into a highly protected economy. This economy was 
thus exposed to a rapidly changing global economy as a consequence of the NEP. Changes 
in the global economic environment reflected changes in economic policy and also reflected 
underlying transformations in the position of labour. This external context had complex 
implications for the developmental strategies possible under the NEP.
The goals of the NEP such as reduction in the incidence of poverty, increasing the 
share of Malays and other ’indigenous” peoples' in the economy, fostering entrepreneurship
1 3 8
among Malays and other indigenous communities, and developing and expanding the social
and physical infrastructure of the economy (Rudner, 1995:218) was affected by this
changing global economic environment. The scope of economic restructuring implied in the
NEP paralleled the attention to detail in the Japanese planning process, exemplifying their
shared character as developmentalist states. In this respect, Rudner observes
Outside the communist sphere, Malaysia is one of the countries most 
attached to developmental planning. It is noteworthy that Malaysia's affinity 
for planning certainly did not stem from socialist convictions; nor from the 
zeal o f  economic nationalism or disappointment with the market economy.
Quite the contrary, Malaysia's involvement with development planning 
occurred within the framework o f a market -oriented and open, 
predominantly private enterprise economy governed by an innately 
conservative political elite... Malaysian planning has been significantly more 
interventionist than any mere dirigiste might imply (Rudner, 1995:228).
Obviously, the NEP approach challenged the conventional neo-classical accounts of 
Malaysia's rapid economic growth (World Bank, 1995a and 1996a). Restructuring in 
Malaysia was both state led and organised. Its privatisation programme started in 1985 
proper also shows the contradictory nature of the Malaysian approach. While privatisation 
has commonly been associated with internationalisation of ownership, in Malaysia's case it 
has disproportionately advantaged an emergent Malay bourgeoisie - with the state providing 
the framework for selective market development and protection within the context of a 
rapidly internationalising economy (Jomo, 1990).
The developmental nature of the Malaysian state is exemplified variously in its 
current (the 7th) Development Plan (Hendcrsen and Appelbaum, 1992). This approach has 
also been referred to as ‘state assisted capitalism’ (Bello, 1996). But the notion of a 
developmental state is a misnomer. It reduces widely varying outcomes in the Asian region 
to a common set of assumptions about state strategies drawn from the experiences of Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan, countries whose developmental strategies the Malaysian state has 
sought to emulate.6 The ‘late-developer thesis’ more aptly captures the diversity of 
developmental approaches in this region.7 All these approaches underrated the centrality 
of labour and state capacities in articulating and sustaining labour policies. This forms the 
starting point for the analysis developed in this chapter.
The high levels of state intervention inevitably flowed into the arena of labour
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markets. This was underlined by the state's willingness to readily discipline labour. This 
approach also demonstrated that labour market deregulation was not simply a part of a 
broader neo-liberal restructuring package driven primarily by the exigencies of the global 
trading environment. Labour policies were derived from the NEP. This goal of redressing 
ethnic imbalances rested upon a restrictive labour policy. Thirdly, the highly interventionist 
approach also implied that labour could win narrow concessions through corporatist 
approaches.
These national developmental trajectories did not run in opposition to the broader
global economic forces. For example, the transition from the ISI to the EOl clearly reflected
shifts in the global political economy at the time. This paradigm and policy shift in Malaysia
thus represented ‘the political as a moment of global relation between capital and labour’
(Holloway, 1994: 31). Because the ‘political’ occurred at the interface of the national and
the global, it highlights the position of a dependent state during a phase of re-organisation
of the global political economy. Thus domestic considerations that shaped state priorities
during phases of re-organisation were also affected by, and open to factors located within
the global system. The Malaysian state was:
able to ride the wave of global internationalisation while at the same time 
imposing a politically determined directional thrust on resource allocation 
within the national territory. (It) thereby integrated and transformed the 
production structure faster than would have occurred had the controllers of 
capital been allowed to operate within an unconstrained logic of global profit 
maximisation (Wade, 1992: 315).8
But Malaysian development was also influenced by a number of distinct historical factors. 
Sub-regional agencies such as the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) and Asian 
Free Trade Area also affected the developmental strategies and approach to labour 
regulation. The commitment to a free trading APEC region by 2010 also had implications 
for the domestic economy, particularly in the low-wage labour intensive sectors. 
Increasingly, economic policies have been subordinated to the requirements of such regional 
and global agencies.
British colonialism also left a political system that was fragmented ethnically. The 
economy that it left behind was dominated at the time of independence by primary sectors 
(palm oil, rubber, tin). The specific contemporary political structures were a product of the
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colonial mode of insertion of its primary sectors. A sustained effort to crush the communist 
challenge initiated by large general unions in the pre-war period, also led to the colonial 
state's sponsorship of the moderate strand o f trade unionism and the introduction of harsh 
'emergency laws' that were periodically used to discipline ‘legitimate’ trade unionism. The 
emergency laws used for the anticommunist military campaigns were incorporated into 
Malaysia's constitution in 1960s, long after the armed struggle had been effectively 
contained (Crouch, 1996: 13). Combined, these measures created opportunities as well as 
tensions for a state that has remained highly regulationist, even under a more liberal global 
environment. This has involved complicated social relationships including patronage in the 
functioning of state institutions and its approach to regulation. Working class and opposition 
challenges to the post-1969 political order have met the full force of such legislation, 
including the harsh Internal Security Act . A combination of social measures and 
authoritarian approaches were utilised to deal with interest group challenges. In these 
respects, the Malaysian approach to labour regulation is unique among the countries studied 
here.
In the post-colonial period, market-based economic relations were re-cast in terms
of the political goals set under the NEP without overtly undermining the market forces.9
Moreover, a politically organised market economy also led to a unique form of state-market
relationship, exemplifying strongly the 'social embededdness of exchange and markets'
(Saycr, 1995: 89). In this respect, explanations of:
Malaysian political evolution must also take account of the communal factor. [This 
factor] ... cannot be dismissed as merely disguised expressions of class interest 
(Crouch, 1993: 136).
One ethno-political outcome was the unequal alliance between 'elites of the Malay and non- 
Malay' (mainly Chinese) communities (Crouch, 1993: 136). In the post-independence period, 
labour and trade unions came to be influenced by such alliances. Leadership selection within 
federations reflected the political and ideological orientation of ethno-political elites. Bowie 
suggests that:
changes in Malaysian economic development strategy can best be explained as 
products of the changing nature of the communal settlement... As the terms of this 
communal settlement - which concerns the distribution of political and economic 
power between the major communities - have evolved over time, so has the extent
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to which the state has been constrained in its ability independently to formulate and 
implement economic policy. The state in turn has responded by adopting different 
approaches to economic development ... to satisfy the twin policy objectives of 
boosting Malaysian economic growth and advancing, Malay communal interests 
(Bowie, 1991:9).
But this argument ignores the broader global context that affected Malaysian economic 
policies as well. This context included Malaysia's international and regional trade obligations 
under the WTO and the APEC. While the Malay orientation of the state was re-affirmed in 
successive elections after 1972, clearly, its economic policy choices have been shaped and 
constrained by both external exigencies and domestic considerations. Bowie's approach also 
ignores the role of labour in the process of economic change. Jomo and Todd ( 1994) also 
examine the impact of state policy upon trade unions and labour politics. Again, they do not 
adequately examine the influence of the broader context that shaped Malaysia's 
developmental options within which particular forms of unionism emerged in the first place.
It is therefore important to understand how regulation of markets was 
operationalised. To understand this, I show that states are the nodal points through which 
regional national, global and highly specific and particularistic interests interact. By focusing 
on this nodal point the relative causal weight of state institutions, social class, non-class 
interests groups and state policy can be studied. By factoring social relations that affect state 
policy, a purchase is also obtained on the contradictory impacts of the process o f economic 
globalisation in Malaysia.
Much of globalisation literature (Ruigrok and Tulder, 1995) ignores the importance 
of the state as a site of contestation. These studies also take the state to be unchanging even 
during periods of rapid transition. This undervalues specific forms of social relations and the 
role of agencies in shaping state strategies. In Malaysia's case, this has not only included a 
recasting of the ethnic relations in a growing market economy, but a recomposition of the 
state itself. The ascendancy of finance and economic planning bureaucracies and their 
vertical integration with international policy making institutions are examples of this 
recomposition. 10 Through such institutional integration, the economic globalisation agenda 
could be shielded from domestic interest group pressures. A national policy elite guided the 
terms of its re-incorporation into a globalising international economy; suggesting that the 
modes of insertion were firmly embedded in a specific social and institutional framework.
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Through such embeddedness, policy makers were able to pursue the goals of ethnic 
redistribution of wealth. By subjugating formal sector employees and their associations to 
the attainment of broad national goals, a restrictive regulatory framework nationally was 
taken out o f  the sphere of political contest. Moreover, because the state manages the political 
sphere so completely, it was able to define the contours of political discourse. These factors 
help show how and why labour has played such a central but yet politically marginal role in 
the spectacular capitalist growth in Malaysia over the past two decades.
6:3 Labour markets and economic development: 1970-1995
A dramatic overhaul of Malaysia's labour markets underscored its pattern of 
incorporation into the global capitalist system, providing pointers for understanding the role 
of state institutions. Clearly, accelerated economic growth had significantly altered the 
sectoral employment composition and the size of the labour force within a space of two 
decades. For example, even between 1990 and 1995, agriculture’s share of total employment 
declined from 28 percent to 19 percent of the labour force. During this period, the 
manufacturing sector’s composition increased from 20 to 26 percent (Economic Planning 
Unit, 1995). Malaysia's post 1985-economic recession restructuring transformed the position 
of agriculture in the economy (World Bank, 1995a). This was a logical product of its 
industrial development policies adopted in the late 1960s. Overall, industrial development 
polices between 1970 and 1995 expanded the trend of export led growth and speeded 
Malaysia's integration into the world economy. 11 The restructuring of the state sector 
industries further complemented this process o f  integration. Both the sectoral restructuring 
and international orientation directly affected its labour markets (Rasiah, 1996; Lee and 
Sivananthiran, 1996).
On another front, restructuring of the public sector during this had a more modest 
effect on the overall levels of employment, exemplifying the ambivalent feature of 
Malaysian economic reforms. At the same time, restructuring sought to further Malaysia's 
integration into the global economic system, which required opening up the state sector to 
international capital. However, the Malaysian state has persistently depended upon the 
public sector to deliver its social goals laid out in the NEP.
Overall, a strong growth in employment by the early-1990s had produced problems
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of acute labour shortages and increased labour mobility (World Bank, 1995a). In response, 
the Prime Minister called on 'firms to stop relying on cheap labour and shift to capital 
intensive industries' (The Economist. 21 September, 1996:92). 12 The economic crisis of 
1997, however, demonstrates again how the international capital markets have been able to 
pressure changes in this increasingly rigid labour market, leading the large scale repatriation 
of expatriate labour (The Economist. 22 February, 1998). Given the high level of state 
regulation of the labour market, Malaysia clearly enjoys a far greater potential to absorb the 
fall-outs from further economic reforms. During the 1998 crisis, the state was able to readily 
pass the burden of adjustment onto imported and temporary labour recruited from the lower 
wage Asian states (Jomo, ed. 1999).
Overall, Malaysia amplifies the new paradox of economic globalisation; that is, 
accelerated economic growth has made national labour markets more porous. However, 
while traditional forms of state regulation of labour were restricted to national labour 
markets, economic globalisation makes it necessary for regulation to extend beyond national 
frontiers. In this respect, the fact the cross-broader supply and regulation of labour has 
become an important issue for bilateral agreements between labour importing and exporting 
states in the region exemplifies the expanding role of states in cross-national labour markets. 
Thus, the process of economic globalisation also internationalises the terrain over which 
contests between labour and capital occur.
This discussion draws out three critical issues for the economic globalisation and 
labour regulation debate. Firstly while labour markets have been deregulated as part of the 
restructuring process, they still remain subservient to the social policy goals of the NEP. 
Secondly, the state still retains control over the labour market by regulating the supply of 
labour through migration and skill formation, training and preferential labour policies. 
Between 1991 and 1995, for example, the Government approved the employment of 630,000 
foreign workers, approximately 8 percent of total wage and salaried employment (The 
Economic Report. 1995:6). 13 Thirdly, the past two decades witnessed a modest expansion 
of individual rights, many of which had workplace implications. The privileging of 
individual rights over collective ones suggests another way in which the architecture of 
labour markets has been altered. This paradox exemplifies one way in which state/market 
relations have been recomposed. But state market relations have also been affected by the
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powerful dynamics of ethnic group relations.
6:4 Ethnic politics and economic development under the EOI
Malaysia's ethnically fragmented political system, and a visible commitment by the 
dominant Malay elite to retain control of government, are also important in understanding 
how economic policy discourse was removed from the arena of political contestation. 
UMNO has generally dominated Malay politics since independence. In May 1996, it was 
reconciled with the breakaway party, the Spirit of 46 Group, which in turn helped re-assert 
its hegemony in the Malaysian political arena (Financial Times. 10/1996: 14). Such divisions 
cloud the slim differences that remain over economic policy orientation among top leaders 
in the party. Because of its dominance, divisions over economic policy within the party, 
rather than across parties are a better barometer of political contestation. 14
Since independence economic policy debates have been gradually marginalised both 
within the party, as well as in intra-party competitive settings. However, the shift from the 
'laissez faire' approach of the 1960s to the NEP agenda was presented as a failure of a 
conciliatory national leadership. Because Malay's had continued to lag in the formal market 
economy by the end of 1960s, the leadership of Prime Minister Tunku Rahman and the 
UMNO dominated Alliance Government that had been in power since independence was 
projected as having held back Malay progress. Thus the failing of the ISI mode of 
development to deliver visible economic gains to the Malay community was projected as a 
failure of conciliatory and pluralist politics. The ascendance of a more radical Malay 
political elite following the 1969 disturbances resulted in the pursuit of aggressive market- 
friendly economic policies (Jesudason, 1990). 15 Subsequently, this new cadre of UMNO 
leadership led the transition to a state-led industrialisation strategy. 16 In this ethnic quotas, 
money and regional alliances came to define the relationships between a new political elite, 
bureaucratic elites and multinational capital. A public service reflected these developments. 
Bowie (1991: 108) noted that
the bureaucratic structure inherited from the British, while suitable for 
administering a colony, was inadequate to tasks such as that of managing the 
vast investment stocks of holding compan(ies). The centralised and strictly 
hierarchical model on which the Malaysian public administration was built 
was poorly suited to operating business for profit. So new structures, 
represented by semi-autonomous agencies like PETRONAS, had to be
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created to meet these new challenges.
The rise of new state institutions further endorsed the hegemony of the 
UMNO, as those loyal to the party were often rewarded with authoritative positions 
in them. During this period, the Economic Planning Unit in the Prime Minister's 
Department also assumed a pre-eminent role. Moreover the Foreign Investment 
Committee and the Capital Issues Committee, charged with furthering Malay 
corporate interests expanded their interventionist remit in the economy and the 
public service more specifically (Jesudason, 1990: 78-80).
Overall, the developmental strategies that underpinned the NEP had consolidated the 
position of UMNO and raised the profile of its political leaders and state institutions. Given 
that the UMNO has remained the dominant party of government since 1969, stability in the 
economic policy regimes has been a defining feature of Malaysian economic development. 
Moreover, challenges to the dominant economic policy regimes have been so thoroughly 
contained to the sphere of party politics and in the labour movement, that even slight policy 
differences come to be presented as major source of divisions.
Given the extent of UMNO hegemony, criticisms of Malaysia’s economic policy 
framework has persistently attracted severe flak from government. In such an environment, 
union opposition to privatisation could be easily presented in anti-national terms (General 
Secretary, MTUC, interview). The finance minister, for example, referred to academics who 
opposed privatisation as an 'obstinate band of comics who persist in their misguided view 
that privatisation means mortgaging the interests of the 'rakyat' (people)' (quoted in Jomo. 
1994). Such responses serve to even further dislodge criticisms from the mainstream policy 
discourses.
The communalisation of party politics in Malaysia has affected policy discourses. 
Because selection on largely ethnic tickets increases the chances for electoral victory for 
individual candidates, competition has been shifted from one focused between parties, to one 
within individual parties. This has exercebated the trend of 'money-politics', which partly 
explains the banning of electioneering in the build-up to the 1996 elections by Prime 
Minister Mahathir IFinancial Times. 20 September, 1996: 16). This tendency has merely 
expanded on a long tradition of close association between political parties and corporations.
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The second associated tendency has been the emergence of a visible rent-seeking behaviour 
on part of the party in Government, which was applied as much to national enterprises as to 
Multinational Enterprises (MNE's). While statutes lay out state support for start-ups, the 
actual levels of support are determined through less formal means (Gomez, 1994; Gomez 
and Jomo, 1997). Also state institutions began to enjoy substantial leverages in interpreting, 
implementing and monitoring the implementation of NEP goals, enabling wider links 
between capital and state institutions. Such direct links between corporations, political 
parties and state institutions impacted upon labour policy and labour markets as well. Rentier 
behaviour on part of the state has meant that many enterprises have been able to retain 
support in the form of protection in spite of the broader objectives of trade liberalisation, 
often under the pretext of advancing Malay equity control. It also has implications for the 
privatisation process, as it becomes a more negotiated process. For capital, this type of 
access to policy makers has been a source of stability, even under the regime of trade 
liberalisation. Communalisation of politics generally, and the legitimisation of ethnic 
separateness across political society, have helped displace economic debates into policies 
about the promotion and protection of ethnic interests within both the civil and corporate 
arena. Such interests, depend of course on the market economy and policy choices made by 
the Malaysian state.
The World Bank and global policies of the Japanese state also influenced Malaysia’s 
developmental trajectories. For example, the World Bank promoted tariff protection and 
import substitution industrialisation in the mid-1950s and neo-liberal policy programs in the 
1980s. The fact that there was a congruent shift in policy orientation domestically with the 
policy framework promoted at different historical junctures globally suggests an 
interconnectedness between the two.
Like Japan, Malaysian industrial policies displayed a tendency to select 'winning 
industries' and ‘winning enterprises’, reinforcing the role o f state institutions. 17 These 
industries and enterprises were targeted for long term support via an array of incentives. 
However, such selections were also influenced by the goal of increasing Malay equity 
ownership. Given a weak entrepreneurial base, state support for industries where the 
potential for Malay equity participation was clear was readily forthcoming (Jesudason, 
1990). However, in the 1980s, this strategy went much further than indirect subsidisation.
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It included the setting up of state owned enterprises, such as the Heavy Industries 
Corporation of Malaysia, banks and enterprises, such as the showcase Proton (the national 
car project), and focus public investment in industry, at a substantial budgetary cost (Bello, 
1996). 18
The Malay elite aggressively pursued FDI for its export processing zones because 
of impediments against Malaysian-Chinese penetration of the manufacturing. This elite also 
sought minimum equity stakes in manufacturing enterprises for an ascendant Malay 
entrepreneurial class in return for negotiated concessions. In turn, such negotiations 
broadened the role of state institutions. While the expansion of a Malay bourgeoisie in the 
industrial and finance sectors has recently slowed down, Malay and Chinese collaboration 
in the manufacturing and industrial sectors is still restrained by the overriding influence of 
ethnic politics (Jesudason, 1990). Ethnicity thus came to be further affirmed as a 
consequence of the chosen mode of economic internationalisation.
However, given the pace of economic globalisation and deepening economic crisis 
across the region, this feature is likely to be reversed as the costs of political interventions 
increase. Indeed following the downturn of 1996-97 and the slowing down of economic 
growth in Japan, the volume of FDI that Malaysia was able to attract has declined 
considerably. Moreover, with IMF’s pressure for accelerated trade liberalisation within the 
region, Malaysian capital has become more inward looking (The Guardian. 21/1/98: 15). 
Accelerated trade liberalisation and a renegotiation of state-market relations subsequently 
affected labour markets in diverse ways, as indicated below.
6:5 Accelerated internationalisation between 1986 and 1995 and labour regulation
Economic internationalisation in Malaysia in the 1970s flowed from the NEP 
programme, which emphasised EOI strategies, state co-ordination of industrial development 
and active support for FDI. After the economic crisis of mid-1980s, this emphasis shifted 
to a more neo-liberal monetarist approach which stressed further trade liberalisation and 
reductions in the size of government through privatisation (Ministry of Finance,1995, 
budget). Measures introduced under its tax regime through successive budgets further re­
affirmed Malaysia's commitment to trade liberalisation as a member country of the WTO 
and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTAJ.19 But these changes did not come without
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contest and reforms have not always been unilinear. The Malaysian state has often adopted 
policies aimed at advantaging specific domestic interests at the expense of its international 
and regional obligations. These contradictions affect its approach to the regulation of labour 
as well.
Overall, the policy shifts noted above deepened the integration of the Malaysian 
economy. The indicator exports plus imports as a ratio of the gross domestic product more 
than doubled over the period 1970-1985 and 1985 to 1995 (World Bank, 1995c). Of the case 
studies, by the end of 1995, the Malaysian economy was by far the most open (as measured 
by ratio of exports and imports to GDP), and yet with the likely exception of Japan, the most 
internally regulated. The challenge then is to explain this contradiction.
Malaysia’s industrial relations featured heavily in explaining its mode of insertion 
during a phase of accelerated economic internationalisation. Because changes in industrial 
relations policies followed changes in developmental strategies, the industrial relations 
regime opens a window for understanding the political character of a reform oriented 
developmental state. The earlier discussions show the contradictions faced (and indeed 
generated) by the state in regulating labour in periods of exceptionally high growth in 
increasingly globalised settings. A key proposition that is advanced in this thesis is that 
industrial relation regimes and the policies of industrialisation adopted by states at specific 
periods historically reflect political choices made by states. In the hyper-global environment 
of the 1980s, such choices privilege multinational capital. In the case of Malaysia, this 
clearly required high levels of state regulation of labour within the context of deregulated 
labour markets. Given these contradictory tendencies, the association between industrial 
relations regimes and economic development policy becomes ambiguous. It does not, 
however, mean that causal relationships do not exist.
Frenkel and Harrod (eds. 1995) examined the association between industrial relations 
regimes and developmental patterns in different Asian settings. They suggested that the 
transition from ISI to EOI was associated with changes in labour relations regimes. But, such 
changes are driven by a variety of domestic and global factors and agencies (Wade, 1996). 
As a result, the choice of labour strategies needs to be understood by references to this multi­
layered context. The relationship between industrial relations regime and economic 
development in the ASEAN region and in Malaysia more specifically has also been
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examined by Kuruvilla and Arudsothy (1995) and Kuruvilla and Erickson, (1996). Kuruvilla
and Arudsothy conclude with respect to Malaysia that:
it would appear that the 1SI strategy was associated with an industrial 
relations policy that was, in some sense pluralistic. However, with the shift 
to EOI, government labour policy became more restrictive and focused on 
cost containment to facilitate the success of the competitive strategy of low- 
cost exports and the need to attract foreign investment. There is some 
evidence that foreign manufacturers did exert some pressure on the 
Malaysian government to contain costs. The mechanisms by which 
repressive state policies were enacted included various changes in industrial 
relations rules and increased government involvement in the industrial 
relations sphere (Kuruvilla and Arudsothy, 1995: 189).
Kochan (1996) concludes that the suppression of unions has not been the key factor 
in the success of the (Asian) economies, emphasising in turn the co-ordination of 
human resource development polices at the state and firm level. This is an argument 
also developed by the World Bank (1995b). With respect to the industrial relations 
framework, this World Bank study recommended limiting the coverage of collective 
bargaining in the non-wage component of the wage-packets, arguing the role of 
unions in negotiating bonuses and 'merit increments' needed to be examined. It 
further recommended that Malaysia needed to ‘design and implement appropriate 
legislation and economic incentives to strengthen in-house worker unions’ (World 
Bank, 1995b:v). The World Bank’s emphasis on enterprise level bargaining was 
strongly resonated in Malaysia’s Look East Policy (Jomo, 1995b). The studies noted 
above suggest strong links between a deregulated enterprise level industrial relations 
system and capitalist growth, particularly in the post-1986 economic environment.
This reorientation of the industrial relations regime is thus intrinsically associated 
with the accelerated internationalisation that was experienced between 1986 and the 
end of 1995. Malaysia’s policy response to its most recent crisis also appears to re­
affirm this association (Jomo, eds, 1999).
The associations between the process of accelerated economic internationalisation 
experienced after 1986 reforms especially and state policy/strategies has been broadly 
established. They provide some pointers for understanding that ways in which Malaysian 
workers have been incorporated into the global economy. Smith (1994a) identifies four
iso
relevant themes: the weakening of the trade union movement over the last two decades; the 
tendency of foreign investors to set up industries employing mainly women; the struggle 
during the last decade to organise electronics workers; and the ideologies for national 
economic development, especially exemplified by national appeals to Japanese and South 
Korean work ethics under the Look East Policy (Smith, 1994a: 159-60). Moreover, the 
privatisation process, a core clement of the economic restructuring process, has illustrated 
how ethnicity can be manipulated by the state to win support, (or mollify opposition) for the 
restructuring project (Kuruvilla and Erickson, 1996).20
The shift away from industrial unionism is also a part o f this transformation. This 
shift was premised on the crushing of radical unionism (organised as general unions) through 
a combination of coercive and legislative means. Moreover the ascendance of a more 
conservative trade union leadership nationally was an outcome o f state support of a selected 
brand of trade unionism. The influence of international trade secretariats (ITS) and the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in this shift were also noteworthy 
(Gamba, 1962). In 1960, a ‘leader of the MTUC assured the government that it would do its 
utmost to help maintain stable labour conditions so the government could attract industrial 
investment’ (quoted in Jesudason, 1990: 75).21
Both CUEPACS and MTUC launched fairly large-scale economic ventures in the 
1970s and 1980s and in so doing become more dependent upon the high growth economic 
cycle for the success of their ventures, although such ventures were failures by early 
1990s.22 Moreover, the MTUC's membership of the ICFTU helped further consolidate a 
neo-liberal outlook, even during the period of accelerated economic expansion between 1986 
and the end of 1995.23 At the Government level, a National Labour Policy recognises the 
importance of ‘industrial peace as basis for continued development and tripartism’ (ILO, 
1996: 5). Given that national unions operate with a low membership base, weak 
organisational links internally and a narrow political base, tripartism can exacerbate labour’s 
vulnerability. It also provides the basis for the labour ministry's intervention in labour market 
domestically while projecting an impression of a more conciliatory attitude towards 
organised labour. Such corporatist approaches have been persistently used to regulate and 
discipline labour over the past two decades.
Generally, two strands of argument appear to explain labour's responses to the
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challenges created by economic globalisation. Caspersz (1996) and Wad (1996) provide 
some evidence of labour's challenges and resilience. Wad's ongoing research documents 
labour’s successes in organising the export processing zones, arguing that enterprise unions 
modelled along Japanese enterprise lines offer cautious prospects for workplace autonomy 
(Wad, 1996, interview). Caspersz (1996: 73) uses structuration theory to unravel how other 
(besides class) social factors ‘structure the agent, and how they can in turn be used by the 
agent to shape the structure'. She argues that labours response was located within and 
defined by reference to the dominant ethnic/religious discourses. Jomo and Tabb (1994) and 
Rasiah (1996), on the other hand, emphasise state control and labour's internal fragmentation 
to explain labour’s compliance to the state in a deregulated and open labour market. Rasiah 
(1995a:87), for example noted that
Malaysia's experience did not appear to offer much room for emergence of strong 
unions. Even a rapidly growing manufacturing sector and falling supplies of labour 
have not offered sufficient ammunition for the strengthening of unions. Given the 
nature of politics and government in the country, this trend is unlikely to change in 
the near future.
Elite factionalism has been a persistent characteristic of the organised labour 
movement headed by the MTUC both historically (Gamba, 1962) and in the current period 
(Jomo and Todd, 1994). Evidently, most of the emerging enterprise unions in export 
processing zones have remained outside the MTUC umbrella, largely for fear of 
derecognition (General Secretary, MTUC, 1995, interview). This has complemented state 
efforts to fragment organised labour, through its support of the breakaway federation, the 
Malaysian Labour Organisation (MLO) (Kuruvilla and Arudsothy, 1995:174).
The openness of the economy (ILO, 1996) had provided an otherwise weak national 
labour movement with opportunities for cross-national action, even though such actions as 
complaints to the ILO attracted severe criticism from the Government. Given that the MTUC 
leadership has been historically dominated by Malaysian Indians, such criticism has often 
taken the form of appeals to national loyalties. Even on a relatively minor issue of an MTUC 
response to a standard ILO questionnaire on multinational enterprises in 1996, the Minister 
for Human Resource, Datuk Lim Ah Lek called on ‘workers and union members to review 
the performance of some irresponsible MTUC leaders for their actions which had tarnished 
the country's image when they should be loyal to the country’ (New Strait Times. 2/9/96:6).
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The MTUC, CUEPACS and individual unions have been largely engaged with short­
term exigencies throughout the high growth decades. Because of their preoccupation with 
factional feuds and constant efforts to read and deflect likely government reactions, union 
leaders have been extremely cautious to avoid commenting on what are deemed to be 
political issues. An issue such as privatisation is presented as a political (and hence non­
union) issue. Because it is a policy articulated by a largely Malay Government ostensibly 
committed to advancing Malay interests, an anti-privatisation stance on part of unions can 
be projected as an anti-Malay action (Das, 1995, personal discussions). The result has been 
the removal of economic policy discourse from the sphere of union contestation. This, in 
turn has enabled policy institutions including the finance ministry and MIDI to dominate the 
policy discourse.
As a further illustration, the MTUC had been so preoccupied with internal dissension 
and urgent day to day activities, that ‘it failed to interpret the structural adjustment package 
introduced after the 1985-86 fiscal crisis. It was only when unionists began to attend 
international (ICFTU) and regional (ICFTU-APRO) union seminars abroad, that they began 
to understand that what Malaysian workers were being subject to was an integrated and 
largely anti-worker adjustment programme - by which time most pieces of the package were 
firmly in place’ (Bruno, 1995, interview).
A low unionisation rate (averaging 10 percent between 1990 and 1995) has been a 
persistent feature of Malaysian trade unionism since independence. Until recently, 
employment laws had directly obstructed union expansion. Labour’s organising struggles 
in the electronics sector are well-researched (Arrifln, 1996; Rasiah, 1996; Caspersz, 1996). 
Employment laws have been used to control unionisation of this sector. While existing 
labour laws have been used to halt the spread of industrial associations, they also provide 
the state with a number of indirect leverages to regulate unions at the enterprise level. These 
were utilised decisively during the high growth decade in Malaysia; emphasising the role of 
political agencies in the arena of labour regulation (Jomo and Todd, 1994).
To understand the politics of labour regulation, it is important to examine the broader 
developmental objectives to which labour has been historically subverted. Because 
developmental choices were articulated within a political context, they also entailed political 
choices about approaches to labour regulation. The choice of one model of trade unionism
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ahead of another was perceived to have implications for economic development, as was clear 
from Mahathir’s Look East Policy. Thus changes in labour law reflected the changing 
emphases of economic policy. Moreover, it is clear that since the reforms of 1986, this dual 
mode of labour regulation has also prevented the re-radicalisation of Muiaysian labour. 
Moreover:
from its inception in 1946, labour laws were criticised by union leaders for 
their essentially undemocratic character, principally its enforcement of 
compulsory registration...But it soon became apparent that the colonial 
administration wanted to use the device of registration to supervise and 
control unions in the same manner as it had been used to controlling societies 
(Arudsothy, 1993:63).
Because the approach to political organisation remained similar in the post-colonial period, 
labour laws retained their restrictive provisions for registration of unions and industrial 
action. These have been used to control the expansion of unionism in the high growth and 
internationalised sectors.
Most of the specific labour laws were detailed in the Industrial Relations Act of 
1967. The right to form and assist in the formation of unions, to join a union and participate 
in lawful activities of a trade union are subject to the restrictions under the Trade Unions Act 
of 1959. Katayanagi (1996: 58), observes that ‘unions established after the enactment of the 
Trade Union Act are required to apply to the Director of Trade Unions for registration under 
the Act within one month of the date on which it was established’. If unions failed to 
comply with this or were refused registration, they 'shall be deemed to be an unlawful 
association, and shall cease to enjoy any of the rights, immunities, or privileges of a 
registered trade union. Moreover, because the qualification for registration largely depended 
upon the Director General of Trade Unions, he/she can refuse registration on the grounds 
that the union ‘is likely’ to be used as a platform for unlawful purposes, without having to 
provide any reason for the judgement. Moreover, the Trade Union Act defines trade unions 
in terms of association ‘within a particular trade or occupation or industry, or within any 
similar trade or occupation or industries’ (Katayanagi, 1996: 60-68). This provision had been 
used to prevent the Electrical Industry Workers Union to recruit members in the electronics 
industry and thereby deny the basis for effective unionism in that sector. The discretionary 
powers in the hands of the Minister for Labour and the Registrar of Trade Unions
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(Arudsothy, 1993: 103-126) have been readily utilised over the past two decades. Moreover, 
because such powers are often discretionary, corporations and enterprises have been able to 
wield political influence upon the bureaucracy and the government to engage these wide 
powers to contain unions.
At the peak of the growth of the manufacturing sector, between 1981 and 1990, the 
Labour Minister readily used discretionary powers to reject union recognition claims. Some 
65 percent of all applications for union recognition that were rejected were from unions 
organising in the manufacturing sectors (Ministry for Labour, 1986). Through a selective 
application of labour laws, the state was able to ensure that sectors/industries targeted for 
growth were given non-tariff protection in the form of a largely union free environment. At 
the same time, the state was able to withstand international scrutiny of its restrictive labour 
practices by maintaining that labour laws broadly complied with the ILO standards. 
Moreover, industries granted ‘pioneer status’ were given exemptions that categorically stated 
that collective agreements between unions and employers in such enterprises would not 
contain terms and conditions of employment more favourable than those provided under the 
Employment Act. Thus, the potential for unions to capitalise upon labour market factors, 
especially during a rapid growth context were effectively capped.
At another level, the high level of import of foreign labour (officially at 8 percent of 
total employment in 1995) required new forms of regulation, particularly during the full 
employment span that lasted until the end of 1997. One mechanism that was used was the 
increasing dependence upon ‘contract labour’ and state recognition of contractors, especially 
in the construction and plantation sectors (Lee and Sivananthiran, 1996). The 'contractors', 
rather than employers, are responsible for their employment, and workers enjoyed little 
effective protection under existing labour laws. By transferring responsibility for labour 
recruitment and regulation to contractors during the phase of high growth, state regulation 
has been selectively reduced without having to further tighten the anti- union emphasis of 
labour laws. Thus when Malaysia entered its most recent phase of contraction, the 
responsibility for the withdrawal of foreign ‘contract labour’ was transferred back to these 
contractors.
Economic internationalisation also has gendered outcomes in the labour markets. 
Low wage strategies have capitalised on the low participation rates of women in the formal
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employment sector. The labour force participation rates (LFPR) for women increased only 
slightly from 46.6 percent in 1970 to 47.3 percent in 1990, though men's wages was still 
nearly twice as high as women's (World Bank, 1995a: 12). This is among the lowest female 
LFPR's among the high growth Asian economies, suggesting a large under-utilised pool of 
labour. With industrial deepening policies and better access to education, it is likely that 
labour polices will seek to mobilise this segment of the workforce. In the arena of labour 
laws, this is likely to mean that labour laws will dilute (rather than strengthen) the rights of 
women in the workforce; as implied in World Bank recommendations in 1995. Moreover, 
it is likely that women workers will bear the burden of adjustment as temporary foreign 
workers in the casual, flexible and low wage sectors are expelled, creating large gaps in 
formal sector labour markets. Overall, these tendencies reflect the ambiguous position of 
legislative labour regulation within the context of economic globalisation. These are 
reflected in a better way through Government’s Look East Policy and its application in the 
high growth manufacturing sectors, the backbone of Malaysia's accelerated 
internationalisation.
6:6 Look East Policy, global integration and the high growth sectors
Mahathir's ascendance to Prime Ministership coincided with the adoption of a "Look 
East Policy". At its face value, it ‘encouraged Malaysians to emulate and learn work ethics 
and attitudes ... inspiration, methods, and skills from Japan’(Shamsul and Smith, 1995: 1). 
Jomo and Todd (1994:171) further observe that ‘Mahathir's Look East policy brought not 
only appeals to work harder and raise productivity, but also the threat of an end to 
supposedly British-style trade or industry unionism in favour of Japanese in-house unions’. 
Tied to this Japanese focus was also a concentration upon the labour relations model of 
South Korea. Moreover, the Look East Policy was part of an on-going process of greater 
regional integration led in the main by Japanese capital which saw decisive comparative and 
political advantages in relocating some of its industries in Malaysia. An important 
amendment to the Trade Union Act was made in 1989 to reflect this change. This 
amendment allowed for ‘the formation of trade unions of workers within the enterprise, 
regardless of whether there were in existence registered and functioning unions that were 
able to cater for such workers’ (Arudsothy, 1993: 91).
Viewed in this manner, the Look East Policy was an effort to re-discipline labour.
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which was gradually becoming more assertive, after almost a decade of continuous high 
growth. At the same time, it was an effort the make clear the link between a disciplined 
labour force and economic growth on which so many other social goals of the 
developmentalist state rested. During this period, existing labour laws were also amended. 
These were a response to growing international pressures against Malaysia’s labour policies 
and they prevented any move towards an industry-based organisation in the union free 
sectors. The consequences of this policy were especially severe in the electronics, garments 
and heavy industry sectors that expanded considerably following the economic reforms of 
the mid-1980’s. Moreover, these sectors illustrate the importance of state co-ordination for 
their expansion, which were derived from political configurations that dominated the 
selection of developmental strategies. Labour policies came to form a core element of the 
chosen developmental strategy both after the reforms of the early 1970s and the crisis of the 
mid-1980s (Jomo, 1990; Jomo, 1995a).
It is too simplistic to treat all economic policies pursued by the Malaysian state since 
the mid-1980s as favouring the process of economic globalisation. Economic policies such 
as those associated with the export processing zones have come under criticism for their 
indirect subsidisation and are thus decidedly anti-global, a form of inverse protection. In the 
face of growing international opposition, the Malaysian state has remained committed to 
them. Such a policy has resulted in employment expansion as well as wage improvements. 
However, such symbiotic relations do not need to be anchored upon social partnerships or 
corporatism.
Export oriented production in these three sectors has been built through export 
processing zones, first set up in 1972. Some of the incentives for FDI were outlined in 
Investment Incentives Act (1968) and the Pioneer Industries Relief from Income Tax 
Ordinance (1958). Tax holidays, duty free export and import provisions, lower wage costs, 
under-utilised quotas under the Multi-Fibre Agreement and non-discriminatory policies in 
the allocation of quotas in early 1970s engendered the rapid expansion of the textile sector 
throughout the 1970s. However, the growth of the electronics sector was far more 
spectacular. Prior to 1971, there were only two companies in the electronics sector. By 1982 
there were more than 100, making Malaysia the largest producer of semi-conductor devices 
in the world (Jesudason, 1990: 173-175). In 1970, the electric and electronic sector output
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comprised 1.8 percent of the total manufacturing output. By 1991, this had grown to 28.1 
percent. Its employment contribution to the total manufacturing sector employment had 
grown proportionately from 2.3 percent in 1970 to 26.8 percent in 1991. The result was a 
dramatic change in the structure of the overall workforce and the skill and gender 
composition more specifically (Rasiah, 1995b: 83).
Mahathir's rise to power also saw a shift in emphasis to heavy industry aimed at 
industrial deepening. Because the investment outlays in such projects were large and the 
gestation period long, the government established HICOM to implement projects, normally 
in joint venture with foreign corporations. Among the heavy industrial projects thus started 
were several cement plants, sponge-iron plants, a cold rolling mill, and a methanol plant 
(Crouch, 1996: 227). This included the showcase PROTON car manufacturing plant. 
However, the mid-1980s recession and fall in oil prices constrained further growth in this 
sector.
In each of these sectors, the state sought to consciously cultivate Malaysia's 
comparative advantages in the international environment. In targeting such sectors, state 
agencies also managed to pursue even more vigorously the social goals set by the 
government. The management of labour by state agencies and its regulation through law and 
non-institutional measures were central to the spectacular expansion in these three industrial 
sectors. Their comparative advantages rested on the assurances that the state would be able 
to maintain a disciplined workforce even in the emerging tight labour markets. By 
underwriting these new industries in this manner, the government was able to lever its 
political support behind the new industries, thus rallying labour to support the ‘national 
interest’.
Labour relations in the electronics sectors illustrates the theme of control and
regulation. The MTUC, for example, applied for the registration of National Union of
Electronics Workers in 1974, but the government dithered on this application and rejected
it eventually in 1989. Rasiah observed that
despite rapid expansion in employment, industrial relations in both industries have 
not developed much. Textile and garment workers have aggressive union 
representatives but their powers are seriously limited by government legislation. 
Electronics workers are still unclear about unionisation. Even official approval of in- 
house unions for the industry in 1988 failed to generate government enforcement, 
such that there were reportedly only eight in-house unions in 1993 (1996:43-44).
1 5 8
The fate of unions in the more traditional sectors was equally bleak during this period. The 
powerful National Union of Plantation Workers saw its membership reduced to 70,000 by 
1990. The one modest success achieved by the union in the 1990s was the acceptance o f ‘the 
guaranteed monthly wages (equivalent to 14-working days of pay). However, it has not been 
able to improve the working conditions of its mainly Malaysian Indian members, much 
above the poverty level. Moreover, national independence and the Malaynisation of 
plantation capital failed to provide any significant changes to the lot of plantation workers 
(Menon and Leggertt, 1996; Ramachandaran, 1994).
Union struggles in these sectors demonstrate the dilemmas noted above. Firstly, 
because of the extent of MNE domination of these sectors, unions and the MTUC in 
particular had a fertile ground from which to launch international campaigns. In the early 
1970s, the Government quietly entered into agreements with MNE's locating in Malaysia to 
ensure union-free environments. However, when Malaysia’s preferential advantages under 
the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) were threatened due to action taken by the 
AFL-CIO (US), the Malaysian Government reconsidered its position. The Minister For 
Labour, Lee Kim Sai, declared that the electronics industry ‘was strong and stable enough 
to allow the formation of trade unions’, though this applied to only in-house unions (Jomo 
and Todd, 1994: 151-153). This concession was clearly won as a result of the AFL-CIO's 
petition to the US Congress, which was arguably pursuing its own self-interest in protecting 
jobs within the US, rather than promoting international labour solidarity.24 Paradoxically, 
this policy put the MTUC on a collision course with independent or employer assisted in- 
house unions even though only three in-house unions were formally recognised by 1995. 
Some of these unions (and emerging ones), according to Wad (1996) and Casperz (1996) 
were able to pursue progressive policies, but were denied MTUC support. As a result, they 
were also cut off from international solidarity. However, a few enterprise unions and 
activists in some Japanese-owned enterprises were able to engage the support of enterprise 
unions in Japan to win workplace concessions. Thus in spite of severe state regulations, the 
internationalised sectors have created both obstacles as well as possibilities for labour. On 
the side of possibilities, economic globalisation has enabled labour to bypass restrictive 
national regulatory frameworks. On the obstacles side, however, economic
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internationalisation has opened a host of opportunities for capital and has strengthened the 
state’s capacity to undermine organised labour. Given the ‘race to the bottom’ tendencies 
in some sectors, the volume of state support for FDI together with wage cost advantages are 
becoming more, rather than less important as primary determinants of comparative 
advantage. On both these accounts Malaysia's advantages are constantly being eroded by the 
lower wage Asian economies. These high economic growth sectors thus illuminate the 
ambivalent consequences of economic globalisation for labour and help explain the often- 
corrtradictory responses by labour.
6:7 Accelerated economic growth and market-led labour regulation after 1986
In the discussion above, I have emphasised the state’s direct and indirect regulation
of labour during the phase of economic restructuring after 1969 and during a period of
accelerated economic internationalisation after 1986. But labour market factors affect labour
regulation in other ways. This study demonstrates that during a period of sustained growth,
state interventions sought to redress the 'distortions' created by wage increases and increased
bargaining strength of several unions. They were necessary because the industrial relations
instruments were unable to reverse the unfavourable consequences of a less flexible labour
market.25 This tendency was especially notable after the reforms following the 1986 crisis
(Jomo, 1990).The World Bank similarly noted that
given the small population base, rapid GDP growth quickly translates into high 
labour costs. Rising wages when productivity is also rising, is a welcome reward to 
workers. However, if productivity lags behind wage increase, the economy's 
international competitiveness is lowered (World Bank, 1995: ii).
In spite of a deregulated labour market, the need for state regulation remained paramount 
during this period. This regulation underscored the state’s role as the interface between the 
national and the global. Clearly, it is in the arena of labour policy that the Malaysian state 
enjoys a wide remit. This was clearly also the arena over which global factors had the least 
direct influence. The combination of the state’s dependence upon monetary and other 
measures noted already is well-amplified in respect to the privatisation programmes.
Malaysia's economic recession of the late 1980s formed the backdrop to its 
privatisation programme. However, privatisation remained subservient to the goal of
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increasing Malay participation in commerce and while retaining its goal of enhancing 
international competitiveness (Gomez and Jomo, 1997). This selective privatisation required 
foreign bidders to place a premium on their allotted shares and required them to take on 
board Malay nationals at all levels of employment ^Financial Times. 7/11/89; Financial 
Times. 19/6/96:12). Significantly, more than M$25 billion worth of public assets or equity 
in public enterprises has been transferred to the private sector between 1991 and 1995. This 
has involved the transfer to the private sector of over 90,000 employees (World Bank, 
1995c), having in turn widespread implications for labour relations.
These developmentalist goals and economic liberalisation generated a series of new 
contradictions. If economic globalisation results from liberalisation, how can the 
contradictory goals of promoting state-determined social relations be attained? The 
privatisation of the Malaysian Airline System (MAS) illustrates these contradictions. It can 
be argued that the MAS at the time of its privatisation was considerably under-valued, 
making it a prime target for take-over by multinational enterprises. Through state support 
during the privatisation phase, including its overt effort to contain labours' opposition, the 
MAS ownership was retained in Malay hands. This was a product of active state 
interventions in both the capital and labour markets. Such interventions demonstrated the 
state’s capacity to firstly, regulate labour through existing legislative devices (such as 
restrictions on strikes in essential services), but also through more indirect means. The ways 
in which labour has been regulated as a result of liberalisation in Malaysia cannot be thus 
explained by reference to labour market and economic policies alone.
For unions, privatisation presents new ambivalences. While, CUEPACS rightly fears 
that exposure to global competitiveness will erode workers interests, it is also aware that 
because restrictions on collective bargaining are removed in privatised enterprises, 
privatisation also presents opportunities for union reorganisation. Often branch officials in 
the target enterprises are those who stand to benefit from the restructuring by assuming 
leadership of newly registered in-house unions following privatisation (General Secretary, 
CUEPAS, 1995, personal discussions). This exemplifies the interconnectedness between the 
global (which determines the privatisation obligations), the national (which implements the 
framework for privatisation) and the local (ethnic interests, patronage).
Global capitalism, is not a competition between different national capitals. Rather
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it is an organisation of distinct national (and within nations specific industries) markets via 
states internationally. States resolve conflicts between interests that seek to dominate 
specific sectors. This role is again illustrated by reference to the MAS during its 
restructuring. Partnerships between states, international capital and national capital are 
readily possible in the airline sector. Global giants may dominate sales, booking and 
technology while allowing national ownership of the airline hardware in a specific site. 
Such complex relations require extensive co-ordination internationally, but this can only be 
achieved through state agencies (in areas of landing rights or inter-airline transfers, safety 
provisions, and commercial law for example). These obviously cannot be regulated by 
capital and nor by international agencies on their own. This example amplifies the ways in 
which the Malaysian state is able to regulate markets, and manage the apparently 
contradictory demands that its ‘national goals’ exert in a liberalised economic environment.
Because the airline sector is among the most internationalised, it also offers more 
possibilities for union action. In practice, however, such possibilities are constrained. A 
strike by MAS employees in December 1978 illustrated this circumstance. Members of the 
Airline Employees Union (AEU) commenced a 'work to rule and ban on overtime' to press 
their claims for a new agreement which in tum was declared an illegal strike action. This 
resulted in pressure by the Labour Minister upon the AEU to deregister the 874 members 
who had participated in that industrial action. As the dispute escalated, the government 
(which owned the MAS) cancelled all MAS flights and called on the union to show cause 
as to why it should not be deregistered. The International Transport Workers' Federation 
escalated secondary industrial action internationally, with one MAS plane stranded in 
Sydney. Internally, the government detained 23 activists by engaging the harsh Internal 
Security Act, thus virtually crippling the union leadership. The MAS-AEU dispute had a 
lasting impact on the Malaysian trade union movement because it demonstrated the extent 
to which the government was prepared to exercise its powers against labour. The Internal 
Security Act was used to detain unionists participating in a trade dispute, serving as an 
ominous warning to all unionists. The enormous discretionary powers o f  the Registrar of 
Trade Unions were also highlighted by the deregistration of the AEU, and its deprivation of 
trade union membership, and restraining secondary actions by Port Klang unions to support 
the MAS workers (Jomo and Todd, 1994: 143). A weakened labour movement internally,
1 6 2
and poor corporate performance, made MAS an easy target for privatisation subsequent to 
the dispute. Through massive state subsidies, the corporation was transferred to Malay 
hands. Arguably, it was the Government's intention to retain majority Malay ownership of 
the MAS all along. A complex labour dispute demonstrated to foreign investors the level of 
dependence upon the state for labour regulation. While economic globalisation has 
broadened the scope for global strategies on part of labour (as was demonstrated by 
secondary action in Australia and the UK), reforms to labour laws in both these countries 
now make it next to impossible for unions to undertake cross-national secondary action. 
The MAS dispute therefore demonstrates the wide remit of the state in the area of labour 
regulation, and the limits of formal labour relations procedures. The example selected above 
exemplifies the importance that the state attached to the regulation of organised labour even 
in the high growth years between 1988 and mid 1990s.
6:8 Labour standards and trade liberalisation
The policy responses by the Malaysian state to the international pressures for trade
liberalisation also exemplifies the tension between global and national strategies for labour
regulation. Given its important role in APEC, it leads a strong campaign against international
efforts to link labour standards with free trade provisions of the WTO. With trade union
rights more firmly established than in its neighbours such as China, Indonesia and Thailand,
Malaysia can be seen to be carrying the torch against what is viewed as ‘labourist-
protectionism’. Its International Trade and Industry Minister, Datuk Seri Aziz warned that
if the WTO work programme is distracted and disrupted by ... issues not linked to 
trade and the WTO, regionalism would be a favoured alternative as countries attempt 
to buffer themselves from the impact of multilateral action (New Strait Times. 
18/8/96:26).
The Malaysian political elite is acutely aware of the potential of labour that is organised 
internationally and has been committed to weakening the links between trade unions in 
Malaysia and international organisations of labour. It has been able to pursue such policies 
by making appeals to ‘national interest’ and questioning trade unions ‘loyalty’ to the 
Malaysian state Moreover, in an era where the state is presented as the basic unit of global 
competition, states are also able to rally support of interests groups in pursuance of what are 
presented as national goals. Thus many unionists interviewed similarly understood the
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pressure for a social clause within the WTO framework as a pressure by Western 
governments to protect their established advantages via non-tariff measures. They thus 
privately supported the position of their government vis-à-vis the social clause, through 
publicly maintained a position congruent with that of the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions, a strong advocate of the social clause.26 In private discussions, most 
unionists were opposed to the idea of linking labour standards to global trade. It is also 
likely, however, that such an ambivalent position on part of unions may be attributed to the 
overbearing influence of the government bureaucracy. For example, even a MTUC response 
to a ILO annual questionnaire in early 1996 resulted in a call by the Human Resource 
Minister to the MTUC's general secretary' to explain his response (New Strait Times. 
2/9/96: 6). In a nation preoccupied with ethnicity, such a call by a Malay government can 
translate into a pressure upon Malay union members to rid the MTUC o f non-Malay leaders. 
The Malaysian Indian leaders of the MTUC thus tread an extremely conciliatory line on such 
matters.
This paradox demonstrates a belief by national actors, including worker associations 
that the core unit of competition in the process of economic globalisation is the state. It is 
often the case that labour leaders are willing to accept economic and social policies that 
advantage the home state, although this may be at the cost of state control over them.27 This 
has the effect of conflating industrial relations issue to discourses about the national interest. 
In accepting such a position, the subservience of organised labour is obtained, without 
having to resort to legislation or coercion. Such a position is premised on the evidence that 
national gains (investment, employment, technology, and markets) are best secured through 
carefully targeted national economic policies aimed at developing national comparative 
advantages. This reference to national comparative advantages, a core notion in the neo­
liberal package, further exemplifies how neo-liberal economics is projected as unproblematic 
and selectively used to obtain the subservience of labour. As a result, the process of 
economic policy formation is further depoliticised.
Overall, the cases examined above show the premium that the Malaysian state places 
upon maintaining its influence in the sphere of labour regulation. Because labour policy has 
been shown to be so central to economic growth in an increasingly free global environment, 
the stakes for the so-called ‘developmental states’ are especially high. Viewed in this way,
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the Malaysian state's opposition to global labour standards exemplifies how states fight back 
to retain their sphere of control from global regulation.
The key trends in labour policy, economic development strategies and their outcomes 
are summarised in the table below.
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Table 4:0 Economie restructuring and labour regulation in Malaysia: 1969-1995
K e y  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  a n d  o u t c o m e s 1 9 6 9 -8 6 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 5
I m p e t u s  f o r  c h a n g e - R a c e  r i o t s  i n  1 9 6 9  f o r c e s  a t t e n t i o n  o n  th e  
e c o n o m ic  m a r g i n a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  
d o m i n a n t  M a l a y  c o m m u n i t y .
- T h e  a s c e n d a n c e  t o  p o w e r  o f  a  m o r e  
o v e r t l y  M a l a y  o r i e n t e d  g o v e r n m e n t  le d  
b y  M a h a t h i r .
- B a n k i n g  s e c t o r  c r i s i s  i n  1 9 8 6 .  P u b l i c  
f u n d s  t o  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  o f  6  p e r c e n t  o f  
G D P  n e e d e d  to  r e v iv e  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s e c to r  
I n c r e a s e d  p r e s s u r e  f r o m  t h e  I M F  a n d  
M a l a y s i a ’s  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s  f o r  
l i b e r a l i s a t i o n .
- I n c l u s i o n  i n t o  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  a  M a l a y  
e l i t e  t h a t  f a v o u r e d  i n c r e a s e d  i n t e g r a t i o n  
a n d  o p e n n e s s .
- U r b a n  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  r a t e s  o f  o p e n  
p o v e r ty  b e c a m e  s e r io u s .
- U n e m p l o y m e n t  e m e r g e d  a s  a  s e r io u s  
p r o b l e m  a f t e r  a  d e c a d e  o f  m o d e s t  g r o w th .
E c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  c h a n g e s -  S h i f t  a w a y  f r o m  i m p o r t  s u b s t i t u t i o n  
t h r o u g h  s u p p o r t  f o r  p i o n e e r  
i n d u s t r i a l / m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r i e s .
-  V i g o r o u s  p r o m o t i o n  o f  M a l a y  
o w n e r s h i p  o f  e n t e r p r i s e s .
- M o d e s t  s u p p o r t  f o r  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i s a t i o n
- R a p i d  l i b e r a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
s e c t o r  b e t w e e n  1 9 8 6  a n d  1 9 9 2 .
R e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  s t a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n s - I n c r e a s e d  M a l a y  d o m i n a n c e  o f  p o l i c y  
m a k i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s
- S t a t e s  i n s t i t u t i o n s  s u c h  a s  M I D I ,  a n d  
T r a d e  m i n i s t r i e s  g iv e n  g r e a t e r  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  i n  c o - o r d i n a t i n g  t h e  
d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  e n t e r p r i s e  a n d  i n d u s t r y .
- A  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n c r e a s e  i n  s t a t e  
i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  e n t e r p r i s e s  a n d  i n d u s t r y
- M i n i s t r i e s  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r a d e  a n d  
F i n a n c e  e m e r g e  a s  t h e  p r e - e m i n e n t  p o l ic y  
a g e n c y  w i t h i n  G o v e r n m e n t .
- A d o p t i o n  o f  a  s w e e p i n g  p r o g r a m m e  o f  
c o p o r a t i s a t i o n  a n d  p r i v a t i s a t i o n  a f t e r  
1 9 8 6 .  P r i v a t i s a t i o n  w a s  a l s o  d e l i b e r a t e l y  
u s e d  t o  p r o m o t e  t h e  c o m m e r c i a l  h o l d  o f  
M a l a y s .
E c o n o m ic  a n d  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  o u t c o m e s 1. E x p o r t s  o f  n e w  m a n u f a c t u r e d  p r o d u c t s  
i n c r e a s e  in  r e a l  t e r m s  a n d  in  r e l a t i o n  to  
t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  e x p o r t  c o m m o d i t ie s .
2 . T h e  s t a t e  r e t a i n s  a  s t r o n g  p r e s e n c e  in  
m a n u f a c t u r i n g .
3 .  G r a d u a l  o p e n i n g  u p  o f  t h e  e c o n o m y .
4 .  H a r s h  c o n t r o l s  im p o s e d  u p o n  t r a d e  
u n i o n i s t s  a n d  t h e  ‘ p o l i t i c a l ’ a c t i v i t i e s  o f  
t r a d e  u n io n s .
5 .  L a b o u r  m a r k e t s  a r e  r e g u l a t e d  c lo s e ly  
t h r o u g h  l a w s  a n d  o t h e r  p o l i c i e s  b y  t h e  
h u m a n  r e s o u r c e  a n d  p l a n n i n g  a g e n c i e s .
6 . S ta t e  b a r s  u n i o n  a c t iv i t y  in  t h e  p i o n e e r  
a n d  n e w  g r o w t h  s e c to r s .
7 .  E f f o r t s  t o  c o n t r o l  a n d  r e s t r i c t  t h e  
p o w e r  o f  l a r g e  i n d u s t r i a l  u n i o n s  i n  t h e  
p u b l i c  a n d  p r i v a t e  s e c to r s .  B a r g a i n i n g  
c o v e r a g e  is  r e d u c e d  b y  a  f u r t h e r  1 8  
p e r c e n t  b e t w e e n  1 9 7 3  a n d  1 9 8 0 .
8 .  G r a d u a l  i n c r e a s e  in  f o r e ig n  in v e s t m e n t  
s i n c e  1 9 7 3 , l e a d i n g  to  r e a l  d e c l in e  in  
u n e m p l o y m e n t  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  1 9 7 0 s .
1 . N e w  e x p o r t  s e c t o r s  s u c h  a s  e l e c t r o n i c s  
a n d  e l e c t r i c a l  p r o d u c t s  d o m i n a t e  t h e  
m a n u f a c t u r e d  e x p o r t s .
2 .  N e w  s e c t o r s  a r e  d o m i n a t e d  b y  M N E ’s 
( e s p e c i a l l y  J a p a n e s e  t r a n s p l a n t s ) .  T h e  
r o l e  o f  t h e  s t a t e  d e c l in e s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y .
i n c r e a s e d  b y  m o r e  t h a n  3 0  p e r c e n t  
s u g g e s t i n g  a  r a p i d  o p e n i n g  u p  o f  t h e  
e c o n o m y .
4 .  C o n t r o l s  o v e r  u n i o n s  b e c o m e  s u b t l e r  
r a t h e r  t h a n  d i r e c t .
5 .  p r o g r e s s i v e  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  
d e r e g u l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  1 9 8 6  a n d  1 9 9 2 .
6 .  S t a t e  a l l o w s  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  
e n t e r p r i s e  u n i o n s  i n  t h e  n e w  e x p o r t  
s e c t o r s .
7 .  E n t e r p r i s e  u n i o n s  e m e r g e  a s  t h e  
d o m i n a n t  f o r m  o f  t r a d e  u n i o n s .  M o d e s t  
r e c o v e r y  in  u n i o n  m e m b e r s h i p  f r o m  a  
l o w  o f  7 %  in  1 9 8 9  t o  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  1 1 %  
b y  e n d  o f  1 9 9 5 .
8 .  3 5 0  p e r c e n t  i n c r e a s e  in  f o r e i g n  
i n v e s t m e n t  a n d  n e a r  f u l l  e m p l o y m e n t  
a c h i e v e d  b y  1 9 9 3 .
S o c ia l /  p o l i t i c a l  o u t c o m e s P r o p o r t i o n  o f  M a l a y  o w n e r s h i p  in T r a d e  u n i o n s  b e c o m e  t o r n  b y  i n t e r n a l
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‘p i o n e e r '  s t r a t e g i c  i n d u s t r i e s  m o r e  t h a n  
d o u b l e d .  M a l a y  c o r p o r a t e  i n t e r e s t s  
b e c o m e s  m o r e  c lo s e ly  a l i g n e d  t o  U M N O  
a n d  t h e  s t a t e .
E t h n i c i t y  b e c o m e s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  in  
t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  c o n t r o l  o f  o r g a n i s e d  
l a b o u r ._________
s t r i f e  a n d  d e e p  f a c t i o n a l i s m  a l o n g  e t h n i c  
l i n e s .  M i g r a n t  l a b o u r  is  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  
e x c l u d e d  f r o m  u n i o n  c o v e r a g e  a n d  
s u p p o r t .
Generally, Table 4:0 above suggests that economic crisis helped open-up the possibility to 
re-orient economic and labour market policies after 1969 and 1986. In spite of the 
reorientation of policy, the state has retained close control over organised labour since 1969. 
After the economic crisis of the mid-1990s, it is not clear if the state can maintain this status 
quo, that is, of promoting liberalisation while continuing to regulate labour markets. Because 
of the serious contraction in employment, it is also unlikely that the burden of adjustment 
can be shifted onto ‘migrant’ labour, who have thus far remained outside the union umbrella. 
In these ways, it is likely that the terrain over which state and labour contests have occurred 
since 1969 are likely to be considerably re-shaped in the near future.
6:9 Conclusion
The Malaysian study demonstrates the contradictory thrusts of processes associated 
with trade liberalisation and accelerated economic internationalisation. Both the rise of a 
largely Malay state that favoured social intervention and a global environment that favoured 
liberalisation amplified these contradictions. The Malaysian state reconciled this 
contradiction in a manner that expanded the scope of its social interventions while 
attempting to maximise opportunities created by the process of economic liberalisation. In 
these respects it has few parallels in the world.
A process of restructuring that began around 1970 saw high levels of state regulation, 
which emphasised both an institutional and a non-institutional approach to securing labour 
market conditions favourable to market-led growth. By making these a part of an overall 
policy of economic liberalisation, labour policies became interwoven into a unified 
developmental policy package. In Malaysia's case the package itself had very overt political 
goals domestically. The contours of restructuring were shaped by domestic economic and 
political exigencies and were underpinned by the developmental goals set by an elite 
political system. Efforts to open-up that package for debate and political competition were
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stifled through an array of measures. Indeed, the Malaysian state acquired a near absolute 
hegemony over the economic policy discourse. This in turn fed the concentration of political 
power within a few institutions of the state. So long as that package held, the state could 
continue to manipulate an increasingly open economy to deliver national advantages without 
threatening foreign capital, thus maintaining the exceptionally high levels of economic 
growth. Through state mediated alliances with FDI and policy co-ordination that was 
supported by international and regional agencies, the Malaysian state was able to pursue 
interventionist and distortionary policies that could have win-win outcomes for a narrow 
segment of co-opted labour, national capital and FDI. Having supported the political 
package, organised labour was not left in a position to contest the restructuring agenda. 
Moreover, the engagement of ethnicity as an agency for regulation ensured that situations 
where a Malay trade union leadership came into direct conflict with the Malay-dominated 
state, reminding everyone of the potential for intra-ethnic class conflict were avoided. Neo­
liberal restructuring in Malaysia represented fundamental political choices and the nearly 
complete displacement of politics from economic policy formulation process. Although 
neoliberalism characterised the economic policy environment in the 1980s, it failed to create 
a broad consensus even within the Malay political elite about a developmental vision for the 
future. The economic policy framework remains open to contestation, in spite of the 
substitution of political negotiation with neo-liberal imperatives. This contestation has 
helped open up new political spaces. How and whether Malaysian labour is able to assert its 
presence on this space will shape its prospects as Malaysia's integration into the global 
economic system is intensified following its most recent economic crisis. This crisis visibly 
dented some of the interventionist capacities that the Malay-state acquired during the high 
growth decade. It is indeed possible that the developmentalist goals and the goals of further 
liberalisation will collide in ways that could unravel the post-1986-deal, thus opening new 
possibilities for labour.
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Chapter Six: Endnotes
1. The launching of the New Economic Policy (NEP) following the riots of the 
1969 ‘coincided with the weakened position of the Malaysian Trade Union 
Congress (MTUC) in relation to government and capital, and the desire for 
moderate unionists to benefit from various opportunities created by the 
government’s NEP’. (These) prompted the MTUC to campaign for active union 
involvement in economic ventures ... this campaign brought raised serious 
questions as regard the role and overall aspiration of the center (MTUC)” (Bahari, 
1989: 204). The early 1970s can be regarded as a low point for both the MTUC and 
other unions individually. The NEP sought to even further dislodge their cross­
ethnic class focussed appeals. Malaysia’s economic restructuring proper thus began 
with a prior weakening of its union movement.
2. (Wade 1996: 318-19) provides an excellent critique of the neo-liberal approach. 
He argues that ‘in the neo-liberal view, growth is a natural or inherent property of 
capitalist economies and that economic liberalization promotes the interests of rich 
and poor countries alike, and within these countries, of labour and capital, and 
further, that insofar as mutual interests are not being served, it is generally because 
the degree of liberalization is insufficient’.
3. This theme is conventionally applicable to the classic multi-ethnic formations. 
However, state interventions to redress disadvantages that specifically excluded 
groups faced in the labour market has become an important arena for state 
intervention and active employment policies in the UK and New Zealand over the 
past few decades as well. Equal opportunity initiatives also demonstrate such forms 
of interventions.
4. Malaya was widely regarded as ‘one of the brightest jewels in the British crown’, 
with export value per head of its population being higher than in all other colonies 
and dependencies, including New Zealand (see, Bowie, 1991: 42-65).
5. While Singapore had pressed for its own independence in federation with 
Malaysia, its fears of Malay domination of the federation led to its withdrawal and 
full independence in 1965 (Bowie, 1991).
6. Another popular formulation is that ‘developmental state is one that in light of 
intense international competition and unequal distribution of wealth and knowledge 
between the developed and the developing nation, has as its central political 
objective the long term economic growth of society’ (quoted in ILO, 1996: 5).
7. Excellent discussions of role of the state in promoting industrial development in 
the region, in contrast to mainstream neo-classical and neo-liberal accounts is 
presented in Frenkel and Harrod eds. (1995). See also Wade (1996) for a discussion
1 6 9
of how the World Bank chose to underplay the importance of interventionist and 
distortionary economic policies in facilitating accelerated economic growth in parts 
of Asia.
8. While Malaysia's post-1969 social order is largely explained in terms of its ethnic 
settlement (Crouch, 1996), it is also a settlement that is firmly market based. 
Because the association between economic function and ethnicity has been 
managed by the state, Malaysia has also come to exemplify the notion of'governed' 
state/market relations (Wade, 1992).
9. Had the NEP for example aimed to advance Bumiputera ownership through 
hostile takeovers of existing enterprises, even at market premiums or blocked the 
access of international capital to important economic sectors, the support of the 
World Bank and of international capital would have been much less enthusiastic
10. Technocrats have periodically over-ridden objectives established by the party 
political leaders in the governing party. Dass (1997:25) notes this tendency as early 
as 1977 when he observed that even the “Third Malaysian Plan was to some extent 
emaciated by over-zealous bureaucrats overriding the basic aims of political leaders 
who had much more equitable ambitions for the various races in the country”.
11. Even in 1970, Malaysia was a relatively open economy as ‘its exports as a 
percentage of GDP hovered just below 50 percent. This share had increased to 72 
percent only 7 years later’ (Mazumdar, 1994: 460). Both these were high by 
developing country and OECD standards.
12. Its Finance Minister similarly noted that because of the full employment 
situation and the high level of dependence upon foreign workers, Malaysia ‘will no 
longer encourage investment in low technology and labour-intensive industries’. In 
this regard the 1995 and 1996 Government Budgets supported the shift to 
‘sophisticated capital-intensive technology, increase automation, and expedite the 
development of a progressive and forward looking labour force’ (Minister For 
Finance, from the 1996 Budget Address).
13. World Bank (1996a:vii) notes, however, that ‘estimates show that there are 
about 1.2 million immigrant workers in Malaysia, or almost 1 in 6 workers (in 
1995). The largest concentration is in construction (70 percent of the total 
workforce), agriculture (30 percent) and non-govemment services (10 percent). 
These figures are twice as high as the documented rates’.
14. The opposition DAP, which has at times enjoyed moderate support among 
worker groups and has had a moderately left-wing policy orientation joined calls 
for even greater liberalisation during the last election campaign in 1995. This 
illustrates a broader political contest by political parties to dominate the center stage 
in politics rather than left or right policy-based fringes. For DAP's recent policies,
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see, DAP Malaysia, 1994, ‘Declaration on Full Liberalization’, party mimeo.
15. The current Prime Minister, Mahathir was among the radical "young turks" 
during this period - overtly committed to Malay commercial and political 
advancement. His severe criticisms of UMNO leadership during the emergency (see 
The Malay Dilemma! resulted in his expulsion from UMNO and he was not 
rehabilitated until 1973.
16. Malaysia was one of the few countries in Asia that succeeded in this strategy of 
state-led ISI with the support of the FDI. A new political elite offered lucrative 
incentives to FDI and negotiated minority equity interests for either individual 
Malays or Malay corporate holdings in the early 1970s in return. In this manner the 
post-1969 political elite sought to meet the twin objectives o f the leadership 
change, i.e. firstly deepen Malay equity control in the corporate sector. Secondly, 
ensure that a high growth cycle would not aggravate the economic differences 
between Chinese and Malays.
17. In its practical application this means selecting individuals and targeting state 
support to their entrepreneurial initiatives. This is done quite openly through 
provisions of the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA), and institutions such as the 
Bank Bumiputera, Bank Pertanian (Agricultural Bank), PERNAS (a state 
investment holding charged with promoting Malay participation in businesses) and 
the State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs) (Bowie, 1991: 94-104). 
Malaysian Premier, for example, commented in this respect that ‘it is my duty to 
see that Malays who are given a chance (preferential state support) are Malays who 
can succeed’ (Far Eastern Economic Review. 1996. ‘Tough Talk: Premier Mahathir 
thrives on no-nonsense policies’, October 24: 26). Neal (1994) critically examines 
the impact and success of two such institutions (MARA and MEDEC), arguing that 
"under the ideological banner which exhorts national unity through income 
redistribution for economic justice, the state elites successfully articulated the 
ideological and institutional rationale for promoting Bumiputera economic 
development through entrepreneurship".
18. State owned enterprises such as Petronas (petroleum) and Proton (automobiles) 
similarly signal state’s determination to foster competitive advantages in selected 
sectors. According to Bello, the Proton project exemplifies all the sins of state 
intervention. ‘Discriminatory treatment was one: the Saga car was exempt from 
various taxes while tariffs were hiked for other cars assembled in Malaysia... 
Another transgression was strategic industrial targeting ... so that the Saga would 
provide extensive forward and backward linkages to the rest o f the national 
economy. A third offence was the compulsory local sourcing of components to 
encourage the growth of local supplier industries’ (Bello, 1996: 169).
19. The 1996 Budget address by the Minister for Finance, for example, observed 
that ‘competition must be encouraged among producers and sufficient supplies 
must be assured for the domestic market. After being given protection for such a
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long time, domestic industries ... are capable of competing with imported products 
... Therefore, I propose to reduce the import duties on more than 710 items which 
have been protected for more than 10 years be reduced’ (Ministry for Finance, 1996, 
Budget address, para. 48).
20. Kuppusamy (1994:9) also argues that government had ‘acted to mollify the 
predominantly Malay employees on its payroll, thus minimising and pre-empting 
labor objections to privatisation policy’. Malay employee’s compliance was 
particularly critical for a Government committed to promoting Malay interests. 
Policy makers have been especially careful that Malaysia's rapid economic growth 
did not lead to a radicalization of its Malay workforce.
21. This has remained persistent since. One very senior unionist interviewed by the 
researcher noted that unions ‘generally felt more comfortable bargaining with 
MNE's than with Malaysian private sector or state enterprises’ (Confidential 
Interview, April 1996, Kuala Lumpur). Moreover, Malaysian unions were also able 
to use at times the lever or support of unions in the home countries of the MNE's to 
pressure collective bargaining outcomes domestically. See Booth, H. 1995 ‘Labour 
Movement Responses to the Globalization of Production: The Case of Northern 
Telecom’, Ph.D. thesis, Queens University Canada for a discussion on this theme.
22. CUEPCS was registered as a public sector trade union in 1957 and it 
represented public sector unions on the staff side of the Whitley Council set up in 
1953. Narrow collective bargaining rights were restored for CUEPACS in 1984 
when it was allowed to negotiate terms and conditions of service for government 
workers, but not salaries, allowances, and certain managerial prerogatives. It 
disaffiliated from the MTUC in 1981, although various threads o f co-operation 
between the two had been re-established by mid-1995 (See Jomo and Todd, 1994).
23. ICFTU's financial and other support to the MTUC have been a ‘source of 
fragmentation, rather than unity within union leadership ranks’ (Interview, Dass - 
trade union activist - Kuala Lumpur, April 10, 1996).
24. This point is owed to Dr Dunston Ayadurai, seminar discussions, Japan 
Industrial Relations Association and Japan Institute for Labour Seminar (JIL), 
March 1996 - JIL, Tokyo.
25. The Finance Minister observed that ‘the rate of inflation had declined to 3.4 
percent in 1995 compared with 3.7 percent in (1994). This strengthens our belief 
that we can achieve zero inflation’ (Ministry for Finance, 1996; Budget address- 
para. 10).
26. This can also be partly explained by the overt dependence of the MTUC and 
many individual unions on the ICFTU and International Trade Secretariats for 
financial support.
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27. MTUC is a high profile member of the regional grouping of the ICFTU's 
regional grouping (Asia Pacific Regional Office - APRO). ICFTU-APRO officials 
questioned by the researcher also held a similar viewpoint on the link between 
labour standards and trade privately. This office does appear to adopt a 
confrontational attitude to European and Western trade unions on a range of other 
issues as well. Moreover, given that most of its core funding comes from the Japan 
Trade Union Congress (RENGO), the unions will do little to hurt the emerging 
comparative advantages of Asian states in the global trading environment.
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Chapter Seven: States and economic internationalisation in comparative settings: writing 
in labour regulation
7:0 Introduction
This chapter considers the associations between economic internationalisation and labour 
market changes in the three studies. It assesses the roles played by states in their deployment of 
contrasting developmental strategies to achieve accelerated economic internationalisation and 
draws attention to the re-articulation of state and market relations through labour policy 
transformations. This re-articulation underlined two developments. Firstly, it emphasises the 
crucial place of the state regulation of labour in the reform process. Secondly, it illustrated the 
varying impacts upon organised labour of economic reforms. It is argued that a re-configuration 
of state/market relations involved an internal reorganisation of the state itself.
The comparative and historical examination has deepened our understandings of the 
politics of restructuring in the three case studies. These studies illustrate the distinct ways in 
which re-configuration was attained. Within this, labour market strategies appeared to be equally 
diverse; although achieving remarkably similar outcomes. This appears as a paradox. Having 
written labour into the analysis, I provide some pointers for understanding how such converging 
outcomes have been achieved. This approach throws open the substantive theoretical questions 
about how labour functions as a dynamic agency in the transformative processes that are studied 
in this thesis.
Such an approach emphasised the political nature of the process of economic 
internationalisation, rather than primarily an economic process. The political nature of the 
process of economic internationalisation rests upon complex inter-linkages between state 
strategies and labour market policies. Labour’s responses to economic reforms confirmed the 
centrality o f ‘political agents’ in the reformulation of state/market relations, throwing light on 
the political foundations of economic policy transformations. At the same time, the studies 
illustrated complicated variations in economic and labour market policies. However, in spite of 
such differentiation, labour was progressively excluded from the policy processes. To 
understand this puzzle, the study examined how national labour policy regimes were articulated 
during the restructuring phase and more fundamentally, how political factors affected policy 
shifts.
Labour is not a homogenous class, but is differentially organised and located. Segmented 
labour markets were observed in all the case studies. These generated and sustained
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contradictory interest cleavages within labour. In the case of New Zealand, for example, the 
more marginal Maori and Pacific Islander labour pursued their interests separately from the main 
organisations of labour. In the case of Malaysia, the large immigrant labour market, and in Japan, 
the peripheral workforce characterised similarly distinct interest cleavages. The political 
associations of the different cleavages were similarly disaggregated. Evidently, economic 
globalisation has led to a widening of many of the existing inequities in national labour markets 
and a further disaggregation of labour-based interest cleavages. The ways in which labour market 
segmentations were affected by political agencies, especially premier policy making institutions 
throws open the need to critically examine the place of politics in the deregulated and liberalised 
labour markets that is one of the defining features of the process of economic globalisation.
This analysis is laid out in the following manner. The first section examines the 
reconfiguration of state and labour market relations highlighting the general shifts in state 
policies. It is followed by a discussion of trends that help explain the centrality o f labour in these 
shifts and the consequences for a phase of accelerated economic internationalisation. Finally, the 
discussion assesses some of the wider implications and consequences of this reconfiguration of 
state/market relations. The chapter concludes by reviewing the factors that appear to be driving 
the contradictory changes that are observed, as well as examining the interconnectedness 
between them.
7:1 Reconfiguring states and labour markets
By recasting state/market configuration by references to modes of labour regulation, this 
thesis reinterprets the state regulation of labour problematic.1 Through this, the study concluded 
that even though economic globalisation appeared to be driven by capital markets, the process 
rested upon active state interventions in the labour markets. This conclusion substantiated Tilly’s 
(1996) efforts to connect globalisation and labour rights by calling attention to the importance 
of segmented nature of labour markets, the social and power relations upon which such 
segmentation is grounded, and the interconnectedness between labour markets within national 
boundaries, regionally and globally. Labour rights in the most internationalised sectors did not 
necessarily deteriorate as a result of accelerated internationalisation. This theme was illustrated 
with respect to core labour in Japan’s post-war industrial giants (‘keiretsus’), for example 
(Ruigrok and Tulder, 1995: 166). By driving economic policy shifts aimed at harmonising the 
conditions for accumulation, it was commonly argued that nation states had become less
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important agents for economic regulation (Lee, 1996; Clark and Williams, 1995). By positioning 
labour at the centerstage of this analysis, the thesis demonstrated how labour market policies 
featured in this harmonisation process, in so doing it underlined the central role of the state and 
hence of politics.
One of the impacts of the rapid internationalisation of economies exemplified by these 
studies has been on the re-organisation of labour markets. Microeconomic policy instruments 
were deployed to ‘free markets’, thereby promote growth and employment (Landsberg and 
Burkett, 1997; Jesudason, 1990; Kelsey, 1993). However, these shifts also entailed pressures that 
have eroded hard-won labour rights. This highlighted the tensions between policies based on 
market intervention or liberalisation as the dominant approach to labour regulation.
Governments in each of the three cases broadly recognised that the financially driven 
wave of globalisation had transformed the state-bounded accumulation process. These 
governments committed themselves to the view that ‘markets needed the steadying hand of 
governments’ given the destabilising impacts of trade liberalisation (Boyer and Drache eds., 
1996: 54-9). As a result economic restructuring came to be associated with policies of market 
disintervention and de-regulation, generating periodic, and at times, severe contestation between 
and within the state institutions and labour organisations. However, the complicated nature of 
contestation often camouflaged the political goals of economic restructuring, a discussion I 
return to in Chapter Eight.
The state in each case promoted specific policies aimed at defining labour markets in 
particular ways. With the growing internationalisation of the three economies, such policies were 
critical in providing the basis for neo-liberalism, which was underpinned by the de-regulation 
of labour markets. These approaches are illustrated with reference to the segmentation of labour 
markets, the gendered reconfiguration of labour markets, decentralised bargaining and other 
labour market policies, including policies relating to immigrant labour.
In all the three economies, immigrant labour, for example, was increasingly concentrated 
in the low echelons of the labour market, often deprived of union representation and denied 
legislative protection. Economic internationalisation also increased the demand for migrant 
labour. In each instance, the importance of immigrant labour was in terms of its workplace 
flexibility and to the weakening of the control of collective labour institutions. The growing 
importance of such labour for workplace flexibility made it easier for co-ordinating agencies to 
implement labour market reforms in the more internationalised sectors. In the case of Japan,
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however, the overall level of migrant labour remained small, although expanding. Nevertheless, 
Japanese enterprises that had relocated to the more traditional labour exporting countries in Asia 
and to low wage regions within Japan, showed similar patterns to New Zealand and Malaysia.2
A gendered reconfiguration within these national labour markets was also evident. The 
low participation rates of women in the labour force ensured that a pool of flexible labour was 
readily available for deployment as these economies internationalised. Women workers were 
concentrated in the low wage and low skill sectors. As a result, the differential incorporation of 
women workers into the labour market was associated with increased workplace vulnerabilities. 
The female labour force participation rate was 25.3 percent in 1980 in Malaysia, 38.5 percent 
in 1984 in Japan, and 46 percent in New Zealand in the same year. The proportion of women in 
the wage and salaried workforce has been increasing over the past two decades (ILO, 1995a and 
1995b). At the same time, the flexible workforce that is increasingly dominated by women has 
been the source of flexibility for businesses during the recent economic downturns in Malaysia 
and Japan especially. Thus the internationalising strategies of governments depended upon 
mobilising women as a key domestic source of new labour during periods of accelerated growth.
Moreover, the ratio of mean wages for women as a percent o f  wages for men was 46 
percent in 1977 in Japan. This declined to 42.5 percent in 1986. In New Zealand, this was 73.3 
percent in 1977, and it again declined to 71.8 percent in 1986 (ILO, 1995a: 103-4). Comparable 
data for Malaysia was not available, although it is anticipated that this tendency would also 
apply. These tendencies are significant given that all the governments also made important 
strides in improving the position of women in the labour markets and improving their conditions 
of employment during the period under examination.
This observation illustrates the key thesis that internationalisation of national economies 
induced and depended upon very specific patterns of labour market segmentation within national 
economies as well as between economies (Grace, 1990; Shin Yamada, interview, 1996). 
Additionally, professional and technical segments of national labour markets also expanded 
disproportionately, even in the tight and regulated markets in Malaysia and Japan. Accelerated 
internationalisation over the past two decades widened existing income disparities in each 
national labour market. During this period, these economies also experienced a decline in the 
influence of trade unions and accelerated economic internationalisation over a broadly similar 
time frame. However, it was also true that some segments of labour were able to secure 
considerable gains without the support of collective labour institutions and had benefited from
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increased cross-national mobility. Overall, economic internationalisation was associated with 
increasingly permeable national labour markets and the fragmentation of labour markets 
internally. It was also associated with the emergence o f differentiated labour policy regimes in 
the three economies. Such transitions were consequences of reorientation of policy within 
selected state institutions. These new forms of segmentation problematised the conceptual and 
explanatory approaches of labour economics that have shaped the neo-classical developmental 
discourses. New forms o f segmentation that evidently aggravated distinctions not only in 
relation to women, but minorities, younger and older workers and peripheral workers highlighted 
how segmentation in the labour markets served the broader aims of labour market flexibility 
upon which the neo-classical policy framework rested. The segmented outcomes in labour 
markets also demonstrated the inability of neo-classical labour economics to explain the wide 
variations in labour market outcomes that were associated with the process of economic 
globalisation. This problematic deserves closer scrutiny if the economic globalisation and state 
relationships are to be better understood.
The variables discussed above exemplify the high priority given to regulation and co­
ordination of labour markets by the three states. However, their co-ordinating functions 
appeared to contradict the deregulatory tendencies associated with neoliberal reforms in other 
sectors. While the reconfiguration of labour markets appeared as a part of a generally 
deregulatory thrust of economic policy, the deregulated market itself provided new means for 
labour regulation (Boyer and Drache, eds. 1996). However, labour market deregulation based 
on the three case studies was associated with a fundamental recomposition of labour politics.
These labour market outcomes and strategies were essentially political in nature. They 
involved, and resulted from political negotiation and contestation between labour and the state 
in the political arena. The studies demonstrated the continuing relevance of the ‘political’ to 
understanding the ‘economic’, validating the observation that:
politics is n o t... to be read off from economics. Rather, the political and the economic 
are both to be seen as forms of social relations, whose differentiation enables the 
everyday conduct of government and yet whose contradictory unity circumscribes the 
volition of states. Government thereby responds to the power of labour at home and is 
forced to deal with the consequences of labour-capital struggles on a global scale.... 
Whilst the national state cannot ultimately resolve these contradictions,... it may be able 
to mobilise resources and refashion international political and economic relations, to gain 
a more favourable temporary position in the interstate system characterised by uneven 
development (Burnham, 1995: 104).
Through examining state/market relations situationally, this study has reaffirmed the
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importance of a range of ‘political agencies’ in negotiating and sustaining labour policy 
transitions, thus helping avoid economic reductionism. Moreover, the examination of the 
reconfiguration of state/market revealed state and markets as interconnected rather than distinct 
spheres. The realms of state, market, political and economic systems’ were ‘densely and 
inextricably intertwined’. Logically, therefore, state and market relations come to be shaped by 
politics. These relations thus need to be viewed alternatively as ‘internal and necessary, rather 
than external and contingent’ (Burnham, 1996). These relationships are illustrated through the 
variety of ways in which state/market relations were reconfigured in the three countries.
7:2 Economic internationalisation and the role of state agencies
To understand the process of internationalisation of national economies, it is necessary 
to develop a set of criteria to examine the ‘political’ agencies and mechanisms through which 
these policies are operationalised. The particularity of context is important since states facing 
similar sets of exigencies developed distinct approaches.3 As part of this process, states provided 
the conditions for internationalised economic activity through restructuring so as to ensure the 
patterns of change observed in each country. They also provide the means through which these 
conditions can be shielded from a variety of interest group and social pressures. To be able to 
provide and shield these conditions conjunctly, state institutions themselves had to undergo a 
metamorphosis.
A key feature in the state restructuring process was a re-organisation and re-positioning 
of state institutions. Changes in the remits of agencies, such as the Treasury departments, 
planning and co-ordinating agencies, were particularly noteworthy. Their re-organisation aided 
the centralisation of economic policy formulation, which led to a hollowing out of national 
corporatist frameworks and of collective responsibility (Williamson, ed. 1994). Conventional 
labour market institutions including tripartite agencies were pushed aside through a complicated 
process of reform driven by these re-organised economic policy institutions. New forms of 
contestations involving the conflicting policy orientations of the different agencies emerged.
Through complementary institutional reform, political parties in government refocused 
their traditional approaches and policies. Within the parties in Government, new axes of 
contestation developed around the premier finance and planning agencies, promoting elite group 
decision making. Where governments were comprised of complex coalitions, as in Malaysia and 
Japan, this conflict went into the very heart of the decision making process. In both these
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countries, interest representation through traditional forms of political lobbying, became more 
opaque and complex. The result was that these transformations dislodged the traditional alliances 
between party political institutions and labour-based interest groups. Paradoxically, such 
dislocations also helped shield economic reforms from opposing political and interest group 
pressures. In this manner, economic globalisation not only had implications for traditional 
industrial relations processes but for the democratic process more generally (Offe, 1996).
Nowhere was the globalising thrust of economic restructuring seen more clearly than in 
the state sectors of the economy. In all the state formations studied, state sector restructuring 
aided economic internationalisation by exposure to international competition. State sector 
restructuring took two main forms. The first was privatisation, largely inspired by the goals of 
efficiency and deficit reduction. However, this process was qualified in Malaysia and Japan by 
sentiments associated with economic nationalism. In New Zealand such a sentiment was 
restricted largely to the domain of electoral politics rather than actual policy. Second, state 
sector reforms were directed at reshaping the role of state bodies in co-ordinating market 
relations.
Politics played an important part in the scope and scale of privatisation particularly in 
Malaysia and Japan. On the one hand, privatisation was part of a broader trade liberalisation 
agenda driven by international agencies, such as the World Trade Organisation. On the other, 
the three governments embarked upon privatisation to deal with economic exigencies. 
Moreover, privatisation in the case of Malaysia advanced the political goals o f the Malay state. 
It provided an opportunity to advance the state sponsorship of a Malay national bourgeoisie as 
a counterweight to Malaysian-Chinese capital. However, privatisation in itself did not explain 
the Malay advantage because throughout the 1970s, the Malaysian state had pursued a policy of 
expansion of the state-owned sector to promote Malay participation in the commercial sector. 
More importantly, this transition demonstrated the state’s capacity to subvert economic policies 
for the attainment of political goals. Japan presented more diffused outcomes, in spite of the 
gradual privatisation of the JR, political goals continued to define economic priorities and goals, 
even in the privatised sectors. JR’s privatisation contrasts with that of Nippon Telephone and 
Telegraph (NTT) which faced substantial domestic opposition to its possible take-over by global 
giants. Thus in the case of the developmental and the post-developmental states of Malaysia and 
Japan, neo-liberal types o f reforms in the public sector reinforced the importance of state 
politics. In both cases, policy selections and strategies were politicised. Some on these political
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factors, such as a popular hostility to foreign take-overs, provided useful levers of influence to 
trade unions as well.
A politicised environment also created opportunities for labour, mitigating against the 
decentralising impacts of labour market deregulation. Clearly, the process of privatisation 
substantially weakened unions. Nonetheless, unions in Malaysia and Japan were able to 
consolidate themselves in the privatised corporations. In cases where privatised enterprises 
remained subject to political interventions, labour managed to retain the leverage open to them 
and fared better than their private sector counterparts. In Malaysia and Japan, labour was also 
able to rebuild some of its previous influence as a result of its ability to retain an advantaged 
position in key privatised sectors.
In all the case studies, state sector restructuring was preceded by economic crisis marked 
by increasing national debt, widening budgetary deficits and declining levels of investment, 
clearly evident by the early 1980s in New Zealand and Malaysia (OECD, 1992 and 1993). At 
the same time, the ascendance of the neoliberal orthodoxy within national policy making 
agencies helped dilute the enthusiasm for high levels of state intervention. The subsequent 
restructuring was propelled by a combination of unfavourable external exigencies, domestic 
economic crisis and supportive policy agencies that resulted from the public sector restructuring 
in each o f the case studies, all were factors that amplified the crisis of Keynesian interventionism 
(Held and Mcgrew, 1994; Clarke, 1988). It is relevant to compare how the agencies responsible 
for formulation and implementation of economic policies have evolved in the three cases 
therefore.
Generally, highly specialised and centralised agencies emerged within the state 
bureaucracies. These premier agencies were also vertically integrated into international 
institutions of decision making, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and 
the Asian Development Bank (Tanzer, 1995). In the case of New Zealand and Japan, their 
membership of the OECD and the flow of their nationals between OECD offices and relevant 
policy institutions domestically were equally significant. The vertical integration of policy 
institutions globally and regionally provided the necessary interface between policy institutions 
in diverse settings. The flow of people between relevant international agencies and national 
policy institutions further aided the transmission of a global reform agenda even when the 
national political institutions were not favourably disposed to that agenda, as was the case with 
Japan (Wade, 1996).
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Major realignments in the responsibility and function of state institutions responsible for 
economic policy formulation resulted from these reform agendas. However, in the case of Japan, 
MITI and the Economic Development Committee were exceptions to this trend. These agencies 
had emerged in the early post-war period, explained in terms of the exceptional post-war 
circumstances of Japan and the concentrated economic restructuring programmes that Japan had 
been subject to as a result of US occupation. Such centralised agencies evolved much later in 
Malaysia and New Zealand and their emergence were more closely associated with the 
ascendance of reform orientated governments in the 1980s. Some of the key transformations that 
occurred in the case studies are summarised in the table below.
Table 5:0 Changes in the economic and labour policy environment (early 1970s and mid 
1990s)_____________________________________________ _________________________
Country 1970s 1990s
N e w  Z e a la n d C o l l e c t i v e - c a b i n e t  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  o v e r  
p o l i c y  f o r m u l a t i o n  is  s t r o n g ly  
e m p h a s i s e d .
S t r o n g  s i n g le  p a r ty  c o n s e r v a t iv e  
g o v e r n m e n t s .
T h e  ro l e  o f  t h e  T r e a s u r y ,  F in a n c e  
m i n is t r y ,  S ta t e  S e r v i c e s  C o m m is s io n  
a n d  R e s e r v e  B a n k  in  p o l i c y  
f o r m a t io n  is  e n h a n c e d .
N a t io n a ls  ( c o n s e r v a t i v e s )  r e p la c e  a 
s h o r t  l iv e d  l a b o u r  g o v e r n m e n t  in  
1 9 8 8 . T h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  b o th  l a b o u r  
a n d  n a t io n a l s  r e d u c e d  th ro u g h  
e le c to r a l  r e f o r m s .
M a la y s ia C o r e  C a b in e t  a n d  F in a n c e  M in is t r y  
m a in ly  r e s p o n s ib l e  fo r  e c o n o m ic  
p o l i c y  fo r m a t io n .
C o n s e r v a t iv e  U M N O  h o ld  o n  
g o v e r n m e n t  s t r e n g t h e n e d  a f te r  1 9 7 3 .
T h e  ro l e  o f  M I D I ,  M in is t r y  o f  
F in a n c e  a n d  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r ’s  o f f ic e  
e n h a n c e d  a f te r  t h e  c r i s i s  o f  1 9 8 6  
F u r th e r  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  e c o n o m ic  p o l ic y  
d u r i n g  th e  p r e s e n t  c r i s i s .
T h e  d o m i n a n c e  o f  U M N O  c o m e s  
u n d e r  g r o w in g  c h a l l e n g e
J a p a n M I T I ,  F in a n c e  M in is t r y ,  C a b in e t  
h a v e  s t r o n g  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  d e s ig n  o f  
e c o n o m ic  p o l i c y .
T h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  L D P  G o v e r n m e n t  
d o m i n a t e d  g o v e r n m e n t  th r o u g h o u t  
th e  d e c a d e .
T h e  ro l e  o f  M I T I ,  F in a n c e  M in is t r y ,  
E P A , E c o n o m i c  D e v e lo p m e n t  
C o m m i t t e e ,  a n d  in c r e a s in g ly  B a n k  
o f  J a p a n  in  e c o n o m ic  p o l i c y  is 
g e n e r a l l y  e n h a n c e d .
F u r t h e r  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  p o l i c y  d u r in g  th e  
p r e s e n t  c r i s i s .
T h e  d o m i n a n c e  o f  t h e  L D P  d e c l in e s .  
E le c to r a l  r e f o r m s  l e a d  to  c o a l i t io n  
g o v e r n m e n t s .
There was a general shift away from the collective decision making at cabinet (or its
equivalent) level towards a smaller fraction within cabinet and a small number o f core policy
departments. This core was increasingly dominated by heads of economic planning agencies,
treasuries and finance ministries. They were also more open to influence by international policy
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agencies such as the IMF. There was also an observable reduction in the degree to which 
Cabinets had collective control over economic policy (Jomo, eds, 1999; Grant, 1996; Kelsey, 
1995). By the mid-1990s, in both Malaysia and Japan, co-ordination and regulation functions 
had become much more centralised, aiding the developmental nature of these ‘competition 
states’. By competition states, I refer to a general orientation to the pursuit of ‘international 
competitiveness of industry in these countries. As a result, it became possible to influence labour 
policy through planning agencies, ministries of trade and economic affairs in ways that were not 
possible in the 1970s. The key impact of the transitions noted above was that they reinforced 
the ‘technocrats’ influence over the policy process. In the 1990s, the larger political parties 
(UMNO, Labour and National in New Zealand, LDP) in all the three countries became more 
dependent upon the policy institutions of the state for framing their policy outlook. This enabled 
policy institutions to limit the influence of organised labour over the political decision making 
process. In this manner, the analysis presented above provides an interesting standpoint from 
which to assess some of the underlying generative mechanisms of large scale changes in the area 
of labour regulation in the present period. The centralisation of control over the policy process 
and a general weakening of the hold of single political parties over the government machinery 
occurred over a period in which these economies experienced increased economic openness. 
Combined, these factors aided the internationalisation of the three economies.
These transitions also enabled economic policy agencies to transform the narrow 
corporatist devices to support the broader developmental objectives (Scholte, 1997). By situating 
national developmental goals in relation to labour during periods of structural transformation, 
the underlying rationale and ideologies that drove state agencies in one or another direction is 
better understood. National developmental visions such as Japan’s income doubling goal of the 
1960s or Malaysia’s 2020 vision presented favourable glosses over systematic programmes of 
labour market deregulation. The ‘growth discourse’ in New Zealand served a similar purpose.
Without understanding the dynamic and contested nature of changes, it would be difficult 
to understand the particular ways in which they affected labour regulation. For example, 
arguments about state sector inefficiencies during periods of economic crisis were skilfully 
deployed to achieve state sector reforms. These arguments helped mollify powerful public sector 
unions. They often had little to do with efficiency gains. Moreover, state sector reforms generally 
were presented in a manner that disconnected them from the wider economic restructuring 
programmes. Different sets of reforms presented themselves as separate, disconnected and
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autonomous processes. This served to similarly fragment public debates and opposition about 
the reforms.
The three states found different levers within the neoliberal reform agenda through which
to placate public groups. While the Fourth Labour Government in New Zealand presented itself
as a radical reformer addressing state sector inefficiencies, the new Japanese Government
assumed the mantle of an anti-corruption reformer. The Malaysian state, on the other hand, used
state sector reforms to promote ethnic equity. In each case such posturing served to cloud the
public debate about the broader economic restructuring agenda. Trade union respondents
displayed a serious lack of understanding of the interconnectedness between populist state sector
reforms and broader labour market reforms. Trade union literature did not make the crucial
connections between the emerging trend of centralised economic policy formulation process,
anti-trade union labour market reforms and financial sector liberalisation. And yet, they were
interconnected parts of an ideologically based and politically-led transformation agenda pursued
by developmental and rampant neoliberal states alike.
One crucial thrust of economic policy shift during this period was the attempt to provide
greater stability in market relations. A consistent policy framework helped reduce fluctuations
derived from economic policy oscillation. The stabilisation of interest rates, inflation, and
exchange rates depended to a large extent upon the reduction of the rentier type influences of
organised labour. This was part of the approach by the post-1985 Malaysian, post-1984 New
Zealand and post-1990s Japanese states. Drache ( 1996) observed
that the new role for the state is to maintain a trade friendly environment and accept its 
obligations to open national markets regardless of the adjustment costs. This is the 
underlying essence of free trade ... It is a covenant between governments and markets 
that the logic of efficiency has to determine the allocation of activity among all trading 
nations (quoted in Boyer and Drache eds., 1996:49).
Such a covenant implied transformations in state institutions to compensate for the absence of 
transnational political structures to secure inter-state economic regulation. By themselves 
multilateral institutions could not enforce compliance within national economies; nor could they 
regulate and discipline labour or guarantee property rights and relations. The centralisation of 
influence over economic policy at the national level redressed this partly. This was characterised 
by the expanded policy formulation roles of the finance and treasury agencies in Malaysia, New 
Zealand and Japan as well as expanded roles for specialised agencies such as MITI in Japan and 
the State Services Commission in New Zealand. Williamson (1994: 189) and Schor and You eds.
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(1995) stressed the need to understand the varied ways in which economic and political actors 
have combined to collectively shape economic outcomes. Nonetheless, such convergence of 
practice did not erase the domestic room for manoeuvre. It helped to sustain a separation of the 
field of economics from politics within the public sphere, however.
A separation of the economic and the political spheres helped legitimate arguments about 
a narrowed room for manoeuvre on the part of political policy makers across the studies. The 
argument was that the state was unable to intervene to reconstruct corporatist practices, since the 
momentum for reform was outside state control. The outcome of this was the denial of political 
influence to labour. The separation was also legitimated by references to scientific calculations 
that highlighted the ‘distortionary’ impact of unions upon industry and international 
competitiveness.
The process of economic liberalisation is affected by domestic political considerations. 
In the case o f Japan, for example, there were persistent efforts to limit the dislocating impacts 
of economic liberalisation in strategic sectors and in industries with strong political lobbies. 
Similarly, the dislocational impacts of economic reforms in terms of ethnic balances triggered 
state interventions and regulation in Malaysia. These seemingly contradictory tendencies 
illustrate the limits to the globalisation thesis and present its contradictory nature (Lee, 1996). 
Overall, the case studies do not provide compelling evidence in support of the thesis that 
economic globalisation had unilinear liberalising impacts upon national markets. Neither do they 
provide evidence that neo-liberal reforms are placed beyond political contest or are irreversible. 
This was sharply demonstrated in the case of New Zealand. Following the 1996 elections under 
the new proportional representation system, the junior coalition partner in the National-led 
government, New Zealand First Party secured a significant concession to enhance the flexibility 
of New Zealand’s Reserve Bank by increasing the upper inflation level limit from 2 to 3 percent. 
It also proposed a compulsory pensions scheme, reintroducing a nationally legislated business 
cost that the post-1988 reforms had ended (The Economist. 14/12/96: 78). These propositions 
re-opened the technical arguments that underpinned its economic reform in the 1980s to political 
scrutiny.
There was limited opposition to the reform agenda. In both Malaysia and Japan, 
characterised by their dominant single party governments, debate was restrained because of a 
lack of consensus within trade unions and interest groups allied with labour. It was clear that 
unions in these states lacked a coherent view of the overall reform agenda, particularly as
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reforms were introduced in a piece-meal fashion and often lacked coherence. But the 
reconfiguration of state/market relations did not follow a unilinear path. A general shift from 
import substitution (ISI) to export orientation for example was gradual. These shifts in economic 
orientation and the corresponding state strategies are summarised below.
Table 6:0 Re-configuring state/market relations in the 1960s and 1990s
Country 1960s 1990s
N e w  Z e a l a n d C e n t r a l i s e d  im p o r t - s u b s t i t u t i o n  
in d u s t r i a l i s a t io n ,  h ig h  d e g r e e  o f  
i n t e r v e n t io n  in  p r im a r y  e x p o r t  s e c to r s
L ib e r a l i s e d  m a r k e t ,  r e je c t i o n  o f  I S I ,  
m in im a l  s t a t e  r e g u la t io n  a n d  in t e r v e n t io n ,  
m in im a l  p o l i t i c a l  r e g u la t io n
M a l a y s i a A  g e n e r a l  IS I  o r i e n t a t i o n ,  c e n t r a l  p la n n in g ,  
h ig h  d e g r e e  o f  i n t e r v e n t io n  a n d  re g u la t io n  
in  p r im a r y  e x p o r t  s e c to r s ,  p o l i t i c i s e d  t a r i f f  
a n d  q u o ta  p r o t e c t io n s
E O I ,  c e n t r a l i s e d  p l a n n in g  r e ta i n e d ,  
r e d u c e d  l e v e ls  o f  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  a n d  
s e l e c t i v e  d e r e g u la t i o n  in  e x p o r t  a n d  
f i n a n c e  s e c to r s
J a p a n A  s t r o n g  m ix  o f  IS I  a n d  E O I ,  h ig h  d e g r e e  
o f  r e g u la t io n  a n d  c o - o r d i n a t i o n ,  m o d e ra te  
in te r v e n t io n
R e d u c e d  l e v e l  o f  r e g u la t io n  a n d  c o ­
o r d i n a t i o n ,  r e d u c e d  in t e r v e n t i o n ,  s t r a te g ic  
l i b e r a l i s a t i o n .
It was evident that the transitions in state/market relations on labour regulation were also 
associated with contrasting sets of policy challenges. However, the approaches and the specific 
ways in which such contradictory outcomes have been attained were dramatically different.
At a general level, New Zealand provided one extreme case of radical restructuring, 
Japan was an example of a modest and strategically selective restructuring programme, while 
Malaysia occupied the middle position; although this was likely to change given the scale of its 
present economic crisis. Both the pace and direction of restructuring were driven by different 
sets of national and international factors.4 Overall, the case studies exemplify three modalities 
of economic internationalisation, illuminating the complicated relationships between modes of 
labour regulation, economic policies and patterns of internationalisation. At the same time, 
this discussion o f the general tendencies support the argument that ‘considerations of 
international competitiveness have influenced the formulation of national employment and 
labour policies’ (Lee, 1996:495) in a manner that favoured international capital. However, this 
does not make international capital the only, or even the main lever for domestic policy change 
(Holloway, 1994 and 1995). While the pace of liberalisation has differed, in all these countries 
there has been a general reduction in the scope of state interventions in the economy.
The country studies noted a clear, but gradual displacement of the influence of collective 
labour market institutions in the economic policy management frameworks. This displacement 
was both an outcome and a source of liberalisation, one of the key elements of the
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reconfiguration of state/market relations. The labour market outcomes of liberalisation are 
detailed in the section that follows.
7:3 Labour market consequences of accelerated internationalisation
The country studies present economic internationalisation during the 1980s as a process 
marked by increased economic openness, financial sector liberalisation, constrained state 
intervention and labour market deregulation. Accelerated economic internationalisation has been 
associated with policies aimed at trade liberalisation and labour market deregulation (see Tables 
2, 3 and 4). The evidence presented raises questions about the Hirst and Thomson’s (1996a and 
b) thesis as well as showing the faulty foundations of the position advanced by Ruigrok and 
Tulder (1995). MNE’s presence in national economies were boosted as a result of increasing 
openness of all economies, the unwinding of protective barriers, liberalisation of capital and 
labour markets, and the pursuance of market friendly developmental strategies more generally. 
All the cases provided compelling evidence of these trends, although these trends were most 
marked in the case of New Zealand.
While the extent of economic internationalisation differed across the studies, an overall 
orientation towards economic openness was persistent, signalling a favourable policy orientation 
towards both national and multinational capital. However, there were important differences in 
the outcomes in each country. These differentiations occurred along regional, industrial, sectoral 
and other lines; although they were less important in the finance sectors in comparison with the 
manufacturing sectors. These outcomes were most significantly expressed through the labour 
markets. A key feature of economic openness was its non-discriminatory emphasis. As a result, 
the distinction between national and state embedded capital and private international capital 
became less relevant as the policy environment changed. Subsequently, multinational take-overs 
through privatisations became widespread. However, in spite of the non-discriminatory policy 
reforms, the extent of such take-overs were varied. For example, in the developmental states of 
Japan and Malaysia, there were state directed transfers of state sector enterprises. In Malaysia, 
such interventions went one step further. The Malaysian state consciously embarked upon a 
policy of supporting the expansion of a Malay bourgeoisie through the privatisation process. In 
contrast, the New Zealand state left the deregulated markets much more independent, although 
a very tight control on inflation was retained via an autonomous Reserve Bank. The result was 
that MNE take-overs were more frequent in New Zealand, than the overtly ‘politically’
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controlled economies of Malaysia and Japan.
Clearly, not all interventions affected labour regulation. Indeed, economic restructuring 
did not always correlate with immediate labour market reforms. This is best illustrated in the 
case of New Zealand where the Fourth Labour Government embarked upon sweeping 
liberalisation of the financial sector during its first term in office. Labour market reforms aimed 
at decollectivising organised labour were only attempted by the subsequent National 
government. This contrasts with the experiences of Japan and Malaysia where developmental 
states invested heavily in the political regulation of labour, and shaping a policy of self-discipline 
on the part of labour that aided the national goals promoted by the developmental states and 
derived corporatist rewards in return (Johnson, 1995: 72-93).
There was unevenness in the impact of accelerated economic internationalisation upon 
labour regulation. Economic internationalisation brought into sharp relief the differences along 
spatial, sectoral as well as regional lines. Sharp differences in labour regulation between 
enterprises were a noteworthy feature in all the case studies, though most clearly illustrated in 
the case o f Japan (Shirai, eds, 1983). This can be explained by reference to size of the larger 
enterprises in Japan, with their complex networks of inter-firm linkages and the regulation of 
such networks by the state ( Kuwahara, 1989; Chalmers, 1989). The association between intra­
firm labour market segmentation, labour regulation and economic internationalisation was less 
clear. Notable differentiations also existed between formal and informal labour markets. While 
the distinction between state regulated and non-regulated sectors in the studies became less 
relevant over the past two decades, differentiations along the above lines became more marked. 
Economic internationalisation presented itself in the form of homogenising influences in other 
sectors, most clearly in the form of financial sector deregulation. However, it was only in 1997, 
that Japan initiated financial sector reforms on the scale reaching that of New Zealand in the 
1980s. This resulted from a combination of domestic pressures against the rentier operations of 
financial conglomerates within Japan and pressures by global (mainly US) capital markets. 
Overall, economic internationalisation had the effect of widening differentials between different 
segments o f labour markets.
The importance of the financial sectors in this process has two dimensions to it. Firstly, 
it raises issues about states’ roles in economic policy management (Wade, 1996). Moreover, the 
financial sector is also a growing employment sector in all the three economies (World Bank,
1995b: 72-81). Thus changes in wages, working conditions and the position of unions within this
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strategically important sector appears to have wide reverberations. In Japan, for example, only 
a few months after the announcement of the ‘big bang’ package of financial sectors reforms, 
wage differentials between the finance sector and other sectors had begun to widen. This has 
pressured changes in the annual ‘shunto’ format through which wage improvements are secured 
(Financial Times. 1/4/97:6). Given that co-ordinated wage bargaining by numerous enterprise- 
based unions had the effect of mitigating the weakness associated with size, any reform of the 
‘shunto’ system will almost certainly further weaken the wage bargaining position of individual 
unions and widen the disparities between different economic sectors. These tendencies were also 
apparent in Malaysia where the banking sector union secured gains over wage and conditions 
of employment, in excess of national averages (Bruno, 1997, interview). In both these cases, the 
liberalisation of this vital sector appeared to trigger and indeed depend upon significant changes 
in labour relations.
Two broad approaches to bringing about economic internationalisation in national 
settings are observed from this study. First is the hyper-liberal approach to deregulation evident 
in New Zealand, which permeated all factor markets. Because restructuring affected industrial 
development across all sectors, efficiency, competitiveness and similar criteria induced 
significant adjustments in wages and employment. Restructuring emerged within the deregulated 
framework characterised by increased autonomy of the reserve bank, and the transfer of anti- 
inflationary responsibilities to ‘non-political’ policy institutions. This restructuring had variable 
impacts upon different segments of the labour markets in each of the countries.
New Zealand’s hyper-liberal approach contrasted with relatively high levels of state co­
ordination that were still prevalent at the end of 1996 in the other two economies. The Malaysian 
state achieved a relatively high degree of autonomy over the economic policy regime while 
retaining relatively high levels of intervention (Cho, 1990). Moreover, Japan maintained a more 
co-ordinated economic and industrial development framework while gradually reducing the scale 
of direct political interventions (Tabb, 1995). This suggests a more managed approach to 
economic internationalisation. In these two cases, however, this more gradual approach had 
reached a crossroad by mid-1996 when the ‘Big Bang’ package was announced by the new 
government in Japan at the end of 1996 (Financial Times. 1/4/97:6). Thus, in the approach to 
restructuring a substantial variation in the degree and level of state co-ordination and 
intervention was evident in these three studies.
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Some of the key labour market transitions associated with economic internationalisation 
are summarised below.
Table 7:0 Key outcomes of economic internationalisation in labour markets
Country 1960s 1990s
N e w  Z e a l a n d K e y  in d u s tr ia l  s e c to r s  a r e  s t a t e  
c o n t r o l l e d  a n d  r e g u la te d .
C o r p o r a t i s t  l a b o u r  r e la t io n s  w e r e  w e ll  
e n t r e n c h e d .
P o l i t i c a l  i n s t i tu t io n s  c o m m i t t e d  to  
c o r p o r a t i s t  a r r a n g e m e n ts .
F u l l  e m p lo y m e n t  a n d  a  ‘m o d e l ’ 
w e l f a r e  s ta te  s e r v e  t o  p r e s e r v e  
c o r p o r a t i s t  a r r a n g e m e n ts .
N e a r  c o m p l e t e  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i s a t i o n .  
C o r p o r a t i s t  a p p r o a c h  r e p la c e d  b y  
m a r k e t  b a s e d  re g u la t io n  
D e r e g u l a t i o n  le a d s  t o  c o l l a p s e  o f  
u n io n  c o v e r a g e ,  e x p a n s io n  in  
‘ f l e x i b l e ’ a n d  o t h e r  fo r m s  o f  
v u l n e r a b l e  l a b o u r  p r a c t ic e s .
U n i o n s  o v e r w h e lm e d  b y  th e  p a c e  
a n d  s c o p e  o f  r e s t r u c tu r in g  
O n  t h e  e c o n o m ic  f r o n t,  r e s t r u c tu r in g  
l e a d s  t o  h i g h e r  le v e ls  o f  e c o n o m ic  
g r o w th ,  d e c r e a s e  in  o p e n  
u n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  im p r o v e d  p u b l i c  
f i n a n c e s .
L a b o u r  m a r k e t s  b e c o m e  m o r e  
s e g m e n t e d  a n d  l a b o u r  o r g a n is a t io n s  
b e c o m e  m o r e  f r a g m e n te d .
O r g a n i s e d  l a b o u r 's  in f lu e n c e  o v e r  
p o l i c y  d im in i s h e d .
M a l a y s i a K e y  e c o n o m ic  s e c to r s  a r e  s t a t e  
c o n t r o l l e d  a n d  r e g u la te d .
A  p l u r a l i s t  l a b o u r  r e g u la t io n  
f r a m e w o r k  is  k e p t  in  p l a c e  u n t i l  1 9 7 3 . 
T r a d e  u n io n s  g e n e r a l ly  o r g a n i s e  
t h e m s e lv e s  a lo n g  in d u s tr i a l  l i n e s .  T h e  
g e n e r a l  u n io n s  h a d  b e e n  b r o k e n  u p  b y  
th e  e a r l y  19 6 0 s .
I n c r e a s in g  o p e n  p o v e r ty  a n d  e c o n o m ic  
m a r g in a l i s a t i o n  o f  ru r a l  a n d  n o n -  
fo r m a l  e c o n o m ic  s e c to r  p o p u la t i o n  
e m e r g e s  a s  a  s o c ia l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e .
T a r g e t e d  F D I  in  e x p o r t  s e c to r s ,  p a c e  
o f  d e r e g u l a t i o n  in c re a s e s  
H ig h  l e v e l  o f  e c o n o m ic  g r o w th  
b e t w e e n  1 9 8 7  a n d  1 9 9 3 , n e a r  fu l l  
e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  a c u te  la b o u r  
s h o r t a g e s  d e v e lo p  a s  w e l l .  A  n e w  
c y c l e  o f  c r i s i s  e m e r g e s  t o w a r d s  th e  
e n d  o f  1 9 9 5 .
L a b o u r  m a r k e t  s e g m e n ta t io n  w o r s e n s  
( m i g r a n t  a n d  n o n - c o r e  w o r k e r s  
c o m p r i s e  m a jo r i t y  o f  n e w  
e m p l o y e e s ) .  M ig r a n t  a n d  n o n - c o r e  
e m p l o y e e s  b e a r  th e  b r u n t  o f  th e  
e c o n o m ic  d o w n tu r n  o f  t h e  m id  
1 9 9 0 s .
T r a d e  u n i o n s  b e c o m e  e x t r e m e ly  
f r a g m e n t e d  in te r n a l ly  a n d  i s o la t e d  
f r o m  t h e  p o l i c y  p ro c e s s .
T h e  d e c l i n e  o f  ‘s ta te  a s  a  m o d e l  
e m p l o y e r ’.
J a p a n S ta t e  c o - o r d in a t e s  s e le c t iv e  
in t e r n a t io n a l i s a t i o n  o f  i n d u s t r y  u n t i l  
e a r ly  1 9 7 0 s , o th e r w is e  k e y  s e c to r s  a r e  
h ig h ly  r e g u la te d .
T h e  d i s s o lu t io n  o f  g e n e r a l  a n d  la rg e  
i n d u s t r y  u n io n s  w a s  g e n e r a l l y  
s u c c e s s f u l .  E n te r p r i s e  u n io n i s m  
b e c a m e  th e  d o m in a n t  m o d e  o f  l a b o u r  
o r g a n is a t io n .
F u l l  e m p lo y m e n t  a n d  d e v e lo p m e n ta l  
g o a l s  u s e d  e f f e c t iv e ly  to  r e d u c e  th e  
i n f l u e n c e  o f  ra d ic a l  f r a g m e n t s  o f  
o r g a n is e d  la b o u r .
S ta te  s e l e c t i o n  o f  s t r a te g ic  in d u s t r i e s  
c o n t i n u e d ,  p a c e  o f  l ib e r a l i s a t i o n  
in c r e a s e d  a f te r  th e  1 9 9 0  s lo w d o w n .  
S ta t e  s e c t o r  e m p lo y m e n t  s lo w s  
d o w n .  M a j o r  p r iv a t i s a t i o n s  u s e d  to  
w e a k e n  r e m a i n in g  in d u s tr ia l  u n io n s .  
I n c r e a s e d  f lo w  o f  S M E ’s  a b r o a d .  
E n te r p r i s e - b a s e d  u n io n s  w e ll  
e s t a b l i s h e d  a n d  th e y  d e v e lo p  n e w  
p o l i t i c a l  a l l i a n c e s .
S e g m e n t a t i o n  in  l a b o u r  m a r k e t s  
w o r s e n s .  T h e  p e r ip h e r a l  s e c to r s  b e a r  
b r u n t  o f  a d ju s tm e n t .  C o s ts  o f  
a d j u s t m e n t  a r e  p a s s e d  d o w n  th e  
s u p p l i e r  n e tw o r k s .
E c o n o m y  b e c o m e s  m o r e  o p e n ,  b u t  
o p e n  a n d  h id d e n  u n e m p lo y m e n t  
i n c r e a s e s  a s  w e l l .
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Overall, a shift towards full liberalisation was initiated in each country in the 1980s, 
although the pace of transformations differed sharply. Ostensibly, a shift in economic policy 
regimes was triggered in each case by a perception of economic crisis. Thus economic 
restructuring aimed to restore conditions favourable to growth. In either case, these policies 
aimed to create employment reduce deficits, control inflation and boost domestic and foreign 
investment. These factors, in each of the case studies were legitimated as enhancing international 
competitiveness.5 This discussion has shown that these macroeconomic goals had important 
implications for labour regulation. It was also clear that the present economic crisis in both Japan 
and Malaysia had provided a further impetus to economic internationalisation.
There was some evidence that internationalisation of trade was associated with an 
increase in the vulnerability of organised labour. A key goal of restructuring in the case studies 
was to enhance the export orientation of the overall economy. However, it should be noted that 
historically, the primary sectors in Malaysia and New Zealand had been export oriented, 
although both had depended upon preferential international markets. While an export orientation 
implied deeper integration into the global economy, this integration was not necessarily 
associated with a free trading structure. Protected trade in the traditional export sectors had 
implications for costs of production, affecting labour policies. A transition to a freer trading 
environment in these traditional export sectors affected the price of labour, reflecting lower 
prices for primary commodities in the ‘free’ global markets. This downward adjustment 
depended upon a prior decollectivisation of labour organisations and a rupturing of the 
corporatist alliances in these sectors. The demise of the large agricultural union in Malaysia and 
the farming sector interest group lobbies in New Zealand (Kelsey, 1995: 95-97) were associated 
with this globally induced transition.
In Japan, export orientation was based on strong supplier networks, protection in 
domestic markets and access to subsidised capital. It was capital, rather than labour, that were 
most directly affected by the realignment of the Japanese economy. Capital was thus able to 
influence the pace of internationalisation. A strong network of capital ensured that agricultural, 
finance and industrial sectors were realigned in a comprehensive manner. Subsequently, a 
calculated strategy of internationalisation ensured that labour’s alliances with capital were 
reconstituted on a regional scale.
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A snapshot of the overall trend in export orientation is presented in the table below.
Table 8:0 Export Orientation
Country Exports/GDP (1975) (%) Exports/GDP (1995) (%)
New Zealand 19.80 24.20
Malaysia 43.75 75.80
Japan 12.20 22.82 (1992)
(Source: New Zealand, Key Statistics, 1997, World Bank, 1996a.)
Exports expressed as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) demonstrate the 
level of dependence upon international markets. Because the proportions have increased in each 
case, they support that thesis that economic restructuring has facilitated, rather than retarded the 
internationalisation of these economies. It is therefore instructive to examine the situation of 
labour in the export sectors where the yardsticks of international competitiveness apply more 
closely. By focussing on labour regulation, it became clear that export competitiveness was 
derived not solely from traditional neo-classical indices of labour, that is, wage and labour 
productivity. Competitiveness relied upon an armoury of state support for export sectors. It is 
thus within the framework of state support that labour policies specific to internationalising 
industries were articulated. The most visible tendency observed from the study is that policies 
that supported competitiveness, or at least were presented as doing so, also exposed labour costs 
to international yardsticks of competitiveness. Thus corporatist practices, collective wage 
determination, minimum wage protection and other social protections could be presented not 
only as anti- competitive, but also as harming national interests. The pursuit of ‘competitiveness’ 
assisted in securing labour’s discipline and subservience.
It was also significant that in both hyper-liberal New Zealand and moderate Japan that 
internationalisation did not wipe out the relative importance of the national market. In both 
countries the internationalisation ratio has remained below 30 percent. Thus the argument that 
‘the growing internationalisation of the economy is eroding one of the basic foundations of the 
nation-state, i.e. the national market’ (quoted in Boyer and Drache eds. 1996:67) is shown to be 
problematic.
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Economie policies aimed at promoting competitiveness of industry impacted upon 
wages, labour productivity and labour organisations in variable ways. In Malaysia, tax breaks 
and related measures for pioneer export industries went hand in hand with protection of these 
industries in the form of anti-union measures. In Japan, besides extensive capital subsidies, the 
protection in domestic markets for the export industries remained strong. A hierarchy of supplier 
networks where trade union encroachment was limited enabled the sustenance of a relatively 
high wage and permanent employment structure in the internationally trading sectors. This gave 
Japanese corporations a unique comparative advantage; they did not have to rely on the direct 
control and subversion of organised labour.
The New Zealand’s case was even more dramatic. Because of the historical 
embededdness of social corporatism, internationalisation strategies associated with economic 
restructuring relied very heavily upon labour market reforms. As indicated earlier, economic 
globalisation not only had serious implications for organised labour, but also for the New 
Zealand’s democratic political framework. Clearly, the association between democratic political 
processes, economic restructuring and changes in the regulatory environment for labour is a 
central to explaining the process of change.
State interventions aimed at boosting competitiveness invariably had implications for 
labour. However, the relationships between labour and export-led growth were uneven across 
the case studies. This reflected the wide variations in these relationships that existed within the 
Asia/Pacific region. This variance is exemplified by New Zealand’s post-1984 
internationalisation, which proceeded within a framework of declining social protectionism, 
displacement of corporatism and breathtaking market-friendly legislative reforms. In Japan, the 
core of organised labour in the internationalised sectors enhanced their position, even during the 
recent recession. In Malaysia export-orientated industrialisation proceeded from a base of prior 
exclusion of collective labour associations. The implication is that labour policy and state 
regulation of labour should be viewed in conjunction with the overall economic policy 
framework of each country, and not assessed separately.
Moreover, differentiation in the pace of internationalisation was also associated with 
changes in the approaches to labour regulation and varying role o f  change agencies. Variable 
domestic power configurations affected the leverage of labour over economic policy. Overall, 
however, reconfiguration of state/market relations is associated with a decline in the political 
significance of labour associations. Any assessment of the shifts and re-orientation in the
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dominant economic policy approaches needs to factor in the changing circumstances of labour. 
To explain the variable outcomes in these states, it is thus important to look at how political 
agencies negotiated the selection of reform strategies. Across the case studies, it was clear that 
the ability for labour to preserve advantages that had evolved during an era of protection had 
waned, the corporatist relations of the past were transformed and as market considerations 
increasingly shaped labour market outcomes. This change was also associated with the growing 
assertiveness of interest groups, such as the Business Roundtable in the case of New Zealand, 
and employer associations in both Malaysia and Japan. So while the policy influence of 
organised labour declined, business agencies prospered. Economic globalisation clearly had far 
reaching and mainly negative consequences for organised labour. However, globalisation was 
not premised on a prior weakening of labour generally as the New Zealand case illustrated. This 
is a puzzle. Arguably, therefore, these declining fortunes of organised labour, on the one hand, 
and the sustained currency of policies engendering economic internationalisation, on the other, 
appears as a problem from these case studies.
7:4 Drawing out the implications of economic internationalisation
Overall, the case studies have shown that external trade re-orientation and reform 
favoured export sectors at the expense of the domestic orientated sectors. This transition was not 
merely an economic policy one. They were underwritten by a number of changes in the area of 
labour regulatory framework. There was an ambivalence and ad hoc aspect to these policies, 
which made it very difficult for labour to respond in a strategic way. At one level, there had been 
extensive debate about these policy directions, particularly in international agencies. At another 
level, policy-makers were much less clear about their initiatives. Indeed, New Zealand’s radical 
reformer, the Labour finance Minister, Roger Douglas, commented that his government neither 
had a full idea of the restructuring programme, nor any firm idea about its sequencing. Many of 
the policy reforms were chanced upon. In such circumstances, it was thus clearly difficult for 
labour to respond to a nebulous reform agenda, as was the case with the 1984 to 1988 New 
Zealand government reforms. Often also unions were locked into quite specific and discrete 
struggles with the state, such as opposition to privatisation and thus failed to see the wider 
reform context. This was evident with both RENGO and the MTUC in the 1980s. These national 
union centres had wasted a lot of political capital in such specific disputes, affecting their ability 
to secure broader support and alliances in opposition to the larger reform agenda. Moreover, the
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reforms themselves often triggered harsh local and internal disputes within the union movement.
Thus, labour’s responses to national economic restructuring, were diverse and uneven. 
These responses took particular national forms, such as the impacts of contingent bureaucratic 
conservatism on part of union officials in New Zealand (Roper, 1996), state repression in 
Malaysia (Dass, 1991) or labour’s subservience to state institutions in Japan (Price, 1997). 
Sectoral, enterprise and even regional demarcations became important in explaining labours 
reactions (or lack of it) to the broad economic changes noted above. Rapid restructuring 
accelerated these tendencies and often forced labour on to a defensive terrain. Some of these 
responses were also direct outcomes of the institutional reforms in the industrial relations 
envirqnment.
The analysis of economic reform and accelerated economic internationalisation 
highlighted the increased importance of industrial relations regimes in the economic policy 
discourse. Labour market strategies were presented as a central pillar of the reform agendas (Lee, 
1996;World Bank, 1996b). A deregulated industrial relations framework that emphasised 
individual and enterprise-based settlement came to be associated with post-1988 New Zealand 
and with Japan in the post-1973 period. Such policies were presented as central to economic 
growth, reflecting a broader trend across the Asia-Pacific region (World Bank, 1996a and 
1996c). The link between labour market processes within the institutional remit of industrial 
relations and economic growth was an uneasy one. The World Bank’s attempt to locate the 
reasons for economic growth disregarded the political contexts in which industrial relations 
policy choices were articulated. Instead, the evidence of the study underlines the importance of 
examining these processes within a political framework centred on the central dynamic of 
labour-management relations. These factors were important to explaining the success of 
neoliberal reforms by reference to its industrial relations framework.
It is equally important to disaggregate the varied patterns evident in the labour relations 
regimes in each country. In the case of Japan and Malaysia, sectoral and regional differentiation 
continued to be significant. For example, a slow improvement in wages and working conditions 
in the garments sector in Malaysia can be attributed to competition rather than collective 
bargaining (Rasiah, 1995a: 27-9). Chalmers (1989) observed how power relations were central 
to the relatively stable employment in Japan’s core employment sectors. These differentiations 
help contextualise industrial relations processes in relation to the whole economy. Such 
differentiation demystifies a neo-liberal view that national policy transformations can have
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homogenous impacts across economic sectors. Moreover, in both Japan and Malaysia, the 
dominant industrial relations systems and practices rested upon formal and informal agreements 
between employers, unions and state agencies that had evolved over a long historical time frame.
Such agreements defined the parameters for collective and individual action resulting in 
routinised organisation. Partly, as a result, both Japan and Malaysia were able to avoid sharp 
ruptures in the industrial relations regime during periods of radical economic restructuring. 
However, this was not the case in New Zealand, where party political differentiation influenced 
debate and policy. The political competition between the National Party and the Labour Party 
had resulted in changes to the labour relations regimes. While a fragment from the Fourth Labour 
Government articulated a radical liberalisation agenda, it was far more restrained in the area 
of labour market deregulation. By the time the National Party promoted a radical liberalisation 
agenda, labour organisation and indeed the electorate had tacitly accepted anti-labour reforms 
as a consequence of a regime change.
Significantly, while the overall variances in the legislative environment of labour 
regulation were marked, a number of continuities were notable.6 What is common to these 
legislative programmes, however, is the persistent move towards greater labour market 
deregulation. Ostensibly, labour market reforms sought to reduce the interventionist power of 
organised labour. Additionally, governments sought to realign wage fixation to enterprise 
performance, thus ensuring that enterprises could readily respond to international exigencies. In 
the past, a continued heavy presence of the state in direct economic production had retarded this 
potential and distorted wage outcomes given strong union organisation in the public sectors. 
Moreover, preferential trade, domestic support and subsidisation also created mismatches 
between wage and competitiveness and broadened the scope for political regulation. Labour 
market reforms, both of a legislative variety as experienced in New Zealand, or the more tacit 
and subtler forms, that occurred in Malaysia and Japan, sought to minimise the scope for 
political regulation. Clearly, this reduction in the scope for political regulation rested upon self­
restrictions imposed through the economic role of state agencies.
One of the pillars of industrial relations reform in the neo-liberal ideological framework 
was the assumption of a correlation between international competitiveness and decentralised 
collective bargaining (ILO, 1996). This framework also associated strong trade unionism with 
the persistence of workplace inefficiencies. Thus labour market reforms sought to fragment and 
decentralise bargaining levels. In the case of New Zealand, the mechanism for achieving this
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objective was the individual employment contract. In Malaysia, there was a more gradual move 
to transform the general unions in the late colonial era into industrial unions during the ISI phase 
and then to enterprise unions in the EOI phase, after 1970. Significantly, the government chose 
to keep unions out of the international sectors by according the ‘pioneer status’ to the new 
growth sectors. Japanese labour conventions and laws in the post-war period also encouraged 
the rapid dissolution of emerging general and industrial workers associations and their 
replacement by enterprise unions. It was clear that bargaining was restricted in Malaysia’s large 
immigrant labour-dominated sectors and in much of the non-core employment sectors in Japan. 
Moreover, the shift from an industrial to enterprise based system in Malaysia between 1960s and 
the early 1970s coincided with the rise to power of a new political elite that was more ethno- 
nationalist and less committed to pluralist politics. The transition in Japan was similarly 
associated with the fracturing of the socialist challenge in the 1950s. Interestingly, the Fourth 
Labour Government in New Zealand, under whose tutelage economic restructuring commenced 
supported the emergence and consolidation of larger trade unions units - with a minimum legal 
membership requirement of 1000. This reasonably progressive trade union legislation was 
repealed completely only one year later with the ascendance to power of the National 
Government. Overall, these reflected shifts in political orientation of the government of the day.
Industrial relations policy shifts promoted decollectivised bargaining while minimising 
the political fallout of such a move. The latter took various forms. In New Zealand, an expansion 
of the field of individual rights not only through the ECA but other measures such as its Bill of 
Rights amplified these contradictory aims. The Japanese and Malaysian governments’ promoted 
decollectivisation and social corporatism conjunctly, but by restricting the scope for corporatism, 
they aimed to confine the agenda over which labour would be consulted. These changes were 
not insignificant for the field of democratic politics as well. A proliferation of individual rights 
and carefully confined spaces for labour’s incorporation had the effect of dislodging labour from 
spaces that it could use to articulate opposition to new developmental agendas.
Economic restructuring in each of the case studies was associated with the reform of 
labour laws, although the direct association between the two was not universal. In New Zealand, 
the infamous Employment Contracts Act was introduced by the National Government in 1988. 
Decollectivisation o f labour affected workers ability to use the workplace as a site for collective 
contestation not only with reference to the more traditional trade union agendas, but also in
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support of the anti-reform agitation. A similar goal was achieved in the case of Malaysia 
through its harsh emergency laws. Its Internal Security Act was periodically deployed during the 
1980's to both subvert labour’s challenges to the restructuring agendas and to demonstrate the 
anti-working class credentials of the Malay leadership. Moreover, the economic reform agenda 
was supported through non-legislative devices such as the deployment of ethnically-decisive 
strategies to fragment workplace opposition, splintering the national trade union centre, and 
promoting enterprise unionism through securing allegiances of in-house unions. Thus, “unlike 
the ‘quasi-corporatism’ of the early 1970s, official labour policy since the 1980s has deliberately 
undermined the already moderate and largely ineffectual trade union movement” (Jomo, K.S., 
1995a: 187). In its private sector, the approach was quite different as the case of electronic 
workers illustrated. Unlike the private sector, electronic sector employees were able to engage 
the AFL-CIO in their organising dispute with limited success. Some evidence was also presented 
of the growing support of enterprise unions within Japan who pressured their employers to 
respect freedom of organising and bargaining in Malaysia. Because of the globalised nature of 
the manufacturing sectors, the potential for cross-national alliances was illustrated favourably 
even under the otherwise harsh and restrictive national regulatory framework.
In Japan significant changes in the arena of labour law were incurred during the post-war 
restructuring phase and it thus had a head start in the labour market reform process. Political 
strategies during that period aimed at promoting the workplace based worker organisations and 
fragmenting large industrial or general unions. In this respect, these strategies were not so 
different from those in Malaysia. The more salient point however, is that economic restructuring 
in Japan was far less sweeping than in New Zealand or Malaysia in the contemporary period. 
This was the outcome of the commitment to a US-led path of economic development after the 
War. It meant that the orientation of the economy was already more congruent with the 
directions implied in the neo-liberal agendas that became more fashionable in the 1980s. In spite 
of this broad orientation, the Japanese economy was much more situationally specific, both 
through the forms of segmentation that it evolved domestically, and in the arena of labour law. 
Even in the present contested programme of restructuring, the emphasis on labour law is less 
significant than elsewhere. This is mainly so because enterprise unions and productivity 
bargaining have characterised its industrial relations from the early 1980s onwards. Finally, 
labour organisation and the predominant industrial relations practices in Japan reflected limited
consensus and corporatism, which served the agenda of restructuring rather well.
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Overall, therefore, the legislative framework for labour regulation as part of the 
economic restructuring process has presented itself diversely. In each case, the diversity is 
explained by the differential competence of the nation state in regulating and co-ordinating the 
behaviour of market agents. Labour’s responses to different forms o f legal regulation differed, 
although in each case capital/state strategies dominated the shape of the reforms. If the formal 
regulatory regimes were so different, how is labour’s weakness in preserving its gains or 
bargaining potential explained? For this, we need to look at how decollectivisation and 
fragmentation were promoted and legitimated. It is thus necessary to look at market/state 
relations to understand how anti-working class goals are secured by reform-oriented states. 
Decollectivisation of labour appeared in the first instance in the more ideological response to the 
challenges of promoting international competitiveness and flexibility. However, the political 
nature of decollectivisation was illustrated strongly in each of the countries studied.
Harvey (1989) notes that one principal task o f  the capitalist state is to locate power in 
the spaces which the bourgeoisie controls, and dis-empower those spaces which the oppositional 
movements have the greatest potential to command. Offe’s (1996) thesis on state actions and 
structures of collective will formation draws further attention to the dichotomy between market 
based and legal based frameworks for disempowering labour, and obtaining legitimisation at the 
same time. Traxler (1996: 382) observes that national economic policies have not converged 
despite economic internationalisation, implying that industrial change entailed not only 
disorganisation, but also rather re-organisation of the economy. These writers point towards an 
association between open market policies, labour regulation and a market-based control over 
labour. However, the association between economic globalisation and labour regulation is 
implied but not substantiated. These writers help move the debate beyond the almost 
atheoretical presentations by the globalisation theorists examined in Chapter Two. What is 
common to all of them is the view that the modem capitalist state has reconfigured its role vis-à- 
vis the market so as to reduce the need for direct political regulation. The de-regulatory and 
decollectivising thrusts of labour markets reforms appeared to be necessary to maintaining a 
separation between the political and economic spheres.
The country studies have stressed that labour regulation changes have occurred through 
a mix of labour market strategies and political deregulation by these three reform-oriented states. 
These had the effect of severely restricting the spaces for collective action. In New Zealand, 
trade unions were disorganised through labour market instruments. Moreover, the shift to a
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proportional representation system of parliamentary representation in 1996 fed the 
disaggregation of the political associations of organised labour. In Malaysia, labour was brutally 
contained by the colonial and early post-colonial state through coercive means. An import 
substitution era that followed its independence saw the proliferation of moderate industrial 
labour organisations whose potential for political interventions had widened by the end of the 
1960s. During its NEP phase, state strategies shifted towards a mixture of political means (such 
as state coercion sponsorship of ethnic divisions) and labour market instruments designed to 
accelerate Malaysian’s internationalisation. Labour movements in Japan were subject to similar 
state pressures in the early post-war era. However, labour’s chosen strategy of building a strong 
enterprise industrial relations culture in selected industries helped it expand its interests largely 
as a consequence of the unique way in which Japan’s capitalism evolved. The shift to the 
proportional representation system also encouraged the tendency of dispersal of organised 
labour’s political associations more recently.7 But, labour market instruments were far more 
effective in the non-core, small/medium enterprise sectors. Finally, the gradual emergence of one 
main national centre - helped further moderate labour’s political agenda - mainly because of the 
diffused party political configurations, declining employment in state and protected sectors and 
expansion of relatively internationalised sectors.
Such observations do not, provide theoretical tools for studying causality. To do that, 
the empirical relationships between economic openness and labour regulation have to be more 
comprehensively studied. However, what is clear from this study, is that labour regulation was 
the crucial anchor to the economic reform policies. Secondly, all the case studies demonstrate 
the centrality of the state in regulating labour even when dealing with comprehensively 
deregulated settings. Thirdly, they also variously demonstrate the limited utility of the neoliberal 
labour market deregulation framework in disciplining labour. Finally, the study exposed a 
persistent reliance upon ideological, corporatist and coercive means of disciplining labour even 
within more democratic environments. These observations are helpful in understanding aspects 
of causality.
Two over-arching features across the case studies was the notable tendency of 
fragmenting organised labour’s political associations and sharpening the divisions between 
competitive and protected sectors. These exemplified the political project that underwrote labour 
market policy transitions. While labour’s fragmentation was an overtly political goal of the 
capitalist state and an outcome of both political and labour market strategies, they were
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differentially legitimated. In the closed economy era, labour regulation depended to a larger 
extent upon political strategies, including coercion. In the accelerated internationalising phase, 
this shifted to labour market strategies. This shift, it is argued was closely associated with the 
patterns and pace of internationalisation of the three economies.8
By assessing these seemingly disconnected twin considerations, two contradictions in the 
capitalist form of production are brought to light. On the one hand, while the increasing openness 
has shifted the gravity for economic regulation in favour of international agencies and markets, 
there has been no corresponding shift in the arena of labour regulation. So while capital markets 
and international agents have narrowed the remit for economic regulation in the three states; they 
have at the same time brought into sharper relief the need for labour regulation at the national 
level. Secondly, the decollectivisation thrust of labour market deregulation was most apparent 
in the internationally trading sectors. Industries and enterprises where states or state agencies still 
maintained regulatory interventions were less prone to labour’s decollectivitsation. This 
development demonstrated the tendency for more free markets to support labour’s fragmentation 
with less and less support of the state. These developments underline the two profoundly 
contradictory developments that have arisen out o f the restructuring processes studied.
7:5 Conclusion
Economic restructuring has been a constant feature of the capitalist form of production 
historically, as national economies needed to continuously developed strategies that favoured 
capital accumulation (Tilly, 1996). By comparing three cases over the chosen time period, the 
form of adjustment in the present period was highlighted. Modes of insertion into the global 
capitalist system that characterised each of the economies have been historically specific and 
contingent upon both external and domestic considerations.9 By reducing external and historical 
variabilities, this chapter has explored the associations between internationalisation in the present 
period and labour regulation, highlighting complex inter-relationships. While it is difficult to 
confirm causality in such relationships, what was clear from this discussion is that states directly 
or indirectly promoted economic internationalisation through changes to their regulatory 
framework. This regulatory framework emphasised a shift towards deregulated labour markets. 
This shift contributed to the widening of differentials among different categories of labour and 
enhanced the vulnerability of labour. These factors contributed to a narrowing of the ‘space for 
oppositional collective action’ by organised labour. However, increased economic openness and
201
internationalisation in the present period relied upon a range of policy instruments and changes. 
Changes to the regimes of labour regulation were only one set of policy changes. Nevertheless, 
in each case economic internationalisation exposed labour to international markets. This had 
implications for labour organisation, labour market institutions and for industrial relations 
processes. During the current period, economic restructuring has been characterised by a shift 
of emphasis away from law and other regulatory mechanisms to market-based instruments. 
When we view economic internationalisation from this standpoint, the case studies provide 
compelling evidence that the globalisation debates overviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 were too 
simplistic. This turns our attention to the changing relations between state and labour 
organisations. A particular problem that is thrown up by these three political systems thus was 
the problem of legitimation of anti-labour regimes introduced through the mixture of strategies 
noted.
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Chapter Seven: Endnotes
1. On a separate theme, Tilly’s thesis gains some credence from the failure at the World 
Trade Organisation December 1996 Singapore assembly to connect labour standards 
concretely with trade liberalisation for fears that it would result in labour-favouring 
protectionism (AsiaWeek. 20/12/96: 53-54).
2. This point is owed to Naoyuki Kameyama, Vice Research Director General 
(Research) of the Japan Institute for Labour (personal discussions).
3. On a biographical note, this study had initially sought to study the similarities and 
differences between the sweeping labour market reforms introduced by the post­
military coups regimes in Fiji between 1987 and 1990 and the radical economic 
reforms introduced in New Zealand after 1990. The initial study painted an outline 
where political factors (such as orientation of party in government and state capacities) 
appeared to play an important role in the articulation and implementation of radical 
reforms. By recasting the study in its historical and comparative framework, both the 
‘political’ and the ‘state’ have been re-emphasised so as to yield explanations for these 
developmental trajectories by reference to global exigencies as well.
4. Restructuring (or employment adjustment as it was then referred to) in Japan was 
induced by the combination of the flotation of the US dollar and the oil crisis in early 
1970s. The energy crisis was less important in shifting developmental trajectories in the 
other two case studies. New Zealand was forced to initiate long-term adjustment in its 
primary sectors after the entry of Britain into the European common market, brining to 
a sharp end its preferential access to the British market.
5. One measure for the openness of an economy is the ratio exports+imports/GDP. 
Exports as a ratio of the GDP is indicative of the relative importance of the export 
sector. Given that Japan is a resource poor country, its import ratios are relatively 
higher than resource rich states such as Malaysia and New Zealand. This needs to be 
factored in so as to minimise the distortions that are created by the uniqueness of the 
case studies in a comparative study such as this.
6. Discontinuities in the industrial relations regime characterised economic 
restructuring in Britain as well. However, unlike New Zealand, these discontinuities 
rested upon a sweeping legislative agenda on part of the post-1979 Conservative 
Government - an agenda that is unlikely to be significantly rolled back as a 
consequence of change in government in 1997. In the same breath, the Fijian state 
responded to a situation of economic decline by launching a programme of sweeping 
legislative reforms between 1987 and 1991. These reforms flowed from the ‘successful’ 
experiences of the Britain and New Zealand. The neoliberal policy framework was 
realigned to meet the immediate political needs of a regime based upon a narrow 
support base. This framework is unlikely to be overhauled following an expected 
change in its system of government (Prasad, 1996; 1998).
7. The relationship between the proportional representation electoral systems adopted 
by Japan and New Zealand and the political influence of organised labour warrants
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further research. Such research will also benefit from trends noted from more than one 
national elections in both the countries. In both countries, trade union respondents 
strongly supported the move to this new electoral system.
8. A shift from a political anti-labour strategy on part of a military government in Fiji in 
1987 to a more directly deregulated labour market strategy in 1989 was an important 
ethnographic origin for this broader comparative study. This continuum from a 
political, to legislative to depoliticised economic policy approach to labour regulation is 
well studied and documented with respect to Britain. See Bonefeld, Brown and 
Burnham (1995) and Grant (1993; 1996) for example. But it is less well studied in 
relation to economic restructuring in the Asia/Pacific region.
9. For Japan, the Meiji reformation particularly in response to the external imposition of 
unfair trade agreements was one historically specific mode of insertion. For both 
Malaysia and New Zealand, key modes of insertion were articulated during their 
colonial phases and retained in their early post-colonial periods. Thus both their 
primary export sectors were developed in relation to the British colonial economy. This 
political-economic context was to change substantially in the post-war period.
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Chapter Eight: Politics of economic internationalisation and state regulation
State politics does not hang from the clouds; it rises from the ground, and when the
ground trembles, so does it (Burawoy, 1985:139).
8:0 Studying the relationships between economic internationalisation and labour
The previous chapter examined the variety of ways in which state and labour market 
relations were reconfigured in the three country studies; drawing particular attention to the 
variability of modes of labour regulation. Building on that analysis, this chapter assesses the 
mechanisms through which the reformulations were legitimated and the compliance of labour 
sustained.
This analysis is central to explaining the variability in labour’s responses to restructuring. 
The paradox of significant deterioration of the condition of labour in some sectors and 
significant gains in others illuminated the problem of legitimation. In Chapter Seven, we 
demonstrated the specific ways in which instruments of labour regulation were reconstructed. 
As a result of their unequal impact, and the ways in which they were hidden from public 
scrutiny, they did not always inflame organised labour’s resistance. In spite of significant 
national differences this broadly common outcome appears as a puzzle. By shifting attention to 
the problem of legitimation, the thesis provides a better view of the place of politics and the role 
of state institutions in sustaining the labour market changes.
Economic integration and labour rights were associated in a contradictory manner (Tilly, 
1996; Standing, 1997). The contradictory impact of economic growth upon employment and 
labour rights has been well established (Lee, 1996). Drawing on these developments, this 
Chapter demonstrates how the three states legitimated regulatory regime changes, especially 
those that were inherently designed to hollow out labour’s organisational capabilities. The 
chapter then argues that neoliberal labour market policies were coupled with narrow corporatist 
gains to provide one anchor for the legitimation process. It also demonstrates the ways in which 
economic restructuring programmes were legitimated by aggressive policy institutions, focussing 
on some of the consequences of this for democratic politics. The specific agencies and means 
through which legitimation was obtained are spelt out in the sections that follow. The chapter 
concludes by affirming the key role of politics in explaining policy transformations and the links 
between the accelerated internationalisation of economies and state regulation of labour.
The previous chapter observed that internationalisation was associated with a parallel 
process that aimed to politically disorganise labour. It was also previously demonstrated that
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economic integration relied upon labour market policies that strengthened wage competitiveness 
in the open sectors of the economy. Trade liberalisation across the case studies reinforced the 
centrality of wage competitiveness at industry and enterprise levels. Because most of the new 
employment were created in the open sectors, external relativities thus increasingly shaped the 
framework for collective bargaining in the most internationalised sectors. These outcomes were 
then transmitted to the more closed and the state sectors. In this manner the international 
environment influenced outcomes even in the shielded sectors where the scope for state 
intervention and political settlement was well established. This process was further backed by 
policies that protected high growth sectors from trade union organisation.
In each of the case studies, the political strength of unions rested disproportionately 
upon their public sector bases. The pursuit of wage competitiveness and the decline in public 
sector- investments had significant implications for organised labour therefore. Clearly, 
restructuring did not translate into increased resistance by labour across all economic sectors. 
This was because wage competitiveness was secured via labour market mechanisms, and 
because wage increases and employment growth came to be more closely shaped by private, 
rather than public sector movements. These trends defined one of the key parameters of labour 
and state relations over the restructuring periods, thereby affirming one of the theoretical 
challenges presented by Tilly (1996) on the association between globalisation and labour rights.1
These trends merely describe changes in the labour markets. They do not explain how 
such fundamental shifts were generated in the first place. Cross-national comparisons thus 
provided greater precision in observing the generalised trends and enabled isolation of case 
specific causal relationships at the same lime. The comparative approach provides a method for 
understanding the contradictory tendencies associated with accelerated internationalisation. 
These contradictory goals were legitimated quite differently. This approach also enabled me to 
view the dynamic nature of transitions in the relationships between labour and state. While the 
relationship between changes in industrialisation strategies and industrial relations is supported 
by Kuruvilla and Arudsothy (1993:38-39), it is argued that this needs to be expanded to include 
the whole spectrum of economic policy. This thesis also argues that dramatic shifts in economic 
policy orientation make it easier to focus on the impact of political factors and distributional 
claims upon the state and they help contextualise the longer-term historical observations. In 
examining the complex ways in which transformations in state and labour market relations were
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embedded during a period of accelerated internationalisation, the transformative model of social 
agency was found to by particularly useful in outlining underlying generative mechanisms of 
large scale transformations (Bhaskar, 1989). By turning attention to the sphere of legitimation, 
it was possible to assess the fundamental ‘generators’ of reforms. By studying how economic 
policy frameworks were articulated, implemented and sustained across the case studies, a better 
view of the legitimation problematic was thereby obtained (Offe, 1996).
8:1 State transformation and internationalisation
This section specifically discusses the means through which economic globalisation was 
pursued through reform within state agencies. The discussion provides pointers for a theoretical 
research agenda that may help explain the puzzle of legitimation and embeddedness of labour 
market regime changes (White, 1993). These themes are illustrated with respect to the 
privatisation experiences of the three economies (Jomo, 1995a; JIL, 1995; Easton, ed., 1989).
I have argued that privatisation, and other reforms in the state sector are part of the process of 
economic internationalisation. Changes in the modes of labour regulation drive this process.
To examine how states’ feature in the process during periods of accelerated economic 
internationalisation specifically, I return to the discussion in Chapter Seven. Economic 
development and thus capital accumulation depended upon constant reconfiguration of markets 
that not only transformed the state itself, but also social relations. Through their selection, 
sponsorship and re-orientation o f  policies around which state-market relationships were 
organised, I was able to study how states featured institutionally in the process of reform.
Increasing internationalisation of the economies was both a product of, and, had 
consequences for the internationalisation of the state itself. A shift in responsibilities for 
economic policy formulation and management away from the legislature generally and from 
departments of government collectively to the treasury and the relatively closed policy units such 
as the EPA and M1TI, signalled the extent to which the state itself has been transformed. 
Economic restructuring over the past two decades thus problematised the state as both an agent 
of reform and the subject of reforms. In New Zealand, for example, the important policy text 
‘Economic Management’ signalled a political determination to open this black box. The 
principal thrust of this text was its political calculation that the treasury and finance units, rather 
than the cabinet be the agency principally responsible for economic management. A similar re­
thinking was observed in Malaysia particularly after 1986 when its relatively policy elite
institutionalised a close relationship between industry and state officials in support of a dynamic
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export -oriented regime. Similar changes have been unfolding in Japan following the 1996 
general elections and the upheavals in its financial sectors.
These developments indicate an acknowledgement on part of political actors that reforms 
within the state were key preconditions for the economic policy reorientation. Both a ‘ 
hollowing out’ of the state and a deepening of its market co-ordination role have been key 
characteristics of these reforms. Firstly, because agencies, such as treasuries, were most closely 
integrated into the international economic policy agencies, institutionally and through the regular 
exchanges with multilateral finance agencies, they became vital transmission belts for a global 
agenda of liberalisation. Secondly, the deregulation of the financial sector reduced the scope for 
neo-Keynesian interventions. By adhering closely to the anti-inflationary guidelines set both by 
national governments and internalising guidelines dictated by capital markets, select state 
institutions further strengthened their institutional roles. These changes enhanced the 
transmission belt role of the state and influenced their approach to labour market regulation.
However, the Japanese case study also illustrated the severely contested nature of this 
process of reform. In early 1997, for example, its finance ministry partly stalled moves to confer 
greater autonomy to the Reserve Bank. Such a rear-guard action by state agencies was partly 
influenced by the fact that Japan was the least open of the economies covered by this study. This 
conferred upon the Japanese political system a degree of autonomy that was not enjoyed by the 
other two states. Further, the relatively closed nature of its economy ensured that the disciplinary 
powers of international capital markets were moderated. The size of the economy also meant that 
its impact on the global environment was substantial (Wade, 1996).
The significance of central banks in these reforms should not be underestimated. 
Rueschemeyer et al (1985) criticises sociology which because of the academic division of labour, 
paid little attention to what is in fact a major determinant of important components of national 
economic well being. It should be noted that central banks in New Zealand, Japan and Malaysia 
were among the most internationalised of national state agencies. As a result of the flow of 
people between central banks and international policy agencies, they have become important 
conduits for policy transformations at a local level. Their actions increasingly affected organised 
labour and capital relations. A significant development in recent years has been the growing 
resistance by pressure groups, such as organised labour of the expansion of the autonomy of 
central banks, expressed strongly in New Zealand and Japan during the 1996 general election 
campaigns. In Malaysia, it was expressed less directly, through the MTUC’s policy projects on
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globalisation and labour (ILO, 1996). A concentration of the powers of central banks over 
aspects of economic policy represented one important feature of the reform of state structure. 
The affect of this reform upon labour regulation and the legitimation of modes of labour 
regulation were clear, although trade unions and labour organisation took a while to understand 
the significance of this transformation.
Such reforms of state institutions give an appearance that economic internationalisation 
is associated with an internalisation of international economic policy guidelines promoted by 
multilateral agencies. So as to keep open the conduits of economic policy, this internalisation 
rested upon the autonomy o f policy-making institutions. Thus, the centralisation of economic 
policy and the reification of policy units in government went hand in hand with efforts to shield 
them from the executive arms of government.
' In one respect, the Japanese and Malaysian case studies indicated different trajectories 
of reform. In both these countries, an elitist-long term vision articulated by political leaders 
coincided with the policy reform agendas of central policy agencies. In the case of New Zealand, 
a national developmental policy, such as the Liberal Democratic Party’s post-war goal of 
catching up with the West, or Malaysia’s 2020, vision was lacking. A well-articulated political 
vision gave central policy institutions a broad remit in policy formulation. It also ensured that 
political agents did not need to interfere excessively with policy institutions.
A link between an elite political vision and a market based reform agenda was 
complemented by one other development. Economic reforms also resulted in the emergence of 
a strong private/public nexus in policy formation through the co-option of private sector interest 
groups. In New Zealand the influence of the Business Roundtable, as opposed to its employers 
federation, was especially noteworthy (New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1994). In Japan and 
Malaysia, this took the form o f the co-option of private sector think tanks (Gomez, 1995). These 
developments had three implications. Firstly, the incorporation of private sector organisations 
expressed a generalised re-orientating of the economic policy formation process in all three 
countries. Secondly, this incorporation partly displaced employers’ federations and thus 
relegated to a secondary position the policy influence of tripartite structures. Finally, it opened 
the way for the movement of people between private sector organisations such as think tanks, 
state institutions and international policy agencies. Each of these, in turn, had variable 
implications for the changing patterns of labour regulation in each country.
Chapter Seven illustrated the ways in which many public sector reforms were aimed at
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the (re)-regulation of labour by the state. Public sector reforms in each of the cases were directed 
at opening up sectors previously closed to international competition. While both Malaysian and 
Japanese states sought to retain national control of key privatised sectors, the opened up sectors 
in the three economies were subject to greater marketisation of social relations. In each case, the 
transformations resulted in a clear reduction in bargaining abilities of large, industrially 
organised unions such as public sector unions. These unions presented one of the strongest 
opposition to the reform project in Japan and New Zealand. Public sector unions had been the 
core of the organised labour movement in each of the case studies during their 
interventionist/statist era (Price, 1997; Jomo and Todd, 1994). However, in the reform period 
these unions were subject to severe constraint. In New Zealand and Malaysia, public sector 
union leaders were at times humiliated by the reform process and were often tacitly reduced to 
bargaining for their personal job protection rather than for the collective interests of public sector 
workers. The reforms thus brought in a phase of recomposition of union leadership, internal 
union restructuring and reformulation of union strategies overall.
One of the consequences of this process of public sector restructuring was to divert union 
attention away from the comprehensive economy-wide restructuring programmes that were 
underway. During a period of strategic reorganisation, the few challenges that public sector 
workers launched, such as those of the airline works in Malaysia, railway employees in Japan 
Rail, and teachers in New Zealand, were isolated and thus more easily defeated. In none of the 
countries were unions legally allowed to use the strike or related industrial action to challenge 
changes in the economic policies. Finally, the spread of new managerialism in public sector 
organisations often saw the recruitment o f ‘high flyer policy- ideologues’ into senior positions 
in the restructured state bodies. In Malaysia and New Zealand, private sector think tanks became 
recruiting grounds for such personnel.
Clearly, the outcome of such reforms and pressures reduced the capacity of trade unions 
to reverse the changes in the economic policy regimes. This had the further effect of enhancing 
the autonomy of state institutions. In this manner economic restructuring reduced the overall the 
validity of the distributional claims advanced by labour. This does not imply, however, that the 
state became any less concerned with labour regulation. In fact this distancing of the state from 
the labour market itself represented one type of regulation. The contestation during the reform 
process remained potent, though varied in form; labour/state and capital/state distributional 
competitions continued to shape the outcomes of restructuring, most significantly in Japan and
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slightly less so in New Zealand.
The comparative-historical approach presented here contextualises the relationships 
between state transformations and internationalisation. Internationalisation of the state went 
hand in hand with greater internationalisation of capital and labour. A redefinition of the 
parameters of labour conflict gives tentative support to the thesis that capital/labour conflicts are 
increasingly being articulated in a regional/global context (Silver, 1995a; Tilly, 1996).
8:2 Centralisation in decentralised labour markets
One important starting point for the analysis was the thesis that transitions of the state
in the three settings supported the trend towards ‘the internationalisation of the state’ (Bonefeld
et al. 1995). This was associated with the increasing centralisation of decision making within the
nation state, which had two parallel outcomes. On the one hand, economic restructuring required
policy co-ordination, which engendered a centralisation of policy making and macro-economic
management. On the other, deregulation resulted in a dispersal and fragmentation of state
institutions particularly in the provisions of public goods and services. Panitch (1994:70)
observed the implications of such changes on power relations, noting:
rather than a loss of power, the internationalisation of the state ... reflected a shift in 
power inside the state, entailing a restructuring of the hierarchy of state apparatuses. In 
appearance there was virtually nothing to signal this change in the structure; rather the 
goals pursued and the uses to which the structures were put changed. Agencies with 
direct links to the client groups of the national economy, such as ministry’s of labour and 
industry and institutions of tripartite corporatism that had developed in the inter-war era, 
remained relatively privileged and even pre-eminent. But they were subordinated to 
prime ministerial, and presidential offices, foreign offices, treasuries and central banks 
in such a way that they became instruments of policy transmitted through the world- 
economy linked central agencies.
This observation aptly captures the main transformations in the three cases. Firstly, there were 
changes in state institutions that resulted from the privatisations noted in the country chapters. 
Secondly, the functions and responsibilities of different state agencies were reformulated, as 
demonstrated in Chapter Seven. Thirdly, in spite of a general contraction of state bureaucracies, 
there were clear trends towards the concentration of power. Paradoxically, these developments 
did not draw serious objections about the anti-democratic thrusts of these policies. But this did 
not invalidate the scope for political challenge and contestation by labour.
Although privatisations were pushed by the external obligations under Uruguay Rounds 
of GATT or commitments at the regional level under APEC, they were also propelled by a
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desire to centralise decision-making and concentrate regulatory powers that had previously been 
diffused across state agencies (World Bank, 1995b and 1996b). Significantly, while international 
obligations generally aimed at promoting economic openness, broadened cross-national 
ownership of privatised industries did not always occur. In both Malaysia and Japan, the state 
actively promoted policies that ensured that foreign ownership of key privatised industries were 
restricted, without overtly violating their international obligations (Tsuru, 1996: 206-211).2 In 
both these situations, privatisations thus related to the political transformations within state 
institutions.
The political nature of privatisations in New Zealand is expressed differently. Its more 
direct relevance to this thesis lay in the fact that privatised enterprises created conditions where 
factors such as international competitiveness could more directly mould wage and employment 
outcomes across the economy. Privatisation programmes also forced open what were the hard 
to internationalise sectors of the economy. In these ways, privatisations helped sustain the 
tendency towards centralisation within the state because they legitimated the state’s withdrawal 
from regulation of employment (Boston, 1995). However, it is necessary to go beyond the issue 
of privatisation to draw out the broader significance of transfomiations within state institutions. 
A critical dimension in explanation is the role of labour, as proponent or subject of the 
restructuring process. In the much less centralised union setting of Japan, a significant expansion 
of corporatist practices was observed. This was based on a renegotiation of neo-liberal reform 
packages and a high level of social consensus on employment adjustment (Nikkei Weekly. 
2/7/97; Inagami, 1992). This derived from the fact that the Japanese state was a pervasive 
market agent without a large market presence. A transition from corporatism without labour to 
'corporatism with labour’ helped maintain this characteristic. In the case of Malaysia, the state 
remained a significant market player, in spite of the wave of privatisations after the mid-1980s 
recession. An extensive range of interventions through both centralised policy co-ordinating 
agencies, and the extensive powers of state governments in employment creation and public 
investments, characterised the state in this rapidly internationalising economy. The post-war 
New Zealand state was a similar pervasive market player, highly regulationist and inherently 
interventionist. Restructuring in its case transformed these features both radically and readily. 
Because the radical restructuring phase was initiated by a Labour Government, union opposition 
was more muted.3
It is unwise to see restructuring simply in terms of the sharp breaks in policy orientation.
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Equally, it is unhelpful to view policy transformations including dramatic overhaul of state 
institutions as cyclical responses to ‘overaccumulation’ and more general economic crisis 
(Clarke, 1988). An historical approach provides a framework within which sharp shifts and 
reorientations can be better understood. With respect to the dramatic changes in the industrial 
relations regime in New Zealand, even the New Zealand Employers Federation study indicated 
that the ‘Employment Contracts Act can be seen less as a sharp break with the past and more as 
a radical shifting of reformist gears. It is (only) the extent and momentum of changes that makes 
the 1991 legislation different from the processes of steady modification to industrial law that has 
been taking place since 1973’ (Clark and Williams, 1995: 59). Similarly in Malaysia, strong 
continuities in the industrial relations framework were noted (Ayadurai, 1996). In the secondary 
literature it was obvious that writers were tempted to see sharp policy turns as separate from 
the longer term historical processes at work within national economies (Jomo, 1995b; Boston, 
1995).
During their interventionist phases, the three states developed an array of instruments 
and machineries for the regulation of labour. These arrangements were shaped by historical 
exigencies such as the apparent strength of organised labour in the case of post-war New 
Zealand; nationalism and the co-option of labour in Malaysia; and the co-option of labour into 
a reconstruction ideology elaborated in Japan. But the expansive administrative and regulatory 
machineries were also driven by the changing requirements of capital. The shift from a protected 
accumulation regime to an open export oriented regime fundamentally changed the requirements 
of capital. While this shift had major implications for the modes of labour regulation, it was not 
a homogenous process. Malaysia’s post 1986 reforms were still operationalised within the 
context of Malay dominance. Similarly, the unique role of private finance houses in Japan 
continues to enjoy disproportionately high levels of protection during its present phase of 
reforms. Such specificities showed how state institutions shaped and sustained labour market 
interventions. In spite of these differentiations, the role of state institutions in labour markets 
became less important as a consequence of the deregulatory thrusts of their labour market 
policies.
Malaysia illustrates well how international priorities were mediated by national interests 
via state agencies. The government’s concern with redressing ethnic imbalances provided the 
pretext for a particularly harsh mode for labour regulation. Thus public sector reforms, ‘rather 
than primarily enhancing public accountability, government transparency and other democratic
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safeguards, or promoting the objectives of deficit reduction and increasing private sector control” 
are also subordinated to the ostensibly Malay-wealth-enhancing objectives through rent 
redeployment, particularly to the politically well connected. By securing a broad support base 
within the Malay population, the Malaysian state maintained sufficient internal strength to 
impose a consistent strategy of control and a high degree of ideological and progmatic unity 
about why such control had priority’ during a period of major transformation (Jomo, 1995b: 58). 
In order to sustain its control regime ‘changes in the power balance in technocratic agencies 
were also necessary. To maintain such control, the Economic Planning Unit in the Prime 
Minister’s Department was strengthened. In the 1980s, the Malaysian state appointed to 
authoritative technocratic positions, persons ‘who were politically loyal and committed to the 
leaderships world view, rather than those who were merely technically competent’ (Jesudason, 
1990:77). Thus while global economic policy agendas were transmitted via ‘technopols’, their 
influence were constantly mediated by the national political objectives that were transmitted via 
the heads of policy institutions. These developments set the Malaysian experience apart from the 
two other case studies. While, the political objectives of the state were decidedly anti-trade union 
in orientation, this experience illustrates the continued scope for national policy interventions 
while promoting internationalisation strategies at the same time. Moreover, rapid growth and 
favourable labour market conditions such as full employment can also indirectly foster 
conditions that enhance the position of labour in the longer term.4 Significantly, this outcome 
with respect to the regulation of labour was obtained in a context of extreme centralisation of 
political and executive authority within the state and a notable loosening of the state’s direct 
regulation of labour markets. In contrast, the New Zealand experience was of a different order. 
The 1984 reform projects were articulated quite narrowly, within the finance ministries by 
technocrats who were shielded from political directives by its reformist Finance minister. These 
radical reforms, including the technocratic appointments to the economic policy institutions, 
were based on the commitment to the neo-liberal agenda rather than political loyalties or other 
considerations. The capacity of state institutions dedicated to the notion of collective 
responsibility and bureaucratic autonomy derived from the Westminster system of government, 
were soon an obstacle to wider economic restructuring. The Fourth Labour Cabinet’s reforms 
of state businesses were slowed down ‘by conflicts between bureaucrats and their minister s for 
control of the policy process’ (Massey, 1995:134). Bureaucrats committed to economic reform, 
thereafter moved among key institutions, putting reforms in place and preventing bottlenecks.
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A centralisation of economic policy formulation within the Cabinet Policy Committee serviced 
by the Treasury and the State Services Commission also ensured that the non-reform segments 
of the Labour Cabinet and the state bureaucracy were effectively marginalised. Moreover as the 
importance of monetary policy was understood, the Government moved to shield the Reserve 
Bank from direct political control through the Reserve Bank Act of 1989. These transformations 
also went hand in hand with other measures whereby union, academic and other pressure group 
opposition to economic restructuring were marginalised and other watchdogs neutralised (Scott, 
1996; Kelsey, 1995). An array of instruments was deployed to achieve the reform objectives. 
This initially meant taking a high electoral risk for a Labour Government with close links with 
trade unions. However, the most pressing fear was the danger of a reversal of reforms through 
electoral swings in future. Thus rather than relying upon a nexus of bureaucrats, political and 
industry leaders as was the case in Malaysia, the New Zealand state elite skilfully transformed 
the state apparatus to ensure that their autonomy and commitment to a neoliberal framework 
would not be deflected by future electoral political swings. In this manner the outcomes of the 
reforms were quite similar in the two countries, even though the means differed quite markedly.
Transformations in the Japanese state occurred over a much longer time frame. 1 have 
already discussed the post-war transformations engineered by the occupying powers, and the 
post-1973 adjustments following the oil crisis. Japan as the paradigmatic strong state erected 
barriers to prevent external control, and created, under state direction, a concentration of powers 
within a cohesive capitalist class which enjoyed close links with the main post-war ruling 
coalition, the LDP. This characteristic of the developmental state should be seen as a variant of 
capitalist development in which the state secures privileged access to resources, technology and 
markets for its capitalists. Like Malaysia, the developmental form of the state depended upon 
bureaucratic agencies to manage strategic vulnerabilities, foster competitiveness selectively and 
sustain social harmony (Tabb, 1995:100). Even during its post-bubble crises, reforms in Japan 
were aimed at maintaining this balance. In Japan’s case, this dilemma of maintaining a high level 
of state co-ordination has been far more difficult than had been the case with Malaysia or New 
Zealand. But like New Zealand, the reforms announced in 1997 signal a commitment to reduce 
the influence o f domestic political levers over economic policy. This will rely fundamentally 
upon a reform o f its economic planning/policy agencies and a further centralisation of economic 
policy backed by a class of technocrats committed to neo-liberalism.
While the transformations noted were not always presented in terms of economic
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globalisation, this was the broad context of the national reform agenda. In the case of Malaysia, 
they were driven by the political objectives of the NEP including its sponsorship of a Malay 
elite. Economic internationalisation thus enhanced the redistributive goals of the NEP without 
dislodging Malay Chinese capital (Gomez and Jomo, 1997:168). However, the long-term effects 
of these changes were that state institutions were made subservient to the attainment of economic 
goals determined by the dominant fragments of political system. They ensured that state 
institutions gave priority to the interests of capital generally, rather than national capital within 
that mode of production ahead of all other distributional claims. However, in the case of Japan 
and Malaysia, the developmentalist state ensured that interests of capital came to be 
circumscribed in national and ethnic terms respectively. In this manner, the sharp differences in 
national specificities became less significant. These differences, it is argued were crucial to 
explaining the different modes of legitimation and the contrasting ways in which labour was re­
positioned.
8:3 The socio-political context of restructuring
The conditions under which neo-liberal type of reforms occurred in the three contrasting 
settings are important to establish and identify the generative factors of these processes. A 
banking crisis played a central role at the commencement of radical reforms in each of the case 
studies (Malaysia, 1986-88 and 1997; New Zealand, 1984-1990, Japan, 1973-5 and 1993-present 
time). Social and economic fallouts associated with this were high unemployment, declining or 
static investment in employment generating sectors, outflow of capital, currency devaluations 
among other factors. These arc detailed in the country chapters. Williamson ed. (1994) argued 
that the prevalence of economic crisis, the political orientation of government, a fracturing of 
social consensus and opposition affected economy policy oscillations. These conditions were 
broadly visible in the case studies.
In the recent debates about economic restructuring, party political differentiation became 
visibly less marked in the strong and dominant two party systems in New Zealand. For quite 
different reasons, divisions over economic policy were less important reason for party political 
differentiation in Malaysia where the electoral prospects for opposition parties were far more 
restrictive. On the contrary, the Japanese political groupings have been sharply divided over 
economic policy objectives. However, the tradition of post-electoral coalition building reduced 
the significance of such divisions. In each of the studies therefore, the party political institutions
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aided both the legitimation and sustainability economic reforms. They also helped strengthen the 
grip of peak state institutions over the economic policy formation process.
Governments that attempt radical reforms obviously invite close scrutiny of their policies 
by their electorates. Thus, electoral calculations have become an important consideration in 
shaping the reform agendas. The corollary is that within the liberal democratic system, there are 
often strong disincentives for sweeping economic reforms. However, New Zealand demonstrated 
that reforms need not necessarily lead to the reversal of the electoral fortunes of the party/ies 
in government. Moreover, it also illustrated how interest groups could be encouraged to 
legitimate and sustain the reform processes. One such example quite paradoxically was New 
Zealand farmers associations, a group acutely affected by trade liberalisation but which most 
strongly rallied behind the reform processes through its support of the National Party in the 
1980's (Massey, 1995:181-2).
lit each case, neo-liberal programmes were levered into the centre-stage of politics by
state officials. Kaufman and Haggard eds.(1992:13) observe that these officials included senior
economic officials and academic economists:
(Who) were important carriers of neo-classical ideas, forming the core of 
transnational policy coalitions favouring liberalisation. A growing number of 
these ‘reformist cadres’ served as staff members of the World Bank, IMF, and 
regional development banks... These academics-cum-technocrats had a broader 
understanding of, if not sympathy for, orthodox policy prescriptions, as well as 
some comparative knowledge of the adjustment experiences of other countries.
These officials were frequently thrust into positions of substantial authority, often 
acting as interlocutors in negotiations with the international finance institutions.
Thus, the ascendance of reform ‘technopols’, that is, a cadre of reformers occupying
central economic policy institutions ensured that a broad committed to the economic policy
reforms that flowed from the Washington consensus could be sustained (Williamson, ed. 1994).
What was even more significant was the influence of such technopols within the main political
parties. In New Zealand this took the form of professional/academic support for the two main
parties. In both Japan and Malaysia, this type of influence was wielded by an array of ‘think
tanks’. Significantly, this cadre was increasingly mobile between premier policy agencies and
corporate institutions (Jesudason, 1990; Bowie, 1991). At least in the case of New Zealand, this
was also a cadre strongly integrated into international policy institutions (Kelsey, 1995),
although, increasingly this has also been the case in Japan. As missionaries of an ideology of
economic science, the role of the technopols is significant and deserves more detailed
sociological inquiry. Its influence over the democratic processes should also not be
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underestimated.
Economic restructuring policies that deepened trade liberalisation, reduced domestic 
protection, and weakened centralised regulation of labour markets were ostensibly legitimated 
by reference to real or perceived national economic crises. In each country studied, the 1973 oil 
crises became the focal point for reform agendas. Moreover, Britain’s entry into the European 
common market affected New Zealand’s primary exports, compounding the perception of an 
economic crisis. However, it was the recession of the last two decades that appeared more 
important in promoting a dramatic reorientation of economic policy. When the New Zealand 
economy changed from one that enjoyed near full employment throughout the post-war decades 
to double digit unemployment in the 1980s, the past policy approach was challenged. A 
speculative run on capital markets in 1984 followed a change of government, further reinforcing 
perceptions about the nature of New Zealand’s economic crisis. The Malaysian economy also 
faced a similarly grave public debt and fiscal crisis by the early 1980s. The direct cost of its 
banking crisis was equivalent to 5 percent of its GDP during 1985 and 1988 (World Bank, 
1996a:68). Similarly, the banking sector crises in the post-bubble period in Japan had equally 
severe political reverberations, partly given the scale of banking sector collapses. It appears to 
have been the case in all the three economies that financial sector crises exposed the complex 
inter-linkages between national financial institutions and the global political economy. This 
helped empower the reform-oriented bureaucrats and political elites in each country.
There are several other commonalities in the nature and impacts of the fiscal crises in 
these contrasting economies. For example, the national economic crises were nowhere near the 
scale and gravity of Mexico in the early 1980s or Indonesia in 1997. However, these crises were 
presented in almost equally dramatic terms. They attracted extensive media coverage as well as 
very public scrutinies by international agencies. Moreover, the new economic crises 
demonstrated the volatile nature of capital markets. Thus, it was not the economic crises in 
themselves that directly triggered the accelerated reform and adjustment programmes in the case 
studies, but the projection of a perception that only limited options were available to policy 
makers. Indirectly, these crises defined the options available for continued labour regulation and 
provided a pretext for radical labour market reforms. Significantly therefore, domestic economic 
crises aggravated external vulnerabilities, and restricted national policy options entered the 
labour regulation discourse in each of these countries in different ways.
Legitimation of reforms aimed at promoting economic globalisation also depended upon
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the cultivation of a range of national fears and anxieties by the ‘new economic policy agents’ 
both domestically and internationally. Lee (1996: 486) summarised these anxieties in the 
following manner,
(first was the) fear in industrialised countries that globalisation is unleashing new 
international competition ... that they cannot withstand and which is causing rising 
unemployment and falling relative wages among skilled workers; in developing countries 
a similar fear that liberalisation will lead to job losses and rising wage inequality; the fear 
that globalisation of the labour market is leading to a race to the bottom with respect to 
wages and labour standards; and the fear that in the face of these new problems 
globalisation also implies a loss of national policy autonomy and (that) governments are 
becoming impotent.5
By cultivating such fears, state agencies helped keep popular opposition in check. They also
helped promote the fragmentation of and division within labour organisations. Such dramatic
perceptions were readily relayed into the political arena through national budgets and speeches
by finance ministers. Their impact was felt partly through a fragmentation of large political
groupings in New Zealand and Japan (Roper and Rudd eds. 1993; Makoto, 1996). In Malaysia
this was less direct as ethnic divisions continued to dominate political cleavages, although
underneath its ethnic cleavages were more important ideological divisions (Boulanger, 1996).
Restructuring was subject to serious contestation even within ruling coalitions. Important
policy agents cultivated new ideologies whose appeal lay with a more dispersed audience,
playing on populist fears. As Lee (1996:495-6) notes:
increasing globalisation, national policies are still paramount. However a basic 
paradox is that at the same time as the social dislocations caused by increasing 
international competition are rising, the capacity, and even perhaps the will, of 
governments to take such compensatory or ameliorative actions is weakening.
By shifting national attention away from the possibilities for politically expensive policy choices, 
governments effectively wiped out, or considerably shrank the space for contestation over 
economic policy. Thus, a broad acceptance of the neoliberal economic framework as the ‘only 
policy option available’ was one means whereby reforms were legitimated and sustained in these 
countries. So long as this ideology was presented in technical terms and had the backing of 
authoritative state institutions, contestations could be managed and the situation sustained.
Finally, it was noteworthy that national labour relations regimes were embedded in 
‘supportive power structures, institutional arrangements and cultural patterns’ in all of the case 
studies (Traxler, 1996:272). When national modes of economic governance were transformed, 
it was likely that labour relations regimes that were premised upon it would undergo change.
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From the point of view of legitimation, this posed an even more difficult situation. In relation 
to other interest groups, labour was the most organised and capable of mounting significant 
resistance to these policies. It was this potential source of opposition that was managed during 
the reform process. The contrasting changes and impacts upon labour, and their responses are 
thus examined in the section that follows.
8:4 Contrasting modes oflegitimation and the marginalisation of organised labour
In the above section, it is argued that the presentation of economic crises aided the 
imposition of sweeping economic policy reforms. But this in itself does not explain labour’s 
compliance and subsequent political marginalisation. To understand this, I examine how labour’s 
marginalisation was legitimated.
The proposed internationalisation strategies were presented and justified in different 
terms in each country. New Zealand’s sharp economic downturn in the 1980s brought into relief 
the problems associated with state-led and subsidised industrial development. This situation was 
compounded by harsh external exigencies such as the cessation of preferential market access in 
the UK. Competitiveness, thus was presented as the point of reference for the entire reform 
agenda, slowly permeating the reform discourse in the public sector. Economic reform policies 
were also presented in terms of the need to ally fears of international capital, given the runaway 
deficits, rising inflation and politically induced exchange rate variations. The alarm of 
international capital markets was also expressed in the form of the reduction in New Zealand’s 
credit worthiness by key ratings agencies. In a similar manner, Japan faced a credit rating 
adjustment at the end of 1996. In mid 1997, currency speculation against the ringgit also 
exemplified the direct influence of international capital markets (Financial Times. 23/6/97). 
These cases exemplify one way in which the influence of international capital markets on the 
domestic policy regimes came to be exercised.
Nevertheless, there were compelling domestic arguments that helped win popular 
support, or dent opposition to the reforms in each of the states as well. In the case of Japan, 
internationalisation strategies were historically legitimated on the grounds of national 
reconstruction, catching up with the West, and more recently, in terms of reducing bureaucratic 
waste, corruption and graft. Malaysian internationalisation strategies were legitimated with 
reference to the goal of minimising inequities between ethnic groups and in terms of the broader 
developmental goals such as the 2020 vision. For the Malay dominated state,
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internationalisation and restructuring were also presented to its constituents in terms of the 
potential for breaking the economic stranglehold of Malay-Chinese capital over the national 
economy. In each case however, the argument that internationalisation strategies were the 
inevitable consequences of international pressures appeared misplaced, although presented to 
the populous in such terms.
However, reforms aimed at economic openness needed more than an ideological
umbrella or prism to rest upon. Panitch (1994:74) observed that:
the internationalisation of the state in the 1990s appears to be taking the form, in 
continuing absence of the ideological consensus or capacity to bring about a transnational 
regulation of capital markets, of formal interstate treaties designed to enforce legally 
upon future governments general adherence to the discipline of the capital market. This 
arises out of a growing fear on the part of both domestic and transnational capitalists, as 
the crisis continues, that ideology cannot continue to substitute for legal obligation in the 
internationalisation of the state.
Legal regulation was particularly compelling once decisions were taken to restructure national 
economies so that international capital appeared to become an important determinant of 
economic growth. To preserve the new policy regime, state’s had to address possible pressure 
points and opponents of reform, such as labour, which was perceived as well-organised with 
strong international links.
It has been shown that economic restructuring had inherently divisive impacts. Divisions 
flared up within ruling coalitions over the pace and thrust of economic policy reforms. These 
reforms also were disputed and contested outside governments, often. It was clear, from for 
example interviews of national union leaders in the three countries that reform and anti-reform 
divisions within organised labour had developed into internal power fractions and cleavages. 
While such a development had an overall effect of weakening the response of unions, it also 
demonstrated that many union leaders had a fairly weak understanding of the full implications 
of nco-libcral type of economic reforms. This was understandable given that these policies were 
open to debate and disagreement at all levels o f society. One outcome was that labour leaders 
were often pushed into the defence of the immediate rather than challenge unclear and nebulous 
state strategies.
Moreover, labour leaders were often confused by the fact that reforms enjoyed 
widespread public support. Broad public frustration at the quality of services provided by the 
bureaucratic public sector organisations was apparent in all the case studies. Such public views 
helped fertilise the popular support for a new economic orthodoxy as well as fragment the
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solidarities between public sector unions and consumer and related civic groups. In Malaysia 
and Japan, this was aided by the prevalence of high profile corruption and mismanagement of 
public enterprises by public sector managers. In periods characterised by extremely low 
employment growth in the skilled sectors represented by many public enterprises, closed-shop 
policies held in place by strong public sector unions contributed to divisions between public 
sector unions and the wider public.6
Furthermore, during this period there was a reconfiguration of political elites, with 
Finance ministries becoming pre-eminent. In both New Zealand and Malaysia, economic 
restructuring coincided with the rise in the influence of finance ministers. Indeed the Fourth 
Labour Government Finance Minister in New Zealand overshadowed the then Prime Minister 
Lange in initiating the reform agenda (Boston, 1995). Even in the strong factional-driven single 
party dominant UMNO, the political clout of its finance minister, was noteworthy. This 
tendency was increasingly observable in Japan after the last general elections.
The legitimation of anti-union labour reforms was also framed with reference to the goals 
of efficiency, correcting price distortions and opening up sectors to international competition 
(The Nikkei Weekly, various issues, October, 1996 to January, 1997; Clark and Williams, 1995). 
Such analysis and presentations ‘fail to notice that a politics of deregulation, no less than one of 
regulation, has the character of massive state intervention’. A further ‘interventionist 
characteristic of deregulation is that it typically relies on policy initiatives in the fields of law, 
culture and socialisation’. In each of the case studies, governments, policy institutions, and 
private individuals presented deregulation as a policy that discredited the opposing values of 
social justice, responsibility, and solidarity, and sought to restrict the room for manoeuvre for 
those who represented such values, and sought to promote policies that disorganised them. Thus 
the legislative and political weakening of associations and organised interests, and in particular, 
the denunciation of trade unions as special interest groups formed an underlying thrust of 
deregulation. These efforts were focussed more on ensuring that prospects for future reversals 
of deregulation were minimised. Paradoxically, in both Malaysia and Japan, a modest expansion 
of corporatist institutions complemented, rather than contradicted this tendency, reflecting a 
‘new constitutionalism’. This was the move towards construction o f legal or constitutional 
devices to remove or insulate substantially the new economic institutions from popular scrutiny 
or democratic accountability (Tabb, 1995: 321).
Nonetheless, organised labour still retained a capacity to resist these changes. This was
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demonstrated during and after the 1997 general elections in both Japan and in New Zealand. In 
early 1997, the new Japanese government had moderated its popular deregulation programmes 
in light of ‘interest group’ representations, factional lobbying within the legislature and 
resistance by important segments of the state bureaucracy (The Economist. 21/5/97: 38). In both 
New Zealand and Japan, unions nurtured new electoral alliances and sought to wield influences 
in a more differentiated political environment.
These fragmented union responses and the absence of coherence in their responses aided 
the legitimation of the reforms. The differences between the level of union organisation appeared 
to have been marginal in explaining the variability in labour’s responses. Their responses to the 
decollectivising thrusts of labour market reforms were often confused. While unions generally 
associated deregulation with reduced incomes, wage moderation and reduced levels of state 
welfare, the proponents of deregulation, on the other hand, emphasised instead the goals of 
efficiency, economic growth, reducing graft and promoting international competitiveness. Across 
the case studies, this translated into a battle for public opinion, with organised labour facing 
considerable constraints.
Deregulation had another side to it. Central to the deregulatory policy framework was 
the promotion of individual rights rather than collective ones. This aspect of deregulation 
policies served to dislodge unions from their social base. Civil liberty groups for example 
welcomed legislation, like the Bill of Rights in the case of New Zealand. Increasingly, labour 
related non-govemmental organisations were taking over some of the more traditional social 
responsibilities of unions. The expansion of consumer associations in Malaysia and Japan are 
examples of this process in these countries.
These developments helped deflect union opposition to the deregulation policies. 
Moreover, the union case was further weakened by the fact that the deregulation of the state 
sector industries impacted upon the price of public goods from the beginning. In the case of 
Japan, the recent intensification of liberalisation which has threatened conventions, such as life­
long employment, created only a minor dent in the electoral fortunes of the ruling LDP in the 
1996 elections (Look Japan. February, 1997).
Central to the conundrum of organised labour’s relatively timid opposition to the neo­
liberal project is the changing relationships between organised and disorganised labour. By 
externalising developmental constraints, states and other agencies have projected economic 
restructuring as inevitable and externally driven. Appeals to national interests were periodically
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invoked to cripple popular opposition. The restructuring led to a widening of the differentials 
between organised and disorganised workers, while these two broad categories of labour and 
their organisations having increasingly differential stakes in the internationalising economy.
Moreover, as labour market reforms expose the pre-existing industrial relations and 
labour regulation regimes to more market-based forces, the visible and immediate impacts of 
such changes are concentrated upon the organised sector. For example, national union 
collectivities in all cases promoted working class solidarity in the era of corporatism and state 
led economic growth. This often-implied high levels of high income tax regimes, narrow 
expansion in the full time employment sectors where union numbers were most concentrated and 
the marginalisation of the non-core employment sectors by established institutions. In an era of 
growth and employment expansion, corporatism, even of the Malaysian type, secured industrial 
peace.
The decline of corporatist practices grew out of the restructuring of organised 
state/labour relations. This affected political stability, contributing to the first post-war changes 
in government in Japan in 1993, a change in leadership in Malaysia in 1981 and two quick 
changes in government in New Zealand in 1984 and 1998. Simlarly, political stability during (the 
post 1973 oil crisis) restructuring process in Japan was achieved by marginalising important 
groups of employees, and by means of ‘individualisation’ of the threats of unemployment.
Economic internationalisation widened the differentials between organised and 
disorganised labour, creating tensions with industrial relations arrangements in each economy. 
In particular, a largely enterprise-focussed labour relations system in Japan was under intense 
pressures, as unions sought ways to mitigate the impact of restructuring. Japan’s ministries of 
Transport and International Trade and Industry, and Labour intervened to rescue an enterprise- 
based system in return for union support for the restructuring process. Government investments 
in declining industries sought to maintain employment security for the core employees around 
which this labour relations system was structured, further marginalising the peripheral workforce 
and widening the organised/disorganised cleavages.
In the case of Malaysia, these cleavages opened up somewhat differently. Malaysia’s 
spectacular recovery following the recession of the mid-1980s created acute labour shortages. 
Unions in the core sectors sought to preserve their narrow gains and establish new partnerships 
with industry and capital. In the privatised sectors, several unions emerged better organised than 
before, although based on a segmented labour relations regime. In spite of a restrictive labour
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relations regime overall, many unions made private deals which could only be sustained by 
excluding the flexible, temporary and disorganised workforce and severing links with unions and 
union federations that were deemed too oppositional. The peak body, the MTUC gave very little 
attention and support to the often-courageous efforts of mainly women workers in the electronics 
sector during their difficult organisation campaigns in this period. The result was a segmented 
labour relations regime evolved, where the majority of disorganised workers sought new 
alliances and mechanisms through which to advance their class interests. Such alliances included 
support for the ruling party and the preservation of workplace ethnic solidarity as basis for 
collective negotiation. As a result, many ruling Malay political leaders often-wielded indirect 
influence over industry in support of the claims by Malay workers in their constituencies. For 
the older and well-established unions, such developments only further reinforced their defensive 
strategies and further isolated them from the political process. Most significantly, unions failed 
to penetrate the high growth sectors that were more closely integrated into the global system.
In a different manner, restructuring in New Zealand exposed the hollow foundations of 
corporatism in a developed liberal democracy. An industrially organised union structure that had 
flourished in a corporatist environment had a weak workplace organisation, which left unions 
ill equipped to face the consequences of deregulation. Moreover, the inadequacy of workplace 
organisation was further exposed when the closed shop regulations were removed during the 
most recent restructuring phase. The CTU was thus hit from both ends. Its influence over policy 
at a national level was eroded, as corporatist conventions became redundant in the wake of the 
neoliberal reforms. At the same time, many workplace organisations almost literally fell apart 
when the closed shop protection was withdrawn.
These developments highlighted the limited ability on the part of unions in the three 
countries to pursue strategics that aimed to maintain industrial relations frameworks as political 
buffers. Economic restructuring represented a political project in which the restriction and 
curtailment of organised labour was a key objective. Only in Japan, where unions had complex 
alliances with government, was labour able to win concessions and hold on to the narrow gains 
it had made during the high growth years. Unions in Malaysia, Japan and New Zealand used 
instruments such as the International Labour Organisation to call international attention to the 
impacts upon labour of labour market reforms. But this discourse was narrowly dominated by 
organised segments of labour; rather than by the organisations representing all segments of 
labour. Thus the dislodging of organised labour through institutional transformations and the
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contradictory outcomes of labour market reforms combined to create varying sets of 
circumstances that helped embed the reforms.
8:5 Shielding a new economic governance regime
Besides the ideological drives implemented through economic policy institutions, 
universities, and multilateral institutions, there were other ways in which the new orthodoxies 
came to dominate the public sphere. One shift that was observed in all three countries was the 
acceptance of the broad thrusts of the neoliberal framework by the dominant party political 
groupings. Moreover, the differences in the economic policy orientation between large political 
groupings in each country had also narrowed. The example of the LDP and the JSP in Japan was 
one example. A policy convergence between the National Party and the Labour Party in New 
Zealand was evident in the 1980s. Similarly, in Malaysia the two main parties both sought to 
occupy to popular terrain of the radical liberaliser during the last elections.
However, such convergence in itself does not shield the reforms from political 
contestation. While the trend of constitutionalisation against public sector economic involvement 
has not won much support internationally, it is necessary to look at other means through which 
states could avoid sharp policy reversals in future. Nagel (1994:43) points in a useful direction 
with respect to New Zealand, arguing that:
there are strong theoretical reasons for believing that the fate of New Zealand’s new 
economic order will be less at risk under the MMP than it would have been under FPP. 
The argument is straightforward and can be put in any of several forms.7 In social choice 
terms, a pluritarian system is less stable than systems requiring the agreement of larger 
coalitions. Unstable systems can bring about wide swings across the policy space, 
including policy reversals. Thus the retention of FPP would increase the chances that 
someday a new ruling coalition might develop that would reverse the free market order, 
just as the Labour and National coalitions o f 1984 and 1990 have reversed 
interventionism. Conversely, a stable system by definition is more likely to preserve the 
status quo, or not move far from it. In other words, enacting MMP in the hope of rolling 
back economic reforms was worse than locking the barn door after the horse had 
escaped, because the lock would also prevent the beast from wandering back in.
The comparative evidence is quite compelling. New Zealand’s first elections under the MMP
in 1996 led to a ’hung parliament’ from which an unexpected National Party and First New
Zealand coalition government evolved. This led to a slight moderation of the economic
liberalisation agenda. Had a coalition between First New Zealand and Labour Party been
possible, it is unlikely that there would have been a dramatic change to the economic policy
regime or to the labour regulations mode. In this respect, the proportional representation system226
lived up to its expectations. It reduced the chance for single party government, encouraged 
political coalitions and reduced considerably the prospects for sharp policy swings or reversals. 
In this manner, the electoral transformation has served to preserve the radical transformations 
that have occurred in New Zealand’s economy over the past decade.
Japan’s first experience under a similar proportional representation system had a similar 
outcome in 1996. It denied the LDP a single party majority, led to a coalition government and 
increased the legislative representation of the minor parties. It thus provided for a similar 
continuity in the policy orientation of the government. In both these countries, the MMP 
provided electoral incentives to compete for the centre stage.
The Malaysian political system has attained a similar continuity, but by other means. 
Ever since the 1969 riots and disturbances, the prospects for an opposition electoral victory 
overall have become almost impossible (Crouch, 1996). However, what has evolved in its place 
is the rise of a dominant party, the UMNO which establishes coalitions between the three main 
ethnic constituents. Thus the search for consensus and coalition building is internalised within 
the dominant party. The re-entry of the breakaway Semangat-46 group into the UMNO prior to 
the 1996 elections completed this process. Interest-based coalitions within the UMNO became 
far more distinct than was the case previously. At the same time, political processes outside the 
Peninsular remained dominated by regional political groupings.
Thus in all the three case studies, electoral politics has been structured to provide 
continuity in the economic policy arena and reduce the possibilities for radical challenges by 
labour. Overall, therefore, economic restructuring is a process that not only involves policy shifts 
and re-orientation in the economic policy regime, but also involved and was dependent upon 
major transformations in the political arena. The embeddedeness of the political transformations 
rested on the democratic orientation of emerging political institutions. Economic restructuring 
reduced the scope for corporatism, it reduced organised labour to more traditional forms of 
pressure group politics. At the same time, economic openness has introduced new political and 
social values and concerns, around consumer issues, civil rights at the workplace, equal 
opportunities, often ending the traditional monopoly of trade unions over these issues. These 
tendencies were given a boost by the MMP system of representation, which provided a wider 
scope for airing and pursuing issues, by single-issue pressure groups. This electoral 
transformation reflected a widening of the democratic space, with political opposition to the 
reforms becoming less acute. The net impact of these political transformations was the isolation
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of organised labour, thereby shielding the new economic governance framework from sustained 
opposition.
8:6 How much of economic internationalisation is really about labour?
So what can be made of the complex networks of relations between economic 
internationalisation and labour. The neo-liberal school argues that economic globalisation is 
primarily driven by international capital and that over time it expands the possibilities for labour 
(World Bank, 1995b and 1996b). Tilly (1996) on the other hand advances the proposition that 
globalisation was linked to a deterioration in the position of labour. This comparative study 
provides some pointers for resolving this debate.
The neo-liberal market friendly approach to economic development was associated with 
anti-inflationary policies. Inflation had its sociological foundations in distributive conflicts, 
involving wage and social security between organised labour, on the one hand, and, private 
capital and the state, on the other. To preserve the anti-inflationary foundations of the neo-liberal 
economic policy framework, states sought to shield the accumulation process from distributive 
coalitions that could affect inflation through collective interventions.
In both Malaysia and New Zealand, a corporatist approach to labour regulation 
engendered strong public sector trade unionism and accommodative wage settlements in the 
public sector. Although labour unions enjoyed different levels of support in these countries, 
wage settlements in the public sector created signals for private sector settlements. In both 
countries divisions between the public and private sector unions were well-established features. 
Moreover, an informal system of wage and price indexation lay at the heart of the corporatist 
labour relations framework. Under these conditions, distributive conflicts translated into higher 
prices by creating political pressures for an accommodative monetary policy.8 Given the 
organised interests in the public sector, price shocks emanating from the state sector were readily 
transmitted across the economy.
In Japan, the state sector remained the powerhouse of its large industrial unions, which 
enjoyed a high level of legislative representation through its sponsorship of socialist parties or 
individual candidates. Its state sector was open to direct political horse-trading through intricate 
webs of coalitions and factionalism that characterise its diet. Here, strong unions could affect 
prices, and public sector borrowing through a combination of collective bargaining and direct 
political representation. Moreover, through its unique tradition of spring offensives, public sector
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pay settlements often set the benchmark for settlements in the decentralised and enterprise based 
private sector.9 The mode of public sector labour regulation was likely to most affect inflation 
and when combined with the policy of seniority pay and productivity bonuses, their impacts 
could be debilitating.
By presenting the economic internationalisation and labour regulation paradox from this 
perspective, one of the underlying generative mechanisms of economic restructuring became 
clear. The immediate aim of decollectivisation was price stability. The fact that both Malaysia 
and Japan achieved price stability through political regulation in earlier post-war periods had 
become an unlikely option in the 1980s and 90s when the world’s attention on human and civil 
rights were so intense and capital markets much more fearful of regulation. However, the shift 
to labour market strategies, did not make the reforms any less political.
But how could essentially political reforms be stably anchored without recourse to 
political means? The deepening internationalisation of each of these economies rested on 
sustaining favourable macroeconomic conditions, stable policy regimes and demonstrating the 
irreversibility of reforms. From these standpoints the two extremes presented above in assessing 
the relationships between globalisation and labour appear flawed. Rather than trying to see if 
there is some causality between the two, the emphasis should change to understanding why and 
how political strategies for capital accumulation changed and developed in specific ways. 1 have, 
thus argued that when the modes of economic governance that sustained capital accumulation 
were altered, labour regulation regimes changed correspondingly.
8:7 The parameters for organised labours’ response to state policies
While organised labour has remained the main vehicle for collective interest articulation, 
albeit reduced to a narrow interest group, its primacy as a key political agent has been displaced. 
With the partial exception of Japan, in both Malaysia and New Zealand, organised labour has 
lost its political clout over the past decade. In the post-reform political sphere, organised labour 
was forced to compete for party political attention with a host of other civic organisations. In 
each case, economic restructuring also coincided with a distancing of organised labour from 
labour-based political groups. Only in Japan has organised labour been modestly successful in 
re-negotiating economic reforms, providing a few broader lessons for union regeneration.
Paradoxically, in each of these countries, economic restructuring was partly responsible 
for the emergence of more unified national labour associations in the form of RENGO, MTUC
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and the CTU. The ending of the cold war resulted in a dilution of the ideological divisions that 
had characterised labour organisations internationally. This, in turn, helped to reduce some of 
the long existing inter-organisational conflicts between labour movements. There was, thus, a 
consolidation of national centres aimed at bolstering international capabilities of labour. Unions 
in all three countries used new found national solidarity to engage international mechanisms 
provided via the International Labour Organisation. However, the limited utility of international 
strategies in the specific cases was partly attributed to weak structures that existed at the 
international level.10
The strategies of organised labour appeared to be further constrained by three factors. 
Firstly, there was evidence that high wage and inflation strategies prompted the exercise of the 
disciplinary powers of capital markets in the international trading sectors. This is where 
employment expansion was generally the most concentrated. To understand labour’s moderate 
strategies on the wage front during the restructuring period, it is necessary to examine wage 
outcomes and labours strategies in a more differentiated manner. The comparative studies drew 
attention to the expansion of the flexible and unorganised workforce where trade union 
penetration in all societies were very low and statutory protection minimal. This expansion also 
took a gendered and, at least in the case of New Zealand and Malaysia, an ethnic dimension as 
well. It is this segment that bore the brunt of economic restructuring and its implicit goals of 
competitiveness. While such sectors were dominated by the small-medium scale enterprises, they 
were generally located in the internationalised sectors. International market exigencies readily 
shaped prices, output, wages and other outcomes in these sectors. Denied collective interest 
articulation, the scope for distributional competitions by industry associations including those 
of labour were reduced.
The second common factor that appeared to underwrite labour’s responsive capacities 
was derived from the expansion of the democratic process represented by broadening media 
freedoms, individual employment rights and reduced constraints upon oppositional politics, 
particularly in Malaysia. Given the expansion o f the scope of individual rights, these 
developments also had the effect of forcing organised labour to compete with other pressure 
groups and coalitions for the support and attention of government, political parties and state 
bureaucracies. A dispersal of interest representation had the effect of moderating the 
distributional claims of organised labour and the internalisation of a more moderate collective 
bargaining outlook.
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Finally, the responses of organised labour were also guided by the fact that wage claims 
had consequences for competitiveness in the internationalised sectors. The electoral costs for 
parties allied to labour to pursue such policies were increased by the sense of economic crisis 
and low full-time employment growth. Established political parties thus no longer had same 
level of the electoral compulsion to nurture the support of organised labour. Thus, a re­
negotiation of the relations between organised labour and organised political collectives were 
also associated with the restructuring process.
Denied its traditional influence and given the failure to assert a presence in the new 
flexible and high growth sectors, national associations of organised labour sought new alliances 
with capital and state institutions. Organised labour realised how much they depended upon the 
support of state institutions and state-led reorganisation of market relations. Moreover, the 
pursuance of neo-realist collective strategies on the part of organised labour also resulted in the 
further marginalisation of the radical fragments of labour. The last vestiges of radical unionism 
in the rapidly shrinking public sector suffered as much from state opposition as from the 
antipathy of organised labour more generally. In countries such as New Zealand, which had been 
presented as a showcase of industrial democracy for much of the century, many argued that this 
represented one of the final legislative efforts to secure a compliant labour force.
One of the principal theses examined thus far is that the different modalities of neo­
liberalism and economic restructuring have reinforced state-led efforts to re-regulate labour. 
Such re-regulation was primarily driven by the goal of re-establishing conditions favourable to 
capital accumulation. Labour market policies along with the economic policy framework 
reflected the continuingly important roles played by states even in the context of an increasingly 
globalised economy. This thesis contrasts with the neo-classical view, which supports causality 
between persistent reforms and economic internationalisation. Based on the actual outcomes in 
these three liberalising states, it is reasonable to argue that this central tenet of the neo-classical 
view is faulty by its own terms. The outcomes of the reforms further support the thesis that 
economic reforms were as much political projects articulated by a political class influenced by 
industry, as they were microeconomic policies based on the logic of growth."
To understand the choice of state strategies during periods of accelerated 
internationalisation, it is important to re-examine the contingency thesis. Radical restructuring, 
sharp policy turns and transformations in labour regulations indicated a range of context-specific 
constraints upon state interventions. During real or perceived economic crisis, modes of
231
economic regulation and governance came under sharper scrutiny. However, even in the era of 
globalisation, there were no set-paths, or predetermined programmes of reforms for managers 
of national economies. Thus different states adopted different policies and strategies. Since 
labour regulation is a core element of the mode o f economic governance, options available to 
states are contingent on labour. However, the elevation of any particular factor to a position of 
general ‘causal priority that applies equally to all the case studies were rejected’. Hence, 
strategies and policies that aided internationalisation, openness and growth more generally were 
inevitably affected by the mode of labour regulation. As a result, the multi-causal approach that 
lies at the core of interpretive-historical methodology stands vindicated.
8:8 Conclusion
Overall, this analysis confirms the thesis that what is presented as economic globalisation 
is underwritten by a new and complex re-articulation of labour markets in the three specific 
contexts studied here. While such re-articulations were shaped by specific historical exigencies, 
they brought to the forefront realignment of labour market structures with developmental goals 
that emphasised growth and competitiveness. This re-articulation depended upon political 
institutions and active intervention by state agencies. This rearticulation was quite explicit in the 
arena of labour regulation. The links between the modes of economic restructuring in the 
contemporary period and labour regulation regimes suggests a strong association between the 
two dimensions of social regulation.
To study labour regulation as an agent of economic restructuring and hence accelerated 
internationalisation, the operationalisation of the reform agendas by state institutions needs to 
be considered. Moreover, one needed to understand how complex interactions between these and 
international agencies resulted in re-negotiations of national compromises, assertion of new 
goals and the legitimation and sustenance of new developmental policies. In doing this, attention 
naturally shifted to the arena of politics, legitimation and to the state itself. It was clearly wrong 
to discard the state and some of its key agencies as insignificant transformative agencies.
By drawing out the importance of labour regulation in three national settings over a 
broadly comparable time frame, the question of constraints upon the independent operations of 
states in the context of a transforming international system was addressed. State capacities and 
policies were clearly affected by external exigencies. Economic policies were open to scrutiny 
by international capital markets more intensely than in the past. But these did not deflect from
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the political nature of economic policy choices. By examining labour regulation, I have 
illustrated the central role of politics, negotiation and contestation. The most significant 
challenges faced by reform agencies were the legitimation of labour market changes that visibly 
disorganised labour. New clusters of social relationships played important roles in this process. 
These new forms of clustering draws attention to the fact that theoretical discourses that depend 
upon conventional institutions as a basis for their analysis were glaringly inadequate. By writing 
in labour and state politics, an alternative conceptualisation of the general process of economic 
globalisation in three settings is presented. In spite of their variable methods, in each the 
compliance and marginalisation of labour was not neutral to the phenomena of accelerated 
economic internationalisation. The fact that new reform cleavages operate in territories that are 
less bounded does not deflect the centrality of the state, and politics in analysing the profound 
transformations underway.
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E ndno tes: C h ap te r Eight
1. (Offe, 1996:174) observed that the ‘prevailing patterns of economic and industrial 
change generate the well-known disjunction between changes in economic output and 
changes in employment resulting in increased open and hidden unemployment, or 
labour market marginalisation of discouraged and unemployable labour’. Because this 
segment of the workforce is rising in New Zealand, Japan, Malaysia and indeed in 
many other countries in proportion to core workers, the balance of numbers shifts 
towards the less organised segments of labour.
2. The Malaysian state made a decisive turn against its statist policy orientation of the 
1970s in 1983 through the adoption of a sweeping privatisation agenda. However, 
privatizations still occurred within the framework of the policy goals of the NEP and 
they actively favoured the politically dominant Malay’s rather than capital per se. Tsuru 
(1996:211) similarly stresses the importance o f ‘societal objectives’ in some of the key 
privatisations in Japan. Other writers have argued that Japan’s complex financial sector 
regulations continue to inhibit FDI penetration into the privatising sectors (see for 
example. Japan Echo. May, 1997). In these ways, privatisations in both these countries 
have not resulted in internationalisation of ownership.
3. Roper (1996) and Scott (1996) explain the success of the radical neoliberal project in 
New Zealand in terms o f ‘bureaucratic conservatism of the NZCTU leadership’ and 
changing ‘media-government’ relations respectively. Both these are useful in 
understanding the constraints under which union opposition to the anti-worker reforms 
could be understood. Both these apply to the Malaysian and Japanese case studies as 
well.
4. However, a neoliberal criticism of this conclusion would be that a strong and 
centralised orientation of the state would be necessary to mediate the demands of 
various interest groups caused by imposition of uneven social costs of reforms.
5. See also Boyer and Drache (eds. 1996) and Berger and Dore (eds. 1996) for 
assessments that highlight the continuing scope for economic intervention by national 
states more generally.
6. These factors were strongly affirmed by public sector union respondents in each of 
the case studies. To an extent the responses also signalled the inability of public sector 
union and government corporatist arrangements to cope with severe economic 
contractions. More specifically, negotiated incomes policies and employment creating 
public sector investments became less tenable during periods of little to nil economic 
growth.
7. In contrast to the previous first past the post (FPP) system and the single member 
constituencies, the New Zealand model o f MMP sought to prevent wild swings in the 
economic policy regime after successive general elections.
8. For a comparative discussion of the political economy of inflation also see Goldstein
2 3 4
( 1995).
9. However to apportion direct causality upon public sector unionism is difficult given 
the lack of historical data. Moreover, even if that were available, it would be difficult to 
quantify the impact of political influences such as those suggested in the Japanese case 
study.
10. It should also be noted that international strategies are also a source of friction for 
national/local trade unions. For example, enterprise unions in the case o f Nissan and 
Toyota in Japan ‘were unwilling to abide by International Metalworkers Federation 
guidelines on international company based meetings, for fear of allowing more militant 
unions to attend these meetings’ until 1992 (Williamson, 1994:194). For a while 
international obligations were also a source of deepening friction between the 
Malaysian Labour Organisation and the MTUC.
11. Some of the outcomes of the reforms over the period 1981-83 and 1990 to 1995 
that support this include the following. Over the 1981 to 83 period, Japan was the most 
integrated and New Zealand the least. On a scale ofO to 10, Japan ranked 1.41, 
Malaysia ranked 1.10 and New Zealand a much lower 0.34. Between this period and 
1993 to 1995, the speed of integration index was -0.39 percent for Japan, -0.61 percent 
for New Zealand and 1.80 percent for Malaysia. Thus both Japanese and New Zealand 
economies were slightly less integrated than they were a decade earlier, while the 
Malaysian economy was more open. Contrary to our expectations, the radical 
liberalisation reforms of New Zealand achieved a less open economy than that of 
Malaysia. Even on other related indicators, this trend was persistent. Over the same 
period, for example, the change in the level of FDI as a share of GDP had also modestly 
declined by -0.016 percent in New Zealand compared with a modest expansion of 0.03 
percent in Japan and 0.054 in Malaysia (World Bank, 1996: 67-70) Over the same 
period, changes in the contribution of manufacturing to exports ranged from 0.12 
percent in Japan, 0.56 percent in New Zealand and 3.50 percent in Malaysia (World 
Bank, 1996b: 67).
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion -  capitalism, state regulation of labour and economic 
globalisation
Analysing structures does not limit whatever agency exists.
Indeed, it is only when we have mastered the structures, yes, 
have reinvented the “master narratives ” that are plausible, 
relevant, and provisionally valid, that we can begin to exercise 
the kind o f judgement that is implied by the concept o f agency.
Otherwise, our so-called agency is blind, and i f  blind it is 
manipulated, i f  not directly then indirectly. We are watching 
the figures in Plato's cave, and we are thinking that we can 
affect them (Wallerstein, 1997: 1256).
9:0 Contestation and containment
This thesis has assessed the relationships between economic internationalisation and 
state strategies in the New Zealand, Japanese and Malaysian economies. A key lever in 
understanding the links between state strategies and the pace and direction of economic 
internationalisation was the choice of labour policies. By studying modes of labour regulation 
during the process of internationalisation of closed sectors of the three national economies, 
the complex relationships between labour regulation and patterns of internationalisation 
became clearer. Variabilities in these relationships were consequences of contestation and 
negotiation in the political spheres. The thesis has argued that the modes of labour regulation 
adopted by the three states at times seemingly contradicted the stated economic goals. These 
contradictions underwrote the role of the state and politics in defining and sustaining 
economic policy regime transformations in the modem era. Contest and negotiations made 
visible the variable roles played by a range of reform agents during these transformations. By 
thus understanding the place of politics in the selection and legitimation of particular labour 
market strategies, I was able to obtain a sharper understanding of the patterns and pace of 
economic internationalisation. But labour market strategies were only one part of a broader 
political process to transform the three economies.
9:1 Methodological and theoretical outcomes
The validity of a multidisciplinary approach to the study of economic 
internationalisation and changing labour/market relations has been strongly affirmed. This 
approach was especially helpful in illustrating the variety of ways through which specific 
economic discourses acquired pre-eminence without seemingly having to depend upon the 
dominant institutions of power in these capitalist formations, an approach that had been 
affirmed by Wallcrstein (1996).1 This approach was informed by historical and comparative 
insights. These had especial utility in drawing attention to the ‘particular’ in large-scale 
transformations. The validity of historical-comparative analysis rested upon a further 
methodological technique. By following a historical-comparative approach it has been
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possible to examine the impacts of both the general and the specific. The country studies 
were central to confirming the underlying generative mechanisms of large-scale social and 
economic transformations. These generative mechanisms flowed from the reconfigurations 
within state institutions, new ideological alliances between domestic and international policy­
making institutions and the location of labour. This was further backed by the cultivation of 
some sense of real or perceived national crisis and the projection and legitimation of an 
economic developmental ideology by new reform agents. These occurred in a variety of 
ways, involving both policy and direct political instruments and agents.
Clearly, the relationships between state, economic globalisation, the role of labour 
regulation needs broader examination. But this thesis has established a strong association 
between state regulation of labour and patterns of economic internationalisation, drawing 
attention to a conceptual flaws in the general economic globalisation debates that have been 
reviewed. However, this association needs to be examined through wider cross-national 
observation. The case studies suggest that while economic internationalisation deepened the 
interconnectedness between national and the global, national particularities strongly 
influenced the momentum of change. Moreover, internationalisation occurred in a varied, 
rather than in a homogenous pattern. This variability involved differential modes of labour 
regulation in both the internationalised and state sectors of the three economies.
By drawing attention to the conceptual flaws of prevailing analysis, the thesis makes 
a modest contribution to re-conceptualising the process of economic internationalisation. 1 
have demonstrated that the arguments advanced by the more globo-sceptics appear to be 
miscued. Moreover, I found the explanatory approaches developed by the hyper-globalists 
even more problematic. Both are unable to deal with the complex ways in which state 
interventions in the economic sphere have been reconfigured. Interventions were subject to 
political negotiations and were not merely outcomes of an economic policy framework. They 
depended upon reconfiguration of state/market relationships. These negotiations and 
transformations involved a number of agencies. The critical absence of agencies that shaped 
policy frameworks was an inherently problematic feature in much of the literature of 
economic globalisation. By tracing the underlying generative mechanisms of policy change 
and transformations historically, I have demonstrated the variable role played by a variety of 
agencies in contrasting reform-oriented settings. It is demonstrated that conventional 
agencies such as the state have been fractured into smaller and more powerful sub-categories 
with improved capabilities for initiating and sustaining large-scale economic transformations.
The observations drawn in this study compellingly show the inherently ‘political’ 
nature of economic transformations. It is also clear, nevertheless, that the role of labour as an 
agency within these transformations continues to pose problems as economic policy 
frameworks experience a new phase of overhaul (Wallerstein, 1996; Hobsbawn, 1996).2 In 
connecting the politics and the changing modes of state regulation of labour, I have
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demonstrated the complicated forms in which state/market relations were reconfigured in the 
three settings. Contestation, co-option and legitimation helped throw light upon the 
variabilities in these reconfigurations. Contestation followed by co-option characterises the 
changing modes of labour regulations in Japan, more strongly than in the other two studies. 
Labour’s subservience through ethno-political strategies deployed by the Malaysian state 
underwrote the labour market policy shifts over the past two decades. The New Zealand’s 
study demonstrated how corporatism had hollowed-out organised labour; undermining its 
ability to interpret and respond to shifts in political power in society. However, organised 
labour’s support for a range of measures that broadened democratic choice and accountability 
provided limited avenues through which to claw back some influence. In each case, it was 
clear that organised labour had been displaced in the political economy. Its political influence 
and capacity to negotiate social gains were circumscribed. At the same time, it is argued that 
the ’agency’ nature of organised labour was transformed, nurturing new alliances both 
domestically as well as internationally. The ambiguities of such responses were also 
examined, derived from the often, contradictory ways in which labour challenged new 
growth ideologies, often leaving the power configuration beneath it untouched. Labour’s 
responses to economic policy oscillations and transformations demonstrated some of inherent 
weaknesses in their strategies of contestation as well as the failure of corporatist politics 
more generally.
By highlighting the ‘agency’ nature of labour, this study observed a wide variety of 
instruments of labour regulation both within and across the studies. In each case, labour 
market policy shifts were backed by political strategies that were less visible. For example, 
the privatisation experiences were related to the political strategies of the reform-oriented 
states to diminish the powers of well-established public sector trade unions. Moreover, the 
fragmentation of labour markets and the utilisation of different strategies for different 
fragments of national labour markets also became important tools for labour regulation in the 
three settings. This was powerfully illustrated with reference to the non-core employment 
sectors in Japan and the foreign worker segment in Malaysia. However what was even more 
illuminating was the persistent engagement of an ideology of growth to re-define the place of 
organised labour. The combination o f an ideology of growth and the de-radicalisation of 
labour were most powerfully demonstrated during the restructuring of industrial production 
in Japan in thel950’s. A similar outcome was achieved in slightly different ways in New 
Zealand, where the neo-liberal framework was quietly projected as the hegemonic policy 
discourse. However in Malaysia, the state continued to rely upon political instruments for 
actively disciplining labour. In spite o f these variances, the manipulation of an ideology of 
growth by selected state institutions and agencies stand out as a defining characteristic of 
labour regulation in the modem era.
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Derived from the neoliberal school, this ideology was applied ruthlessly to articulate 
and define fundamental economic transformations. In each case, the manipulation of the 
discourse of growth relied upon nurturing images about the national interest. The 
manipulation of images about the national interest was used quite effectively to reinforce the 
fracturing of organised labour’s links with other social groups. Thus, as a consequence of the 
reforms over the past two decades, organised labour in all the three case studies found itself 
isolated within civil society, and hence more vulnerable to political efforts to erode its 
collective strengths. This vulnerability was more easily reproduced when organised labour’s 
influence over the political process was reduced. On a more optimistic note, by the mid- 
1990s there was some evidence that national trade union centres were clawing back some of 
that lost influence. This was demonstrated partly through the expansion of neo-corporatism 
mechanisms in Japan and Malaysia and the internal restructuring of trade unions in all three 
cases. National trade unions centres consolidated their strengths in both New Zealand and 
Japan by redressing some of the historical divisions that had afflicted these movements.
But the impacts of a neo-classical and developmental ideology of growth went 
beyond labour markets. This is best illustrated by New Zealand where support for a 
ncoliberal growth ideology was cultivated, and legitimated as national policy obtained in 
visibly undemocratic ways. This same process unfolded in slightly different ways in 
Malaysia and Japan, where the overwhelming dominance of single party governments and 
the centralisation of the policy process in select state institutions conspired to bring about 
broadly similar outcomes. An almost fundamentalist emphasis on monetarism, and the 
overwhelming anti-inflationary emphasis of neo-liberalism, worked to displace historical 
social settlements. The pursuance of these polices pressured social compromises. These 
pressures originated in very narrow elite segments of the state bureaucracy, where they were 
able to circumvent the political checks available in democratic and democratising societies. 
The ascendance of such a policy framework dominated by treasuries and finance ministry’s 
thus also coincided with a centralisation of authority over fundamental policy issues. This 
transformation, although varied in form, was generally apparent as a dominant trend over the 
past two decades. More than a transformation in policy, this represented a transformation in 
the very nature of the institutions of the capitalist state.
This study is an exploratory one, attempting to deal with a conceptual and theoretical 
flaw in the globalisation literature. It is argued that economic internationalisation resulted 
from economic restructuring that also involved major socio-political transformations. The 
challenge for social sciences is to provide suitable analytical frameworks to read the 
dialectics of these transformations given their broad and complex expressions. Some pointers 
for understanding the complex processes associated with economic globalisation in the 
contemporary period are advanced in Chapter Eight. Like Tilly (1996:4), this study cautions 
that economic internationalisation represents a tendency that has a ‘net flow in the global
239
direction, but with a significant counter undercurrent’. More, cyclical fluctuations must not 
be confused with long-term trends and permanent transformations and that generalisation 
require differentiated and comprehensive measurement.
At the risk of over-generalisation, this thesis advances the claim that by shifting the 
generator of economic growth decisively in favour in private capital, states narrowed their 
ability to control and discipline capital. In the globalised environment of the 1990s, the idea 
that capital embedded within nation states was largely committed to expanding accumulation 
within the nation state waned slightly. This helped displace capital-state nexuses that had 
evolved during periods of state-led development. With that relationship under stress, policy 
attention shifted, even without the assumed overbearing influence of international agencies or 
international capital. In the shift to private capital-led growth, two sets of factors appeared 
paramount. First, the prevalence o f a macroeconomic policy regime favourable to private 
capital accumulation and one that did not discriminate aggressively in favour of any type of 
capital were noteworthy. Incumbent within this was a premium on stability in the economic 
environment. Second, it appears that organised labour was perceived as the most potent 
source of risk to stability during periods of accelerated reform. Thus economic globalisation 
became associated with labour decollectivisation, erosion of nationally embedded labour 
rights, and the loosening of national bargaining coalitions. These represent the essentially 
political nature of economic internationalisation in the present period. To understand how 
and why this is so, it is necessary to reintroduce politics into discussions about what appear to 
be merely economic transformations.
9:2 The differential impacts upon and responses by labour
The interconnectedness between modes of labour regulation and economic 
internationalisation drew attention to the wide differences in the responses by labour, and the 
impacts of economic policy changes. For example, in New Zealand, organised labour was 
decollectivised and fragmented into smaller units on the backs of new legislation. In 
Malaysia, on the other hand, there was little change in the size and composition of the 
organised workforce in the public sector, except that the corporatised sectors set up 
enterprise-based labour units. In Japan, labour’s decollectivisation and restructuring occurred 
over a much longer period. Thus as economic processes were embedded in social structures, 
so were labour relations. Some forms of labour relations survived economic restructuring due 
to their embeddedness in supportive or contingent power structures, rigid institutional 
arrangements and cultural patterns, even when those forms collided with the economic policy 
orientations of government. Structural adaptations may mirror external exigencies, but they 
do not solely determine them. To accept the former would be to accept that validity of the 
thesis that national agencies and structures were merely repositories of global trends and 
outcomes of global pressures. None of the case studies lent support to this thesis. Change in
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the labour regulation regimes closely followed the ‘trajectories determined by their particular 
mode of embededdness’ (Traxler, 1996: 272-273). This mode was shaped by political 
considerations, and reflected the balance of organisational strengths of labour, capital and 
state collectivities and conflicts at the commencement and at specific points over the reform 
process. Historical elaboration helped tease out the combinations that yielded specific 
outcomes. A comparative inquiry helped throw up combinations that were more generally 
prevalent across the region and possibly more globally as well. However, it was clear that 
many of the general tendencies were historically contingent upon the contest by labour and 
the reflected the outcomes of such contest.
9:3 Sociological analysis of large-scale economic transformations
The sociological analysis of economic transformations presented in this thesis has 
emphasised the variety of ways in which economic policy frameworks were depoliticiscd and 
hence removed from the sphere of contest. Labour’s narrow and issue-by-issue responses in 
each of the case studies exemplified this process of depoliticisation. Unless, the essentially 
undemocratic nature of policy formation is challenged by labour primarily through political 
action, it is unlikely that it will be able to claw back the social gains that have been wiped out 
over the past two decades. In the absence of political action, it is likely that labour will 
continue to find itself on the margins of the political process where it is forced to compete 
with the increasing numbers of civil society groups for political leverage over the policy 
discourse. Labour’s marginalisation exemplifies the essentially political outcomes of the 
deregulatory thrusts of labour market policies.
But these have resulted in a reconfiguration of the national political terrain as well, 
which now incorporates the international environment. During periods of economic crisis, the 
impacts of international agencies on domestic policy do become significant. Often, such 
pressures merely complement the policy approach desired by bureaucrats. Such pressures 
have helped to constrain the influence of the executive arms of government over economic 
policy as well. Clearly, international agencies have been able to shape national policies and 
their influences upon labour market policies have been shown to be especially significant.
Economic internationalisation resulted in the differential integration of national and 
regional labour markets into a more global economic system. The imperatives of 
international competition and declining levels of state support acted to promote labour 
market policies that favoured further integration. Thus the Employment Contracts Act of 
New Zealand demonstrated how labour policies became fundamental to New Zealand’s 
chosen mode of economic internationalisation. Social contracts were not renegotiated, but 
simply pushed aside by a zealous reform orientated state. In Japan, however, the social 
bargains that lay at the core of its complex production structure were reconfigured in a more 
nuanccd way. But, by late 1997, it had become clear that even the reconfigured bargains had
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become politically unsustainable. The Malaysian case study was more complicated. A 
combination of authoritarian measures and deregulated labour market strategies were 
managed skilfully by a ‘developmental’ state bureaucracy. This endangered some social 
bargains that were rooted in its complex ethno-political structures and enabled the state to 
sustain its high level of co-ordination during the boom years, although the state was much 
more vulnerable when Malaysian markets confronted a severe loss of confidence by 
international capital markets.
Overall, the three country studies have demonstrated the differential approaches taken 
by three reform-oriented states to labour regulation. But they have also shown how these 
approaches have been constrained and affected by the process of economic 
internationalisation in turn. These were most sharply expressed during periods when the three 
states experienced accelerated internationalisation. A policy commitment to 
internationalisation allowed some agencies to play a powerful role in the reform process. 
However, the state remained central to explaining how such agencies were able to affect 
national labour markets and labour market policies. Historically, the persistent trade deficits 
in the relatively closed environment in New Zealand and Malaysia had forced an excessive 
level of dependence by the state upon national industries. These industries were often 
predicated upon social bargains reflected in favourable labour management regimes. 
Moreover, the states subsequent commitment to internationalisation was also aimed at 
reducing the dependence of the state upon national enterprises. This resulted in renegotiations 
of both the regulatory frameworks and the social bargains. In each instance, the 
renegotiations of historical bargains and settlements affected worker associations adversely 
and aided the opening of national economies.
Economic internationalisation was predicated upon a reformulation of the labour 
relations regime. Trade unions were not merely impacted upon; they were often active agents 
of change. In New Zealand’s case, the initial complicity of labour to the economic reform 
agenda heralded by the Fourth Labour Government made them vulnerable to the neo-liberal 
labour market reforms that followed. Certainly by 1998, when the Employment Contracts 
Act was proposed, organised labour could no longer muster strong opposition to the political 
imperatives of the reform project. In Japan, the ‘moderate fragment’ of unions that came to 
dominate the scene after the 1950s invested heavily in employment security. Malaysia’s post- 
reform growth came from the new manufacturing enterprises, many on greenfield sites, 
which were largely union-free zones. A reform-orientated state, committed to promoting 
Malay equity in commerce helped sustain this union-free environment. Either through 
complicity or by default, trade unions affected the economic policy orientation of the three 
states - and as such they aided the chosen modes of economic internationalisation. In the 
longer term, this was to weaken labour’s political potential overall.
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Organised labour’s responses to state developmental strategies were complicated and 
at times contradictory. Throughout the post-independence period, the Malaysian state 
committed itself most forcefully to direct regulation and political control. However, extreme 
authoritarianism gave way to labour market based instruments of regulation in the 1980’s. 
Moreover, the subversion of organised labour to the political imperatives of an ethnically 
structured political system ensured that labour’s political capacities remained weak. In New 
Zealand, a range of factors reduced organised labour’s capacity to confront the anti-working 
class thrusts of the post 1984 developmental policies. Organised labour ended up with a 
political base which restrained it to pressure-group type of politics. A political response to 
the new developmental thrusts was most noteworthy in Japan. Labour increased its direct 
representation at the executive level and was able to use this to preserve some of the gains 
secured during the high growth decades. However, here as in the other case studies, these 
were extremely constrained political responses. Economic internationalisation thus appeared 
to have hurt the political capacities of labour in each of the case studies.
By attaching such importance to the state regulation of labour, this thesis has 
attempted to lay the foundation for recognising political agencies as a crucial element in 
major economic transformations. Although the regulation of labour was presented as part of 
economic policy programme of reforms, they were clearly political processes as well. In each 
case, accelerated economic internationalisation sharply transformed the political 
environment. A reconfiguration of the ’political’ appeared as a general feature of economic 
restructuring. In this manner, it is argued that accelerated internationalisation of the three 
economics was predicated upon the political rather than economic policy changes per se.
Overall, therefore, this thesis has introduced labour regulation as a variable that helps 
us understand more sharply the patterns and trends of economic internationalisation in these 
Asian/Pacific economies. This variable was operationalised through changing economic 
policy instruments. These were demonstrated by the different ways in which the three states 
responded to domestic exigencies and international pressures during a specific period. The 
three reform oriented states were both affected by and affected the terrain on which 
accelerated internationalisation occurred. An understanding of the role of state agencies 
helped us assess how different strategies for labour regulation were deployed and sustained, 
especially during periods of accelerated internationalisation. The intense economic crises that 
confronted two of these case studies at the end of 1997 further affirmed this approach.
9:4 Postscript: politics and endgame
By the end of 1997, both Japan and Malaysia had entered into a new economic crisis 
-  which was clearly induced by a combination of national and global factors that were far 
more serious than the bubble and 1986 crises respectively. I have argued that state responses 
to crisis of accumulation has historically involved a reorientation and often an overhaul of the
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mode of labour regulation, backed by other changes in the economic policy framework. In 
both these countries, however, labour markets were already fairly deregulated, unions 
considerably weakened and the social compromises of a previous era already hollowed-out. It 
is unclear how much further a mode of regulation that seeks to coerce even greater 
concessions from labour in the name of an almost ‘ethereal’ national interest can progress. 
Arguably, further reforms are likely to open new fault lines in labour and state conflicts, 
which may offer modest prospects for optimism for labour after some two decades of retreat.
State policy responses in both these societies in early 1998 to this economic crisis; 
have clearly re-affirmed the central tenets of this thesis. The immediate response by the two 
governments’ to these crises took the form of changes in the regulatory frameworks for the 
financial sector -  the least open of the major economic sectors. Their economic policy 
responses appeared to lead to the further concentration of the powers of premier policy units 
within the state bureaucracy. As a consequence, the treasuries in both countries increased 
their influence over some of the main aspects of labour policy. Moreover, economic policy 
responses that favoured greater internationalisation were presented in even more 
‘dcpoliticised ways’.
Clearly, the unfolding responses in both these countries appear to reinforce the central 
tenets of this thesis. Economic internationalisation transforms, but docs not displace the role 
of states in economic management. Moreover, economic restructuring as a consequence of 
economic crisis is most often associated with the implementation of policies that directly or 
indirectly affect the leverage and influence of organised labour. 1 therefore conclude that a 
renegotiation of labour policy and further changes in state’s approach to labour regulation arc 
likely to form a part o f  policy re-orientation in both these countries. As with the previous 
crisis in both these countries, the cultivation of appeals about the national interest is likely to 
be associated with these transformations. Such appeals have historically helped isolate and 
mollify labour.
Overall, these recent crisis demonstrate that in spite of the overbearing prominence of 
the ‘footloose’ global capital markets, the central organising role of the states within specific 
sites of accumulation are even more powerfully affirmed following such a major crisis. 
Economic internationalisation as represented by the increasing assertiveness of capital 
markets consolidates, rather than hollows-out the state’s remit in the arena of labour 
regulation and economic policy. How labour responds to these anticipated transformations 
will affect not only its continued political leverage, but also shape the nature of social 
democracy that economic globalisation induces.
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Endnotes
1 Foucault had similarly argued that ‘knowledge could constitute a system of control 
in the production of discourse, fixing its limits through the action’. The ascendance of 
a neo-classical developmental ideology appears to affirm that observation. See 
Foucault, M. (1972:224). The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on 
Language. New York: Pantheon.
2 See also for example, Sholte, J. (1997), “Global capitalism and the state”, in 
International Affairs. 73(3) and Evans, P. (1997), “The Eclipse Of the State: 
Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalisation”, in World Politics. 50(October).
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